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Abstract	
Nowadays, as a result of the ubiquitous nature of information technology, evidence 
presented in court is less likely to be on paper.  Evidence of computer crime also differs 
from that related to traditional crimes for which there are well established standards and 
procedures.  In order for digital evidence to be admissible, investigators need to 
demonstrate that they have specialised knowledge and have applied reliable principles and 
models to acquire it.  Careful notice is taken in court of the manner in which the digital 
investigative process has been carried out.  However, despite such requisites, the field of 
digital forensics still lacks formal process models that courts can employ to determine the 
reliability of the process followed in a digital investigation.  The existing models have often 
been developed by digital forensic practitioners, based on their own personal experience 
and on an ad-hoc basis, without attention to the establishment of standardisation within the 
field. This has prevented the institution of the formal processes that are urgently required.  
Moreover, as digital forensic investigators often operate within different fields of law 
enforcement, commerce and incident response, the existing models have often tended to 
focus on one particular field and have failed to consider all environments. This has 
hindered the development of a generic model that can be applied in all the different fields 
of digital forensics.  In addition, the existing models often capture only one part of the 
investigative process as opposed to the entire process.  To address these shortcomings, this 
research makes a novel contribution by proposing a Comprehensive Digital Forensic 
Investigation Process Model (the CDFIPM), encompassing the entire digital investigative 
process, which is formal 1  in that it synthesizes, harmonises and extends the existing 
models, and which is generic in that it can be applied in the three stated fields of digital 
forensics.   
 																																																								
1 In the context of this thesis, the term ‘formal’ is not equivalent to the same term employed in the domains of 
Mathematics and Computer Science, in which the word ‘formal’ is used to refer to a set of strings of symbols 
that might be constrained by rules that are specific to it.  In contrast, for the purposes of this thesis, the term 
‘formal’ has been employed to refer to the UML Activity Diagrams, scientific methods, standards of practice, 
consistency, structure, agreed-upon components and terminology, harmonisation, and the unified approach 
that have been brought to the proposed model, the CDFIPM.     	
	xi	
The methodology used to carry out this research is the Design Science Research widely 
adopted in the domain of Information Systems on the basis that it is suitable for the design 
and development of novel artefacts and the analysis of the performance or use of such 
artefacts.  The Peffers et al’s (2006) Design Science Research Process model is followed 
during the course of this research as the appropriate selection of the Design Science 
Research on the basis that it is inclusive of the common elements of the previous Design 
Science Research studies.    
 
Existing models are critically reviewed and assessed against three different assessment 
criteria including: Beebe and Clark’s four-point requirement, Carrier and Spafford’s five-
point requirement and the Daubert Test.  The result of the model assessment reveals that 
there does not exist a model that has all the three characteristics of being “comprehensive”, 
“formal” and “generic”.  However, through the model assessment, some models are 
identified that can contribute to the design and development of the proposed model.  
Following identification of the prevailing models, their key contributions are determined 
based on the assessment criteria, and the necessary components for the new model are then 
identified.  A new set of domain-specific components is then developed in addition to the 
already identified components.  Following identification of the necessary components and 
the newly developed set of domain-specific components, the outcome of the design and 
development stage is the proposed Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Process 
Model, the stages of which are represented through the use of the UML Activity Diagrams.  
Based upon the selected methodology (the DSRP), the CDFIPM is tested through both the 
Demonstration and Evaluation activities.  The Demonstration activity involves applying the 
model into various cases studies and performing a walkthrough of the model, as well as 
conducting a forensic laboratory experimentation.  The Evaluation stage involves the 
independent verification and validation of the model by its intended user community, 
including digital forensic investigators operating within the three fields of relevance for this 
research, namely law enforcement, commerce and incident response, as well as experts in 
the domain of digital forensics, legal practitioners, a judge and researchers in both 
academia and industry.  After feeding the results of the Evaluation stage back into the 
CDFIPM’s design and development stage, the model is amended accordingly.  
	xii	
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Chapter	1:	 Introduction	
In this Chapter, three issues associated with the existing digital forensic investigation 
process models (DFIPMs) will be identified.  The three problems relate to the lack of a 
model that has all the three characteristics of being “comprehensive”, “formal” and 
“generic”.  These three issues will be formulated into one single key research problem 
as follows: 
 
That there does not exist a comprehensive model encompassing the entire digital 
investigative process that is formal such that it can assist courts of law in 
determining the reliability of the investigative process followed, and that is 
generic in that it can be applied in the different fields of law enforcement, 
commerce and incident response (Montasari, 2016, c). 
 
Therefore, a Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Process Model (the 
CDFIPM) is proposed, encompassing the entire investigative process.  It is formal in 
that it synthesizes, harmonises and extends the existing models (see the footnote in page 
x or the section 1.4.1 for the meaning of the term ‘formal’ in the context of this study) 
and generic in that it can be applied in the three fields of law enforcement, commerce 
and incident response.  By implementing the CDFIPM, this model will be of immediate 
value to both digital forensic investigators (DFIs) operating within the stated fields and 
courts of law.  Moreover, as Adams (2012) state, the development of such a model will 
establish a starting point from which other investigators and researchers in the field will 
be able to continue to advance the field’s scientific credentials.  Following the 
identification of the research problem, this chapter will proceed to define the research 
hypothesis, aim, objectives, questions, scope, limitation, contributions and 
methodology, concluding with a summary.  
 
1.1	 Background	
Nowadays, the nature of evidence presented in courts of law is less likely to be paper-
based due to the ubiquitous nature of information technology (Adam, 2012; Stanfield, 
2009).  Evidence of computer crime differs from that related to traditional crimes for 
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which there are well established standards and procedures (Adams, 2012; Stanfield, 
2009; Smith et al., 2011).  In order for digital evidence to be admissible, investigators 
need to demonstrate that they have specialised knowledge, and that the evidence was 
acquired using reliable principles and methods (Kessler, 2010).  As with other types of 
evidence, digital evidence is not assumed to be valid and reliable: empirical testing in 
relation to the theories and techniques of its production is required (Adams, 2012; 
Mason, 2007).  Careful notice is taken in court of the manner in which the digital 
investigative process has been carried out (Cohen, 2011; Kessler, 2010; Mason, 2007). 
 
A digital forensic investigator might discover significant and incriminating evidence, 
but if they cannot present the evidence in a coherent and understandable way to the lay 
audience (such as judge and jury), the case may be lost (Sherman, 2006).  The 
complexity of tools and methodologies used to perform a digital investigative process 
requires investigators to be able to explain the process in a manner that a judge and jury 
can understand it (Kessler, 2010).  Such tools and methodologies must also adhere to 
some standards of practice and be accepted by other investigators operating in the field 
(Adams, 2012; Kessler, 2010; Armstrong, 2010).   
  
Nevertheless, the field of digital forensics still lacks both consensus and formal process 
models that the courts can employ to determine the reliability of the digital evidence 
presented to them (Montasari et al., 2015; Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Kohn et al., 
2013, US-CERT, 2012; Agarwal et al., 2011).  This lack of a formal model is not an 
isolated flaw within the field of digital forensic science.  Cohen (2012) states that the 
entire field of digital forensic still lacks consensus in fundamental areas.  A study 
conducted by Cohen et al. (2011) on the level of consensus in foundational elements of 
digital investigative process revealed the lack of use of common definitions and 
language.  The authors state that the consensus can be found only after the definitions 
are made explicit (Cohen et al., 2011).  The absence of agreements associated with 
DFIPMs has also been widely acknowledged also by other researchers (Montasari, 
2016, c; Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Adams et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2013; Agarwal et 
al., 2011; Rogers et al., 2006).  Zainudin et al. (2011) state that one of the most 
significant problems encountered by digital forensic investigators is the absence of 
standardisation in the field of digital forensics.  
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Casey (2011) argues that the development of a formal process model enables a 
complete, rigorous investigation, ensures proper evidence handling and reduces the 
chances of mistakes created by preconceived theories, time pressures, and other 
potential pitfalls (Casey, 2011).  Similarly, Valjarevic and Venter (2015) state that 
conducting a digital forensic investigation requires a formalized process model, arguing, 
“There is currently neither an international standard nor does a global, harmonized DFI 
process (DFIP) exist”.  Montasari et al. (2015) and Trcek et al. (2010) suggest the 
concept of a widely agreed-upon process model to harmonise the practice of digital 
forensics.  However, despite many calls to bring formalisation to DFIPMs, a solution 
has not yet been provided (Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Adams et al., 2014; Kohn et 
al., 2013; Cohen, 2012).  Many researchers, also as cited by Adams (2012), 
acknowledge the limited progress, if any, in defining and improving a formal digital 
forensic process since the DFRWS held in 2001 (Montasari, 2016, a; Montasari et al., 
2015; Cohen, 2011; Aggarwal et al, 2011; Nance et al., 2009; Trcek et al, 2010).   
 
One reason for the absence of formal process models is the relatively recent addition of 
digital forensics as a scientific discipline compared to traditional forensic science 
(Cohen, 2012).  The latter has developed, together with its fundamental biological 
sciences, over several decades (Beebe and Clark, 2005; Palmer, 2001), whereas digital 
forensic science is still being formed and therefore lags considerably behind the better-
developed, underlying computer science (Beebe and Clark, 2005; Carrier et al, 2003).  
Some researchers argue that the digital forensic discipline has developed without any of 
the initial research required to provide an essential, thorough, scientific foundation 
(Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; US-CERT, 2012; Peisert et al., 2008; Meyers and Rogers, 
2004; Carrier, 2002).   
 
The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT, 2012) also 
acknowledges that digital forensics is still in its infancy, noting, “Because computer 
forensics is a new discipline, there is little standardization and consistency across the 
courts and industry.”  Meyers et al. (2004) take an even stronger view, warning that 
digital forensics is branded as a “junk science” because of the absence of certifications, 
standards or peer-reviewed methods (Meyers et al., 2004).  Similarly, Carrier (2002) 
highlights that issues are raised in considering digital forensics as a science due to the 
absence of generally agreed-upon standards and procedures.  Having no formal DFIPMs 
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for the digital investigative process, courts have resorted to applying methods used to 
test “classical evidence” to determine the reliability of “digital evidence” (Adams 2012; 
Kessler, 2010; Calhoun, 2008).  For instance, in the United States, federal courts apply 
the Daubert Test to determine the reliability of digital evidence (discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2).  
  
A further cause of the lack of formal models for digital investigative process is the “ad-
hoc” approach taken by the authors of these models, who have failed to employ 
scientific approaches when developing them.  Previous models have often been 
developed by practitioners based on their own personal experience, on an ad-hoc basis 
(Montasari, 2016, c; Montasari et al., 2015; Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Adams, 2012; 
Aggarwal et al., 2011).  This could be because digital forensics is often conducted by 
practitioners who are not scientists but law enforcement officers (Adams et al., 2012; 
Mayer et al., 2004).  However, Karyda and Mitrou (2007) state that using ad-hoc 
methods and tools for the extraction of digital evidence can undermine its reliability and 
credibility.  Referring to the same issue, Reith et al. (2002) state, “This is a problem 
because evidence must be obtained using methods that are proven to reliably extract and 
analyse data without bias or modification (Reith et al., 2002).”  This is further supported 
by Beebe and Clark, who argue that rigor in a DFIPM is achieved only through the use 
of “formal” and “scientific” approaches (Beebe and Clark, 2005), and by Solomon et al. 
(2011), who argue that current procedures and tools should not be mistaken for a 
consistent investigative process.  The latter authors contend, 
Tools and procedures are developed from the experience of law enforcement 
and system administrators simply in an ad-hoc manner rather than “coming 
from the scientific community where other traditional forensic sciences get their 
methodologies” (Solomon et al., 2011).        
 
In conclusion, the adoption of ad-hoc approaches in developing previous models has led 
to a variety of process models with conflicting stages, activities and terminology, which 
in turn has prevented the establishment of the formal processes urgently needed by 
courts and investigators alike (Montasari et al, 2015; Adams, 2012; Agarwal et al., 
2011).  As a result, many researchers have increasingly called for scientific approaches 
and formal methods for the digital investigative process (Cohen, 2012; Carlton and 
Worthley, 2009; Garfinkel et al, 2009; Pollitt, 2009; Leigland and Krings, 2004).  
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A further issue with the existing models is their tendency to focus on one specific area 
of digital forensics, neglecting other environments (Montasari, 2016, b and c; Montasari 
et al., 2015).  Unlike in other domains of forensic practice, digital forensic investigators 
operate in various fields (Adams, 2012; Freiling, 2007; Beebe and Clark, 2005; 
Ciardhuáin, 2004).  Therefore, as Carrier and Spafford (2003) argue, “A model must be 
abstract and apply to law enforcement investigations, corporate investigations, and 
incident response.”  However, instead of being generic, previous models have often 
focused on only one specific area, such as law enforcement, commerce or incident 
responses (Adams, 2012, Pollit, 2009), therefore failing to consider the requirements of 
those operating in different domains.  The result has been the hindering of the 
development of a generic model that can be applied in the various fields of digital 
forensics (Montasari, 2016, a, b and c; Montasari et al., 2015).      
 
A third significant concern associated with the previous models is that they are not 
comprehensive, failing to cover the entire investigative process.  The models often 
focus on the “middle part” of the investigative process, that being ‘Identification, 
Acquisition and Examination Processes,’ excluding other essential stages (see Chapter 
2).  Beebe and Clark argue that a more comprehensive and generally accepted 
framework is needed to enhance scientific rigor and facilitate education, application and 
research (Beebe and Clark, 2005).  Similarly, Ciardhuáin states,  
 
A comprehensive model of cybercrime investigations is important for 
standardising terminology, defining requirements, and supporting the 
development of new techniques and tools for investigators. (Ciardhuáin, 2004)  
 
However, as of May 2016, such a comprehensive model is not found in the current 
literature (see Chapter 2).  Although a few researchers have attempted to capture the 
entire investigative process in their models (Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Kohn et al., 
2013; Aggarwal et al., 2011), they tend to be predominantly single-tier, higher order 
process models, focusing on the abstract, rather than the more concrete principles of the 
investigation.  Beebe and Clark (2005) supported by Montasari (2016, c) and Kohn et 
al. (2006) criticise this approach, arguing that the complexities of the digital 
investigative process cannot be represented at such a high level.  Beebe and Clark 
develop their point with an analogy, stating that if flying an airplane were a function of 
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a higher order framework consisting of three phases: “take-off”, “fly” and “land”, very 
few pilots could achieve the task without acquiring further details in relation to each 
phase.  In the same way, greater detail for each stage of a digital investigative process is 
required in order to enhance the usability of the forensic methodology for DFIs (Beebe 
and Clark, 2005).  Such detail is missing in the existing DFIPMs.   
 
1.2	 Research	Problem	
The foregoing considerations lead to the following research problem2: 
 
There does not exist a comprehensive model encompassing the entire digital 
investigative process that is formal, such that it can assist a court of law in 
determining the reliability of the investigative process followed, and that is 
generic, in that it can be applied in the different fields of law enforcement, 
commerce and incident response.  
1.3	 Research	Hypothesis	
1.3.1	Hypothesis	1	
A formal process model can be developed that is comprehensive in that it encompasses 
the whole digital forensic process and that is generic in that it can be employed by the 
digital forensic investigators in the fields of law enforcement, commerce and incident 
response. 
 
1.3.2	Hypothesis	2	
A formal process model will enable digital forensic investigators to carry out more 
effective, forensically-sound digital investigations than is possible with the use of ad-
																																																								
2 The research problem is also influenced by Adams (2012) study, which calls for other researchers “… to 
provide a more comprehensive model.  Ultimately the other activities of digital forensic practitioners 
(such as analysis and presentation) could be incorporated in the same format in order to provide a 
complete formal model of digital forensics.” See section 7.7.2 of Adams’ (2012) study. 
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hoc tools, and will assist the courts in determining the reliability of the processes 
employed in such investigations. 
1.4	 Research	Aim,	Objectives	and	Questions	
1.4.1	Research	Aim	
The aim of this research is to develop a comprehensive model encompassing the entire 
digital investigative process that is formal in that it synthesizes, harmonises and extends 
the existing models, and that is generic in that it can be applied in the different fields of 
law enforcement, commerce and incident response. 
 
In the context of this thesis, the term ‘formal’ is not equivalent to the same term 
employed in the domains of Mathematics and Computer Science, in which the word 
‘formal’ is used to refer to a set of strings of symbols that might be constrained by rules 
that are specific to it.  In contrast, for the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘formal’ has 
been employed to refer to the UML Activity Diagrams, scientific methods, standards of 
practice, consistency, structure, agreed-upon components and terminology, 
harmonisation, and the unified approach that have been brought to the proposed model, 
the CDFIPM.     
 
1.4.2	Research	Objectives	
In order to achieve the aim, the following objectives must be accomplished: 
 
1. Critically analyse and assess the previous DFIPMs against different assessment 
criteria in order to identify the models that can contribute to the design and 
development of the new model. 
 
2. Following the identification of the prevailing models (those that have withstood 
the assessment), determine their key contributions based on the assessment 
criteria. 
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3. Identify the components essential for the new model from a combination of the 
key contributions of both the prevailing and the reviewed models. 
 
4. Build upon the contributions of the previous models by constructing a new set of 
domain-specific components. 
 
5. Based upon the above preceding steps, design and develop a formal 
representation of the new model (the term “formal” is defined both in abstract 
and also under the research aim, section 1.4.1), incorporating both the identified 
components and the new set of constructed components.  
 
6. Evaluate the model using three methods, including applying the model to 
different case studies, assessing it against the different assessment criteria used 
to assess the previous models and recruiting different sets of independent 
experts.   
 
1.4.3	Research	Questions	
In order to achieve the research objectives, the following three research questions, 
inspired by Adams’ (2012) study, need to be answered: 
 
1. What are the essential components necessary in a comprehensive model that is 
formal, generic and forensically sound for the entire digital forensic process?  
 
2. Once the components of such a comprehensive model that is formal, generic and 
forensically sound are determined, how can they be integrated into a working 
model?   
 
3. What is the most appropriate method to describe, present and use the model for 
the entire digital forensic process? 
 
To answer these questions, this research will enable the design and development of a 
forensically sound and comprehensive model, the CDFIPM, encompassing the entire 
digital forensic process.  It will be formal in that it synthesizes and extends the existing 
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models, and generic in that it can be employed in the different environments of digital 
forensics.  It is contended that the CDFIPM will be a significant step towards instituting 
the currently lacking standards which would assist in establishing an improved digital 
forensic investigative process. 
1.5	 Scope,	Limitations	and	Assumptions	
1.5.1	Environmental	and	Jurisdictional	Scopes	
The environment scope for this research has been limited to the three fields of “law 
enforcement”, “commerce” and “incident response” digital forensic practice within the 
United Kingdom jurisdiction.  The military environment has not been considered due to 
the fact that it is difficult for anyone outside of this area to acquire data on their 
processes, as Adams (2012) states.  The jurisdiction is limited to the United Kingdom 
due to the difficulty of assessing the model against the requirements of a large number 
of jurisdictions where digital forensics are carried out (Adams, 2012).  Making the 
model appropriate for other jurisdictions could be an aspect of future research.  
However, it is contended that the CDFIPM, as it stands, has relevance to other 
jurisdictions with similar legal foundations for evaluating the digital investigative 
process.    
 
1.5.2	Digital	Forensics	Branch	Scope	
The proposed model focuses predominantly on “Computer Forensics” as opposed to 
any other branches of digital forensics such as Malware Forensics, Cloud Forensics, 
Network Forensics or Mobile Forensics.  Although some much simpler models 
(Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Freiling and Schwittay, 2007) 
have claimed to be appropriate for various branches of the digital forensics, such a 
claim is not made in relation to the CDFIPM for accuracy purposes.  However, due to 
the CDFIPM’s generic steps and activities, it could be easily adapted to cover any of the 
stated branches.  The CDFIPM therefore provides guidance mainly for the following 
types of digital devices used in different circumstances: 
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• Digital storage media used in standard computers such as hard drives, optical 
and magneto optical disks and data devices with similar functions; 
• Desktop and laptop computers with network connections; 
• Digital still and video cameras, Tablets, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), 
Personal Electronic Devices (PEDs), removable storage media, and memory 
cards; and 
• Devices with similar functions to the above. 
 
1.5.3	Types	of	Audience	Scope	
The research presented in this thesis is aimed at digital forensic investigators in the 
three domains of law enforcement, commerce and incident response, as well as judges 
and legal practitioners.  The research is also relevant to the research community of 
digital forensics and information security.  For reasons of simplicity, the term “Digital 
Forensic Investigators (DFIs)” is used throughout this research to refer to different 
digital forensic personnel including the “Digital Forensic Practitioners (DFPs)”, 
“Digital Forensic Analysts (DFAs)”, “Digital Evidence First Responders (DEFRs)”, and 
“Forensic Laboratory Managers (FLMs)”.   
 
1.5.4	Details	Scope	
The success of each step of the investigative process is dependent upon ‘Forensic 
Readiness’ in the form of policies, protocols, procedures, training and experience (Kohn 
et al., 2013; Casey, 2011; Rowlingson, 2004).  An investigating organisation employing 
the CDFIPM must therefore already have their own standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) in place, in which methodologies are already defined and appropriate 
procedures have already been developed.  The CDFIPM is intended to assist 
investigating organisations in structuring their existing methods in a formal manner that 
can be easily described to the courts, as opposed to replacing them completely, an 
approach supported by Adams (2012).  It would be impractical to attempt to provide 
specific guides in relation to different technologies as any specific method can easily 
become obsolete in light of the constant and rapid changes in technology (Adams, 
2012).  Specific methods in relation to new domains of technology can be found in 
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research and technical papers which are frequently being updated.  They can help 
investigators with new or unfamiliar technology and best practices (Adams, 2012; 
Sammes and Jenkinson, 2007).  It is therefore outside the scope of this research to 
provide the investigating organisation with techniques or methods of digital forensic 
investigation.    
 
1.5.5	Assumptions	
It is assumed that those investigators who follow the CDFIPM have the essential skills, 
training and experience for conducting digital forensic investigations.  However, due to 
its detailed approach, the CDFIPM also could provide valuable proper training to 
inexperienced investigators.  In accordance with ISO/IEC 27043 (2015) and ISO/IEC 
27037 (2012), it is also assumed that DFIs using the CDFIPM will have obtained proper 
authorisation prior to initiating the digital investigation, and that they will adhere to the 
requirements that their actions are: 
 
• auditable through proper documentation; 
• repeatable in that using the same tools on the same item under the same 
conditions would produce the same results; 
• reproducible in that employing different tools on the same item would produce 
substantially similar results; 
• and justifiable. 
 
In accordance with ACPO (2012), it is also assumed that investigating organisations 
employing the CDFIPM will adhere to the following four principles to optimise the 
admissibility of the digital evidence in the United Kingdom courts: 
 
• Principle 1: No action taken by investigators should change any data which may 
subsequently be relied upon in court. 
• Principle 2: In circumstances where an investigator finds it necessary to access 
original data, that person must be competent to do so and able to give evidence 
explaining the relevance and implications of their actions. 
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• Principle 3: An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to the digital 
evidence should be created and preserved.  An independent third party ought to 
be able to examine those processes and achieve the same result. 
• Principle 4: The person in charge of the investigation has overall responsibility 
for ensuring adherence to the law and these principles. 
 
Furthermore, due to rapid technology changes, this research does not take into account 
the use of particular tools or methods, an approach supported by Adams (2012).  
However, an assumption is made that DFIs employ only tools that have been approved 
in courts of law, such as FTK, EnCase or X-Ways. 
1.6	 Research	Contribution	
This research makes a significant and novel contribution to the field of digital forensic 
science by implementing a process model, the CDFIPM, that would assist DFIs in 
following a uniform approach, and also courts of law in determining the reliability of 
the processes followed in a digital investigation.  The research presented in this paper 
synthesizes, harmonises and builds upon existing models to produce the first process 
model with all three characteristics of being “comprehensive”, “formal” and “generic”.  
The CDFIPM is represented using formal modelling language, through UML Activity 
Diagrams, and contains generic methods that DFIs can use to convey technology to 
non-technical observers.  This thesis also contains the most comprehensive, critical 
review and assessment of all existing digital investigation process models presented, as 
at May 2016.   
 
1.7	 Methodology	
This section presents the methodology that has been used in this research.  The Design 
Science Research (DSR), widely adopted in the domain of Information Systems (IS) 
(Hevner et al., 2010; Peffers et al., 2006; Hevner et al., 2004; March and Smith, 1995; 
Walls et al., 1992; Nunamaker et al., 1990), has been selected as the methodology to 
conduct this research.  The DSR is used to serve as “the archival venue of science-based 
design knowledge across multiple disciplines” (Design Science Journal, 2016).  
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Researchers in the Information Systems domain have used the DSR in their discipline, 
arguing the validity of Design Science (DS) as an IS research paradigm (Hevner et al, 
2010; Edirisuriya, 2009; Peffers et al, 2006; Hevner et al, 2004; March and Smith, 
1995; Walls et al. 2004 and 1992; Nunamaker et al., 1990).   
 
The DSR has also been adopted in various other fields, including: Engineering (Fulcher 
and Hills, 1996; Reich, 1994; Eekels and Roozenburg, 1991; Archer, 1984), Computer 
Science (Takeda et al. 1990), Software Engineering (Frey, 2013) and the Business 
Model Ontology (Osterwalder, 2004).  In addition, the DSR has been used for the first 
time in the domain of digital forensics in a research study conducted by Adams (2012).  
The main aim of the DSR is to achieve or develop knowledge and understanding of a 
problem domain by building and applying a designed artefact (Hevner et al., 2004; 
Aken and Ernst, 2005).  The DSR involves the design of novel or innovative artefacts 
and the analysis of the performance or use of such artefacts (Watts et al., 2009; 
Kuechler and Vaishnavi, 2008).  The development and evaluation of artefacts form an 
important part in the DSR (March and Storey, 2008; Hevner et al, 2004).  Artefacts 
include, amongst others: models, methods, constructs, instantiations and design theories 
(March and Smith, 1995; March and Storey, 2008), social innovations, and new or 
previously unknown properties of technical, social or informational resources (March 
and Storey, 2008). 
 
The artefact related to this research is a new model, a Comprehensive Digital Forensic 
Investigation Process Model (CDFIPM), that encompasses the entire digital 
investigative process.  The organisational context associated with this research is that of 
law enforcement, corporates and incident response.  This research also addresses the 
hitherto unsolved problem that there does not exist a comprehensive model 
encompassing the entire digital investigative process that is both formal, in that it 
synthesizes, harmonises and extends the existing models, and generic, in that it can be 
employed in the different fields of law enforcement, incident response and commerce. 	
1.7.1 		Justification	for	Using	DSR	
The selection of the DSR over other research methodologies such as the Grounded 
Theory (GT) or Requirements Engineering (RE) has not been due to the unawareness of 
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those methodologies (see sub-sections 1.7.1.1 and 1.7.1.2).  The selection of the DSR 
over other alternative methodologies is justified as it is particularly suited to the task of 
creating and evaluating a new process model (an IT artefact) (Adams, 2012).  
Armstrong and Armstrong (2010) state that with the DSR’s focus on designing 
solutions, it is ideal when approaching the problem domain of digital forensics.  Hence, 
because this study also has at its focus the design, development and subsequent 
evaluation of the CDFIPM, the DSR is considered to be the most appropriate choice.  
The DSR is also preferable as it is more pragmatic than alternatives such as Explanatory 
Science Research (ESR) (Aken and Ernst, 2005) and as it can be used to solve a 
problem for which no solution has already been found (Peffers et al, 2006; Hevner et al, 
2004).  Therefore, since this research is a problem-based study3, again the DSR is the 
most appropriate methodology.  Moreover, the DSR uses both inductive and deductive 
process.  Since this study is aimed at producing a new knowledge and literature 
(through inductive process), as well as testing the two research hypothesises (through 
the deductive process), once again the DSR is the most appropriate choice.  
 
As stated above, prior to the selection of the DSR as the preferred methodology, the 
‘GT’ and ‘RE’ were also considered. However, the two stated research methodologies 
were deemed inappropriate to be adopted in this study.  The following two sub-sections 
briefly discuss the GT and RE and provide the rationale why they were not employed in 
the study.    
 
1.7.1.1				Grounded	Theory	
Grounded Theory is a qualitative research methodology employed in early studies in a 
new field (Kessler, 2010; Leedy and Ormrod, 2010). Although various approaches to 
Grounded Theory studies have been described in the literature (Charmaz, 2006; Schram, 
2006; Dick, 2005; Elliott and Lazenbatt, 2005; Pogson et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2002), 
these approaches often use five similar fundamental components as follows:    
 																																																								
3 This research aims to address the problem that there does not exist a Comprehensive Digital Forensic 
Investigation Process Model (CDFIPM) that is both formal and generic. 
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• Data Collection: Grounded Theory research begins with basic data collection, 
usually using open-ended questions in the form a questionnaire or interview.  
 
• Note Taking: As data are collected, the researchers must take note of the 
emerging themes.  
 
• Coding: In order to compare the data provided by the different study participant 
and detect emerging trends, data are coded at this stage through both ‘initial 
coding’ and ‘focused coding’. 
 
• Memoing: The next stage in the process is to write memos. During this step, the 
researcher must organise the trends to define categories and relationships. From 
here, the researcher can produce theories that are published to offer foundational 
literature. 
 
• Writing: The final stage in the grounded Theory process is to publish the 
results. 
  
While the GT has, to some extent, similarities to the DSR as both are qualitative studies 
and share some common components (such as communication/writing and data 
collection), it is nevertheless considered to be an inappropriate methodology to adopt in 
this study.  In contrast with the DSR, that is problem-focused, the GT is not a problem-
centred study.  In GT, the researcher is not required to identify a research problem prior 
to the collection of primary data.  Hence, this is why the first entry point in the process 
is “Data Collection”, denoting that the researcher already knows what kind of a problem 
he/she is going to investigate that they are collecting the primary data for.  In contrast, 
in this study a problem needed to be identified, research hypothesis determined, aim and 
objectives established, and research questions formulated prior to the data collection. 
Therefore, since, the DSR provides the “Problem Identification and Motivation” as the 
first entry point in the process, at which the researcher can start the study, the DSR is 
considered the most appropriate choice. 
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Moreover, GT employs only ‘inductive process’ whereby data is collected to develop a 
theory (Kessler, 2010; Charmaz, 2006; Dick, 2005; Pogson et al., 2002; Schram, 2006).  
This is in contrast to the deductive process whereby data is collected to test a hypothesis 
(Kessler, 2010).  Since this study is concerned with providing both a new knowledge 
and also a foundational literature (through inductive process), as well as testing the 
research hypothesises (through the deductive process), again the DSR is considered the 
most appropriate methodology as it provides both inductive process and deductive 
process.  Finally, the GT is not concerned with the design, development and subsequent 
evaluation of artefacts.  Therefore, since this study has at its focus the development and 
evaluation of the proposed model (the CDFIPM), the GT was considered an 
inappropriate methodology to adopt in this research.     
 
1.7.1.2				Requirements	Engineering	
Requirements Engineering (RE) is concerned with the process of refining, documenting 
and maintaining requirements to the sub-fields of Systems Engineering and Software 
Engineering related to this process.  It focuses on the use of systematic and repeatable 
techniques that ensure the completeness, consistency, and relevance of the system 
requirements (Sommerville and Sawyer, 1997). RE consists of the following 
requirements:  
 
• Requirements Elicitation is the process of determining, reviewing, 
documenting, and understanding the user's requirements and constraints for the 
system. 
 
• Requirements Analysis and Negotiation is the process of checking user’s 
requirements and resolving stakeholder conflicts. 
 
• Requirements Specification is the process of documenting the user's 
requirements and constraints clearly in a requirements document. 
 
• Requirements Verification is the process of checking that the system 
requirements are complete, correct, consistent, and clear and that the 
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documented requirements and models are consistent and meet stakeholder 
needs. 
 
• Requirements Management is the process of managing changes to the 
requirements as the system is developed and put into place.  
 
Contrary to the GT that is not concerned with the development and evaluation of IT 
artefacts, the RE has a focus on the systems and software development, making it more 
relevant to this study than the GT.  However, with the RE, the problem (systems or 
software requirement) is not identified by the developer (who designs and develop the 
system/software) rather by the requester or client (who understands the problem to be 
solved by the system/software but does not know how to develop it).  The problem 
addressed by this study and the research artefact (the CDFIPM) needed to be identified 
and developed by the thesis author himself.  Thus, the DSR was considered to be a more 
appropriate option than the RE.  Moreover, although the RE is concerned with the 
design and development of IT systems, it is not ‘specific’ to the task of creating a new 
process model (Adams 2012; Armstrong and Armstrong 2010), whereas the DSR is 
‘particularly’ suited to the design, development and evaluation of a process model. 
Hence, since the product of this study is a process model, the DSR was once again 
considered to be a more appropriate option than the RE.  Finally, the RE does not have a 
‘communication’ or ‘writing’ stage as offered by both the DSR and the GT, in which 
the results of the study must be published to the scientific user community.  Therefore, 
the DSR was once again considered a more appropriate option in this study.   
 
1.7.2			Selection	of	the	Appropriate	DSR	Methodology	
Various researchers both within and outside the IS domain have provided guidance to 
define the DSR and have described what goals should be followed in its production 
(Hevner et al, 2010; Wieringa, 2009; Peffers et al, 2006; Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2004; 
Hevner et al, 2004; Adams and Courtney, 2004; Rossi and Sein, 2003; March et al. 
1995; Walls et al. 1992; Nunamaker et al., 1990; Eekels and Roozenburg, 1991; Takeda 
et al, 1990; Archer, 1984).  These researchers have often proposed various methods, 
processes or theoretical frameworks to rationalise the DSR studies.   
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The most prominent methods in relation to the DSR are those proposed by Hevner et al. 
(2004)4 and Peffers et al. (2006)5 in the domain of Information Systems (IS).  Hevner et 
al. (2004) provided a list of seven guidelines to assist IS researchers in conducting, 
evaluating and presenting the DSR.  The seven guidelines are intended to address: (1) 
Design as an Artefact, (2) Problem Relevance, (3) Design Evaluation, (4) Research 
Contribution, (5) Research Rigor, (6) Design as a Research Process, and (7) 
Communication of Research (Hevner et al, 2004).  Similarly, Peffers et al. (2006) 
developed a “mental process model”, the Design Science Research Process (DSRP) 
(Figure 1), for producing and presenting IS research.  It comprises six activities, 
including: (1) Problem Identification and Motivation, (2) Objectives for a Solution, (3) 
Design and Development, (4) Demonstration, (5) Evaluation, and (6) Communication.   
 
The Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP model would meet the three following objectives:  
 
• Consistency with prior literature; 
• Provision of a nominal process model for undertaking the DSR; and  
• Provision of a mental model for presenting and understanding the DSR.     
 
Peffers et al. (2006) combined the findings from seven previous influential DSR 
studies6 in order to identify common elements for inclusion in their DSRP model.  The 
result of an all-inclusive DSRP model is the reason it has been selected as the 
appropriate methodology to follow in this research.  The Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP 
model has also been selected over alternatives such as the seven guidelines by Hevner et 
al. (2004) as it provides a graphical representation of the conceptual process for both 
carrying out and presenting the DSR.  Such a mental model facilitates the application of 
the DSR and can also assist the thesis author in producing and presenting a high quality 
DSR that would be accepted as valuable, rigorous and publishable within the field of 
digital forensics science. 
 
																																																								
4 Google search engine shows that this work has been cited 7, 966 times as of October 7, 2016. 
5 Google search engine shows that this work has been cited 313 times as of October 7, 2016. 
6 These notable DSR studies included those carried out by Hevner et al. (2004); Rossi and Sein, 2003; 
Walls et al. (1992); Nunamaker et al. (1990); Eekels and Roozenburg (1991); Takeda et al (1990) and 
Archer (1984). 
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1.7.3			Describing	the	DSRP	Selected	for	This	Research	
It is the common components in Peffers et al’s synthesis of the previous DSR studies 
and their sequential order which form the basis for their DSRP model.  The result of the 
integration is a process model with six activities in a nominal sequence, as presented in 
Figure 1.  The sections following Figure 1 provide a brief description of each activity 
within the DSRP before a description is given of how the DSRP is applied into this 
research. 
 
Content was removed for copyright reasons. 
Peffers, K., Tuunanen, T., Gengler, C., Rossi, M., Hui, W., Virtanen, V. and Bragge, J. 
(2006). ‘The Design Science Research Process: A Model for Producing and Presenting 
Information Systems Research’, 1st International Conference on Design Science 
Research in Information Systems and Technology, pp. 83-106. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The DSRP model after Peffers et al. (2006) 
 
Activity	1	–	Problem	Identification	and	Motivation	
Activity one involves defining the research problem to be addressed and justifying the 
value of the research based on the perceived benefits of the resulting artefact.  To 
accomplish this activity, researchers are required to have knowledge of the state of the 
problem and the importance of its solution.   
 
Activity	2	–	Objectives	of	a	Solution	
The second activity involves researchers defining the aims and objectives in relation to 
the problem to be resolved.  They should be deduced rationally from the problem 
specification.  For this activity, researchers need to have knowledge of the state of the 
problem, as well as current solutions and their efficacy, if any.    	
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Activity	3	–	Design	and	Development	
Activity three requires the researchers to create the artifactual solution.  As discussed 
previously, such artefacts can be constructs, models, methods or instantiations (Hevner 
et al, 2004).  Researchers must have theoretical knowledge for this activity, which they 
can apply in investigating a solution.    
 
Activity	4	–	Demonstration	
Activity four involves demonstrating the efficacy of the artefact in an environment 
appropriate to solve the stated problem.  This could involve the researchers applying the 
artefact in experimentation, simulation, a case study, proof or other appropriate activity.  
The activity requires effective knowledge of how the artefact should be applied in order 
to solve the problem. 
 
Activity	5	–	Evaluation	
The fifth activity involves observation and measurement of how effectively the 
constructed artefact supports a solution to the stated problem.  It involves the 
researchers comparing the objectives of the solution in Activity 2 to the observed results 
from the application of the artefact in Activity 4.  At this stage, if it became evident that 
the artefact required further design and development, researchers would return to 
Activity 3 as part of an iterative process. 
 
Activity	6	–	Communication	
The final activity of Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP model involves communication of the 
problem and its significance, the artefact, its utility and novelty, the rigor of its design, 
and its usefulness for other researchers and appropriate audiences such as practising 
professionals.  This requires researchers to have knowledge of their discipline. 
 
1.7.4			Applying	the	Methodology	to	the	Research	Problem	
Although Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP is structured in a “nominally sequential order”, 
researchers will not always proceed in a sequential order from Activity 1 through to 
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Activity 6.  The DSRP model provides four possible entry points, at each of which 
researchers can start their research process, depending on the type of research approach.  
The focus of this research being the problem that there does not exist a Comprehensive 
Digital Forensic Investigation Process Model (CDFIPM) that is both formal and 
generic, it is based on a “problem-centred approach”, and as such the entry point in the 
DSRP is Activity 1.  The DSRP’s various entry points allow iteration within the 
research process.  The “build and then evaluate loop” might be iterated a number of 
times before the final design artefact is produced (Markus et al, 2002).  This is 
important as during the Demonstration and Evaluation Phases of this research, the thesis 
author might need to return to the Design and the Development Phase to make 
improvements to the artefact (the CDFIPM).   
 
The following sections explain how Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP will be followed 
during the course of this research.  Moreover, since the DSRP does not comprise the 
low-level details of how a researcher should carry out the activities within the individual 
stages (Adams, 2012), the following sections will also explain how the thesis author 
will apply the process in relation to the appropriate methodologies. 
 
Activity	1	–	Problem	Identification	and	Motivation	
Rocco and Hatcher (2011) state that many research studies start with the identification 
of a problem or the purpose for engaging the study. Boote and Beile argue that a 
detailed and sophisticated literature review provides the foundation for “substantial and 
useful research” (Boote and Beile, 2005).  A profound knowledge of the problem 
addressed by this research will be acquired through a detailed analysis and assessment 
of the literature related to previous DFIPMs.  There are different approaches to 
literature review, including, amongst others, Systematic Review, Evaluative Review, 
Exploratory Review, Instrumental Review and Focused Review (Bryman, 2015).  In 
this research, the Evaluative Review in combination with the Systematic Review will be 
followed, these being more focused on a research question than the alternatives (Adams 
et al., 2007).  Having drawn conclusions from the literature review, the author will be 
able to formulate the research questions this thesis is intended to answer.  Interactions 
with other experts and the thesis author’s own experience in the field of digital forensics 
will also provide insight into the stated problem.  
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Activity	2	–	Objectives	of	a	Solution	
The research aim has been formulated according to the definition of the problem.  This 
approach is supported by Peffers et al. (2006), who state that objectives should be 
deduced rationally from the problem specification.  Therefore, in order to formulate the 
stated aim, a deep knowledge has been acquired of the state of the problem and its 
current solution in the form of previously proposed DFIPMs and their efficacy.   
 
Activity	3	–	Design	and	Development	
Prior to designing and developing the new model, all previously proposed models will 
be analysed and assessed against three different assessment criteria7 (see Chapter 2 for 
details), in order to identify which can contribute to the model in this research.  Law 
enforcement, commerce and incident response are the three environments on which this 
research focuses, therefore the existing models within those three domains which most 
closely meet the assessment criteria will be considered for their possible contributions 
to the new model.  Such an approach is considered important by other researchers 
(Kohn et al., 2013 and Cohen 2012 and 2010) as any model institutionalized through 
subsequent intellectual discourse and practical use must take into account other 
researchers’ perspectives, approaches and “vernacular”.   
 
In order to assess the previous models against the three sets of assessment criteria, each 
model will be given three sets of scores in accordance with the three sets of assessment 
criteria8.  Models will be scored according to how many of the requirements are met for 
each particular set of criteria.  This method of assessing the previous DFIPMs against 
“three” different criteria is another novel contribution of this research in the field of 
digital forensic science.  However, this approach should not be considered as a 
conclusive assessment (Adams, 2012).  Rather, the score-based assessment of previous 
models is employed to determine how many of the requirements of each given criteria 
have been fulfilled by a model, as closely as is possible (Adams, 2012).   
 
																																																								
7 The idea of assessing the existing DFIPMs against the assessment criteria was originally devised by 
Adams (2012).  However, Adams (2012) uses only two sets of assessment criteria.  
8 This denotes that each score given to a model will correspond with a particular set of the assessment 
criteria.  The idea of using score-based approach has been derived from Adams’ (2012) study.   
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Once the most reliable models9 have been identified, their specific key contributions 
will be determined for inclusion in the new model according to the assessment criteria.  
Following this, the essential components necessary for the new model will be identified 
from the specific key contributions.  These will form the basic structure of the new 
model.  The prevailing models will then be extensively built upon by the construction of 
a new set of domain-specific components,10 comprising not only first-layer processes, 
but also lower-level phases and sub-phases, in order to achieve usability, utility and 
rigor, as set out by Beebe and Clark (2005).  Contribution of the previous models in the 
form of identified components as well as the new set of constructed components will 
then be used to develop the new model.  The CDFIPM will be graphically represented 
in the form of UML Activity Diagrams for each given process and its associated lower-
level phases and sub-phases.  To ensure that the new model is forensically sound, 
attention will be paid to the criticisms made of the design and implementation of 
previous models (Adams, 2012).  It is intended that the CDFIPM will not only include 
all the advantages of previous models, but also draw upon the knowledge of a wide 
variety of experts11 that cannot be found in the literature. 
 
Activity	4	–	Demonstration	
After the CDFIPM has been developed, its implementation will need to be 
demonstrated within an appropriate environment based on the Demonstration Activity 
of the DSRP.  Peffers et al. (2006) suggest the use of case studies as such an appropriate 
environment.  Other researchers in the field (Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Adams et al, 
2014; Casey, 2011; Beebe and Clark, 2005; Ciardhuáin, 2004; Carrier and Spafford, 
2003) have also used case studies as an appropriate environment to determine the 
applicability of their models.  Therefore, case studies pertaining to the different fields of 
law enforcement, commerce and incident response will be used as an appropriate 
environment for testing the proposed model.  The CDFIPM will be applied to the case 
studies in order to demonstrate its application and effectiveness within the three stated 
domains.  The rationale for selecting different types of case study is to ensure the 
applicability of the CDFIPM to both forensic and non-forensic investigations.  The 																																																								
9 Those that have acquired high scores and most closely met the assessment criteria (Adams, 2012). 
10  I.e. those components associated specifically with either law enforcement, commerce or incident 
response; this approach was originally undertaken by Adams (2012). 
11 These include law enforcement and commercial digital forensic investigators, legal practitioners such 
as judges and barristers, and experts within academia. 
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Demonstration Activity will enable any shortcomings to be addressed prior to the 
submission of the model to independent experts for formal evaluation, which will avoid 
impinging on the time of the external reviewers.  The results of the Demonstration 
Activity of the research will determine whether the Design and Development stage 
needs to be repeated in order to make certain alterations.  
 
Activity	5	–	Evaluation	
Based on the DSRP’s requirements, the CDFIPM will be evaluated to determine how 
well it supports the solution to the stated problem.  The evaluations will compare the 
CDFIPM’s application and effectiveness with the characteristics set out in its research 
aim.  During the Evaluation Phase, the CDFIPM will be submitted to digital forensic 
practitioners within the three domains that are the focus of this research, namely law 
enforcement, commerce and incident response, and also to judges, barristers and 
researchers in academia, those being experts within two other domains to which the 
model has relevance.  The aim of such an approach is to enable the author to acquire 
insightful and reliable feedback as to the effectiveness of the CDFIPM from 
authoritative external reviewers.  As with the Demonstration phase, once the evaluation 
has been carried out the author will be able to judge whether to repeat the Design and 
Development Phase of the CDFIPM in order to make improvements.  Any such 
amendments will subsequently be introduced to the design and implementation stages 
of the CDFIPM. 
 
Activity	6	–	Communication	
Again, in accordance with the DSRP’s requirements, the problem addressed by this 
research and its importance, its solution (the CDFIPM), its utility and novelty, the rigor 
of its design and implementation, and its effectiveness will all need to be communicated 
to the intended user community.  The Communication Activity of the DSRP in relation 
to this research will be achieved through publications in well-known and peer-reviewed 
journals and conferences.  Seven papers will have already been published or accepted 
for publication within reputable journals and conferences by the time of the thesis 
submission (see section 6.2 or page iii).  The thesis itself will be published within the 
Research Repository of the University of Derby.  In addition, there will be direct 
		 25	
interaction with a wide variety of experts, including digital forensic practitioners, legal 
practitioners and experts in academia. 
 
1.8	 Outline	of	the	Thesis	
Chapter 1, Introduction to the Research, explains the background of various issues 
associated with the existing modes, and concludes by identifying the problem with 
which this research is concerned. It also presents the research hypothesis, aim, 
objectives, questions, scope, limitations and assumptions, contribution, and 
methodology. 
 
Chapter 2, Literature Review, provides a general overview of digital forensic 
investigations, followed by a detailed review of how the admissibility of digital 
evidence is governed within the U.K. and U.S. jurisdictions.  A critical review is made 
of the existing models and the different assessment criteria against which previous 
models will be assessed are introduced.  The Chapter then covers the process for 
identifying those models that can contribute to the design and development of the 
proposed model by assessing each previous model against the assessment criteria.  
Following the identification of the prevailing models, their key contributions will be 
determined based on the assessment criteria.  Finally, the components necessary for the 
proposed model are identified from the key contributions of the prevailing models and 
all the reviewed models collectively.  
 
Chapter 3, Design and Development, outlines the Design and Development activity for 
the CDFIPM and provide the rationale behind each stage of the new model. 
 
Chapter 4, Demonstration, covers the process for an initial assessment of the CDFIPM 
by applying the model to three case studies.  This will take place prior to its submission 
to the external, independent experts for formal evaluation (Adams, 2012, Beebe and 
Clark, 2005; Carrier and Spafford, 2003).    
 
		 26	
Chapter 5, Evaluation, details the make-up of the panel of experts, the tasks they will 
undertake and the results of their evaluation, concluding with a detailed amendment to 
the CDFIPM (Adams, 2012; Rogers et al., 2006; Ciardhuáin, 2004).   
 
In relation to the research philosophy adopted in this study, since the study requires in-
depth and insightful feedback and responses from the study participants, the research, 
being a qualitative study, draws upon ‘Interpretivism’ approach to allow the study 
participants to provide depth and thoughts into their feedback.  Therefore, since this 
research is not looking for a large ‘quantity’ of data rather the ‘quality’ of data, the 
Interpretivism was considered as the appropriate approach in this study.   
 
There are three other main types of research philosophies in addition to the 
Interpretivism approach, including: Pragmatism, Positivism and Realism. However, 
since the research philosophy is a vast topic, its detailed discussion is outside the scope 
of this study.  For more information on research philosophies, readers are instead 
encouraged to refer to Burrell and Morgan’s (1985) study that is considered by many 
researchers (Holden and Lynch, 2004) to be the most comprehensive philosophical 
framework. 
 
Chapter 6, Conclusion, comprises a detailed conclusion to the research, discussing the 
research limitations and potential future research opportunities, and includes a detailed 
summary based on the research aim and objectives.  The contribution of the CDFIPM in 
relation to the field of digital forensics is discussed, as well as how this research has 
been communicated to date and how it will be communicated in future.        
 
1.9	 Summary	of	the	Chapter	
This Chapter has provided the rationale for this research, setting out the background and 
formulating the research problem, its hypothesis, aim, objectives, questions, scope, 
limitations, assumptions and contributions. The selection of the Design Science 
Research (DSR) and the Design Science Research Process (DSRP) by Peffers et al. 
(2006) as the appropriate methodologies to follow during the course of this research has 
been justified, and the structure of the thesis has been outlined.   
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Chapter	2:	 Literature	Review	
2.1	 Introduction	
Based upon the Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP – the research methodology used for this 
research – two resources are required in order to define the “objectives of a solution”.  
These include the “… knowledge of the state of the problem” and “current solutions and 
their efficacy, if any”.  The knowledge of the state of the problem for this research was 
addressed in Chapter 1, where the research problem was defined and the value of its 
solution justified.  This Chapter continues with Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP, gathering 
further knowledge of the state of the problem and identifying current solutions, if any, 
and their efficacy.  To achieve this, previous models are critically reviewed and 
assessed in order to identify “prevailing” models which can contribute to the Design and 
Development of the new model (covered in Chapter 3).  This will enable the thesis 
author to decide upon the necessary components for the proposed model that will 
constitute the basic structure of the new model’s Design and Development.   
 
However, prior to the review and assessment of the previous models, a general review 
of the topic of Digital Forensic Investigations (DFIs) is provided in section 2.2, 
followed by a detailed review of the field of digital evidence in section 2.3 and a review 
of the existing standards associated with the digital investigative process in section 2.4.  
The discussion of these three topics provides the necessary background for a review and 
assessment of the existing digital forensic investigation process models (DFIPMs).  
 
2.2	 Digital	Forensic	Investigation	
Digital forensics, originally known as computer forensics, first presented itself in the 
1970s (Pollitt, 2010).  During the first investigations, financial fraud proved to be the 
most common cause on suspects’ computers (Kohn et al, 2013).  Since then, digital 
forensics has grown in importance in situations where digital devices are used in the 
commission of a crime (Garfinkel, 2010).  The original focus of digital forensic 
investigations was on crimes committed through computers (Casey, 2011).  However, 
over the past few years, the field has extended to include various other digital devices in 
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which digitally stored information can be processed and used for different types of 
crimes (Nance et al., 2009).  Palmer defines digital forensics as, 
 
The use of scientifically derived and proven methods towards the preservation, 
collection, validation, identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation and 
presentation of digital evidence derived from digital sources for the purpose of 
facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or 
helping to anticipate unauthorised actions shown to be disruptive to planned 
operations. (Palmer, 2001) 
 
This definition is widely accepted within the digital forensic community (Montasari, 
2016, a; Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Kohn et al., 2013; Casey, 2011) and is therefore 
adopted within this research.  A digital forensic investigation (DFI) is the process of 
linking extracted information and digital evidence in order to establish factual 
information for review by the judiciary (Casey, 2011; Ioeng, 2006).  Cohen (2010) 
highlights the need to establish factual information as the outcome of such an 
investigation. 
 
A DFI is carried out as an investigation after the occurrence of an incident (Freiling and 
Schwittay, 2007; Rowlingson, 2004).  It is therefore a distinct type of investigation 
“where the scientific procedures and techniques used will allow the results, in other 
words digital evidence, to be admissible in a court of law” (Agarwal et al, 2011).  Due 
to the fact that digital evidence is contained in a digital device and cannot be observed 
by the naked eye, forensic tools such as Encase (Guidance Software, 2016) and FTK 
(Access Data, 2016) are used to extract and examine data representing potential digital 
evidence.  The extent of the value of the digital evidence is based not only on the extent 
to which a tool is trusted (Wojcik et al, 2006; Ciardhuáin, 2004), but also on the 
competence and experience of the investigator carrying out the digital investigation 
(ISO/IEC 27037, 2012; ACPO, 2012).   
 
There are four basic principles of DFIs which must be considered.  These are 
auditability, repeatability, reproducibility and justifiability.  Auditability refers to the 
need for an independent investigator to be able to evaluate the activities performed by 
other investigators to determine whether or not a suitable scientific method was 
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followed (ISO/IEC 27043, 2015).  Repeatability requires one investigator to be able to 
arrive at the same conclusion as another under similar conditions (Valjarevic and 
Venter, 2015; von Solms et al., 2006).  Reproducibility is established when the same 
test results are produced using the same method, but with different instruments and 
under different conditions, and can be reproduced at any time after the original test 
(ISO/IEC 27037, 2012). Justifiability refers to an investigator being able to justify all 
the actions and methods they used during the course of a digital investigation (ISO/IEC 
27037, 2012). 
 
A DFI is often initiated in order to ascertain certain facts after an incident has occurred. 
It must be conducted in such a methodical manner that it can withstand scrutiny by the 
court and defence team (Casey, 2011).  There exist various types of DFIs, including live 
forensics, static forensics, proactive forensics and cloud forensics (Rogers et al, 2006; 
Beebe and Clark, 2005).  The fundamental point of any DFI is to answer ‘what’, ‘why’, 
‘how’, ‘who’, ‘where’ and ‘when’ type questions in relation to the data analysis and 
evidence in order to confirm or refute allegations of suspicious activity (Ioeng, 2006; 
Kruse and Heiser, 2001).  ‘What’ refers to the data attributes or metadata, ‘why,’ the 
motivation (Grobler et al, 2010), ‘how,’ the manner in which the incident was initiated 
or the way in which the necessary evidence was isolated (Beebe and Clark, 2005), 
‘who,’ the people involved (Carrier and Spafford, 2003), ‘where,’ the location of the 
potential digital evidence (Casey, 2011) and ‘when,’ the time of occurrence (Mandia et 
al., 2003). 
 
This research focuses only on the question of “how”. Kohn et al. (2013) state that the 
“how” question is addressed by the steps of the investigative process undertaken which 
have to be defined.  Several authors have defined these steps in a DFPM which is the 
main subject of this Chapter (review and assessment of the previous models). 
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2.3	 Digital	Evidence	
2.3.1			Background	to	Digital	Evidence	
Nowadays, almost all transactions from the commercial world, government and private 
individuals exist only in digital form (Cohen, 2012; Casey, 2011; Sommer, 2008).  In 
such cases, it is only through digital evidence that one can demonstrate that something 
did or did not happen (Kessler, 2010; Rogers et al., 2006).  Digital footprints of 
individuals’ activities are left in the digital world, from which their actions and 
intentions can be deduced (Sommer, 2008).  Digital evidence is the product of the 
digital forensics process (Kessler, 2010; Cohen, 2010 and 2008) and can be extracted 
from various sources, including digital devices (such as desktop and laptop computers, 
thumb drives, mobile devices, digital cameras and tablets), network servers (such as 
supporting applications including Web sites, e-mail and social networks) and network 
hardware (such as routers) (Casey, 2011; Kessler, 2010; Brown, 2009; Gonzales et al., 
2007).  
 
“Forensics” refers to the application of scientific evidence in courts of law, where 
judges play a vital role as gatekeepers in deciding what evidence is and is not 
admissible (Kessler, 2010; Cohen, 2010 and 2008; Jones, 2009; Kerr, 2009).  Casey 
(2011) and Palmer (2001) argue that while the actual mechanics of digital forensics are 
different from the better-known physical and medical forensics, the processes of all 
forensic sciences are fundamentally the same. Each phase in the process must be 
performed in such a way that the integrity of the evidence is preserved and its 
admissibility assured.  Digital evidence can be employed in many types of criminal 
investigations, such as homicide, sex offences, missing persons, child abuse, drugs, 
fraud and theft of personal information (Casey, 2011).  Digital evidence can show how 
a crime was perpetrated, provide investigative leads, prove or refute witness statements 
and identify potential suspects.  Various similar definitions of digital evidence have 
been proposed in the literature (Mason, 2007; Rowlingson, 2004; Whitcomb, 2002).  
However, for the purposes of this research, the following definition given by Casey 
(2011), which is widely accepted within the digital forensic community, is used: 
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any data stored or transmitted using a computer that support or refute a theory 
of how an offense occurred or that address critical elements of the offense such 
as intent or alibi. 
 
The term “computer” in the above definition can be replaced with “digital device” to 
cover various types of devices, such as computers, laptop computers, tablets and smart 
mobile devices.  Data in Casey’s (2011) definition of digital evidence essentially refers 
to numbers that represent information of various types such as text, images, audio and 
video. A simple computer file can contain incriminating information and have 
corresponding properties that are useful in an investigation.  For instance, details such 
as when a file was created, who may have created it, or that it was created on another 
computer, can all be essential.  Notwithstanding its pervasiveness, few people are well-
acquainted with the evidential, technical and legal issues associated with digital 
evidence.   
 
Consequently, digital evidence is often disregarded, acquired incorrectly or examined 
and analysed ineffectively.  Digital evidence is often challenged in court because of the 
ease with which it can be altered, which is due to poor handling.  The manner in which 
searches of digital evidence are authorised and carried out, the way in which it is 
handled, received and rejected, and the various legal issues associated with digital 
evidence, all differ from one jurisdiction to another.  The topic of digital evidence 
reviewed in this research focuses on the United Kingdom jurisdiction, occasionally 
incorporating the United States jurisdiction for the purposes of comparison.    
 
2.3.2			Admissibility	of	Digital	Evidence		
Digital evidence is increasing in both size and significance in criminal and civil trials 
(Casey, 2011; Kerr, 2010; Brown, 2009; Kessler, 2010; Cohen, 2010 and 2008; Ball, 
2008 and Manes et al., 2007).  It is latent in the same way as a fingerprint or DNA 
sample (ACPO, 2012). However, digital evidence is more complex and volatile as it can 
be accidently or improperly modified, damaged or destroyed during the investigative 
process (Giova, 2011; Holder et al., 2009; Mukasey et al., 2008; Bem et al., 2008; 
Ashcroft et al., 2004).  Due to its fragility, courts pay close attention to the process in 
which the digital evidence was acquired and stored (Kessler, 2010).  Investigators’ 
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methods in carrying out digital investigations are often scrutinised by the courts 
(Montasari et al., 2015; Rogers, 2004).  Therefore, to be admissible in court, digital 
evidence must have all the characteristics of other types of scientific and technical 
evidence and fulfil the standards associated with them (Casey, 2011; Kessler, 2010).  
However, electronic-based evidence presents far greater challenges, both for the courts 
and in relation to the procedures (Kessler, 2010; Sommer, 2008).  The manner in which 
it is extracted plays a significant role in weighing the probative and prejudicial value of 
the evidence when presented in court (Cohen, 2010 and 2008; Frowen, 2009; Kerr, 
2009).  To withstand the stringent admissibility requirements, the evidence produced by 
law enforcement agencies must be robust.  Evidence presented in court can be “real”, 
“documentary”, “technical”, “expert” and “derived” and must satisfy two criteria of 
“admissibility” and “weight” (Sommer, 2008).  To be admissible, it must fulfil legal 
acceptability tests.  This is a function of jurisdiction which derives from English 
common law rather than European civil codes.   
 
The following three sections discuss the practices carried out by courts in relation to the 
admissibility of digital evidence.  Emphasis is placed on the U.K. courts, but 
comparisons are also made with the U.S. jurisdiction.  
 
2.3.2.1				Challenges	Facing	the	Judiciary			
Judges play a vital role in protecting the legal system from the impacts of flawed 
evidence (Cohen, 2010). Just as judges need to remove “junk science” from the 
courtroom, so they need to keep out poor-quality digital evidence (Cohen, 2010 and 
2008).  They play the role of gatekeeper, determining what evidence is and is not 
admissible in their courtrooms (Kessler, 2010; Cohen, 2010 and 2008; Jones, 2009; 
Kerr, 2009).  Judges weigh the evidentiary value against the prejudicial effect of any 
evidence produced (Cohen 2010 and 2008).  However, their role has various subtleties 
and complications.  One of the greatest challenges facing both judges and juries (lay 
audiences) is their lack of proper understanding of digital technology.  Kessler (2010) 
states that for a judge to be able to fairly assess the merits of digital evidence, they need 
to have some understanding of basic ICTs and the applications from which digital 
evidence is extracted (Kessler, 2010). 
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Other researchers have raised this issue, arguing that a lack of familiarity with digital 
technology and the subsequent detrimental effect on court cases might indicate the 
necessity for “new laws of evidence” or “specialist judges” (Beebe, 2009; Nance et al., 
2009; Shaw, 2006).  As there has been no such initiative to date, such a lack of 
appreciation could prevent judges from critically assessing the evidence submitted to 
them (Losavio et al., 2006).  There is currently no study in the literature in relation to 
judges’ perceived knowledge of digital evidence within the U.K jurisdiction (Kessler, 
2010; Scarborough et al., 2009; Rogers et al, 2007; Losavio et al., 2006).  This must be 
considered an imperative subject area for future research. 
   
Technical terms have also proved challenging for judges and juries.  For instance, the 
forensic copy of an evidentiary medium was previously called a “mirror image” 
(Garber, 2001).  Whilst researchers in the field of computer science understand this 
terminology, it has been misinterpreted by “lay audiences” to denote a reverse copy, as 
mirrors reflect an opposite image (Brown, 2009; Kessler, 2010).  To remove such 
confusion, the process is now called a bit-by-bit forensic copy (Casey, 2011). 
 
2.3.2.2				United	States	Jurisdiction		
As with any evidence, the proponent of digital evidence has to lay an appropriate 
foundation in relation to its reliability (Ryan and Shpantzer, 2002).  Various practices 
are carried out across the different jurisdictions in terms of laying such a proper 
foundation.  In the United States, the admission in a federal court of scientific evidence 
(including digital evidence) is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) (U.S. 
Courts, 2015; Sommer, 2008).  These rules require the trial judge to act as gatekeeper, 
determining, prior to its admission, whether the evidence is scientifically valid and 
relevant to the case (Kessler, 2010).  Across the U.S. federal courts, judges employ the 
Daubert Test (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993) in order to determine 
the admissibility of the scientific or technical evidence.  The Daubert Test includes the 
following five assessments:  
 
(1) whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested;  
(2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; 
(3) its known or potential error rate; 
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(4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and 
(5) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific 
community. 
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993) 
 
Using the Daubert Test, a judge can objectively determine the reliability of any digital 
evidence presented in the courts.  The Kumho Tire v. Carmichael (1999) decision 
extended the Daubert guidelines to any form of technical evidence. In addition, FRE 
Rule 702 provides guidelines for qualifying expert witnesses and minimizing 
adversarial bias in expert testimony (U.S. Courts, 2015).  The Rule 702 requirement for 
reliability may work against its design to balance “the imperatives of maintaining an 
adversarial system and mitigating bias” (Kessler, 2010).  In particular, Rule 702 can be 
employed to prevent the admission of an expert’s assumptions, which a judge might 
otherwise find useful, as assumptions cannot be considered to be reliable (Bernstein, 
2008).  In conclusion, the Daubert Test and Rule 702 are employed in the U.S. courts to 
determine the admissibility of digital evidence as well as any other types of scientific 
and technical evidence (Kessler, 2010; Rothstein et al., 2007; Meyers and Rogers, 2006; 
Noblett et al., 2000). 
 
2.3.2.3				United	Kingdom	Jurisdiction		
In the United Kingdom, judges can exercise their discretion within the boundaries of 
U.K. law (discussed in this section) to dismiss evidence that has been acquired unfairly.  
In many cases, digital evidence is ruled inadmissible in the U.K. courts if it has not met 
certain conditions (also discussed in this section).  The concept of admissibility requires 
courts to establish whether evidence is “safe” to place before a jury and whether it will 
provide a solid foundation for arriving at a decision in the case.  In practice, 
admissibility amounts to a set of legal tests performed by a judge to evaluate an item of 
evidence (Casey, 2011).  This evaluation process can be complex, especially when 
evidence has not been handled properly or has characteristics that make it less reliable 
or more prejudicial.  In the U.K. legal system, “admissibility” refers to legal rules that 
are applied to an item of potential evidence prior to a court considering the value of the 
fact that it claims to offer (Sommer, 2008).  There exist various laws and rules that 
govern the admissibility of digital evidence in U.K. courts.   
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The most important laws associated with the admissibility of digital evidence are the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.  For 
instance, section 117 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 regulates the admissibility of 
communication data that has been obtained under warrant.  Under section 17 of the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 content is not admissible.  However, it 
will become admissible if it has been acquired from a foreign law enforcement agency 
within its own jurisdiction and is available to an investigator to be presented in the U.K. 
court (Sommer, 2008).  Another example is section 78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, according to which intercepted data content can only be used for 
intelligence purposes; it cannot be admitted as evidence.  Also, relevant to the issue of 
the admissibility of digital evidence is whether the material is a “business record,” as 
outlined under section 117 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, an “expert report,” defined 
under section 118(8) and 127 of that Act, or “real evidence”.  Importantly, under section 
78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, courts can reject any evidence 
deemed to have been acquired unfairly. 
 
Compared with the U.K. legal system, admissibility rules in other European counties 
are much more relaxed and, although admissibility rules in the United States follow the 
English common law model, they have evolved differently. For instance, authorisations 
to seize evidence in the U.S. must be drawn up with far greater precision than in the 
U.K. (Sommer, 2008) and any material acquired outside the warrant is likely to be 
considered inadmissible.  Another deviation relates to the way in which technical 
evidence is handled. Within the U.K. courts, the jury is simply provided with opposing 
expert witnesses, while in the United States, technical evidence is an admissibility issue 
with the judge acting as a gatekeeper to protect the jury from scientific evidence which 
has not been established as “generally accepted” (Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 1993). 
 
U.K. judges often consider three issues before deciding whether or not to admit digital 
evidence.  These can be classified as issues relating to search warrants, reliability and 
best evidence. 
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Search	Warrants	
	
Acquiring digital evidence under “proper authorisation” is vital for its admission in the 
U.K. legal system.  Investigators must obtain a search warrant or subpoena before they 
can search, seize or examine digital devices.  Subpoenas are employed to seize a 
company’s business records, while search warrants are needed to access more detailed 
information such as customer-owned files (Casey, 2011). For instance, in circumstances 
involving an Internet Service Provider (ISP), a subpoena might be required to identify 
the name of an individual owning a specific e-mail account and a search warrant used to 
extract the contents of e-mail or user profiles (Kerr, 2009).   
 
As already stated, digital evidence acquired without authorisation will not be admitted 
in courts.  In order to acquire the necessary warrant, investigators must demonstrate to a 
judge that a crime has been committed, evidence of the crime exists and the evidence is 
likely to exist at the place to be searched.  Search warrants in the United Kingdom can 
be more loosely defined than in the United States.  In the U.K. legal system, there are 
several types of warrants such as a “specific premises warrants”, all-premises warrants” 
and “multiple entry warrants” (Casey, 2011).  Even when investigators have obtained 
authorisation to search a computer, they must focus only on the crime under 
investigation.  If they identify evidence of other crimes during their investigation, that 
evidence will not be admissible as it is outside the scope of the warrant.  In such 
circumstances, investigators would have to obtain a second warrant before being able to 
use evidence to charge the offender (Casey, 2011; Sommer, 2008).    
 
Furthermore, investigators may need to acquire two separate warrants for a seized 
computer: one for the computer itself and one for the files contained in it.  Seized 
computers usually constitute “real” evidence for admissibility purposes, with individual 
files having to be admitted separately in accordance with section 117 of Criminal 
Justice Act 2003.  This is of particular importance where more than one individual has 
had access to a computer.  In such situations, in order to adhere to Computer Misuse Act 
1990, investigators must prove that they are authorised to access the computers.  
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Reliability	
	
In the U.K. courts, digital evidence is also considered for its “weight of fact”, 
“persuasiveness” or “probative value” (Sommer, 2008).  Since digital evidence is not 
considered different from text contained within a document, it is subject to the same 
rules and laws as documentary evidence.  Therefore, the responsibility lies with the 
prosecution to prove that the evidence is no more or less at the date of the court hearing 
than it was when it was taken into the possession of police (ACPO, 2012).  This is why 
it is so important for investigators to demonstrate that digital evidence is reliable, 
otherwise it will not be admissible. Certain conditions must be fulfilled before digital 
evidence will be considered reliable, and they are often the same across the U.K. and 
U.S. jurisdictions (Adams, 2012; Steel, 2006).  To be considered reliable, digital 
evidence must be “authentic”, “accurate” and “complete”.  
 
To demonstrate its authenticity, investigators must be able to specifically link the digital 
evidence to the alleged crimes and individuals in the case (Casey, 2011; Kessler, 2010; 
Sommer, 2008).  They must also prove that the recovered evidence is the same as 
originally seized data, demonstrating that the evidence was extracted from a particular 
computer or location and that a “complete” and “accurate” copy was acquired.  They 
must be able to prove how the evidence was acquired by demonstrating each process 
through which it was collected.  This is not only to demonstrate that evidence has not 
been modified during the processing, but also to prove that no mistakes have been made 
by the investigators or the tools employed (Sommer, 2008).   
 
Investigators will need to make a forensically sound copy12 13 of the medium containing 
potential digital evidence (Montasari, 2016, c; Brown, 2009) and conduct the 
examination and analysis on the “working copy”.  This is to protect the integrity of the 
original data and to ensure that the original evidence is not contaminated (Montasari, in 
press, b; Casey, 2011; Kessler, 2010).  Therefore, they will need to demonstrate that an 
authentic copy of the original data was created (ACPO, 2012; Brown, 2009; Casey, 
2011).  To prove that there has been no contamination or modification, investigators 																																																								
12 The imaging process often duplicates the original evidence in fixed-size blocks to the “examination 
medium” and each block is individually validated (Kessler, 2010). 
13 In certain circumstances, partial or selective imaging might also be regarded as acceptable, for instance 
in cases where the storage size is very large, and it is not practicable to image a large volume of data.	
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need to show that the evidence has been subjected to digital fingerprinting and the 
original digital fingerprint matches the presented exhibit (Montasari, in press, b; 
Kessler, 2010; Sommer, 2008).  The most commonly employed algorithms for verifying 
data in digital forensics are MD5 and SHA-1 (Casey, 2011).  Investigators must also 
demonstrate that the imaging process can be reproduced, in order that two different 
qualified practitioners can create identical forensic replicas by employing the same 
hardware and software when considering the same original (Casey, 2011; Brown, 
2009). 
 
As stated above, to meet the requirement of reliability, investigators need to 
demonstrate that digital evidence has remained unchanged since it was acquired.  The 
“Chain of Custody” plays a vital role in proving the authenticity of digital evidence.  
This refers to the necessity to maintain detailed notes and to report every action 
performed on an item of evidence, from the moment it was collected to the point that it 
is presented as an exhibit.  Such notes must detail the sources of the data, record which 
proven tools and techniques were employed and demonstrate that the data has not been 
modified since it was extracted through maintaining hash values such as MD5 and 
SHA-1 (Montasari, 2016, c; Casey, 2011).  A proper chain of custody will prove that 
digital evidence was extracted from a particular system or location and has been 
continuously controlled since its acquisition.   
 
Proper chain of custody documentation allows the court to relate the digital evidence to 
the crime.  Inappropriate documentation may lead to confusion over how and where the 
digital evidence was acquired, raising doubts about its reliability.  In terms of the 
evidence itself, although it is often a computer hard-disk or other type of digital device 
that is seized, what actually needs to be placed before the court is often a number of 
accurate “printouts” or “screen dumps” 14 . Therefore, it is also important for 
investigators to demonstrate that the printout is complete and reliable, and who 
produced it.  As stated above, a whole computer or other item of data storage media is 
admissible as “real evidence,” with items derived from it following digital examination 
and analysis being separate exhibits in their own right, such as printouts and screen 
																																																								
14 UK courts are often uncomfortable with the idea that the whole computer system is presented to them. 	
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captures.  These separate exhibits become admissible if the investigator who conducted 
the extraction can attend court to produce the exhibit and be cross-examined. 
 
In terms of proving the accuracy of digital evidence in courts, some researchers 
(Buskirk and Liu, 2006), as also cited by Adams (2012), argue that if it is accepted and 
admitted in court, it is both reliable and correct.  This argument is flawed as 
inconsistencies in forensics software, errors in the imaging process and differences in 
practitioners’ knowledge can negatively impact upon the reliability, accuracy and 
integrity of digital evidence.  This is supported by Kessler (2010), Cohen (2010 and 
2008) and Casey (2002). Therefore, digital evidence must be free from any reasonable 
doubt concerning the quality of procedures employed to acquire the material, examine it 
and present it to the court.  The evidence must be produced by an individual (often a 
digital forensic analyst) who can describe the processes followed to produce the 
evidence.  Digital forensic methods employed to acquire and process the evidence must 
be clear, such that it can be tested by third-party experts. In circumstances where 
exhibits themselves include statements, the requirement for accuracy extends to the 
content. Investigators producing documents provide a witness statement and must be 
available for cross-examination in court.  Finally, the term “completeness” refers to the 
requirement for a complete history of the specific set of circumstances or events. 
 
Best	Evidence	
	
The “best evidence” rule refers to a legal principle that an original copy of a document 
is superior evidence.  In the past, based upon this rule, secondary evidence such as a 
copy or “facsimile” would not be admissible if an original document was in existence 
and could be acquired (Ormerod and Perry, 2015).  The original purpose of the rule was 
to ensure that decisions reached in courts were based on the best available information 
(Casey, 2011).  However, with the arrival of photocopiers, scanners, computers and 
other technology that can produce effectively identical replicas, duplicates became 
acceptable instead of the original.  According to Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2014 
(Ormerod and Perry, 2015), the best evidence rule in England and Wales is now all but 
defunct.  Therefore, evidence that is not an original will be admitted provided it meets 
other admissibility requirements.  If a question is raised in relation to the authenticity of 
the original or the accuracy of the copy, or if the circumstances dictate that it would be 
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unfair to admit the copy in place of the original, the best evidence rule will still apply.  
As most forms of digital evidence can be duplicated exactly, this issue does not often 
arise and copies are usually admitted in the U.K. courts.  In fact, producing a duplicate 
of digital evidence is often preferred as it removes the possibility of the original being 
accidently modified.  According to the “Hearsay Rule”15, digital evidence would not be 
admissible if the witness (the digital forensic analyst) was not present in court to verify 
its truthfulness.16 
  
2.4	 Standards	and	Guidelines		
Since Digital Forensic Science is a new discipline, there is a limited number of 
standards and guidelines related to the field.  Those standards in existence, however, do 
not cover jurisdiction-specific requirements that relate to issues such as admissibility, 
evidential weighting, relevance and other judicially controlled limitations on the use of 
potential digital evidence in courts of law.  This view is supported by the UK Forensic 
Science Regulator, who states,  
 
Standards such as ISO/IEC27037:2012 may be used as guidance if required, 
however they are not equivalent and cannot be used as a substitute for the 
accreditation standard. (Forensic Science Regulator, 2016) 
   
Furthermore, these standards and guidelines are not generic as each has a specific focus 
on a particular field such as law enforcement, electronic discovery, commercial digital 
forensics or incident response.  The existing standards and guidelines usually capture 
only parts of the investigative process as opposed to covering the entire process.  The 
key standards and guidelines identified through the process of literature review are 
discussed in this section.      
 
																																																								
15  Under section 114(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, “hearsay” in criminal proceedings is “a 
statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings that is evidence of any matter stated.” 
16 There are exceptions for evidence that describes events accurately and is simpler to authenticate, but 
the discussion of these is outside the scope of this research.  	
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2.4.1	ISO/IEC	27035:2011		
ISO/IEC 27035 (2011) is an international standard that provides guidance only on 
“information security incident management” for organizations. This standard is not 
comprehensive as it only covers guidelines in relation to incident detection and first 
response.  It consists of two parts contained in two separate documents.  Part one 
provides guidelines on detecting, reporting, assessing and managing information 
security incidents, while part two provides guidelines on planning and preparing for 
incident response.  This standard is only aimed at corporate investigation, and excludes 
other fields such as law enforcement.   
 
2.4.2	ISO/IEC	27037:2012		
The ISO/IEC 27037 (2012) is an international standard developed by the Joint 
Technical Committee of ISO (the International Organisation for Standardisation) and 
IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission), providing guidelines for activities 
in dealing with potential digital evidence.  This standard only deals with the initial 
digital evidence handling process including: Identification, Collection, Acquisition and 
Preservation (the post-mortem17 stages).  No pro-active activities are incorporated into 
ISO/IEC 27037, such as Forensic Readiness Process (Montasari, 2016, c; Valjarevic 
and Venter, 2015; Rowlingson, 2004; Mandia et al., 2003) which is essential for 
advanced planning and preparation prior to incident detection.  Other important 
processes that this standard lacks include: Examination, Analysis, Presentation and 
Investigation Closure.   
 
Furthermore, ISO/IEC 27037 (2012) does not address activities associated with legal 
proceedings in handling potential digital evidence.  Since it is an “international” 
standard, it does not cover jurisdiction-specific requirements that relate to issues such as 
admissibility, evidential weighting, relevance and other judicially controlled limitations 
on the use of potential digital evidence in courts of law.  Since ISO/IEC 27037 cannot 
replace specific legal requirements of any jurisdiction (nor any other standards), 
investigators would need to adapt it so that it could comply with the “national” laws, 																																																								
17 Post-mortem processes are the reactive measures utilised to investigate an incident after it has taken 
place. 
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rules and regulations.  The main advantage of this standard is that it has provided some 
level of details in relation to its data acquisition process, which the new model will draw 
upon.  However, this standard is incomplete on its own and should be used in 
conjunction with other standards concerning digital evidence and the investigation of 
information security incidents. 
 
2.4.3	ISO/IEC	27043:2015		
ISO/IEC 27043 (2015) describes processes relevant to different kinds of investigations, 
such as unauthorized access and corporate breaches of information security.  Authors of 
this standard claim that it is comprehensive since it is based on the harmonisation of 
fourteen of the previously proposed DFIPMs.  Although ISO/IEC 27043 has attempted 
to capture the entire investigative process, the Processes included in this standard are 
overly high-level without any lower-level details, i.e. Phases and Sub-Phases, to assist 
the investigators.  Beebe and Clark (2005) supported by Montasari (2016, c) and Kohn 
et al. (2006) criticise such an approach arguing that the complexities of the digital 
investigative process cannot be represented at such a high level.   
 
To elaborate their points further, they draw a useful analogy stating that supposedly 
flying an airplane were a function of a higher order framework consisting of three 
Phases: “take-off”, “fly” and “land”, very few pilots could achieve this task without 
acquiring further details in relation to each of the Phases.  Similarly, greater detail 
associated with each stage of a digital investigative process is required in order to 
enhance the usability of the forensic methodology for DFIs.  This is, however, is 
missing in ISO/IEC 27043 (2015).  Authors of this standard, themselves, admit such a 
shortcoming stating, 
 
This International Standard provides a general overview without prescribing 
particular details within each of processes covered in this International 
Standard ISO/IEC 27043 (2015). 
 
ISO/IEC 27043 has not also provided any details in relation to the activities associated 
with live acquisition of the potential digital evidence, nor has it specified certain 
important processes such as evaluating and securing the crime scene.  As ISO/IEC 
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27043 documentation itself states, this standard will need to be used in conjunction with 
other international standards including: ISO/IEC 27035, ISO/IEC 27037, ISO/IEC 
27042 and ISO/IEC 27041. 
2.4.4	British	Standards	Institute	(BSI)	
British Standards Institute developed BS 10008 Standard (BS 10008, 2014) , which 
outlines the requirements for: 
 
• addressing issues associated with the authenticity and integrity of the 
electronic information;   
• transferring information from one computer system to another 
electronically; and 
• implementing and operation of electronic information management 
system. 
 
The BS 10008 also outlines the requirements for the management of the availability of 
electronic information and addresses issues in relation to: 
 
• electronic copyright systems; 
• electronic identity verification; 
• linking of electronic identity to particular electronic documents; and 
• use of electronic signatures. 
 
Although the requirements outlined in BS 10008 are generic, this standard only applies 
to corporate environment, and excludes other domains such as law enforcement. 
 
2.4.5			Association	of	Chief	Police	Officers	(ACPO)		
In the United Kingdom, the National High-Tech Crime Unit has produced the Good 
Practice Guide for Digital Evidence on behalf of the Association of Chief Police 
Officers with its main focus being on the field of law enforcement.  This guide has been 
updated several times with the latest one being Version 5 in October 2011 (as of May 
2016).  In the latest version of this guide, the ‘computer-based evidence’ was replaced 
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with ‘digital-based evidence’ to reflect the development of investigating cyber security 
incidents in a broader context.  This guideline consists of four principles as follows:  
 
Principle 1: No action taken by law enforcement agencies, persons employed 
within those agencies or their agents should change data which may 
subsequently be relied upon in court. 
 
Principle 2: In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access original 
data, that person must be competent to do so and be able to give evidence 
explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions. 
 
Principle 3: An audit trail or other record of all Processes applied to digital 
evidence should be created and preserved.  An independent third party should be 
able to examine those processes and achieve the same result. 
 
Principle 4: The person in charge of the investigation has overall responsibility 
for ensuring that the law and these principles are adhered to. 
 
Since ACPO Good Practice Guide does not form a legal requirement within the UK 
jurisdiction, its application by DFIs is voluntary. 
 
2.4.6			Other	Guidelines		
Other guidelines with a single author have been reviewed and assessed under the 
“Model Assessment” section in this chapter.  These include guidelines by the US 
Department of Justice (Ashcroft, 2001) and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (Kent et al, 2006). 
2.5	 Method	of	Identifying	the	Previous	Models	
In order to perform a successful literature review, various online data resources 
accessed via the library of University of Derby were utilised.  The online data resources 
included, but were not limited to, Science Direct, IEEE and ACM digital libraries.  
Journal articles and conference proceedings related to this research were identified and 
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downloaded for study through the three aforementioned digital libraries.  Moreover, 
online search engines in particular Google Scholar, university repositories, 
governmental and reputable websites were used to identify papers related to this 
research.  Other resources of data included books and special magazines.  In order to 
identify the relevant papers, various search terms were performed, either 
unaccompanied or in combination.  These included: Computer forensics, digital 
forensics, process model, framework, methodology, ad-hoc, standards, collection, 
examination, guidelines, incident response, cybercrime, imaging and digital evidence.  
To ensure that all the papers containing the previously developed process models have 
been identified, the references in already-identified papers were cross-checked to ensure 
that no relevant paper was missing (an approach also taken by Adams (2012)).   
 
2.6	 Assessment	Criteria	for	the	Previous	Models	
Following on from the research aim, the underlying requirements of a digital forensic 
investigation process model are that: 
 
• The model must be comprehensive and detailed in that it encompasses the entire 
investigative process and contains granularity (low-level details). 
 
• The model must be formal in that it harmonizes and integrates previous models 
by creating a synergy between different points of view and then builds upon the 
models extensively. 
 
• The model must be generic in that it can be applied to both law enforcement and 
corporate investigations.  
 
As well as taking into consideration the research aim when assessing the previous 
models, three further different sets of assessment criteria have been employed to 
determine those models that can contribute to the design and development of the new 
model.  This is to establish whether there are any aspects of those “prevailing” models 
that can be used to assist in the design and development of the CDFIPM.  The three sets 
of assessment criteria that have been used as a framework against which the previous 
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models will be judged include: (1) the four-point requirement suggested by Beebe and 
Clark (2005), (2) the five-point requirement proposed by Carrier and Spafford (2003) 
and the five-point requirement set by Daubert Test (Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 1993).   
 
To assess each previous model against the three sets of assessment criteria, each model 
will be given three different scores, each of which refers to a particular set of criteria.  
The score given to each model in relation to a particular set of criteria will be based on 
how many of the requirements in that particular criteria have been met.  The score-
based approach used to assess the previous models is adopted on the basis that there are 
no other studies from which assessment data for previous models could be extracted 
(Adams, 2012).  Although two other researchers (Adams, 2012; Beebe and Clark, 2005) 
have used evaluation criteria for assessing previous models, their approach has been 
limited either to two sets of assessment criteria (Adams, 2012) or to one set of 
assessment criteria (Beebe and Clark, 2005), namely those of the Daubert Test (Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993) and Carrier and Spafford (2003).   
 
Thus, assessing the previous DFIPMs against “three” different assessment criteria have 
been conducted for the first time in the field of digital forensic science, which is another 
novel contribution of this research.  Such an approach should not, however, be 
considered as a conclusive assessment.  Instead, the score-based assessment employed 
is used to score the previous models in order to determine (as closely as possible) how 
many of the requirements of each given criteria have been fulfilled by a given model 
(Adams, 2012).  
 
2.6.1	Beebe	and	Clark’s	Four-Point	Requirement	
The followings summarize the four-point requirement set by Beebe and Clark (2005) 
against which the previous models can further be judged:  
 
1. A model must achieve scientific rigor and relevance. 
2. A model must simplify complex process to facilitate understanding of the 
underlying structure. 
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3. A model must retain enough granularity 18 , or the flexibility to incorporate 
granularity needed to exploit the framework in unique situations. 
4. A model must delineate standard assumptions, concepts, value and practices. 
 
The above four requirements can be explained in further detail: 
Rigor is attained through the use of Classes19 and Processes approach and the inclusion 
of important Principles, and the relevance is achieved via the use of objectives-based 
Phases and Sub-Phases.  In other words, in order for a model to achieve both rigor and 
relevance, it must be comprehensive such that it contains not only the higher-order 
layers, i.e. ‘Classes’, ‘Processes’, but also lower-level components, i.e. ‘Phases’ and 
‘Sub-Phases’, as well as important ‘Overriding Principles’ such as maintaining detailed 
documentation or preserving a chain of custody (requirement 1).  Simplification of 
complex digital investigative process can be achieved through a hierarchical process 
model which allows its users to focus on higher order layers abstractly (requirement 2).  
At the same time, granularity is achieved by incorporating multiple layers of details into 
the model, i.e. Processes, Phases and Sub-Phases (requirement 3).  Finally, a model can 
delineate standard assumptions, concepts, values, and practices through the use of 
constraints, definitions, principles, objectives, and task hierarchies. 
 
To judge each previous model against Beebe and Clark’s (2005) assessment criteria, 
each model will be given a score out of “4” on the basis of how many of the four 
requirements have been met.  To the thesis author’s best knowledge, no other researcher 
in the literature has used Beebe and Clark’s (2005) four-point assessment criteria 
previously to assess either their own models or the models proposed previously.  Thus, 
this four-point requirement has been used for the first time to assess the existing models 
in this thesis.    
 
																																																								
18 In this context, granularity refers to the extent to which a model is broken down into lower-level details 
(behavioral entities).  Granularity is also the level of detail considered in a model or decision making 
process. The greater the granularity, the deeper the level of detail. Granularity is usually used to 
characterize the scale or level of detail in a set of data. 
19 In the context of this study, the term ‘Class’ does not refer to the same term employed in object-
oriented programming, in which a class is a template definition of methods and variables in a particular.  
Instead, the word ‘Class’ is used throughout this study simply to refer to the specific category in which 
the proposed model’s Processes are placed.     	
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2.6.2			Carrier	and	Spafford	Five-Point	Requirement	
Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) five-point requirement set 20  by which the previous 
models can be further assessed are summarized as follows: 
 
1. The model must be based on existing theory for physical crime investigations; 
2. The model must have practicality matching steps taken in actual investigations; 
3. The model must be technologically neutral to ensure that the process isn’t 
constrained by current products and procedures;  
4. The model must be specific enough that general technology requirements for 
each phase can be developed; 
5. The model must be abstract and apply to law enforcement investigations, 
corporate investigations and incident response. 	 	
As with Beebe and Clark’s (2005) assessment criteria, to assess each previous model 
against Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) five-point requirement, each model will be given 
a score out of “5” on the basis of how many of the five requirements have been 
accomplished.  
2.6.3			Daubert	Test	Five-Point	Requirement	
The third set of assessment criteria that have been used to assess the previous models is 
that as outlined in the Daubert Test (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993)21.  
This test has also been selected based on the fact that it is a set of commonly-referenced 
criteria to judge the reliability of scientific evidence by many courts (Valjarevic and 
Venter, 2015; Casey, 2011).  The Daubert Test is used in many federal as well as some 
state courts in the United States to make an initial assessment of whether an expert’s 
scientific testimony is based on reasoning or methodology which is scientifically valid 
and can properly be applied to the facts (Cornell University Law School, 2016).  Using 
this test, the criteria that must be taken into consideration in establishing whether the 
methodology is valid include a set of “5” requirements as outlined in the section 2.3.2.2.  
																																																								
20 Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) five-point requirement have also been used by Beebe and Clark (2005) to 
assess their own model against as well as by Adams (2012) to assess the previous DFIPMs against. 
21 The Daubert Test has also been used by Adams (2012) for the first time in the field of digital forensics 
to assess the previous models against. 
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Similar to Beebe and Clark’s (2005) and Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) assessment 
criteria, to assess each previous model against Daubert Test five-point requirement, 
each model will be given a score out of “5” on the basis of how many of the five 
requirements have been achieved.  
2.7	 Review	and	Assessment	of	the	Previous	Models	
2.7.1			Palmer’s	FDFS	
On August 2001, the first Digital Forensic Research Workshop took place in Utica, 
New York.  This gathering was held in order to stimulate discussion among academics 
and practitioners with experience and interest in the field of Digital Forensic Science.  
The purpose of this workshop was to initiate establishing a community of interested 
individuals for defining the domain of digital forensics and identifying the difficult 
challenges facing the field.  The conference also included a session entitled “A 
Framework for Digital Forensic Science (FDFS)”, the aim of which was to “build a 
taxonomy to guide and direct research” and “identify the areas or categories that define 
the universe of Digital Forensic Science” (Palmer, 2001).  
 
The first effort to categorise digital forensic investigative process was made in the 
DFRWS’s final paper (Palmer, 2001) and included seven processes that were extracted 
from steps employed in digital forensic analysis.  The seven Processes included: 
Identification, Preservation, Collection, Examination, Analysis, Preservation and 
Decision as represented in Figure 2.  However, out of the seven Processes, the attendees 
identified only four processes, namely Preservation, Collection, Examination and 
Analysis, as core Processes even though many other researchers would dispute the 
forensic nature of each step of the process (Kohn et al, 2013; Casey, 2011; Pollit, 2009).  
Finding the consensus on exactly what comprises the “forensic process” appears to have 
been challenging with the final summary defining the incorporated Processes as being 
“…subject to the least confusion” amongst researchers and practitioners (Palmer, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
		 50	
Content was removed for copyright reasons. 
Palmer, G. (2001). ‘A Road Map for Digital Forensic Research’, First Digital Forensic 
Research Workshop (DFRWS), pp. 27-30. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The FDFS after Palmer (2001) 	
Although the Framework for Digital Forensic Science (FDFS) is a valuable source as a 
starting point, it was never intended to be the final model but instead as a foundation for 
future work that would define a full model and also as a framework for future research.  
The FDFS has come under criticisms by other researchers.  Reith et al. (2002) has 
criticised the model for being incomplete, while Baryamureeba and Tushabe (2004) 
have taken an issue with the model for its lack of descriptions for each given Process.  
Similarly, Ciardhuáin (2004) has criticised the model for the fact that it “does not 
discuss the steps of the model” and the fact that the model has a linear representation.  
Adams (2012) is also critical of this model for repetitions, stating “… preservation 
appears four times under different categories”.  
 
There are various other shortcomings associated with the FDFS.  The model is missing 
some very important investigative process such as Forensic Readiness, First Response, 
Secure and Evaluate the Crime Scene, Interpretation, Event Reconstruction, Reporting 
and Presentation.  The model has not also accommodated steps for digital evidence 
management such as those activities related to return, destruction or cleansing and 
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reusing of digital evidence.  More importantly, the FDFS has not incorporated the 
investigative principles which need to be carried out throughout the entire investigative 
process for the purposes of conducting forensically sound investigations.  The missing 
Principles include those pertaining to ‘Maintaining a Detailed Documentation’, 
‘Preserving Chain of Custody’, ‘Maintaining Information Flow’, ‘Interacting with 
Physical Investigation’, ‘Obtaining and Adhering to the Proper Legal Authorisation’ 
and ‘Addressing Safety Issues’.  It is reasonable to attribute the aforementioned stated 
criticisms and shortcomings to the fact that this model was the first attempt to define the 
digital investigative process.  In fact, the group (Palmer, 2001) themselves admitted that 
the model would need to be further developed in the future stating, “… Of particular 
interest is the need for continued development of methodologies employed within the 
discipline.”         
 
In terms of the Beebe and Clark criteria the FDFS meets only Requirements 2 and 3 as 
it is simple enough to be employed and also allows for the model to be infused with 
further details.  However, the model does not have scientific rigor or relevance due to its 
missing investigative processes as well as its lack of lower level details (Requirement 
1).  The FDFS has not also been capable of properly defining its concepts, such as those 
associated with the investigative principles (Requirement 4).  The Beebe and Clark 
score given to this model is 2/4. 
 
In relation to the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the FDFS meets only Requirements 3 
and 4 as it is not dependent on a particular technology (Requirement 3), and it is also 
specific enough to allow for the technology to be used to help the investigators 
(Requirement 4).  However, the model has no basis in theory for physical crime scene 
investigation (Requirement 1), nor is it practical since it has omitted some essential 
stages of the investigative process (Requirement 2).  Moreover, the model is not generic 
as it is only applicable to the field of law enforcement (Requirement 5).  The Carrier 
and Spafford score given to this model is 2/5.  
 
Based on the Daubert Test, the FDFS only meets Requirements 2 as it has been peer-
reviewed and published.  However, there is no evidence suggesting that the model has 
been tested (Requirement 1); as a result, its potential error rate is unknown 
(Requirement 3).  There is also no evidence showing that the model has referenced or 
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drawn upon any standard (Requirement 4).  This might be explained by the fact that at 
the time there were no proper guidelines associated with the field of digital forensic 
science.  Moreover, although the subsequent DFIPMs were developed as a result of the 
FDFS, there is no evidence suggesting that the model has been widely accepted within 
the field of digital forensic community.  The Daubert Test score given to this model is 
1/5. 
 
2.7.2			US	Department	of	Justice’s	ECSIGFR	
The U.S. Department of Justice published a process model in the “Electronic Crime 
Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders” (Ashcroft, 2001), that consists of 
the following phases: Preparation, Collection, Secure and Evaluate the Scene, 
Document the Scene, Evidence Collection, Examination, Analysis and Reporting.  This 
guide is a first responder’s reference to various types of electronic evidence and consists 
of procedures that can be employed to handle them safely.  The ECSIGFR is aimed at 
the investigators who respond to the physical crime scene; therefore, its focus is on 
those requirements.  This process model has only focused on the middle part of the 
investigative process missing important stages such as those related to the case 
initialisation and those associated with the investigation closure.  The ECSIGFR is also 
missing the “Presentation” Process, where the results of the investigation should be 
presented to the relevant audience. 
 
The ECSIGFR is very ambiguous in terms of the descriptions attached to its 
components.  For example, it regards the collection of the “physical hard disk” to be the 
collection of “electronic evidence”.  However, at this point in any digital investigation, 
it is very normal for investigators not to know whether the physical hard disk contains 
pertinent electronic evidence or not.  In line with the view of Montasari et al, (2015), 
Valjarevic and Venter (2015), Rogers et al. (2006) and Carrier and Spafford (2003), the 
collection of evidence very often takes place after it has been identified.  However, in 
this model, the evidence is collected before the digital data has been examined.  In their 
paper, Carrier and Spafford (2003) also highlight this issue, stating that the Collection 
Phase more precisely should collect the physical evidence, and the individual pieces of 
electronic evidence must be collected when it is examined.      
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Since the ECSIGFR’s components have been improperly defined, their objectives have 
also been confused.  For instance, the model has confused the “Analysis” Process with 
the “Interpretation” Process even though these two must be treated as two different 
Processes (Analysis must be carried out first so that its results can be interpreted next).  
This is due to the fact that both processes have different objectives, and each of them 
requires a unique set of investigative techniques to be performed properly.  
 
In relation to the Beebe and Clark four-point requirement, the ECSIGFR has only met 
Requirement 2 as it allows its users to focus on higher order layers abstractly.  
However, the model has no scientific rigor or relevance as it is not detailed and is 
missing essential stages of the investigative process (Requirement 1).  The model does 
not also have sufficient granularity, or does not allow for new layers of details to be 
added to it (Requirement 3).  The model’s components are also improperly defined 
(Requirement 4).  The Beebe and Clark score given to this model is 1/4.  
 
With regards to the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the model only meets Requirements 1 
and 3, as it has basis in existing theory for physical crime scene (Requirement 1), and it 
is not dependent on a particular technology (Requirement 3).  However, the ECSIGFR 
is not practical as it misses many steps that are parts of the actual investigative process 
(Requirement 2).  Also, the lack of guidance in its application and also ambiguous 
descriptions have prevented the design of technological tools to aid DFIs (Requirement 
4).  Moreover, the model is not applicable to various user communities as its only focus 
is on the field of incident response (Requirement 5).  The Carrier and Spafford score 
given to this model is 2/5. 
 
Concerning the Daubert Test, the ECSIGFR has not met any of the requirements.  There 
is no evidence suggesting that the model has been tested (Requirement 1); thus, its 
potential error rate is not known (Requirement 3).  The model has also not been 
subjected to peer review and publication (Requirement 2).  Moreover, there is no 
evidence suggesting that the model is based on a particular standard (Requirement 4), 
nor is there any evidence demonstrating that the model has been widely accepted in the 
digital forensics community (Requirement 5).  The Dauber Test score given to this 
model is 0/5. 
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2.7.3			Reith	et	al’s	ADFM			
Criticizing the previous methods for being too technology specific, Reith et al. (2002) 
proposed the ADFM in an attempt to improve upon the previous models via “the 
amalgamation of common techniques” while attempting to ensure method shortfalls 
were addressed.  Reith et al. (2002) identified the common components from the 
previous models and incorporated those common components into their Abstract Digital 
Forensic Model.  Although the ADFM is mainly based upon the initial model of Palmer 
(2001), it adds a description for each Phase.  This model is based on nine phases as 
follows:  
 
• Phase 1 (Identification) is where an incident is detected, and its type is 
determined.   
• Phase 2 (Preparation) involves preparing tools, techniques, authorisations and 
management support. 
• Phase 3 (Approach Strategy) includes developing an approach based on the 
potential impact on bystanders and the specific technology in question. 
• Phase 4 (Preservation) involves preserving the state of physical and digital 
evidence by preventing people from using the device containing potential digital 
evidence or using any electromagnetic device within an affected radius.   
• Phase 5 (Collection) includes recording the physical scene and duplicating 
digital evidence using standardized and accepted procedures.  
• Phase 6 (Examination) involves the investigators performing an in-depth search 
of evidence concerning the suspected crime. 
• Phase 7 (Analysis) requires the investigators to determine significance, 
reconstruct fragments of data and draw conclusion based on the evidence found. 
• Phase 8 (Presentation) involves summarising the conclusions that should be 
provided in a layperson’s terms using abstracted terminology. 
• Phase 9 (Return Evidence) involves returning physical and digital evidence to its 
rightful owner.   
 
Unlike many other process models where Examination and Analysis are treated as a 
single phase, Reith et al. distinguishes between the two processes. Examination Phase in 
this model involves investigators performing an in-depth search of evidence concerning 
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the suspected crime, while the Analysis Phase requires the investigators to determine 
significance, reconstruct fragments of data and draw conclusion based on evidence 
found.  However, Carrier and Spafford (2003) have criticised such an approach arguing 
that that the names of the Examination and Analysis Phases included in this model can 
be confusing because their meaning is only slightly different, and it is common to have 
two investigators who are referring to the same tasks when they say that they are 
“analyzing a system” or “examining a system”.  This criticism seems to be invalid as 
the Examination and Analysis have different aims and therefore should be assigned two 
separate phases.  Examination Phase should involve activities regarding the extraction 
of potential digital evidence from the acquired data (Montasari, 2016, a and c; Kohn et 
al., 2013), whereas the Analysis Phase should involve activities related to the 
methodical analysis of the digital evidence as well as the construction of the incident 
(Montasari, 2016, a and c; Casey, 2011).  Although this model provides a general 
framework that can be applied to a range of incidents, it has various shortcomings, some 
of which are identified by the authors themselves.  Reith et al. (2002) acknowledge 
three disadvantages of applying their model as follows: 
 
• Categories may be defined as too general for practical use 
• There is no easy or obvious method to test the model. 
• Each sub-category added to the model will make it more cumbersome to use.  In 
other words, as the model is expanded to increase its granularity, it becomes 
more complex and more cumbersome to use (Adams, 2012). 
(Reith et al, 2002) 
 
In addition, although ‘Chain of Custody’ is a vital aspect of any digital forensic 
investigation, this investigative Principle has not been explicitly incorporated into the 
ADFM, a point also raised by Adams (2012) and Ciardhuáin (2004).  Instead, Reith et 
al. (2002) have stated, “This model assumes that a strong chain of custody will be 
maintained throughout the duration of the investigation. The absence of it on the model 
above makes no presumptions that it is not important, only that it is implied in any 
discussion of forensics.”  Ciardhuáin (2004) criticizes the Reith et al’s (2002) model for 
its lack of explicit mentioning of the “Chain of Custody” stating, 
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The single largest gap in the existing models is that they do not explicitly 
identify the information flows in investigations. For example, Reith et al. (2002) 
themselves have noted the absence of any explicit mention of the chain of 
custody in their model. This is a major flaw when one considers the different 
laws, practices, languages, and so on which must be correctly dealt with in real 
investigations. 
 
Other authors such as Boddington t al. (2008), Peisert et al. (2008), Selamat et al. 
(2008), as cited by Adams (2012), adopt the same criticism of the AFPM for its lack of 
the explicit inclusion of the “Chain of Custody”.  However, in accordance with the 
ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence (2012), ISO/IEC 27043 (2015) and 
other researchers including Montasari (2016, c), Valjarevic and Venter (2015), this 
important investigative Principle must be explicitly covered in a DFIPM.  Further 
shortcomings of the ADFM relates to some important stages of digital investigation that 
are absent in this model.  For instance, the model does not contain a Forensic Readiness 
stage as emphasised by Montasari et al. (2015), by ISO/IEC 27043 (2015), ISO/IEC 
27035 (2012) and Rowlingson (2004) to ensure that both Infrastructure Readiness and 
Operational Readiness are in place prior to a possible incident or security breach.  One 
might argue that the Preparation Phase of the ADFM would simply accommodate for 
the Forensic Readiness activities.  However, the Preparation Phase included in this 
model is mainly focused on the activities related to a law enforcement environment.  
Also, a distinction always needs to be made between the Forensic Readiness Phase 
referring to the readiness of the organisation as a whole and the Preparation Phase 
referring to the readiness of the investigators, a view implicitly supported by Valjarevic 
and Venter (2015), Kohn et al. (2013), Rowlingson (2004) and Carrier and Spafford 
(2003).  Another major drawback of this model is associated with its lack of graphical 
representation.  
 
In relation to the Beebe and Clark criteria, the ADFM meets Requirement 4 fully and 
also meets Requirements 1 and 3 partially.  The model is clear in the description of its 
Phases even though it lacks investigative principles (Requirement 4).  The ADFM has 
also achieved scientific rigor and relevance to some extent as it has captured most of the 
investigative stages despite missing some steps (Requirement 1).  Furthermore, 
although the model has not incorporated lower-layers of details, it allows for the model 
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to be infused with additional details (Requirement 3).  However, the ADFM has not 
been capable of simplifying the complex investigative process as the model lacks 
graphical representation (Requirement 2).  The Beebe and Clark score given to this 
model is 2/4 as the model meets Requirements 1 and 3 partially.       
 
In terms of the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the ADFM meets all the requirements 
except Requirement 2.  The model has a basis in existing physical crime scene theory 
(Requirement 1), and it is not dependent on a specific technology (Requirement 3).  The 
ADFM is also specific enough to allow for technology to be developed to assist the 
investigators.  Moreover, the model is relevant to both law enforcement and corporate 
investigations (Requirement 5).  However, the model has major drawbacks in relation to 
practicality and its capability to accommodate changes without becoming overly 
complicated (Requirement 2).  The Carrier and Spafford score given to this model is 
4/5. 
 
Based on the Daubert Test, the ADFM meets only Requirement 2 as the model has been 
subjected to peer review and publication.  However, as Reith et al. (2002) themselves 
admit, the ADFM has not been tested (Requirement 1); therefore, its potential error rate 
is unknown (Requirement 3).  There is also no evidence suggesting that the model is 
based on a standard (Requirement 4), nor does there exist evidence of the model having 
been widely accepted within the digital forensic community (Requirement 5).  The 
Daubert Test score given to the AFPM is 1/5. 
 
2.7.4			Carrier	and	Spafford’s	IDIP	
The Integrated Digital Investigative Process (IDIP) developed by Carrier and Spafford 
(2003) has seventeen Phases organized into five groups as illustrated in Figure 3.  This 
model applies physical crime scene Processes into the digital crime scene with the 
computer being treated as a “door to another room”.  In order to describe the differences 
and similarities between a physical and digital crime scene, Carrier and Spafford define 
the physical crime scene as “an environment where physical evidence of a crime or 
incident exists”.  The environment where the first criminal act occurred is the primary 
physical crime scene and subsequent scenes are secondary physical crime scenes.  The 
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digital crime scene is also defined as “the virtual environment created by software and 
hardware where digital evidence of a crime or incident exists”.   
 
Although Carrier and Spafford’s IDIP is considered to be one of the most prominent 
process models presented to date (Montasari 2016, a, b and c, Valjarevic and Venter 
2015; Adams, 2012, Beebe and Clark, 2005), it is open to some valid criticisms.  For 
instance, the model represents the “Deployment” Phase (that contains confirmation of 
the incident) as being independent of the physical and digital investigation.  In practice, 
it appears impossible to confirm a digital crime unless some initial physical and digital 
investigation is conducted.  Baryamureeba and Tushabe (2004), despite being in favour 
of the IDIP, criticise the model for not providing “sufficient specificity” and question 
the practicality of the model by drawing an analogy to illustrate the problem associated 
with this model.  According to the analogy, the primary crime scene is where the crime 
is initiated; the target of the malicious activity is the victim’s location which is the 
secondary crime investigation.  The physical and digital investigation processes of 
Carrier and Spafford’s model do not include the secondary crime scene. The fact that 
the malicious activity is not included in the physical or digital investigation can have a 
negative effect on the possible reconstruction of a sequence of events. Therefore, 
according to Kohn et al. (2013), this can lead to incomplete findings in the report 
presented to the relevant audience.  However, this criticism is invalid on the basis that 
other authors such as Mercuri (2005) and Reith et al. (2002), as cited by Adams (2012), 
concur that the approach for acquiring digital evidence is essentially the same as that 
employed in terms of acquiring traditional evidence.  Other authors such as Saferstein 
(2010) and Boddington et al. (2008) approve of Carrier and Spafford’s approach by 
drawing a fundamental similarity between the physical and digital crime scene domains. 
 
Rogers et al. (2006) have also criticised the IDIP stating that despite the fact that this 
model might be appropriate for investigations where the entire investigative process 
needs to be followed, the time limitations of certain investigations such as child 
abduction makes the model infeasible.  However, this criticism appears to be in sharp 
contrast with Baryamureeba and Tushabe’s (2004) commendation in relation to the 
IDIP.  Baryamureeba and Tushabe (2004) state that due to the fact that the IDIP has 
emphasized the reconstruction of events that have led to the incident and focused on 
reviewing the entire task, this will untimely build a mechanism for swifter forensic 
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examinations (Baryamureeba and Tushabe, 2004).  Moreover, courts often require 
investigators to conduct a digital investigation using a methodical process in order that 
courts can assess the reliability of digital evidence presented to them.  This means that 
the notion of swift data examination and analysis suggested by Rogers et al. (2006) in 
itself is very likely to attract serious challenges by courts (Adams, 2012).   
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Figure 3. The IDIP after Carrier and Spafford (2003) 	
Although some criticisms have been levied upon the IDIP, many researchers (Montasari 
et al, 2015; Valjarevic and Venter 2015; Adams et al, 2014; Kohn et al, 2013; Casey, 
2011) have adopted many of the ideas introduced by the model, especially the concept 
of “digital crime scene”.  The major and novel contribution of the IDIP is the 
introduction of the concept of the interaction with “physical investigation”.  Another 
main benefit of the model is due to the fact that it has demonstrated well the 
investigative process, such as Data Collection, Interrogation, Analysis and Reporting.  
 
Based on the Beebe and Clark criteria, the IDIP has only met Requirement 4.  The 
model cannot be said has achieved scientific rigor and relevance as it is not 
comprehensive, in that it is missing lower-level components (Requirement 1).  Also, 
since the model is not hierarchical, it has not achieved complex process simplification 
(Requirement 2).  The model has not met the level of granularity specified by Beebe 
and Clark (2005) as it has not incorporated lower layers (Requirement 3).  However, the 
IDIP has been able to delineate standard assumptions, concepts, values, and practices 
through the use of constraints, definitions and principles (Requirement 4).  The Beebe 
and Clark score given to the IDIP is 1/4.   
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According to their own five-point criteria, the model is based on the existing theory for 
physical crime investigations as it has clearly established the interaction between the 
physical and digital scenes (Requirement 1).  The IDIP is also general in terms of 
technology (Requirement 3) and is specific enough to allow for the technology to be 
employed to aid the investigators (Requirement 4).  Moreover, the model is generic in 
that it can be applied to both law enforcement and corporate investigations 
(Requirement 5). The model’s practicality however is not clear and has come under 
criticisms (Beebe and Clark, 2005).  The Carrier and Spafford score given to this model 
is 4/5.   
 
In relation to the Daubert Test, the IDIP has met Requirements 2 and 5.  Although the 
model has been applied to case studies, it has not been tested by its intended user 
community (Requirement 1); therefore, its potential error rate is not known 
(Requirement 3).  There is also no evidence of any standard associated with this model 
(Requirement 4).  However, the model has been peer-reviewed and published 
(Requirement 2), and widely accepted and referenced in the digital forensic community 
(Requirement 5).  The Daubert Test score given to the IDIP is 2/5. 
 
2.7.5			Baryamureeba	and	Tushabe’s	EDIPM	
The Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model proposed by Baryamureeba and 
Tushabe (2004) is based on the original model developed by Carrier and Spafford 
(2003).  The EDIPM follows the same principle in that the digital investigation is 
treated the same as the physical investigation.  The model consists of five Phases 
including: Readiness, Deployment, Trace Back, Dynamite and Review as shown in 
Figure 4.  As with Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) IDIP model, the EDIPM incorporates 
the physical crime scene.  However, unlike the IDIP, this model separates the 
investigation at the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ crime scenes while representing the 
phases as iterative rather than linear.  Moreover, Baryamureeba and Tushabe (2004) 
drops the two ‘Reconstruction’ Phases proposed in Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) 
model, which they claim can result in inconsistency, and instead propose a new Phase, 
namely the “Traceback” Phase.  This new Phase is intended to enable the investigators 
to trace back to the previous phases in the investigation.  The remaining phases included 
in the EDIPM are the same as those in IDIP.  The EDIPM consists of 5 Phases 
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including: Readiness, Deployment, Trace Back, Dynamite and Review. Figure 4 is the 
graphical representation of the EDIPM.  Figure 4 is the graphical representation of the 
EDIPM. 
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Figure 4. The EDIPM after Baryamureeba (2004) 	
Although Baryamureeba and Tushabe (2004) claim that their EDIPM is an enhanced 
version of the Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) IDIP, they have added little to the IDIP.  In 
fact, this model is not as rigorous as that of Carrier and Spafford’s.  The EDIPM is 
aimed at only the field of incident response and neglect the domain of law enforcement.  
Adams (2012) criticises this model for the ambiguous definitions of the activities in the 
model such as the terms “multiple analysis” and “synchronised”, for which no 
explanations are provided and which do not have clear meaning in the context of 
“Analysis”.  Similarly, Perumal (2009) takes issue with the EDIPM as it is missing 
necessary investigative Principles such as ‘Chain of Custody’.  Another shortcoming of 
this model is that it has not been tested by the experts in the field or applied to any case 
study.   
 
In relation to the Beebe and Clark criteria, the EDIPM has not met any of the four 
requirements.  The model does not have scientific rigor or relevance (Requirement 1), 
nor has it incorporated enough details or allowed for the model to be infused with 
additional layers of details (Requirement 3).  The model also does not include 
investigative Principles, and the description provided for some of its components are 
not clear (Requirement 4).  The Beebe and Clark score given to this model is 0/4. 
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Based on the Carrier and Spafford five-point requirement, the EDIPM has only met 
Requirement 1 by providing a relationship between the physical and digital 
investigations.  The model is not practical as it has not been tested to determine its 
practicality (Requirement 2), nor is it technologically neutral as it has focused on 
incident response (Requirement 3).  Also, the lack of guidance in its application, and its 
ambiguous descriptions have prevented the design of technological tools to aid DFIs.  
Moreover, the EDIPM is not applicable to various user communities as its only focus is 
on the field of incident response.  The Carrier and Spafford score given to this model is 
1/5.   
 
Regarding the Daubert Test, the EDIPM has only met one of the five requirements, in 
that it has been subjected to peer-review and publication (Requirement 2).  The EDIPM 
has not been tested by its intended user community (Requirement 1); thus, its potential 
error rate is not known (Requirement 3).  There is also no evidence suggesting that the 
model has been based on a particular standard (Requirement 4).  In addition, the model 
appears not to have been widely accepted by the digital forensic community 
(Requirement 5) as there has been no further development of the model since it was first 
published.  The Daubert Test given to this model is 1/5. 
 
2.7.6			Ciardhuáin’s	EMCI	
An Extended Model of Cybercrime Investigation (EMCI) proposed by Ciardhuáin 
(2004) is the most comprehensive DFIPM presented to date.  Ciardhuáin (2004) merges 
the previously proposed models and extends them by addressing certain activities not 
incorporated into the previous models.  Ciardhuáin’s proposed model includes thirteen 
activities, as shown in Figure 5 in order to model the whole “Information Flow” 
pertaining to a digital forensic investigation.  The EMCI has a linear representation, 
where the Processes follow the waterfall model allowing the investigators to backtrack 
to certain Processes if needed.  Ciardhuáin takes issue with certain previous models, 
such as Reith et al’s (2002) model, and their lack of explicit mentioning of “Chain of 
Custody” (Adams, 2012).  He considers the Chain of Custody as an instance of 
Information Flow and argues that the Chain of Custody should be created by those who 
have handled a piece of evidence and must pass it from one stage to the next, with 
names added at each step.    
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Figure 5. The EMCI after Ciardhuáin (2004) 
 
The main contribution of the EMCI is the fact that the model explicitly captures the 
“Information Flows” in an investigation (from the moment incident is detected until the 
investigation is concluded.) as opposed to only the processing of evidence.  One of the 
weaknesses of this model is the fact that it has excluded certain important steps such as 
the return or destruction of digital evidence at the end of investigation.  Another 
shortcoming of this model lies in the fact that the terminology used to describe each 
activity is not clearly defined (Casey, 2011).  For instance, it is ambiguous whether 
Ciardhuáin (2004) discounts the “Preservation” step since it is not regarded necessary, 
or because it is considered as part of the “Acquisition” Process.  Casey (2011) has also 
criticised this model for not defining goals (an important requirement) within each step 
in an investigation.  Thus, various users of the model might take different approaches at 
each stage of a digital investigation, possibly infringing on important forensic 
principles.  
 
In relation to the Beebe and Clark criteria, the EMCI has achieved Requirements 2 and 
4 and Requirement 1 partially.  Although the model is comprehensive in capturing the 
entire investigative process, this is limited only to higher-order process (single-layer 
details).  The EMCI does not provide the lower-level details needed to guide DFIs 
(Requirement 1).  The model has successfully simplified the complex investigative 
process due to its high-order Processes (Requirement 2).  However, the EMCI does not 
contain the lower-level details needed to retain enough granularity to take advantage of 
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the model in unique situations (Requirement 3).  The EMCI defines standard 
assumptions and concepts such as ‘Information Flow’ through the employment of 
constraints, even though the definitions provided in the model have been criticised by 
Casey (2011) for their ambiguity.  The Beebe and Clark score for the EMCI is 2.5/4.   
 
With regards to the Carrier and Spafford criteria, this model meets all five requirements.  
It has basis in the existing physical crime scene (Requirement 1); the model appears to 
be practical enough as it has been tested by its intended user community (Requirement 
2).  It is also technologically neutral (Requirement 3), and appears to be capable of 
identifying opportunities for development and deployment of technology to aid the 
work of DFIs (Requirement 4).  The model is also generic enough to be applied in both 
law enforcement and industry. 
 
Concerning the Daubert Test, the EMCI meets the first three requirements.   The model 
has been tested by DFIs operating within the law enforcement.  However, as the author 
himself identifies the need, the EMCI will also need to be tested in other environments 
that the model has claimed to cover such as auditing, civil litigation, investigations by 
system administrators and judicial inquiries.  The EMCI has been subjected to peer-
review and publication (Requirement 2) and its potential error rate appears to be known 
due to the model having been tested by experts (Requirement 3).  For instance, 
investigators participating in the testing of the EMCI state that no major elements have 
been omitted from the model.  However, the investigators have felt that there have been 
activities not normally identified as being separate from other investigative Processes, 
and some of these were considered as irrelevant for their work, namely Awareness, 
Transport, Storage and Dissemination (Ciardhuáin, 2004).  The investigators have 
further stated that there must be tighter control on flow of the information to avoid 
“information leakage” due to the needs for confidentiality required of them by external 
policies, regulation and legislation.  The EMCI does not, however, appear to have been 
widely accepted within the digital forensic field as it has not been further developed 
since its creation (Requirement 4).  There does not also appear to be any evidence 
suggesting that the model has adhered to a particular standard (Requirement 5).  The 
Daubert Test given to the EMCI is 3/4. 
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2.7.7			Rogers’	DCSA	
The Digital Crime Scene Analysis (DCSA) model proposed by Rogers (2004) builds 
upon the relationships between the digital and physical investigations as first proposed 
by Carrier and Spafford (2003) and further supported by Baryamureeba and Tushabe 
(2004).  Rogers (2004), as cited by Adams (2012), acknowledges the contribution of the 
previous models in particular that developed by Carrier and Spafford (2003).  However, 
Rogers argues that “...what is still lacking is an applied/practical approach to dealing 
with digital crime scenes and the digital evidence contained therein” (Adams, 2012).  
Rogers (2004), also cited by Adams (2012), criticizes previous models arguing that they 
have mainly focused on incident response and neglected important aspects of law 
enforcement activities such as ‘Chain of Custody’ and the need to adhere to relevant 
rules.  He states that a model should include a discrete element in relation to the Chain 
of Custody as this Principle becomes very important when the case is brought to a court 
of law.  This criticism is levied against those authors, such as Reith et al. (2002), who 
argue that although their models do not include a distinct Phase for the chain of custody, 
this is implied as part of their models.   
 
Rogers (2004) further criticises previous models by arguing that they envisage one 
person to have all the required skills to acquire digital data from all the digital sources 
such as hard disks, routers and networks.  He states that this is not the case in non-
digital forensic investigations where different specialists will be involved in specific 
areas of evidence gathering such as fingerprinting and DNA material (Adams, 2012).  
This argument is valid on the basis that the technology is rapidly changing and therefore 
expecting one individual to have all the necessary skills in all areas of digital data 
acquisition appears to be unrealistic.  This argument is further validated by ISO/IEC 
2037 (2012), where investigators with particular skills are assigned different roles and 
responsibilities.  The novel contribution of the DCSA is the notion of “Forensically 
Sound Tasks” that result from “properties” of digital forensics and that consist of 
Authenticity, Chain of Custody, Integrity, Minimization and Reproducibility.   
 
Adams (2012) criticises the DCSA for the fact that separate tasks have been developed 
for “what could realistically be one task in practice”, namely “Survey the Scene” and 
“Document the Scene”.  Such criticism is invalid on the basis that in order to achieve 
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complex process simplification as suggested by Beebe and Clark (2005), a model’s 
components will need to be broken down to assist its intended users in understanding 
the activities contained in the model more clearly.  This criticism is further invalidated 
given that Adams (2012) goes on to adopt the same approach that he has criticised the 
DCSA for, in his own model (discussed later), where “Survey the Scene” and 
“Documentation” are two separate activities at the crime scene.      
 
In relation to the Beebe and Clark criteria, the DCSA meets all the requirements except 
Requirement 1.  The model does not have scientific rigor or relevance as it does not 
cover the entire investigative process, focusing only on the Analysis stage (Requirement 
1).  However, the DCSA has simplified the complex investigative process (Requirement 
2).  Although the model does not contain sufficient layers of details as it stands, it 
allows for the model to be filled with further components (Requirement 3).  Rogers 
(2004) has also delineated standard assumptions, concepts, value and practices in his 
model (Requirement 5).  The Beebe and Clark score given to the DCSA is 3/4. 
 
Based on the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the DCSA has achieved all of the 
requirements with the exception of Requirement 4.  The model has basis in existing 
theory for physical crime investigations (Requirement 2).  It is not restricted to a 
specific technology (Requirement 3) and has sufficient details to allow for the creation 
of technical aids (Requirement 4).  The DCSA is also applicable to various fields of 
digital forensics (Requirement 5).  However, it is not clear whether or not the DCSA 
matches the steps taken in actual investigations as it has not been tested by its user 
community (Requirement 2).  The Carrier and Spafford score given to the DCSA is 4/5.  
 
With regards to the Daubert Test, the DCSA has only met Requirement 2, being the fact 
that it has been peer-reviewed and published.  The model has not been tested 
(Requirement 1); therefore, its potential error rate cannot be determined (Requirement 
3).  Also, there does not exist an evidence of any standard that governs the DCSA’s 
operation (Requirement 4).  Moreover, the model has not been widely accepted in the 
digital forensic community (Requirement 5).  The Daubert Test given to the DCSA is 
1/4. 
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2.7.8			Beebe	and	Clark’s	HOBFDIP			
Beebe and Clark (2005) state that previous models lack the detail required to be of 
practical use; hence they proposed their model to focus on the lower-level activities of a 
digital investigation as opposed to abstract concepts.  This model consists of six Phases 
as illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Content was removed for copyright reasons. 
Beebe, N. and Clark, J. (2005). ‘A Hierarchical, Objectives-Based Framework for the 
Digital Investigations Process’, Digital Investigation, 2(2), pp.147–167. 
 
 	
Figure 6. The HOBFDIP after Beebe and Clark (2005) 	
At a first glance, it appears that this model has not built upon the previous models due 
to its common Phases.   However, upon a closer inspection of Beebe and Clark’s paper, 
it becomes clear that Beebe and Clark have provided lower-level details for the Analysis 
Phase even though the details are not incorporated into the graphical representation of 
the model.  Beebe and Clark’s model consists of Phases, Principles and Objectives.  
Phases are sequential, time-based and distinct in the process, whereas Principles are 
high-level procedures that apply to more than one Phase while Objectives are the 
intended outcomes.  There are various shortcomings associated with Beebe and Clark’s 
(2005) “Hierarchical, Objectives Based Framework for the Digital Investigation 
Process” as identified by the authors themselves.  These include: 
 
• Its proposed set of Objectives is incomplete.  
• The model needs to be expanded upon so that it can also be applied across 
various layers of abstraction as well as to various types of digital devices. 
 
Other shortcomings of the HOBFDIP include the fact that its lower-level details are 
only restricted to an initial Sub-Phase structure for the Data Analysis Process.  No 
additional layers of detail have been provided for other Processes in the model.  Also, 
the model is not generic as it is biased towards ‘network forensics’.  It has incorporated 
Phases that are often used in the context of incident response such as ‘network 
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monitoring’.  Moreover, although the model has been applied to two different case 
studies as part of its evaluation, no independent testing of the model has been carried 
out by its intended user community.  The notable contribution of this model is the 
concept of a “multi-tiered” approach, as opposed to the “single-layer” approach 
identified in the previous models.  Another contribution of this model is the introduction 
of “Principles” that should be applied throughout the investigative process such as 
“Information Flow”, “Documentation” and “Evidence Preservation” even though these 
Principles had been previously covered in Ciardhuáin’s (2004); Mandia et al. (2003); 
Carrier and Spafford (2003); Reith et al. (2002); Palmer (2001); Ashcroft, (2001). 
 
Based on their own four-point requirement, the HOBFDIP meets the first Requirement 
partially as its lower-level details are restricted only to the Analysis Process.  However, 
Requirements 2 and 3 are fulfilled as complex investigative process appears to have 
been simplified even though there is no evidence of the model’s application in real 
practice.  The HOBFDIP is also capable of being expanded and being infused with 
further granularity.  Requirement 4, however, has been partially fulfilled as there are 
some ambiguities in relation to definitions and some task hierarchies.  The Beebe and 
Clark score for the HOBFDIP is 3/4 as it has only partially met Requirements 1 and 4.   
   
In relation to the Carrier and Spafford five-point requirement, the HOBFDIP meets the 
first Requirement as it has basis in existing physical crime scene investigatory theory.  
In terms of Requirement 2, although Beebe and Clark argue that their model has 
practicality due to its level of details, there is no way of determining whether or not the 
model is actually practical, as it has not been tested by its user community.  The model 
does not also meet the third Requirement as it is not technologically neutral since its 
emphasis is on the network forensics (The authors themselves admit that their model 
needs to be expanded to cover different types of digital devices.).  However, the 
HOBFDIP fulfils Requirement 4 as its level of detail, even though incomplete, allows 
for the addition of specific requirements and gap analysis activities.  Similarly, the fifth 
Requirement is met by this model as it is applicable to both law enforcement and 
industry.  The Carrier and Spafford score for this model is 3/5.     
 
In terms of the Daubert Test, the HOBFDIP does not meet Requirement 1 as there is no 
evidence suggesting that it has been tested by its intended user community, nor is the 
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model’s potential error rate known as it has not been tested independently.  Also, there 
is no evidence of the model being associated with any standard or recognised 
guidelines.  However, the HOBFDIP appears to have been accepted within the digital 
forensic community as it is widely referenced.  The Daubert Test score for the 
HOBFDIP is 2/5 as it has partially met Requirements 1 and 4.       
 
2.7.9			Kent	et	al’s	FSFP		
Kent et al. (2006) created a guideline, the aim of which is to enable the organisations to 
develop their own digital forensic capability through IT professionals for security 
incident response.  Although the authors state that each organisation should employ the 
most suitable model based on their own requirements, they go on to propose a high-
level model, namely “Four Step Forensic Process”, consisting of four stages including: 
Collection, Examination, Analysis and Reporting.  Kent et al. (2006) consider the four 
steps as common stages of investigative process that have been derived from the 
previous models stating that the only difference is the level of details provided for each 
stage.  Figure 7 is the graphical representation of this model.  The FSFP is simple 
compared to those proposed by Ciardhuáin (2004) and Reith et al. (2002); however, 
Kent et al. (2006) delve into some details when describing different activities related to 
each of the four stages of the model.   
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Figure 7. The FSFP after Kent et al. (2006) 	
The FSFP has some merits but also some serious flaws.  Its strength lies in that fact that 
it has provided a large amount of background details to enable the organisations to build 
a general ability in relation to training, procedures and resources.  The model also 
provides some useful details in terms of the standard forensic procedures that could help 
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the organisations to develop their incident response abilities.  However, the FSFP has 
started from the middle part of the investigative process and misses out the preliminary 
activities, such as confirmation in relation to whether or not DFIs are authorised to 
initiate an investigation, and an initial Planning stage which is often followed by 
Preparation and attendance at the crime scene (Montasari et al, 2015; Adams et al, 
2014).  The model is also missing some post-data acquisition stages such as 
Interpretation, Event Reconstruction, Presentation and Investigation Closure, which are 
required as part of a complete investigative process.   
 
Further shortcoming of the FSFP is due to the fact that the activities specified for each 
stage are not explicitly represented in the graphical representation of the model but 
discussed in the text.  This significantly reduces the practicality of the model as DFIs 
would have no visual sighting of the activities that are not presented in the model if they 
were to adopt it.  One might argue that in that case the investigators could simply follow 
text; however, the counter-argument would be that this would be time-consuming given 
the scarcity of time imposed by issues such as authorisation or resources.  Moreover, 
this is in opposition to the complex process simplification requirement proposed by 
Beebe and Clark (2005) which requires the model to be detailed to assist the 
investigators when undertaking investigations.  The model has also inappropriately 
placed the correct set of activities into the incorrect groups, and in some cases the 
activities would need to be considered as separate and distinct ‘Processes’ on their own.   
For example, the Examination stage contains three activities including: “Develop a plan 
to acquire the data”, “Acquire the data” and “Verify the integrity of the data”.  Planning 
and Data Acquisition must be treated as two separate Processes on their own, given that 
each has a unique aim, a view supported by (Montasari et al, 2015; Valjarevic and 
Venter, 2015; Kohn et al, 2013; Casey, 2011).  Therefore, the absence of a clear 
structure as well as the lack of important activities in relation to both ‘pre-data’ and 
‘post-data’ acquisition significantly reduce the practicality of the model. 
 
In relation to the Beebe and Clark criteria, the FSFP does not meet the first two 
Requirements as the model is not structured (Requirement 1), and its higher-order 
stages have not been divided into additional layers to facilitate the complex process 
simplification (Requirement 2).  Although the model does not contain any granularity, it 
allows for the investigating organisations to adjust its details (explained in the text) to 
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match the organisations’ requirements (Requirement 3).  Moreover, the model is 
capable of defining some details to assist organisations in developing their digital 
forensic capability for security incident response (Requirement 4).  The Beebe and 
Clark score given to this model is 2/4.   
 
With regards to the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the FSFP meets Requirements 1, 3 and 
4.  The model is based on physical investigation as well as digital investigation 
(Requirement 1), and it is not dependent on any specific technology (Requirement 3).  
The model is also specific enough to facilitate technology requirement development 
(Requirement 4).  However, the FSFP is not practical due to missing out essential stages 
of the investigative process as well as incorrectly grouping its activities (Requirement 
2).  Moreover, the model is not generic as it only focuses on the domain of incident 
response (Requirement 5).  The Carrier and Spafford score given to this model is 3/5. 
 
In terms of the Daubert Test, the FSFP has not met any of the requirements as the model 
has not been tested by experts in the field, nor has it been subjected to scientific peer-
review or publication.  Its potential error rate is also unknown as no testing has been 
carried out on the model, and there is no evidence suggesting that the model has been 
influenced by any standard.  The model has not also been widely accepted in the digital 
forensic community.  The Daubert Test score given to this model is 0/5. 
 
2.7.10			Kohn	et	al’s	FDFI		
Kohn et al. (2006) proposed a three-stage “Framework for a Digital Forensic 
Investigation”, that consists of three Phases: Preparation, Investigation and Presentation 
as presented in Figure 8.   
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Figure 8. The FDFI after Kohn et al. (2006) 	
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The FDFI is simply the integration and adoption of the previously proposed 
frameworks.  According to the authors, the purpose of the framework is to provide a 
clear, step-by-step guide for the acquisition of evidence appropriate for presentation in 
courts of law.  The major drawback of the FDFI is the fact that it is a very high-level 
approach without providing sufficient details to assist investigators in conducting DFIs.  
As a result, this has significantly reduced its usability.  Although this framework has not 
made any new contribution (as no new steps are added in the framework), the authors 
have nevertheless described the importance of the legal requirements associated with 
the investigative process that the existing frameworks often neglect.  
 
In relation to the Beebe and Clark criteria, the FDFI meets only Requirements 2 and 4.  
The framework is simple enough to be followed (Requirement 2); also, the descriptions 
of the Phases are accurate and the authors have highlighted one of the important 
investigative Principles, namely the Legal Requirements (Requirement 4).  However, 
the framework cannot be considered scientifically rigorous or relevant as it has omitted 
essential investigative Processes (Requirement 1).  Also, the FDFI does not meet 
granularity requirement as it is simply a high-level framework (Requirement 3).  The 
Beebe and Clark score given to this framework is 2/4.   
 
With regards to the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the FDFI meets the first three 
Requirements.  It has basis in existing physical crime scene theory, and it appears to be 
practical even though it has not been tested by experts simply due to its very high-level 
structure (Requirement 2).  Moreover, the framework is technologically neutral without 
being limited to a specific technology (Requirement 3).  However, the absence of 
granularity hinders the development of technology to aid the framework’s 
implementation (Requirement 4).  This framework is not also applicable to various 
domains of digital forensics (Requirement 5).  The Carrier and Spafford score given to 
this framework is 3/5. 
 
Concerning the Daubert Test, the FDFI meets only Requirement 2 as it has been peer-
reviewed and published.  The framework has not been tested (Requirement 1), thus its 
potential error rate cannot be determined (Requirement 3).  In addition, there is no 
evidence that this framework is based on any standard.  Although Kohn et al. (2006) 
refer to ISO 17799 and COBIT, they do not draw upon the content of these standards.  
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They simply state that all organisations (those within South Africa) must have these 
standards as well as their own policies and procedures in place so that these can assist 
them in digital investigations (Requirement 4).  Furthermore, there is no evidence 
showing that the framework has been widely accepted in the field of digital forensics 
(Requirement 5) even though the authors developed the framework further in Kohn et 
al. (2013) (discussed later).  The Daubert Test score given to this framework is 1/5.    
 
2.7.11			Rogers	et	al’s	CFFTPM			
Computer Forensics Field Triage Process Model (CFFTPM) proposed by Rogers et al. 
(2006) uses Phases extracted from the Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) IDIP. The 
CFFTPM includes six Phases as shown in Figure 9. 
 
Content was removed for copyright reasons. 
Rogers, M., Goldman, J., Mislan, R., Wedge, T. and Debrota, S. (2006). ‘Computer 
Forensics Field Triage Process Model’, Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and 
Law, pp. 27-40. 
 
 
Figure 9. The CFFTPM after Rogers et al. (2006) 	
The advantage of the CFFTPM is due to its practical and pragmatic approach being 
developed in reverse of the previous DFIPMs.  Rogers et al. (2006) state that the 
model’s procedures used onsite are forensically sound and maintain the Chain of 
Custody.  There is, however, no explicit graphical representation of this important 
principle, nor is there any description of how the Chain of Custody should be 
maintained by DFIs.  This model is only appropriate for circumstances where a swift 
examination would need to be conducted at the crime scene.  This model should only be 
used “where appropriate and only after carefully weighing the legal and technical 
considerations associated with digital investigations”.  The authors have claimed that 
this model is suitable in diverse cases as financial fraud, identity theft, cyber stalking 
and murder making reference to the model’s six primary Phases (Planning, Triage, User 
Usage Profiles, Chronology Timeline, Internet, and Case Specific).  However, the 
model has not been tested in relation to cases involving the stated crimes.    
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The authors claim that the CFFTPM has been used in real life cases and that the 
evidence derived through the use of this model has not been challenged by the courts 
where it has been introduced.  However, in relation to the admissibility of evidence 
derived through the use of this model by courts of law, a question arises as to how the 
case can be developed against a defendant when the model has missed some very 
important stages.  The CFFTPM lacks Processes such as “Event Reconstruction” or 
“Interpretation”, during which a sequence of events is constructed to answer questions 
such as who, how, when, why and where.  The novel contribution of the Cyber 
Forensics Field Triage Process Model is that it has moved away from the traditional 
digital forensic approach of seizing a digital device, transporting it to the lab, making a 
forensic image, and then searching the entire system for potential evidence.  The 
CFFTPM’s focus is to enable DFIs to carry out ‘onsite triage’ to examine and analyse 
digital devices within hours as opposed to weeks or months.  One of the main 
shortcomings of this model is that it is not generic as it is only applicable to the law 
enforcement agencies.   
 
In relation to the Beebe and Clark criteria, the CFFTPM has partially met the first 
requirement.  The model has achieved both relevance and rigor in the sense that it has 
provided various Sub-Phases or tasks under each primary Phase even though they need 
to be modified based on the specifics of each investigation.  However, the model is not 
comprehensive and hence incomplete as it is missing various important stages of an 
investigative process including Readiness, Incident Detection, Preparation, DFL 
Examination and Analysis, Reporting, Presentation and Investigation Closure.  A 
complete digital investigative process should start from the point where the incident or 
crime is detected up to and including a point where the result of the investigation is 
presented to the relevant audience and the investigation is formally closed.   
 
Rogers et al. (2006) state that their model does not negate the capacity for a digital 
device to be transported back to a DFL for detailed examination and analysis after the 
initial onsite triage has been carried out.  However, they have not expanded on their 
models to provide additional components associated with post-data acquisition stage in 
a DFL.  Moreover, the authors have not explicitly incorporated any of the investigative 
Principles into the model even though they have stated that Chain of Custody must be 
maintained.  Thus, as the model stands in its current state, it is incomplete.  The 
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CFFTPM meets Requirement 2 as the authors have been able to simplify the process 
associated with the Onsite Triage.  However, it is not clear whether the authors would 
have been able to do the same complex process simplification, had they decided to 
include other investigative Processes in their model.  In relation to Requirement 3, the 
authors have been able to provide sufficient granularity for what they have attempted to 
achieve (onsite examination and analysis).  The CFFTPM has gone deep enough into 
some detailed components such as “Usage User Profiles”, “Chronology Timeline”, 
“Browsing Activities” and “Case Specifics”.  In terms of Requirement 3, the CFFTPM 
has met its criteria, i.e. it has provided constraints and definitions, and has objectives 
and task hierarchies to some extent, despite the fact that the model is missing 
investigative principles.  The Beebe and Clark score for the CFFTPM is 3.5/4 as it has 
partially met Requirement 1.         
 
In relation to the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the CFFTPM meets Requirements 1, 2, 3 
and 4.  The authors have clearly demonstrated that their model is based on physical 
crime scene investigation, since the onsite triage activities outlined in the model are 
implemented at the crime scene (Requirement 1).  The model is also practical matching 
the steps taken in actual investigations (Requirement 2).  It is not limited to a particular 
tool or technology (Requirement 3).  The CFFTPM also has sufficient details to 
facilitate the development of technical aids (Requirement 4).  However, the model does 
not meet Requirement 5.  Although Rogers et al. (2006) state that their model is general 
enough to be employed across a wide spectrum of investigations, it is only applicable to 
law enforcement investigations as the investigative approaches that were used to 
develop this model were derived primarily from child pornography cases.  The Carrier 
and Spafford score for the CFFTPM is 4/5.          
 
With regards to the Daubert Test, the CFFTPM meets all the criteria with the exception 
of requirement 5.  The model has been tested by various State and Local Law 
Enforcement Officers from Southern Indiana, USA (Requirement 1).  The model has 
also been subjected to peer review and publication (Requirement 2).  Moreover, the 
CFFTPM’s error rates appear to have been identified (Requirement 3) since the model 
has been used in some real-world cases, and the evidence acquired from these cases has 
not been challenged in the court proceedings where it has been introduced.  The 
CFFTPM has also been associated with some standards as it has complied with the 
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United States Federal and State rules for the admissibility of evidence (Requirement 4).  
However, there is no evidence that this model has been widely accepted by the digital 
forensic community; thus, it does not meet Requirement 5.  The Daubert Test Score 
given to the CFTTPM is 4/5.  
 
2.7.12			Freiling	and	Schwittay’s	CPMIRCF	
Freiling and Schwittay (2007) proposed “A Common Process Model for Incident 
Response and Computer Forensics” (CPMIRCF), where the authors make a distinction 
between digital forensics and incident response, consistent with the view expressed by 
Mandia et al. (2003).  Freiling and Schwittay argue that incident response should focus 
on the activities of organisations who have been subjected to security breaches with the 
main aim of quick detection, containment and recovery.  In contrast, digital forensics 
should be utilised to deal with acquiring, analysing and presenting digital evidence by 
using proven techniques and principles.  Although Freiling and Schwittay distinguish 
between incident response and digital forensics, they argue that these two fields should 
not be treated separately as there are many common elements between the two different 
environments.  Therefore, Freiling and Schwittay propose a model aimed at both 
incident response and digital forensics.  The CPMIRCF consists of three main Phases 
including: Pre-Analysis, Analysis and Post-Analysis.  
 
The Pre-Analysis Phase of the model contains three Sub-Phases dealing with steps and 
activities that are carried out prior to the actual analysis beginning.  The Analysis Phase 
contains five Sub-Phases dealing with the actual analysis while the Post-Analysis Phase 
is concerned with the documentation of the entire activities performed during the 
investigation.  This model has introduced a new component, Live Response, which is 
not explicitly mentioned in many of the previous process models.  The Live Response 
element is concerned with collecting information about an incident on hosts that are still 
running i.e. live.  The main drawback of this model pertains to the terminology, and the 
descriptions of the model’s components which are in contrast with other previous 
models.  For instance, the term Analysis is often used by the authors of DFPMs to 
describe the process of analysing the digital evidence after it has been acquired and 
examined (Casey, 2004; Reith et al, 2002; Palmer et al, 2001).    For instance, referring 
to Reith et al. (2002) and Palmer et al. (2001), Adams (2012) state that the term 
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Analysis is often used by these authors to describe the process of analysing digital 
evidence after it has been acquired and examined. However, Freiling and Schwittay 
consider this stage to cover all the activities between the initial incident and the 
preparation of a report (Adams, 2012).  This model has been criticised by Adams (2012) 
for the fact that the descriptions of its Sub-Phases do not correspond with the stated 
intention of Freiling and Schwittay to produce a generic model applicable to both 
incident response and digital forensic Processes.  For example, Adams (2012) takes 
issue with the Incident Detection of this model by stating that the description of this 
Sub-Phase “... is all about intrusion detection and other aspects of incident response”.  
Adams (2012) further argues that many of the tasks listed within the Initial Response 
Sub-Phase of the model do not have a generic equivalent, e.g. Network Monitoring, 
Removing Compromised Hosts and Initialising Packet Filtering.  Figure 10 represents 
Freiling and Schwittay’s CPMIRCF. 
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Figure 10. The CPMIRCF after Freiling and Schwittay (2007) 	
Using the Beebe and Clark criteria, the CPMIRCF has not met any of the requirements.  
The model has no scientific rigor or relevance as it is missing many steps that are part of 
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an actual investigation, and there is no investigative Principle included in the model.  
The CPMIRCF has not simplified the complex investigative process and is not multi-
layered, thus lacking sufficient details to assist the investigators.  Moreover, the 
components in the model do not have generic equivalent.  The Beebe and Clark score 
given to this model is 0/5. 
  
With regards to the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the CPMIRCF meets only 
Requirements 3 and 4.  The model is not based on existing theory for physical crime 
scene (Requirement 1), nor is it practical matching the steps taken in actual 
investigations (Requirement 2).  Moreover, the model is not generic as it is not 
applicable to various fields of digital forensic fields with its main focus being on 
incident response (Requirement 5).  However, the model is technologically neutral 
(Requirement 3), and it has adequate specificity due to its classification of activities 
(Requirement 5).  The Carrier and Spafford score given to this model is 2/5. 
 
In relation to the Daubert Test, the model has only met Requirement 2 as it has been 
peer-reviewed and published.  However, the model has not been tested; thus, its 
potential error rate is not known.  There is also no evidence of any standard associated 
with the model or no evidence suggesting that the model is widely accepted in the 
digital forensic community.  The Dauber Test score given to the CPMIRCF is 1/5.  
 
2.7.13			Khatir	et	al’s	TDERAPM			
Claiming that their model would present a detailed approach, Khatir et al. (2008) 
proposed an iterative process model, namely the Two-Dimensional Evidence Reliability 
Amplification Process Model (TDERAPM), consisting of sixteen Sub-Phases grouped 
into five Phases.  The TDERAPM also has four tasks that are “Umbrella Activities” 
relevant across all the Phases of the model.  Figure 11 below graphically represents 
Khatir et al’s (2008) TDERAPM. 
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Figure 11. The TDERAPM after Khatir et al. (2008) 	
From the graphical representation of this model, it appears that the coloured horizontal 
lines represent the importance and value of each Umbrella Activity within a particular 
phase (Adams, 2012).  However, Khatir et al. (2008) have not provided any information 
concerning how they have evaluated these measurements or how the units have been 
assessed, a point originally raised by Adams (2012).  The authors have not also 
provided information on how their four Umbrella Activities should be maintained 
(Adams, 2012). For example, according to the authors, the Preservation/Authenticity 
Umbrella Activity is intended to enable the forensic team to follow “...disciplined and 
fully documented steps”.  However, no information has been provided concerning what 
this means and how this is to be achieved in practice (Adams, 2012).  Moreover, a 
trivial discussion is provided in relation to computer tools that can be applied to all 
aspects of investigative process without further details being provided.  In line with the 
views expressed by other authors (Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Adams, 2012), it is 
unnecessary to incorporate into a process model details regarding what digital forensic 
tools should or should not be used.  This might negatively affect the flexibility required 
by the investigators who should use their own trainings and experience to adopt the 
correct set of tools.   
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Other shortcomings of this model relate to aspects of integrity regarding the acquired 
data and the return of evidence; Khatir et al. (2008) make reference to a table that is 
absent (Adams, 2012).  Furthermore, this model has not taken into account Information 
Flow, nor has it considered the physical investigation with the exception that it has 
provided a Sub-Phase for the Physical Evidence Collection.  Further shortcomings of 
the TDERAPM are associated with its discussion of the roles for the two sets of 
individuals including inspectors and managers that the authors have specified in their 
paper.  According to Khatir et al’s (2008) paper, the inspector has the role of performing 
the practical aspects of the investigation whereas the manager has the role of estimating 
costs, time and resources and acquiring an idea in relation to the potential results.  
Adams (2012) criticises such an approach, stating that although this might appear 
valuable in theory, it will not be practical.  Such a criticism is valid on the basis that the 
model assumes that all the earlier cases have been sufficiently logged and categorised 
despite no solution being suggested by the authors in their paper (Adams, 2012).  
Moreover, as Adams (2012) states, each specific case is very likely to have different 
details from the others.  Therefore, stating that the costs or the potential conviction rate 
can be predicted on the basis of the earlier cases appears to be naïve, in particular if 
there is no research to rely upon (which is often the case).   
 
Moreover, there are some other statements made by Khatir et al. (2008) that do not 
reflect the actual digital forensic practice and do not appear to be well researched.  For 
instance, the authors have stated, “The ultimate goal of a digital forensic investigation is 
to support the prosecution.”  Although prosecution can be a major element of a digital 
forensic investigation, this statement is flawed on two accounts.  Firstly, the actual goal 
of a digital investigation is to extract evidence from digital sources to prove or refute an 
offense (Casey, 2011; Baryamureeba and Tushabe, 2004, Palmer, 2001).  Secondly, 
Khatir et al’s (2008) statement has not taken into consideration the circumstances in 
which the case under investigation might not involve a prosecution (Adams, 2012).  For 
example, in situations where the case has not been serious enough to be referred to law 
enforcement, there will be no prosecution aspect to the case.  In such circumstances, the 
disciplinary actions will be carried out by company management themselves instead.    
 
Finally, the TDERAPM has not provided a new ‘practical’ contribution to the existing 
DFIPMs as its components have been simply derived from the previous models.  For 
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instance, issues associated with legal aspects, authorisation, development of the 
investigation plan and the team members’ selection have been previously covered by 
Freiling and Schwittay (2007), Brown (2006) and Ciardhuáin (2004).  Also, the model 
would be of no practical value due to the fact that no information is provided in relation 
to its implementation.  The TDERAPM is not also generic as it is aimed only at incident 
response; this becomes even more obvious through the use of certain statements made 
by Khatir et al. (2008), themselves, such as the need to reinforce the compromised 
organisations’ security.  The main contribution of this paper is the theoretical concept of 
‘management issues’ introduced as an “umbrella activity” and ‘Case Management/Team 
Setup’, as opposed to practical process issues.   
 
In relation to the Beebe and Clark (2005), the TDERAPM meets only Requirement 2, 
where the model has been able to conduct the complex process simplification to some 
extent through its high-level Phases and Sub-Phases.  However, the model has no 
scientific rigor due to missing many details, which also greatly reduces its scientific 
relevance (Requirement 1).  In terms of the granularity of the model, although it has 
incorporated Sub-Phases categorised into groups of Phases, these are high-level without 
providing essential level of details (Requirement 3).  The model has also not delineated 
standard assumptions, concepts, and values in relation to digital forensic practice.  The 
paper has presented many uninformed and flawed discussions as stated while analysing 
the model with regards to digital forensic practice that are open to challenge 
(Requirement 4).  The Beebe and Clark score given to this model is 1/4. 
 
Based on the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the TDERAPM meets only Requirements 3 
as it is technologically neutral (Requirement 3).  However, the model has no basis in the 
existing theory for physical crime scene (Requirement 1).  Furthermore, despite the fact 
that Khatir et al. (2008) have identified key factors of an investigation in a high-level 
approach, such a high-level approach will be of no practical value, a view supported by 
Beebe and Clark (2005), since the model is missing essential details (Requirement 3).  
Therefore, this will significantly constrain the ability to design technology to aid DFIs 
using the model (Requirement 4).  In addition, the TDERAPM is not applicable to all 
user communities as its only focus is on the field of incident response.  The Carrier and 
Spafford score given to this model is 1/5.       
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Using the Daubert Test, the TDERAPM meets only Requirement 2 as it has been peer 
reviewed and published.  The model has not been tested (Requirement 1); therefore, its 
potential error rate is unknown (Requirement 3).  Furthermore, there are no standards 
referenced by or associated with the TDERAPM (Requirement 4), nor is there any 
evidence suggesting that the model has been widely accepted by the digital forensic 
community (Requirement 5).  The Daubert Test given to this model is 1/5.  
 
2.7.14			Selamat’s	MPDFIF		
Selamat et al. (2008) claimed that they had identified common Phases in the previous 
models and had mapped them to a “more concise model” to produce a map of digital 
forensic investigations framework.  Five Phases are identified in this model, Mapping 
Process of Digital Forensic Investigation Framework, including: Preparation, Collection 
and Preservation, Examination and Analysis, Presentation and Reporting and 
Disseminating the Case.  The authors state that their study of thirteen previous models 
reveal a number of redundant steps and Processes with different terminologies, and as a 
result they mapped the previous models in an attempt to simplify those previous 
complex models.   
 
Contrary to what Selamat et al. (2008) claim, the MPDFIF has various shortcomings.  
The authors state that their model can be used as a “general digital forensic 
investigation model for investigating all incident cases without tampering the evidence 
and protecting the chain of custody”.  However, upon a closer inspection of the 
MPDFIF, it becomes evident that this model is far from being applicable to the different 
fields of digital forensics.  For example, certain Phases relevant to the field of 
commerce that should be incorporated into a generic model are missing in the MPDFIF, 
such as Forensic Readiness, which is considered to be essential to prepare organisations 
for a possible incident or a security breach (Valjarevic and Venter, 2015, Montasari et 
al, 2015, Rowlingson, 2004).   
 
Also, important Phases relevant to the Incident Response such as pre-incident 
preparation requirements from the “A Common Process Model for Incident Response 
and Computer Forensics” of Freiling and Schwittay (2007) are missing even though 
Selamat et al. (2008) claim that their model is based on the integration of the previous 
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models.  The MPDFIF also lacks a graphical representation to assist the investigators in 
conducting digital investigations.  The details associated with each Phase of this model 
are also very ambiguous, and no investigative principle (such as Obtaining Appropriate 
Authorisation, Keeping an Audit Trail of all the Activities or Maintaining Chain of 
Custody) have been considered in the MPDFIF.  
 
In relation to the Beebe and Clark criteria, the MPDFIF does not meet any of the 
requirements as it has no scientific rigor or relevance.  The model also does not have 
any graphical representation, and as a result there is no complex process simplification 
associated with it.  Moreover, the MPDFIF does not incorporate any level of details, nor 
are the descriptions of the Phases in the model clear.  The Beebe and Clark score given 
to the MPDFIF is 0/4.  
 
Based on the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the MPDFIF meets only Requirement 3 
since it is not dependent on a specific technology.  However, the model has no basis in 
existing physical crime scene theory as there are no activities in the model pertaining to 
those of physical crime scene (Requirement 1).  Since the MPDFIF is also missing 
some necessary steps of the investigative process and it has not been tested, the model 
cannot also be considered practical (Requirement 2).  The lack of adequate details and 
clear definitions provided by the authors also prevents the implementation of 
technology to aid the model’s development implementation (Requirement 4).  This 
model is not also generic as it only focuses on the domain of incident response.  The 
Carrier and Spafford score given to the MPDFIF is 1/5.   
 
Using the Daubert Test, the MPDFIF only meets Requirement 1 as it has been peer-
reviewed and published.  The model has not been tested (Requirement 1); therefore, its 
potential error rate is not known (Requirement 3).  There is also no standard referenced 
by this model (Requirement 4), nor is there any evidence showing that the model has 
been widely accepted in the digital forensic community (Requirement 5).  The Daubert 
Test score given to the MPDFIF is 1/5.   
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2.7.15			Cohen	et	al’s	DFPM		
Cohen (2009) proposed a Digital Forensic Process Model, that consists of seven 
Processes including: Identification, Collection, Transportation, Storage, Examination 
and Traces, Presentation and Destruction.  Since the focus of the DFPM is on the 
examination of digital evidence, it only covers the middle stages of the investigative 
process.  This has led to the model omitting some essential stages of the investigative 
process including those related to preliminary activities and those associated with post-
data acquisition and examination.  Some of the preliminary activities that the DFPM is 
missing include those related to Obtaining Authorisation (Montasari et al, 2015; 
Ciardhuáin, 2004), Preparing Tools and Techniques (Casey, 2011), Understanding Task 
Requirements (Adams et al, 2014), Performing Risk Assessment (Montasari, 2016, a 
and b; Rowlingson, 2004) and selecting the investigative team as well as defining roles 
and responsibilities (Brown, 2006), etc.  The post examination activities that this model 
is missing include those related to Reporting and Investigation Closure. 
 
The model has also inappropriately placed the Analysis, Interpretation, Attributions and 
Reconstruction activities under the Examination Process. However, Analysis, 
Interpretation and Reconstruction activities must be treated as distinct and separate 
“Processes” (Montasari et al, 2015; Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Carrier and Spafford, 
2003), and Attribution must be treated as a Phase under the Analysis Process (Kohn et 
al, 2013; Casey, 2011).  The main advantage of the DFPM is its inclusion of the 
Reconstruction stage, which is missing in almost all the previous DFIPMs with the 
exception of the models proposed by Casey (2011) and Carrier and Spafford (2003).  
The Reconstruction step in Cohen’s (2009) model refers to a set of mechanisms that 
have given rise to the effect of digital evidence produced.  Therefore, according to the 
model, Reconstruction is a process through which the investigators will need to list 
certain assumptions and limitations in order to present how evidence came into 
existence.   
 
Using the Beebe and Clark criteria, the DFPM meets only Requirement 2 and 3 as it is 
simple enough to be employed and also allows for the model to be infused with further 
details.  The model does not have scientific rigor or relevance due to its omitting 
important stages of the investigative process and has not been capable of properly 
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defining its concepts, as its components have been grouped incorrectly.  The Beebe and 
Clark score given to this model is 2/4. 
 
In relation to the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the DFPM meets only Requirements 3 
and 5 as it is not dependent on a particular technology (Requirement 3) and also can be 
applied to the different user communities (Requirement 5).  The model has no basis in 
the theory for physical crime scene investigation (Requirement 1), nor is it practical 
because it has omitted some essential stages of the investigative process (Requirement 
2).  The DFPM is not also specific enough to allow for the technology to be used to help 
the investigators (Requirement 4).  The Carrier and Spafford score given to this model 
is 2/5.  
 
Based on the Daubert Test, the DFPM only meets Requirement 2 as it has been peer-
reviewed and published.  However, there is no evidence of the model having been 
tested, its error rate being known, any standard governing its procedures, or it being 
widely accepted in the digital forensic community.  The Daubert Test score given to this 
model is 1/5. 
 
2.7.16			Yusoff	et	al’s	GCFIM	
Yusoff et al. (2011) state that they reviewed a selected number of previous models and 
identified common processes from those models to propose their Generic Computer 
Forensics Investigation Model.  The GCFIM contains the following five stages: Pre-
Process, Acquisition and Preservation, Analysis, Presentation and Post-Process as 
shown in Figure 12.   
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Figure 12. The GCFIM after Yusoff et al. (2011) 	
Yusoff et al. (2011) claim that their model “would make it easier for new users to 
understand the processes”.  However, contrary to such a claim, the model has many 
shortcomings that in fact question the credibility of such a claim.  For instance, in 
relation to their Pre-Process stage, the authors simply reduce their discussion to the 
statement that this stage should contain tasks that need to be done prior to the actual 
investigation.  However, Yusoff et al. (2011) do not provide any details of what those 
tasks are.  Moreover, this model misses some essential investigative stages such as the 
Examination Process, in which data needs to be harvested and reduced so that the 
investigators can obtain the relevant information that would represent potential digital 
evidence.  Throughout their paper, Yusoff et al. (2011) make certain general statements 
without elaborating on what they are attempting to convey.  For instance, they state that 
“Various types of analysis are performed on the acquired data to identify the source of 
crime and ultimately discovering the person responsible of the crime.”  Such a general 
statement does not appear to be of any useful value unless “those various types of 
analysis” are detailed out.  The details associated with the five stages the GCFIM are 
also unclear. 
 
The GCFIM has no new contribution to the field, and the model emerges as identical to 
the Selamat et al’s (2011) MPDFIF, which itself is a repetition of previous research.  
Since the GCFIM is identical to that of the Selamat et al’s (2008) model and because 
the GCFIM similarly does not provide any results or conclusions, it has not been 
assessed against the three sets of assessment criteria.  
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2.7.17			Agarwal	et	al’s	SDFIM			
Agarwal et al. (2011) proposed their Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model 
(SDFIM) claiming that this model addresses some of the shortcomings of the previous 
methodologies.  The SDFIM is based on the model developed by Palmer (2001) and 
consists of eleven Phases as shown in the graphical representation of this model in 
Figure 13 below. 
 
Content was removed for copyright reasons. 
Agarwal, A., Gupta, M., Gupta, S. and Gupta, C. (2011). ‘Systematic digital forensic 
investigation model’, International Journal of Computer Science and Security, 5(1), 
pp.118–130. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. The SDFIM after Agarwal et al. (2011) 	
• Phase 1 (Preparation) involves acquiring an initial understanding of the nature of 
the crime and activities and preparing materials for packaging evidence sources. 
• Phase 2 (Securing the Scene) deals with securing the crime scene from 
unauthorized access and preserving the evidence from being contaminated. 
• Phase 3 (Survey and Recognition) involves the performance of an initial survey 
by the investigators for evaluating the scene, identifying potential sources of 
evidence and formulating an appropriate search plan. 
• Phase 4 (Documenting the Scene) involves the documentation of the crime scene 
along with photographing, sketching and crime-scene mapping. 
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• Phase 5 (Communication Shielding) involves blocking all possible 
communication options of the devices prior to conducting evidence collection.  
• Phase 6 (Evidence Collection) involves investigators acquiring evidence from 
digital devices. 
• Phase 7 (Preservation) includes packaging, transporting and storing the 
evidence.  During this Phase, investigators must follow appropriate procedures 
to ensure that the evidence is not altered or destroyed, and all potential sources 
of evidence must be identified.  
• Phase 8 (Examination) involves examining the contents of the acquired evidence 
by digital forensic analysts and extracting information that is critical for proving 
the case. 
• Phase 9 (Analysis) includes a technical review of the Examination results.  Also, 
establishing relationships between fragments of data, analysing hidden data and 
reconstructing the event data will need to be conducted during this phase.     
• Phase 10 (Presentation) involves presenting the investigation results to the 
relevant audience. 
• Phase 11 (Result and Review) includes reviewing the steps in the investigation 
and determining areas of improvement.  
 
Citing Pollitt (2007), Agarwal et al. (2011) state that there has been a need for a 
“standard methodology used for all digital forensics investigations”.  Agarwal et al. 
(2011) go on to criticise the previously developed models for being mainly ad-hoc tools, 
arguing that much needs to be achieved in this particular domain.  This argument is 
valid on its own right given that many other researchers have raised the same issue 
(Montasari, 2016, a; Montasari et al, 2015, Adams et al., 2014, Cohen, 2012; Cohen et 
al., 2009; Kent et al, 2006; Beebe and Clark, 2005; Ciardhuáin, 2004; Carrier and 
Spafford, 2003; Palmer, 2001).  However, such common statements will also need to be 
backed by a solution or at least some steps in the right direction, something which has 
not been materialized in Aggarwal et al’s (2011) model. 
 
A critical analysis of the SDFIM has revealed both shortcomings and inconsistencies in 
relation to associating various activities to the different Phases of the model (Adams, 
2012).  Although the activities that Aggarwal et al. (2011) have defined in their model 
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are correct on their own rights, these activities have been inappropriately associated 
with the Phases of the model.  In other words, the authors have inappropriately related a 
valid set of activities to the wrong Phases in the model.  For instance, activities such as 
“Developing a Strategy for Investigation” and “Considering Various Technical, Legal 
and Business Factors” that Aggarwal et al. (2011) have incorrectly associated with the 
“Preparation” Phase must in fact be related to the Planning stage that this model is 
missing.  Such an argument is in line with the ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital 
Evidence (2012), and the approach taken by other researchers including Montasari 
(2016, a), Casey (2011) and Brown (2006).  Thus, the Planning stage should deal with 
drawing a plan for the aforementioned activities, whereas the Preparation Phase must 
deal with the ‘implementation’ of those activities.   
     
Another example of associating a correct activity to a wrong Phase pertains to the 
requirement for DFAs to create evidence backups during the “Examination” Phase.  
This must take place during or just after the Data Collection Stage.  Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) have also inappropriately defined the activity, “considering the privacy rights of 
the suspect” under the Preparation Phase.  Firstly, this should not be limited only to the 
suspects; the consideration for privacy rights of the victims, witnesses, investigators and 
all the other individuals involved in the investigation are equally important.  Secondly, 
this activity should not be confined to a single point in time as the privacy rights of the 
individuals involved must be maintained throughout the entire investigation.  Therefore, 
this activity would need to be treated as an ‘investigative Principle’ as opposed to an 
“activity”.     
 
More examples of the inappropriate placement of activities in the SDFIM concern those 
of “Formulation of a Search Plan” and “Planning for the Collection and Analysis of 
Digital Evidence”.  In the case of the former, this activity has been defined under the 
“Securing the Scene” Phase.  However, considering the time limit often imposed by the 
search warrant, this activity must be carried out long in advance in the “Planning” stage, 
that this model lacks, in order to save time.  In the case of the latter, similarly this 
activity, which has also been placed under the “Securing the Scene” Phase, should be 
defined under the Planning stage, a view supported by Montasari (2016, b and c), and 
Brown (2006).  Furthermore, the activity of the “Identification of Suspects” at the crime 
scene under the “Securing the Scene” Phase must take place during the “Intelligence 
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Gathering” Phase, that is also absent in this model, just after the crime has been detected 
and reported.  
   
Final instances of such misplacement of the activities in the SDFIM pertain to those 
activities of “Packaging”, “Transportation” and “Reporting”.  The authors have defined 
the “Packaging” and “Transportation” activities under the model’s “Preservation” 
Phase.  However, these activities must be part of the “Collection” stage of the 
investigative process as outlined in ACPO (2008) and supported by other researchers 
(Montasari, 2016, c; Adams, 2012).  The “Reporting”, which has been defined as an 
“activity” under the “Presentation” stage, should also be a separate Phase on its own 
right prior to the Presentation Phase.  This practice is required by ISO/IEC 27043 
(2015) and Montasari (2016, c).  In the light of the Preservation Phase itself, this should 
be considered as both an activity under Securing the Scene Phase as well as one of the 
Investigations Principles that this model lacks. 
 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) have not also been consistent in terms of their criteria for the 
categorisation of the model’s Phases.  Many of the SDFIM’s Phases could have been 
grouped into one single Phase (Adams, 2012). For example, “Survey and Recognition”, 
“Communication Shielding” and “Preservation” Phases should all be placed under the 
“Securing the Scene” Phase as “Sub-Phases” rather than as separate Phases.  This is in 
accordance with the approach taken by other researchers including: Montasari, (2016, 
c), Casey (2011), Beebe and Clark (2005) and Carrier and Spafford (2003).  Other 
shortcomings of the model are associated with the vital stages of the investigative 
process that have been omitted.  These include: Incident Detection, First Response, 
Intelligence Gathering, Planning, Interpretation, Event Reconstruction and Reporting.  
Also, missing in the model is the ‘Investigation Closure’ stage, where activities 
associated with the management of evidence are performed such as its return to the 
rightful owner, its storage, destruction, or cleansing and reuse, where the dissemination 
of the investigation is communicated to the relevant stakeholders, and where the results 
are recorded for the future reference.  
 
The lack of inclusion of Investigative Principles in the SDFIM are further shortcomings 
of this model.  These include: “Addressing Safety Issues”, “Maintaining a Chain of 
Custody” (Kohn et al., 2013; Beebe and Clark, 2005; Carrier and Spafford), 
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“Maintaining Information Flow” (Montasari, 2016, b and c; Montasari et al., 2015; 
Ciardhuáin, 2004) and “Maintaining a Case Management” (Adams et al., 2014; Khatir 
et al, 2008), etc.  Although Aggarwal et al. (2011) have identified the need for 
documentation throughout all the stages of the investigation, they have nevertheless 
limited this activity only to a single Phase, Documenting the Scene, in their model 
(Adams, 2012).  As much as it is important to document the activities carried out at the 
crime scene, it is also vital to maintain a detailed documentation of all the other 
activities performed throughout the entire investigative process.  Therefore, 
Documentation must also stand as an “investigative Principle” in accordance with 
ACPO (2012), ISO/IEC 27043 (2015) and ISO/IEC 27037 (2012). 
 
Throughout their paper, Aggarwal et al. (2011) have made certain statements regarding 
both technical issues as well as the description of the model that question the level of 
diligence that has been put into the background research for the development of their 
model.  In terms of the technical issues, for instance, referring to mobile devices 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) have stated that the majority of evidence will be of a volatile 
nature being present in ROM.  According to Adams (2012), this statement is inaccurate 
considering the fact that large amount of evidence contained in mobile devices is non-
volatile since most of data is stored in flash memory and therefore is not lost when the 
mobile device is turned off (Adams, 2012).  The authors have also argued that all the 
potential sources of evidence must be identified during the “Preservation” Phase.  Such 
an approach is also flawed on two accounts.  Firstly, the aim of Preservation, as the 
name suggests, should be to preserve the original state of both the physical and digital 
evidence in order to avoid altering the state of the evidence.  Secondly, the evidence is 
not identified until digital forensic analysts have started the examination of the acquired 
data (image) during the Examination stage of the investigative process, a view 
supported by Kohn et al. (2013), Casey (2011) and Venter (2006).  
    
Moreover, throughout their paper, Aggarwal et al. (2011) have made certain claims 
without substantiating those claims.  For instance, they have argued that their model is 
standardized without explaining how the model has acquired the “standardization” 
status.  The authors have also claimed that the SDFIM is relevant to both fields of law 
enforcement and commerce.  However, the descriptions provided for the model’s 
activities reflect those carried out within the law enforcement environment.  Aggarwal 
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et al. (2011) have also made certain suggestions in relation to the activities of their 
model without being specific and detailed.  For instance, the authors have stated that 
investigators will need to protect integrity and minimise the corruption of digital 
evidence.  However, they have not provided any details on how the investigators should 
achieve such tasks.  Thus, this will further question the level of diligence that has been 
put into developing the model.  
    
Finally, the critical analysis of the SDFIM suggests a cursory approach that the 
SDFIM’s authors have undertaken in designing and developing this model.  Aggarwal 
et al. (2011) themselves have implicitly admitted that their model is not complete, 
stating that the SDFIM needs to be applied in a “variety of cases” and improved based 
upon feedback.  As a result, they call for other researchers to update the SDFIM by 
identifying and incorporating “new constraints” into the model.  
 
Using the Beebe and Clark (2005), the SDFIM meets only Requirement 2.  Authors of 
the model has been able to simplify the complex process simplification as the model has 
included a set of “Phases” and “Activities” even though these components have been 
misplaced (Requirement 2). The model has no scientific rigor or relevance 
(Requirement 1), nor does it have sufficient granularity (Requirement 3).  Moreover, the 
model is missing investigative principles and has not provided consistent, accurate 
descriptions in relation to its components.  The Beebe and Clark score given to the 
SDFIM is 1/4.  
 
In terms of the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the SDFIM meets only Requirements 1 and 
3.  The model has basis in physical crime scene theory (Requirement 1), and it is not 
dependent on a specific technology (Requirement 3).  However, the SDFIM is not 
practical as it is missing essential investigative stages (Requirement 2), and the model is 
not specific enough to facilitate technology requirement development because of 
inconsistencies in its data flow (Requirement 4).  Furthermore, the SDFIM is not 
generic as its focus is only on the law enforcement environment (Requirement 5).  The 
Carrier and Spafford score given to this model is 2/5. 
 
Based on the Daubert Test, the SDFIM only meets Requirement 2 as it has been 
subjected to peer review and publication.  However, the model has not been tested by its 
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intended user community (Requirement 1); therefore, its potential error rate is unknown 
(Requirement 3).  Also, there is no standard pertaining to this model.  Although 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) have made a brief reference to the guidelines outlined in the 
National Institute of Justice, they have not drawn upon any of those guidelines.  The 
authors have simply stated that the NIJ recommends certain types of Analysis activities 
such as “timeframe analysis, hidden data analysis, application analysis and file analysis 
of the extracted data” without incorporating any of the guidelines into their model 
(Requirement 4).  Also, there is no evidence suggesting that the SDFIM has been 
widely accepted in the digital forensic community (Requirement 5).  The Daubert Test 
score given to this model is 1/5. 
 
2.7.18			Valjarevic	and	Venter’s	HDFIPM			
Based on the belief that “there is currently no harmonised digital forensic investigation 
process model”, Valjarevic and Venter (2012) proposed a model entitled the 
“Harmonised Digital Forensic Investigation Process Model (HDFIPM)”.  The concept 
behind Valjarevic and Venter’s (2012) approach in intending to harmonise previous 
models is praiseworthy especially considering the fact that very few attempts have been 
previously made to bring some sorts of consistency to the existing models.  However, 
similar to all the other DFIPMs, this model is also far from having achieved the status 
of “harmonisation” despite the claim made by its authors.  Prior to providing the 
rationale for the view expressed, one would firstly need to examine the meaning of the 
verb “harmonise”.  Oxford Dictionary (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016) defines “harmonise” 
as “make consistent or compatible”.  Other online dictionaries provide similar 
definitions as “to bring into harmony, accord, or agreement” (Dictionary.com, 2016), or 
“bring several things into consonance or relate harmoniously” (TheFreeDictionary, 
2016).  Based upon the aforementioned definitions and other supporting references 
(Kohn et al., 2013; Cohen, 2012; Beebe and Clark, 2005; Ciardhuáin, 2004; Reith et al., 
2002), it is therefore reasonable to assume that in order to be able to harmonise the 
existing models, one would need to identify, purify and merge the common elements 
(both components and terminology) found in those models.   
 
Until now, no harmonisation has yet taken place in relation to a unified DFIPM as the 
authors of the DFIPMs have adopted differing approaches in their models.  In fact, 
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Valjarevic and Venter themselves highlight this issue in a later published paper 
(Valjarevic and Venter, 2015), stating that the existing models are ad-hoc tools because 
they have been developed by the authors “based on their own personal experience” 
(Valjarevic and Venter, 2015).  In order to bring harmonisation to the existing DFIPMs, 
there must be a ‘synergy’ between different points of view as opposed to only the 
authors’ own ideas.  In fact, in any scientific field, synergy is required to bring harmony 
and consistency to difficult concepts.  The critical analysis of the HDFIPM reveals that 
similar to other authors of DFIPMs, Valjarevic and Venter (2012) have also adopted 
their very own approach to design the model.  This is contrary to their claim that the 
HDFIPM has achieved the status of “harmonisation”.  The analysis in the following 
paragraphs provides the rationale for the argument put forward.     
 
As with other authors, Valjarevic and Venter (2012) have adopted their own 
terminology without following any standard or guidelines such as those outlined in the 
ACPO (2012) or ISO/IEC 27037 (2012).  For instance, the authors have referred to the 
“investigative Principles” included in their model as “Parallel Actions”.  This is 
contrary to the terminology “Overriding Principles”, which is commonly recognised by 
other researchers in the field (Montasari, b and c; Montasari et al., 2015; Montasari, in 
press; Adams et al., 2014; Beebe and Clark, 2005).  Another example relates to missing 
Phases included in other models that this model lacks such as “Forensic Readiness” 
(Montasari, c; Kohn et al., 2013; Casey, 2011; Rowlingson, 2004; Carrier and Spafford, 
2003; Mandia et al., 2003).  
 
There are various other shortcomings associated with this model including those related 
to the missing components and investigative Principles, not least the lack of sufficient 
level of details, as well as the inappropriate classification of the Phases in the model.  
An example of the incorrect categorisation of the model’s Phases pertain to “Potential 
Evidence Transportation” and “Potential Evidence Storage”, which have been assigned 
two separate Phases.  The two components would need to be included under the 
“Potential Evidence Collection” as two Sub-Phases in accordance with ACPO (2012) 
and ISO/IEC 27037 (2012), and the approach taken by Montasari (b and c), (Adams, 
2012) and Carrier and Spafford (2003).   
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Examples of missing components concern both ‘Phases’ and ‘investigative Principles’.  
In terms of missing Phases, the model lacks the ‘Forensic Readiness’ (as stated above), 
‘Securing and Evaluating the Crime Scene’ (Casey 2011 and 2004; Rogers et al., 2006) 
‘Interpretation’ and ‘Event Reconstruction’ (Montasari, 2016, b and c; Carrier and 
Spafford, 2003) and ‘Reporting’ (Freiling, 2007; Ciardhuáin, 2004; Reith et al., 2002).  
There are also no activities associated with the management of evidence such as return, 
cleanse and reuse or destruction of evidence.  With regards to missing investigative 
Principles, the model is missing ‘Maintaining a Detailed Information Flow’, 
‘Addressing Safety Issues’ and ‘Maintaining a Detailed Case Management’ (Casey, 
2011; Khatir et al., 2008; Ciardhuáin, 2004).  More importantly, the HDFIPM lacks 
sufficient level of details as emphasized by Beebe and Clark (2005) and further 
supported by Montasari (2016, c).  In relation to the lack of granularity associated with 
the model, the authors, themselves, admit that the model will need additional layers of 
details, stating “The development of more Sub-Phases on the second tier of the 
proposed model could also be considered in future research.” 
 
Based upon the Beebe and Clark criteria, the HDFIPM meets only Requirement 4 as the 
descriptions of the Phases are reasonably accurate, and the model has included some 
investigative principles.  However, the model does not have scientific rigor due to 
missing components (Requirement 1).  Also, no complex process simplification has 
been carried out (Requirement 2).  Furthermore, the model also does not provide any 
granularity since it lacks lower-level details (Requirement 3).  The Beebe and Clark 
score given to this model is 1/5. 
 
Using the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the HDFIPM meets Requirements 1 and 3 as the 
model is based on physical crime scene theory (Requirement 1), and it is 
technologically neutral without being limited to a specific technology (Requirement 3).  
However, the HDFIPM is not practical due to missing important investigative steps 
(Requirement 2), nor does it have specificity to facilitate technology requirement 
development due to the absence of granularity in the model (Requirement 4).  Also, the 
intended user community of the model is not clear.  It is however obvious that the 
HDFIPM cannot be applicable to the law enforcement environment as it is missing 
important stages associated with this domain such as ‘Securing and Evaluating the 
Crime Scene’.  A model that is not applicable to all the user community, namely law 
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enforcement, commerce and incident response, cannot be considered as generic 
(Requirement 5).  The Carrier and Spafford score given to this model is 2/5.     
 
With regards to the Daubert Test criteria, the HDFIPM only meets Requirement 2 as it 
has been peer reviewed and published.  However, the model has not been tested by the 
experts in its intended user community (Requirement 1); therefore, its potential error 
rate is unknown (requirement 3).  There is also no evidence suggesting that the model 
has drawn upon any standard (Requirement 4), nor is there any evidence showing that 
the model has been widely accepted in the digital forensic community.  The Daubert 
Test score given to this model is 1/5.  
 
2.7.19			Kohn	et	al’s	IDFPM			
Kohn et al. (2013) proposed a Process Flow Diagram consisting of thirty six Sub-
Processes grouped into five Processes, namely Preparation, Incident, Incident Response, 
Digital Forensic Investigation and Presentation.  The components of this model have 
been extracted from the previous models, hence the name Integrated Digital Forensic 
Process Model (IDFPM).  As with Aggarwal et al’s (2011) inconsistent criteria for 
classifying their model’s activities as Phases (correct set of activities were placed in 
incorrect Phases.), Kohn et al. (2013) have also adopted a flawed approach in 
categorising their model’s Sub-Processes as Processes.  Although the Sub-Processes 
related to various Processes of the model are correct in their own right, the criteria for 
their classification as a Process is erroneous.  For instance, the whole of Digital 
Forensic Investigation Sub-Processes are covered in one single Process.  However, 
these should have been grouped into various separate Processes including: Collection, 
Examination, Analysis, Interpretation and Event Reconstruction, which would be 
consistent with the approach taken by other researchers (Beebe and Clark, 2005; 
Ciardhuáin, 2004; Carrier and Spafford, 2003; Reith et al., 2002).  Another example 
relates to the Sub-Processes in the Presentation Process which should have also been 
divided into various separate processes such as Reporting, Presentation and 
Investigation Closure in accordance with ISO/IEC 27043 (2015). 
 
Kohn et al. (2013) have also misplaced various Sub-Processes in their model, which 
highlights a cursory approach to research into the development of the model.  For 
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instance, the authors have incorrectly placed Communicate and Review in the Digital 
Forensic Investigation Process before Reporting in the Presentation Process.  This is 
flawed as an investigation must be first finalised and formally resolved before the 
communication of the results can be made to the relevant stakeholders or before the 
investigators could embark upon reviewing the whole investigation.  Transport and 
Store Sub-Processes have also been incorrectly placed before the evidence Collection in 
the model.  In circumstance where evidence needs to be acquired at the crime scene, 
transportation and storage of the evidence will need to be carried out after the data 
acquisition and not before it (ACPO, 2012; ISO/IEC 27043, 2015; ISO/IEC 27037, 
2012).  However, these two Sub-Processes have been incorrectly placed before the 
Collection Sub-Process in the model.  This is a serious flaw which can have a severe 
impact on the investigation since a missing step or a step that has been performed in the 
wrong order can cause the entire digital investigation to be challenged and ultimately 
rejected by courts.   
 
The IDFPM also lacks lower-level components as suggested by Beebe and Clark (2005) 
and further supported by Montasari (2016, c) and Montasari et al. (2015).  Although 
Kohn et al. (2013) have made an attempt to model the whole investigative process, the 
model still has high-order processes without sufficient level of details.  The authors 
have not provided any lower-level investigative details necessary to guide the steps of 
investigators.  For instance, data collection activity in the IDFPM is simply represented 
as a Sub-Process “Collect” without providing further details on both ‘live’ and ‘static’ 
data acquisition steps.  As a result, this will further bring into question the practicality 
of the model. 
 
Also, as with almost all the previous models, the “Reporting” in Kohn et al’s (2013) 
IDFPM has not been assigned a single discrete Process; instead it has been 
inappropriately placed under the Presentation Process as a Sub-Process.  Reporting and 
Presentation have two different aims; in line with ISO/IEC 27043 (2015), the aim of a 
forensic report should be to compile the investigation findings, whereas the goal of 
Presentation should be to present those findings.  In real practice, Reporting is carried 
out in advance of the Presentation Process so that the investigators have sufficient time 
to review the compiled report before its submission to the court or any other relevant 
audience.  Furthermore, the IDFPM is missing some important components such as 
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those associated with evidence management including return, destruction or reuse of the 
evidence.  The model has not also assigned any components to accommodate for 
activities associated with identifying and applying the lessons learnt.   
 
Unlike the authors of many of the previous models, Kohn et al. (2013) have 
distinguished between an investigative Principle and a Process.  For instance, the 
authors have incorporated Documentation as a Principle, which needs to be maintained 
throughout the other processes in the IDFPM.  Although this is a commendable 
approach, at the same time other important investigative Principles have not been 
introduced into the model. These include: Preservation of Evidences, Maintaining Chain 
of Custody, Maintaining Information Flow, Addressing Safety Issues and Maintaining 
an Accurate Case Management.  The field of forensics in which this model can be 
applied is not also clear.  From the descriptions provided in their paper, it appears that 
the IDFPM’s focus is on the field of incident response.  If the model’s intended usage 
were aimed at the law enforcement environment, then it would need additional 
Processes such as Securing and Evaluating the Crime Scene based on the ACPO (2012) 
and the approach taken by the thesis author in Montasari (2016, b and c).  However, as 
it stands, the IDFPM does not provide details for such a Process.  
 
In relation to the Beebe and Clark’s criteria, the IDFPM meets only Requirements 2 and 
4 as the authors have been able to simplify the complex investigative process.  The 
model does not have scientific rigor due to its lack of flawed classification of Sub-
Processes as a Processes (Requirement 1).  The model also does not contain sufficient 
level of details, nor does it have the flexibility to incorporate the needed granularity 
(Requirement 3).  In addition, the IDFPM has not defined standard assumptions, 
concepts and values (Requirement 4).  The Beebe and Clark score given to this model is 
2/4.  
 
Using the Carrier and Spafford, the IDFPM meets only Requirements 1 and 3.  The 
model has basis in physical crime scene theory (Requirement 1), and it is not dependent 
on a specific technology (Requirement 3).  However, the IDFPM is not practical due to 
the lack of precise ordering of its Sub-Phases as well as essential investigative 
Principles (Requirement 2), and the model is not specific enough to facilitate 
technology development because of inconsistencies in its data flow (Requirement 4).  
		 99	
Moreover, the IDFPM is not generic as it appears that it only focuses on the field of 
incident response (Requirement 5).  The Carrier and Spafford score given to the IDFPM 
is 2/5. 
 
In terms of the Daubert Test, the IDFPM only meets Requirement 2 as the model has 
been peer reviewed and published.  However, it has not been tested by the experts in the 
field (Requirement 1); therefore, its potential error rate is unknown (Requirement 3). 
There is also no standard associated with the IDFPM (Requirement 4).  Also, there is no 
evidence suggesting that the IDFPM has been widely accepted in the field of digital 
forensic community (Requirement 5).  The Daubert Test score given to this model is 
1/5. 
 
2.7.20			Adams	et	al’s	ADAM			
Adams et al. (2014) criticised the previous models for focusing on one specific area of 
digital forensic practice, arguing that such approach has hindered the establishment of 
“generally-accepted standards” for a fundamental digital forensic activity – the 
acquisition of digital evidence.  As a result, Adams et al. (2014) go on to propose a 
three-step model, The Advanced Data Acquisition Process Model (ADAM) (originally 
presented in Adams (2012)), so that it would be applicable to different fields of digital 
forensics.   
 
The ADAM focuses only on the data acquisition aspect and consists of three stages 
including: Initial Planning, the Onsite Plan and Acquisition.  The first stage of the 
model, Initial Planning, involves high-level consideration to be undertaken prior to the 
actual Data Acquisition Process.  Stage 2 requires investigators to attend the scene of 
the incident to determine the location, size and format of the devices containing the 
digital data, and to create the Acquisition Plan.  Stage 3 involves the performance of the 
actual digital Data Acquisition Process on a digital device. 
 
Adams et al. (2014) state that the lack of “generally-accepted standards” has hindered 
the establishment of a fundamental digital forensic activity – the “acquisition of digital 
evidence”, a view supported also by other researchers.  For example, Cohen (2012) 
states that the entire field of digital forensic still lacks consensus on the fundamental 
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areas.  Therefore, the lack of generally accepted standards not only pertains to the 
Acquisition Stage, but also relates to the entire investigative process, a view supported 
by many other researchers as discussed in the Introduction Chapter (Montasari et al., 
2015; Kohn et al., 2013; Agarwal et al., 2011; Garfinkel et al., 2009; Carlton and 
Worthley, 2009). 
 
A detailed and close inspection of the Adams’ study, presented first in Adams (2012) 
and subsequently in Adams et al. (2014), has revealed many advantages in terms of both 
Adams’ background research into the previous DFIPMs, as well as the design and 
development of the ADAM, itself.  Adams full research presented in Adams (2012) is 
probably the most comprehensive study of the previous DFIPMs presented to date.  
 
Unlike many other researchers who have often taken a cursory approach in relation to 
DFIPMs, Adams (2012) has delved into the study of previous DFIPMs prior to the 
design and development of their Advanced Data Acquisition Process Model.  Adams 
(2012) has studied the previous literature in order to identify the essential components 
for the three stages of their model, in particular that of the Initial Planning stage.    
 
The ADAM has provided a detailed discussion concerning its Initial Planning Stage 
which is a commendable approach (some components of this stage are used in the new 
model).  Unlike the previous models which always take a cursory approach in relation 
to discussing the investigation planning, Adams (2012) has covered various important 
issues in detail such as those associated with the legal authorisation of digital 
investigation, timing constraint, data constraint and issues concerning logistics.   
 
Another benefit of the ADAM lies in its usage of the Unified Modeling Language to 
present the model in a formal manner.  The Onsite Plan of the ADAM equally is 
detailed and provides useful tips with regards to activities in relation to conducting 
“Preliminary Survey” at the scene of the incident.  Furthermore, unlike many of the 
authors of the previous models who have not tested their models, Adams has subjected 
the ADAM to two sets of evaluation process, including cases studies and also 
independent evaluation of his model by experts.     
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Moreover, in many cases, often the authors of the previous models appear to have 
neglected the essential Overriding Principles of Digital Forensic Practice. However, 
Adams (2012), relying upon the ACPO guidelines as well as other research papers, has 
provided an operation guide which is intended to accompany the ADAM enabling 
investigators to conduct digital forensic investigations in a forensically sound manner.   
 
Although ADAM has many advantages, it is also open to some criticism (similar to any 
other DFIPM).  One of the shortcomings of this model is due to the fact that it does not 
cover the entire digital forensic investigative process as it has focused only on three 
stages of digital investigation, namely planning, onsite plan and data acquisition. Thus, 
certain essential stages of the investigative process such as Incident Detection, First 
Response, Examination, Analysis, Interpretation, Reporting, Presentation and 
Investigation Closure have not been covered.  In fact, Adams (2012), himself, calls for 
other researchers to expand upon the ADAM to cover other stages of digital 
investigative process such as analysis and presentation.   
 
Within the Data Acquisition stage of the ADAM, there are some essential steps that 
have not been included.  For instance, although Adams (2012) has provided the option 
of “Returning” or “Storing” the evidence, they have not provided any components for 
the ‘destruction’ or ‘cleansing’ of the evidence.  In certain circumstances where the 
digital device has contained sensitive material, the law will often require the destruction 
of the device once the investigation has been finalised.  
 
Moreover, Adams has undertaken a high-level approach towards the Acquisition stage 
of the model, arguing that this should be “the role of the digital forensic practitioner to 
determine the most appropriate activities associated with data acquisition”.  Such an 
approach would leave DFIs to select components for the Acquisition stage themselves 
which might result in inconsistencies.  As a result, this will undermine the notion of a 
“generally-accepted model” which requires some sorts of formalisation to acquire such 
a status.  Being labelled as a Digital Forensic Investigator or Practitioner does not 
necessarily denote that they have adequate ‘scientific’ skills to define components for a 
process model which is the role of a ‘theorist’.   
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One of the reasons why DFIPMs have not been formalised is due to the fact that these 
have often been developed by practitioners based on their own personal experience as 
stated by Valjarevic and Venter (2015) rather than scientists.  Thus, DFIs should only 
be required to have adequate ‘practical’ training, skills and experience to deal with the 
practical aspect of investigations without being expected to have ‘scientific’ knowledge 
of the theory behind the model.  Thus, the approach taken by Adams et al. (2014) in this 
regard might reduce the practicality of the model.   
 
In line with Venter (2006) and Beebe and Clark (2005), a practical model is that which 
can provide the investigators with a step-by-step guide without limiting their flexibility 
when conducting investigations.  Moreover, such a high-level approach taken by Adams 
(2012) towards the main stage of his model (Acquisition) appears to be contradictory to 
their criticism of Khatir et al’s (2008) model, where the former author criticises the 
model proposed by the latter, in Adams (2012), stating, 
 
However, although the key factors of an investigation are identified in a unique 
format the high-level approach is not of great benefit to the investigator as a lot  
of detail is missing thus limiting the practical aspect of this model as well as the 
ability to design technology to assist the practitioner. 
(Adams, 2012) 
 
Such a criticism appears to be invalid considering the fact that Adams (2012), himself, 
has adopted the same approach as that of Khatir et al. (2008).  However, Adams goes on 
to explain why such approach has been adopted.  The author states,  
 
Each organisation undertaking the acquisition of digital evidence should have 
developed their own procedures to supplement those of the ACPO and ISO 
Guidelines but inevitably it is down to the practitioner to decide how these 
guidelines are to be applied in a particular set of circumstances. 
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Adams et al. (2014) have also stated that the outcome of employing their model is a 
clear process description that can be explained in courts that will describe the activities 
in relation to the acquired digital data.  However, courts would need to consider the 
entire investigative process that the investigators have followed in order to be able to 
determine the reliability of digital evidence presented to them.  As a result, courts are 
very likely to require a model that has captured the ‘entire’ investigative process, as 
opposed to a model that has covered only a few stages of the investigative process.   
 
In other words, courts do not reach their decisions on the basis of a few stages in a 
digital investigation as implied by Adams (2012).  There are other essential stages of the 
investigation such as digital evidence Examination, Analysis and Interpretation, etc. that 
will need to be described to the courts.  The decision to prove or refute the reliability of 
digital evidence is made only after the judge and jury have taken into consideration a 
collective process of digital evidence ‘Acquisition’, ‘Storage’, ‘Handling or Chain of 
Custody’, ‘Examination’, ‘Analysis’, ‘Interpretation’, ‘Event Reconstruction’ and 
‘Documentation’.   
 
The Acquisition stage of the ADAM is also missing some essential activities pertaining 
to those of the ‘Onsite Triage’ as suggested by Montasari (2016, b), Parsonage (2009) 
and Rogers et al. (2006).  In certain circumstances, where the case involves 
investigation into missing children or abduction, an Onsite Triage22 will be required 
with the purpose of acquiring investigative leads as swiftly as possible within minutes 
as opposed to days or weeks.  The ADAM’s Acquisition stage, however, has not 
provided any components to accommodate for activities associated with the Onsite 
Triage.  Finally, despite few shortcomings of the model, Adams (2012) has been able to 
take a scientific approach in developing the ADAM.  Adams (2012) rigorous approach 
in conducting his study is another reason why the ADAM stands out from all the 
previous DFIPMs.   
 
In relation to the Beebe and Clark, the ADAM meets Requirements 2 and 4 fully and 
also Requirement 1 partially.  Although the model is not comprehensive as it does not 																																																								
22  This will refer to the prioritisation of digital devices at the crime scene suspected of containing 
potential digital evidence based on their potential evidential value and then swift examination and 
analysis of the prioritised devices. 
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cover the entire investigative process, it has achieved both rigor and relevance due to its 
detailed approach towards the Initial Planning stage (Requirement 1).  Moreover, the 
authors have simplified the complex investigative process through the use of UML 
Diagrams (Requirement 2).  However, the ADAM does not have granularity throughout 
all the three stages (Requirement 3).  Adams et al. (2014), however, have defined 
important concepts and practices such as those of some investigative principles 
including consideration of Documentation and Chain of Custody (Requirement 4).  The 
Beebe and Clark score given to this model is 2.5/4. 
 
Using the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the ADAM has met Requirements 1, 3 and 4.  
The model has basis in existing theory for physical crime investigations (Requirement 
1), and it is not limited to a specific technology (Requirement 3).   Although the model 
is not detailed in terms of its Onsite Plan and Acquisition stages, it has provided 
sufficient details for its Initial Planning stage to allow for creation of technical aids 
(Requirement 4).  However, since the model does not cover the entire investigative 
process, it might not be practical in actual investigations (Requirement 2).  Moreover, it 
is not clear whether or not the model is generic, as it appears to be more relevant to the 
environment of commerce (Requirement 5).  The Carrier and Spafford score given to 
the ADAM is 3/5. 
  
With regards to the Daubert Test, the ADAM has only met Requirements 1 and 2.  The 
model has been tested by experts in the field (Requirement 1); however, its potential 
error rate is not fully known due to the low number of experts who have participated in 
the model’s evaluation.  The authors, themselves, state that a more diverse set of experts 
will need to be involved to test the model (Requirement 3).  The ADAM has been 
subjected to peer-review and publication (Requirement 2).  However, there is no 
standard that governs the development of the ADAM with the exception of the ACPO’s 
four principles that Adams (2012) has referred to (Requirement 4).  Moreover, there is 
no evidence suggesting that this model has been widely accepted in the digital forensic 
community (This might be explained by the fact that the model is still relatively new 
and has not yet fully reached a wider user community), nor is there any evidence 
showing that there has been further development of the model since it was published 
(Requirement 5).  The Daubert Test given to this model is 2/5. 
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2.8			Analysis	of	Model	Review	and	Assessment	
The critical review and assessment of the previous models reveal that as of May 2016, 
there is no comprehensive model encompassing the entire digital investigative process 
that is formal in that it synthesizes, harmonises and extends the previous models, and 
that is generic in that it can be applied in the different fields of law enforcement, 
commerce and incident response.  The literature review also reveals a lack of scientific 
consensus in the domain of digital investigative process.  Although many researchers 
have increasingly called for scientific approaches and formal methods, very little 
progress, if any, has been made.  In this regard, the US-CERT organisation states,    
 
Because computer forensics is a new discipline, there is little standardization 
and consistency across the courts and industry. As a result, it is not yet 
recognized as a formal “scientific” discipline (US-CERT, 2012). 
 
A summary of the comments derived from the literature review demonstrates the 
absence of agreement between researchers and digital forensic investigators alike: 
 
• Previous models are not abstract (Reith et al, 2002). 
• Previous models are not comprehensive as they do not capture the full scope of 
an investigation.  Instead, they focus only on the processing of evidence 
(Ciardhuáin, 2004).  
• Previous models are not comprehensive and are not generally accepted.  They 
are single-tier, higher order process models that focus on abstract rather than 
concrete investigative principles (Beebe and Clark, 2005).  
• Previous models do not have a pragmatic and practical approach (Rogers et al., 
2006). 
• Previous models have not established a clear, step-by-step guide to what steps 
should be followed in a forensic process (Kohn et al., 2006). 
• Previous models have no flexibility (Khatir et al., 2008). 
• Previous models are not consistent and systematic frameworks for digital 
forensic investigation process (Agarwal et al., 2011). 
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• Previous models are not formal as different authors have adopted their own 
investigative methods based on their own personal experience (Kohn et al., 
2013; Valjarevic and Venter, 2015). 
• Previous models have mainly focused on one area of digital forensics and 
neglect the other environments (Adams et al., 2014). 
 
The following provides a summary of the results of the analysis of the model 
assessments: 
 
• No model could be considered comprehensive as the majority of the models 
captured only parts of the investigative process (very often the middle part).   
• Although some authors have attempted to develop a generic model appropriate 
for the different fields of digital forensics, some have instead focused on one 
particular domain such as that pertaining to incident response.  
• No model could be regarded formal as they all had differing focus and 
approaches.   
• The previous models had a heavy focus on single-layer, higher-order process 
lacking the sufficient detail needed to assist the investigators. 
• Despite the fact that the previous models have been peer-reviewed and 
published, none has been subjected to any form of testing with the exception of 
EMCI, CFFTPM and ADAM. 
• No model included or referenced any standards against which an error rate could 
be calculated (Adams, 2012), nor was any model identified that has been widely 
accepted.  
• There has been very little consensus in relation to the definition of digital 
forensic process. 
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Table 1 provides a comparative summary of the previous DFIPMs that were reviewed 
and assessed in this chapter.  The columns in the Table list the models themselves, 
while the Table’s rows indicate the different components of those models as identified 
and discussed.  Also, those cells marked with a “✔” sign indicate the existence of a 
particular component within a specific model. 
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Table 1. The comparative summary of the existing DFIPMs 	
The	Comparative	Summary	of	the	Existing	Digital	Forensic	Investigation	Process	Models	
(DFIPMs) 
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Readiness    ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔    ✔       ✔  
Deployment    ✔   ✔ ✔           ✔  
Policy/ Procedure          ✔  ✔       ✔  
Operational Readiness    ✔   ✔     ✔       ✔  
Infrastructure Readiness    ✔   ✔     ✔       ✔  
Incident Detection (Awareness)   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔      ✔      ✔ ✔  
Report Incident (Notification)    ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔  ✔    ✔     ✔  
Assess Incident.        ✔     ✔      ✔  
Confirm Incident.    ✔ ✔  ✔      ✔ ✔     ✔  
Authorisation    ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Incident Response    ✔   ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔      ✔   
Planning (Approach Strategy)   ✔   ✔  ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Understand Task Requirements                     ✔ 
Determine Overall Picture                    ✔ 
Determine Required Outcomes                    ✔ 
Determine Parameters                    ✔ 
Consider Physical Constraint                    ✔ 
Consider Timing Constraint                    ✔ 
Consider Data Constraint                    ✔ 
Plan Logistics                    ✔ 
Create Outline Plan                 ✔   ✔ 
Preparation   ✔     ✔  ✔       ✔ ✔   
Attend Site           ✔      ✔   ✔ 
Securing the Scene   ✔     ✔         ✔    
Address Safety Issues                 ✔   ✔ 
Communication Shielding                 ✔    
Triage           ✔          
Examine User Usage Profiles           ✔          
Examine Chronology Timeline           ✔          
Examine Browsing Activities         ✔  ✔          
Case Specifics           ✔          
Carry Out Preliminary Survey                    ✔ 
Documentation of Scene    ✔  ✔  ✔         ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Update Outline Plan                 ✔   ✔ 
Search    ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔       ✔  ✔  
Survey    ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔         ✔    
Identification ✔     ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔     ✔  ✔ ✔   
Preservation ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔       ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔  
Collection ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Volatile Evidence Collection         ✔   ✔     ✔    
To Be Continued … 
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The	Comparative	Summary	of	the	Existing	Digital	Forensic	Investigation	Process	Models	
(DFIPMs) 
Existing	DFIPMs	
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Non-Volatile Evidence Collection         ✔   ✔         
Authenticate                   ✔  
Seizure        ✔           ✔ ✔ 
Package                 ✔   ✔ 
Transport      ✔    ✔     ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Storage      ✔    ✔     ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Examination ✔  ✔ ✔  ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  
Harvest        ✔    ✔       ✔  
Reduce        ✔    ✔       ✔  
Identify    ✔               ✔  
Classify                   ✔  
Organise            ✔       ✔  
Compare                   ✔  
Analysis ✔  ✔ ✔    ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  
Attribute               ✔    ✔  
Evaluate                   ✔  
Hypothesis      ✔             ✔  
Interpretation               ✔    ✔  
Reconstruction    ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔    ✔   ✔    ✔  
Reporting  ✔  ✔    ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔   ✔    
Presentation  ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔   ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  
Proof / Defence      ✔  ✔  ✔           
Decision ✔       ✔           ✔  
Review    ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔         ✔  ✔  
Dissemination      ✔  ✔           ✔  
Returning Evidence   ✔     ✔     ✔       ✔ 
Digital Crime Scene Investigation    ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔             
Physical Crime Scene Investigation    ✔ ✔  ✔           ✔ ✔  
Documentation    ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔     ✔     ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Preserving Chain of Custody      ✔ ✔     ✔        ✔ 
Preserving Digital Evidence      ✔  ✔          ✔   
Information Flow      ✔            ✔   
Case Management      ✔       ✔        
End of the Table 
 
As shown in the next table (Table 2), assessing the previous models against the Beebe 
and Clark (2005) criteria reveals that there are five models that meet three of the four 
criteria, while six and five models fulfil two and one out of the four criteria respectively.  
There are also three models that meet no criteria, while there is one model to which the 
assessment criteria are not applicable.  Similarly, comparing the previous models 
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against the Carrier and Spafford (2003) criteria reveals that there is one model that 
fulfils all the five criteria, while there are four other models that meet four of the 
criteria.  There are also four, seven and three models that meet three, two and one out of 
the five criteria respectively, while there is one model to which the assessment criteria 
are not applicable.  In relation to the Daubert Test, there are two models that fulfil four 
and three of the five criteria respectively, while three models meet two of the criteria.  
There are also twelve and two models that meet one and no criteria respectively, while 
there is one model to which the assessment criteria are not applicable. 
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Table 2. Scores obtained by the previous models based on the three assessment criteria 
 Scores	
Models	 Beebe	and	
Clark	
Carrier	and	
Spafford	
Daubert	
Test	
A Framework for Digital Forensic Science (Palmer, 2001) 2 2 
 
1 
Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First 
Responders (Ashcroft, 2001) 
1 
 
2 0 
Abstract Digital Forensic Model (Reith et al., 2002) 
 
2 4 1 
Integrated Digital Investigation Process  
(Carrier and Spafford, 2003) 
3 
 
4 2 
Digital Crime Scene Analysis (Rogers, 2004) 3 
 
4 2 
Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model 
(Baryamureeba and Tushabe, 2004) 
0 
 
1 1 
An Extended Model of Cybercrime Investigation  
(Ciardhuáin, 2004)  
3 
 
5 3 
Hierarchical, Objectives Based Framework for the Digital 
Investigation Process (Beebe and Clark, 2005) 
3 
 
3 1 
Four Step Forensic Process (Kent et al., 2006) 
 
2 
 
3 0 
Computer Forensics Field Triage Process Model  
(Rogers et al, 2006) 
3 
 
4 4 
Framework for a Digital Forensic Investigation 
(Kohn et al., 2006) 
2 
 
3 1 
A Common Process Model for Incident Response and 
Computer Forensics (Freiling and Schwittay, 2007) 
0 2 
 
1 
Two Dimensional Evidence Reliability Amplification 
Process Model (Khatir et al., 2008)  
1 
 
1 1 
Mapping Process of Digital Forensic Investigation 
Framework (Selamat et al., 2008) 
0 1 1 
Digital Forensic Process Model (Cohen, 2009) 2 
 
2 1 
Generic Computer Forensics Investigation Model 
(Yusoff et al., 2011) 
N/A 
 
N/A N/A 
Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model  
(Agarwal et al., 2011) 
1 
 
2 1 
Harmonised Digital Forensic Investigation Process Model 
(Valjarevic and Venter, 2012) 
1 
 
2 1 
Integrated Digital Forensic Process Model 
(Kohn et al., 2013) 
2 2 1 
The Advanced Data Acquisition Process Model 
(Adams et al., 2014) 
2 
 
3 2 
 
Analysing the results of the Beebe and Clark (2005), Carrier and Spafford (2003) and 
the Daubert Test criteria applied to each of the models has identified those that include 
the components suggested by the three aforementioned criteria as necessary for a 
DFIPM.  In total, there are eight models that have been selected for their possible 
contributions to the CDFIPM based on their high scores achieved in relation to meeting 
the three sets of the assessment criteria.  The next section provides the specific 
contributions of these models that will constitute the basic structure of the CDFIPM.  
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2.9	 Identifying	Key	Contributions		
The key contributions that have been identified for each of the models selected through 
the Beebe and Clark (2005), Carrier and Spafford (2003) and Daubert Test criteria are 
summarised as follow: 
 
Reith	et	al.	(2002)	–	ADFM		
• Introduced the concept that common steps from the previous DFIPMs23 
can be abstractly defined to develop a model that is technology-
independent. 
 
• Identified general methods that judicial members can employ to relate 
technology to non-technical observers. 
 
Carrier	and	Spafford	(2003)	–	IDIP		
• Promoted the concept that a model should be based on existing theory 
for physical crime investigations. 
 
• Identified the need for a model to be practical and follow the same steps 
that an actual investigation would take. 
 
• Highlighted the need that a model should be general in relation to 
technology and must not be limited to current tools. 
 
• Identified the need that a model must be generic and apply to law 
enforcement investigations, corporate investigations, and incident 
response. 
 
 
																																																								
23 This refers to using the key aspects of the previous DFIPMs.  Adams (2012) also uses this contribution. 
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Ciardhuáin	(2004)	–	EMCI	
• Introduced the concept of merging the previously proposed models and 
extending them by addressing certain activities not incorporated into the 
previous models. 
 
• Emphasized the need for a comprehensive model that captures the entire 
investigative process. 
 
• Introduced the concept that a DFIPM should be tested by its intended 
user community as well as being compared with previous models.  
 
• Introduced the concept of “Information Flow”. 
 
• Identified the need for both internal and external authorisations. 
 
Rogers	(2004)	–	DCSA	
• Highlighted the need for the Chain of Custody consideration. 
 
• Built upon the relationships between digital and physical investigations 
as first proposed by Carrier and Spafford (2003). 
 
Beebe	and	Clark	(2005)	–	HOBFDIP	
• Emphasized granularity in a model with the inclusion of additional layers 
of details as opposed to a single-tier, higher order process model.  
 
• Emphasized the need for a comprehensive, generally accepted process 
model.  
 
• Highlighted that a model should simplify complex processes to facilitate 
understanding of the underlying structure. 
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• Underlined the need for digital investigation Principles and that they 
should apply to the entire investigative process and should not therefore 
be “cordoned off” as distinct, discrete Phases or steps. 
 
Rogers	(2006)	–	CFFTPM	
• Promoted a practical and pragmatic approach matching the steps taken in 
actual investigations. 
 
• Introduced activities for performing Onsite Triage in relation to 
Identification, Analysis and Interpretation of digital evidence in a short 
time frame while adhering to commonly held digital forensic Principles. 
 
Kohn	et	al.	(2006)	–	FDFI	
• Emphasised the need for a clear, step-by-step guide for the acquisition of 
evidence appropriate for presentation in courts. 
 
• Promoted the idea that a DFIPM must be systematic to produce 
forensically sound evidence. 
 
• Emphasised considerations for standards, policies, procedures, training 
and legal advice in organisations to assist them in investigations.  
 
Adams	et	al.	(2014)	–	ADAM	
• Provided a detailed list of activities in relation to Initial Planning that 
should be carried out onsite. 
 
• Emphasised the need to apply a DFIPM to different case studies. 
 
• Emphasised the need for the use of UML Activity Diagrams within a 
DFIPM to define process flows in a formal manner.  
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2.10	Identifying	Necessary	Elements	for	the	CDFIPM		
By synthesizing the key contributions as well as considering the reviewed models 
collectively, the necessary elements for the CDFIPM are now summarised and 
categorised into seventeen stages:    
 
1. Readiness stage, where organisations should take certain pro-active steps in 
advance of a potential digital crime to increase the chances of digital evidence 
being available, with the aim of deterring, detecting, responding, investigating 
and prosecuting computer crimes.  
 
2. Incident Detection stage, containing the activities associated with the incident 
detection and its reporting. 
 
3. First Response stage, including activities related to initial, pre-investigation 
response to a suspected digital crime.  
 
4. Planning stage, where a detailed plan of action needs to be drawn in relation to 
the investigation and investigation logistics.  
 
5. Preparation stage, involving the implementation of the activities detailed in the 
Planning stage. 
 
6. Secure and Evaluate the Crime Scene stage, dealing with the suspect and the 
crime scene where pre-data acquisition activities need to be undertaken such as 
creating an outline plan and securing the crime scene.  
 
7. Identification stage, where investigators need to identify the items that might 
contain potential digital evidence.   
 
8. Acquisition and Collection stage, containing the activities associated with the 
actual data acquisition, duplication and verification process, as well as those 
associated with the transportation and storage of digital device. 
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9. Examination stage, where data representing potential digital evidence needs to 
be accessed, identified and extracted using a large number of techniques.  
 
10. Analysis stage, containing activities to enable investigators to reconstruct 
fragments of data based on their significance and determine a possible root 
cause of the incident. 
 
11. Interpretation stage, where scientifically proven methods need to be used to 
explain facts discovered during the Analysis stage within the context of 
investigation. 
 
12. Event Reconstruction stage, in which investigators also need to use scientifically 
proven methods to prove or refute theories based also on the Analysis stage. 
 
13. Reporting stage, requiring the investigators to compile and write a concise 
report.  
 
14. Presentation stage, where the output from the Reporting stage in the form of a 
well-written report must be presented to the relevant audience such as courts of 
law. 
 
15. Investigation Closure stage, where activities related to closing the investigation 
formally take place such as returning the evidence, reviewing the entire 
investigation and disseminating the investigation results, etc. 
 
16. Future Readiness stage, containing activities to assist both the investigating and 
victim organisations to take certain steps to be prepared for the future incidents.  
 
17. Overriding Principles group, containing a set of investigative Principles that 
investigators will need to apply concurrently throughout other stages of the 
investigative process. 
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18. The CDFIPM will be described through a formal definition employing the UML 
as first suggested by Bogan and Dampier (2005) and supported by Adams 
(2012), Ruan and Huebner (2009) and Kohn et al. (2008). 
 
2.11	Summary	of	the	Chapter	
This chapter critically reviewed the existing body of knowledge associated with the 
domain of digital forensics.  First, it provided a general overview of the digital forensic 
investigations followed by a detailed review of the field of digital evidence and how its 
admissibility is governed within the U.K. and the U.S. jurisdictions.  Next, a critical 
review of the standards associated with the digital investigative process was provided. 
The chapter then introduced different assessment criteria against which previous models 
were to be assessed.  The chapter continued to cover the process for identifying those 
models that could contribute to the design and development of the proposed model by 
assessing each previous model against the assessment criteria.   
 
Following the identification of the prevailing models, their key contributions were 
determined based on the assessment criteria.   Finally, in this chapter, the necessary 
components for the proposed model were identified from the key contributions of the 
prevailing models, as well as from all the reviewed models collectively.  It is contended 
that the assessment process of the previous DFIPMs is the most comprehensive 
evaluation that has been conducted so far, and is the first to evaluate each model against 
three different sets of assessment criteria.  
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Chapter	3:	 Design	and	Development	
3.1	 Introduction		
This chapter follows the Design and Development stage of the Peffers et al’s (2006) 
DSRP model that has been used to carry out this research.  A critical review and 
assessment of the existing models were carried out in Chapter 2 to address the following 
three research questions:  
 
1. What are the essential components necessary in a comprehensive model that is 
formal, generic and forensically sound for the entire digital forensic process?  
 
2. Once the components of such a comprehensive model that is formal, generic and 
forensically sound are determined, how can they be integrated into a working 
model?   
 
3. What is the most appropriate method to describe, present and use the model for 
the entire digital forensic process? 
 
Having acquired the information concerning the above three research questions, this 
chapter now continues to implement the design and development of the new model, the 
CDFIPM.   
 
3.2	 The	Central	Requirements	of	the	CDFIPM	
All the prominent DFIPMs presented to date were critically reviewed and assessed in 
Chapter 2 to identify necessary components for the CDFIPM.  The rationale in doing so 
was multifaceted.  Firstly, it was intended to leverage the benefits of the previously 
proposed models.  Secondly, it was intended to bring other experts’ knowledge and 
experience into the CDFIPM to create synergy between different points of view.  From 
this critical analysis, various drawbacks concerning the previous DFIPMs were 
identified as follows:  
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1. The DFIPMs are not comprehensive in that they do not cover the entire digital 
investigative process.  They have tended to focus on the middle part of digital 
forensic process, i.e. the Collection and Examination of digital evidence. 
 
2. The majority of the existing DFIPMs are not generic in that they cannot be 
applied in both environments of criminal prosecution resulting in a court of law 
and organisations’ breaches of information security.  The DFIPMs have often 
been predominantly created with only one domain of digital forensic in mind.  
 
3. The existing DFIPMs are not formal in that they are inconsistent in terms of 
differing numbers and types of processes as well as conflicting terminology. 
 
4. The majority of the DFIPMs have not included the activities that are not forensic 
in nature yet closely related to digital forensic process, such as activities for 
organizations’ readiness, incident response or incident closure.  
 
5. Some DFIPMs confuse the different activities of incident response and digital 
forensics resulting in improper activities (such as network-biased requirements) 
with an excessive focus on an environment that is not representative of a generic 
workspace for digital forensic investigators (Adams, 2012). 
 
6. Models have differing concepts applied to their development (for example, 
many of the process models are based on physical crime investigation 
processes). 
 
7. Most of the existing models have not paid attention to the proper order for the 
activities introduced in these models. 
 
8. The greatest problem associated with the existing models pertains to their lack 
of adequate level of detail (granularity).  These models are overly high-level 
(single-layer processes) resulting in failure to incorporate sufficient details. 
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The design and development of the CDFIPM is intended to contribute towards 
addressing the identified shortcomings associated with the existing DFIPMs in order to 
accommodate new and emerging technology by achieving the research aim (as outlined 
in Section 1.4.1).  Therefore, the design and development of the CDFIPM will be 
guided by the following three fundamentals:  
 
• The CDFIPM must be comprehensive. 
• The CDFIPM must be formal. 
• The CDFIPM must be generic. 
 
In relation to the point 3 above, due to the fact that the CDFIPM is to be a generic 
model, it cannot be prescriptive with regards to organisational guidelines.  However, in 
line with Adams’ (2012) Advanced Data Acquisition Model, the CDFIPM needs: 
 
1. To incorporate the overriding principles derived from the guidelines in ACPO 
and also ISO/IEC standards; 
 
2. To accommodate organisational policy and practice such as guidelines, signing 
authorities and other requirements; 
 
3. To accommodate procedures and techniques that can be adapted and expanded 
upon as new data becomes available; and 
 
4. To include the key contributions from previous researchers. 
 
Moreover, the CDFIPM will be based on an ‘objectives-based approach’ as opposed to 
a ‘tasks-based approach’.  This is due to the fact that a model which is based on a pre-
defined check list is counter-productive as it can limit both the practicality of the 
models as well as the investigators’ flexibility.  Moreover, a pre-defined check list 
approach cannot predict different situations due to the uniqueness of each given 
situation.  Thus, in line with Beebe and Clark (2005) and Carrier and Spafford (2003), 
the uniqueness of each situation requires a non-checklist approach such as that of 
‘objectives-based approach’.  For the purposes of this thesis, objective is defined as 
something which is intended to be achieved, whereas the task is defined as something 
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which needs to be done in order to achieve the objective.  Therefore, an objectives-
based approach as suggested by Beebe and Clark (2005) and Carrier and Spafford 
(2003) will be adopted when designing and developing the CDFIPM.  Determining 
what steps to take in a particular digital crime investigation can easily be made by the 
DFIs themselves when the steps are detailed in an objectives-based manner rather than a 
tasks-based approach.  
   
Prior to describing the CDFIPM in section 3.4, its design elements will be discussed and 
justified in the next section. 
 
3.3	 Fundamentals	of	the	CDFIPM	
3.3.1			Fundamentals	of	the	New	Model	
One of the issues associated with the previous DFIPMs is the lack of standardized 
terminology within those models (Montasari et al., 2015; Valjarevic and Venter., 2015; 
Cohen 2011; Ciardhuáin, 2004; Reith et al. 2002).  It is not the digital evidence itself 
that needs to be prevailed in a court of law; the terminology used should also be 
rigorous and widely accepted within the digital forensic community (Kohn et al., 2013).  
To address this issue, the terminology within the previous DFIPMs were studied to 
identify similar meanings in the terminology and extract the most agreed-upon 
terminology from those DFIPMs for inclusion in the CDFIPM.  It is argued that the 
CDFIPM provides a uniform terminology after having considered and purified the 
terminology used in the previous DFIPMs.   
 
3.3.2			Design	of	the	CDFIPM	Formal	Representation	
The existing DFIPMs have often been presented in an informal way.  For instance, most 
models are presented in text, with some aided only by tables (Ruan and Huebner, 2009).  
This has also contributed to a lack of formalisation in relation to the DFIPMs which, 
according to Ruan and Huebner (2009), could lead to “ambiguous semantics of the 
model if sufficient level of detail is not captured”.  Also, in this regard, Kohn et al. 
(2008) state,  
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Most of the modelling representations for forensic investigations found in the 
current literature are made in a rather informal and intuitive way. Thus, it is 
argued that because of the value of a forensic investigation the formal field of 
forensic investigation can benefit from introducing a formal modelling 
approach. 
   
Kohn et al. (2008), relying on the supporting arguments presented previously by Bogan 
and Dampier (2005), suggest the Unified Modelling Language (UML) as an appropriate 
paradigm for modelling forensic process.  Similarly, Ruan and Huebner state, “What is 
needed is a formal model to specify the methodology used in the digital forensic 
analysis, which can provide well-defined and straightforward semantics to the digital 
forensic process (Ruan and Huebner, 2009).”  In consonance with Bogan and Dampier 
(2005) and Kohn et al. (2008), Ruan and Huebner also suggest that the introduction of 
the Unified Modelling Language (UML) methodology to the digital forensic process 
provides formalism and a structured approach to digital forensic processes (Ruan and 
Huebner, 2009).  Therefore, based upon these supporting arguments, the UML was 
considered as an appropriate paradigm to model the entire digital investigative process 
in a formal manner within the CDFIPM.   
 
Although the UML has been previously applied in few research studies for modelling 
digital forensic process (Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Adams, 2012; Kohn et al., 2008), 
its application has been limited to high-level components without providing any 
adequate or low-level details.  In contrast, this research will develop the use of the UML 
in digital forensics, which is discussed in the following section.   
 
3.3.2.1				Selected	Type	of	Unified	Modelling	Language	
The UML is a de-facto standard modelling language (Adams, 2012), the primary 
purpose of which is visualisation (Ruan and Huebner, 2009).  It is “intentionally 
process-independent”, making it suitable for modelling “different processes” as well as 
analysing, designing and implementing artefacts such as models and systems (OMG, 
2016).  The UML specification defines 14 types of UML Diagrams divided into two 
main categories including Structural Diagrams and Behavioural Diagrams (OMG, 
2016).  Structural Modelling captures the static features of a process or a system without 
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describing its dynamic behaviour.  In contrast, the Behavioural Modelling not only 
describes the interaction in the process or system but also represents its dynamic 
features.   
 
The type of UML Diagram selected for modelling the entire digital investigative 
process within the CDFIPM is the UML Activity Diagram under the Behavioural UML 
category.  This research will develop the use of UML in digital forensics by using the 
UML Activity Diagrams to define process flows of both high-level and low-level 
components of digital forensic process.  Developing the use of UML in digital forensics 
is therefore another novel contribution of this research to the field of digital forensics.  
The rationale for selecting the UML Activity Diagram over other types of Behavioural 
UML Diagrams or Structural UML Diagrams is multifaceted, which is now discussed in 
the section below.   
 
Firstly, the UML Activity Diagram is designed to deal with all types of flow control 
within a process.  An Activity Diagram not only describes the sequence from one 
activity to another but also describes the parallel, branched and concurrent flow within a 
process.  Thus, since the flow of activities in the CDFIPM are either sequential, parallel, 
branched or concurrent, the use of UML Activity Diagrams was considered more 
appropriate over other Behavioural or Structural UML types.  This will enable the thesis 
author to model the components of the entire digital forensic process and their 
relationship more effectively and clearly. 
 
Secondly, the use of UML Activity Diagram to model a digital forensic process is 
suggested by other prominent researchers within the domain of digital forensics.  For 
instance, Ruan and Huebner (2009), Kohn et al. (2008) and Bogan and Dampier (2005) 
suggest the use of Activity Diagram and Use Case Diagram, both of which belong to the 
Behavioural UML category, as the preferred choice of UML Diagrams for modelling 
the digital forensic process.  In this regard, Ruan and Huebner (2009) state that Activity 
Diagram provides “a well-defined and straightforward semantics” to the digital forensic 
process facilitating the understanding of the process by various parties involved such as 
legal advisors or judicial personnel.  Although the use of both UML “Activity Diagram” 
and “Use Case Diagram” was suggested by the three aforementioned references for 
modelling digital forensic process, UML Activity Diagram is still the preferred choice 
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within this research.  This is due to the fact that as Adams (2012) states, the UML 
Activity Diagram is more appropriate for describing activities within a process model 
than the Use Case Diagram.  Adams (2012) recommends the use of the Activity 
Diagrams over the Use Case Diagrams on the basis that the latter contributes little 
benefit to the description of process models.  Moreover, Use Case Diagrams would need 
to be tailored for each environment since the players would not be the same across all 
environments thereby making the overall model less generic. 
 
Thirdly, it is contended that the ease of understanding that the UML Activity Diagram 
offers will enable digital forensic investigators to visualise the various aspects of the 
digital forensic process more clearly.  In turn, this will result in the digital investigations 
being expedited.  Last but not the least, regardless of the benefit of adopting a formal 
approach from a technical perspective, the use of the UML Activity Diagram, being a 
form of flow chart, is supported in a court environment (Adams, 2012; Kelly, 2010; 
Dattu, 1998).  Judicial personnel such as judges and legal practitioners are accustomed 
to UML Activity Diagrams.  For instance, in some cases flowcharts have been prepared 
by the judges in order to assist the understanding of processes followed in a digital 
forensic investigation (Ogloff et al., 2006).  Referring to the UML Activity Diagram, 
Ruan and Huebner (2009) highlight that a graph based model has the advantage of 
visualising the process requirements, thus making the model more understandable for 
the various parties involved.  
 
Therefore, since the UML facilitates the modelling and visualisation of various aspects 
of digital forensic process, this research will draw upon the UML Activity Diagrams in 
digital forensics to present both high-level and low-level components in the CDFIPM.   
 
3.3.3			Design	of	the	CDFIPM’s	Overriding	Principles	
To enable DFIs to conduct forensically sound digital investigations, a set of ‘Overriding 
Principles’ are designed and grouped into a class entitled ‘Concurrent Processes Class’, 
the creation of which is another novel contribution of this research (in the context of this 
study, the term ‘Class’ does not refer to the same term employed in object-oriented 
programming, in which a class is a template definition of methods and variables in a 
particular.  Instead, the word ‘Class’ is used throughout this study simply to refer to the 
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specific category in which the proposed model’s Processes are placed).  The Concurrent 
Processes Class are then incorporated into the abstract representation of the CDFIPM as 
a unique and distinct group of processes or Overriding Principles.   
 
These principles are encompassing procedures, guidelines and methodological 
approaches that encompass some or all of the fourteen specified processes of the 
proposed model as well as its phases and sub-phases.  Principles as opposed to phases 
are not distinct and discrete steps in the process.  Rather, they are aims and objectives 
needed to be achieved throughout the process.  Examples of these principles include: 
maintaining a detailed documentation of digital forensic process, preserving chain of 
custody, obtaining proper authorisation and managing information flow, etc.  These 
Overriding Principles apply concurrently throughout the entirety or parts of the other 
processes within the CDFIPM.  Due to the space constraint imposed by the size of the 
CDFIPM when presented in its entirety, these Concurrent Processes will only be 
included in the abstract view of the CDFIPM in Figure 15. 
 
3.3.4			Hierarchical	Structure	of	the	CDFIPM	
Any model institutionalized through subsequent intellectual discourse and practical use 
must take into account differing perspectives and approaches, and the soundness of a 
digital investigation process model is “a function of usability and acceptability” (Beebe 
and Clark, 2005).  In order to acquire usability and acceptability in relation to the 
CDFIPM, processes, phases, sub-phases, principles and objectives were integrated to 
formulate a detailed and scientific process model.  Processes, Phases and Sub-Phases 
are obvious; they are individually separate steps in the process which can sometimes be 
a function of time and are inevitably sequential or sometimes iterative approach.  In the 
CDFIPM, the output of each process becomes an input to the following process as the 
model is inherently a process model.  The processes of the CDFIPM are tied together 
through the process model flow accompanied by its investigative principles such as 
information flow and case management.  Therefore, all the processes of the CDFIPM 
are joined by the information flow.  Furthermore, in line with Beebe and Clark (2005), 
the investigative objective on which the investigation is based also unites the processes 
of the CDFIPM.   
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The remainder of this sub-section describes the compositional components that will 
make up the CDFIPM.  The terms ‘Classes’, ‘Processes’, ‘Phases’, ‘Sub-Phases’ and 
‘Overriding Principles’ are used distinctively within the CDFIPM to refer to the 
different compositional components and their hierarchy within the CDFIPM’s structure.  
This is to contribute towards achieving both the rigor required in a DFIPM (Kohn et al., 
2013; Beebe and Clark, 2005; Carrier and Spafford, 2003) and also the formality needed 
within the DFIPM (Montasari et al., 2015; Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Adams et al., 
2014).  The following points, accompanied by a graphical representation in Figure 14, 
provide further clarification on the meanings and hierarchy of the aforementioned 
compositional components within the CDFIPM’s structure: 
 
• A Class represents the highest level or the first layer of the CDFIPM and is the 
main group which includes a different number of Processes (see the footnote 17 
under the Section 2.6.1 or the first paragraph under the Section 3.3.3 for the 
meaning of the term ‘Class’ in the context of this study).  
 
• A Process is the next level down from a Class and represents the second layer of 
the CDFIPM.  Each Process contains a different number of phases.  Processes 
are obvious and individually separate steps; they can sometimes be a function of 
time and therefore can be sequential or sometimes iterative.  The output of a 
given process will become the input to the following Process.   
 
• A Phase is the next level down from a Process and the third layer of the 
CDFIPM.  Each Phase might contain a different number of Sub-Phases. 
 
• A Sub-Phase is the next level down from a Phase and the lowest level or fourth 
layer of the CDFIPM. 
 
• Concurrent Class Processes or Overriding Principles contain Action Principles 
or Processes that are not confined to a single point in time.  The Concurrent 
Processes or Overriding Principles have a wider scope than a single Process and 
must be applied concurrently throughout the whole or parts of the other 
Processes in the CDFIPM.  
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Figure 14 is a graphical representation clarifying the above descriptions of the 
compositional components of the CDFIPM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. The hierarchical structure of the CDFIPM’s components 
 
Having discussed the design elements of the CDFIPM, the following sections describe, 
justify and incorporate into the proposed model the components that will make up the 
CDFIPM, building significantly upon the existing DFIPMs.   
 
3.4	 The	Proposed	Model	(the	CDFIPM)	
The CDFIPM has been designed using a top-down approach in order to enable digital 
forensic investigators to gain a better insight into its compositional components, namely 
Classes, Processes, Phases, Sub-Phases and Overriding Principles. There are 6 Classes 
contained within the CDFIPM, each of which contains a different number of Processes.  
There is a total number of twenty-four Processes included in the six Classes. Apart from 
the Concurrent Class Processes, which do not provide lower-level details, i.e. Phases 
and Sub-Phases, the remainder of the Processes provide additional lower layers of 
details.  The CDFIPM will be initially presented in its abstract level, prior to being 
refined with more details that make up the model’s lowest-level structure, that is in its 
entirety.    
   
Figure 15 represents the first instance of the formal representation of the CDFIPM in its 
abstract level, containing only the first and second layers of the CDFIPM, namely 
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Classes and Processes.  Following this abstract representation, the CDFIPM will be 
represented in its entirety in Figures 16-21.  Each Process in the CDFIPM is represented 
by a UML Activity Diagram; the combination of all of the UML Activity Diagrams 
make up the entire CDFIPM.  Due to the space constraint of an A4 sheet, the CDFIPM 
runs through several pages (when it is in its entirety).  Each page is considered to be one 
figure and depending on the space, each figure might represent more than one Process 
of the CDFIPM.  Therefore, the entire CDFIPM is presented within Figures 16 to 21.  
After presenting the CDFIPM in its entirety, all the six Classes of the CDFIPM will be 
subsequently discussed under their associated main headings within Section 3.5 to 
Section 3.10.  Also, the lower-level components of each given Class will be presented 
and described under the main heading for that particular Class.   
 
Notice that this version of the CDFIPM’s formal representation (Figure 15 and Figures 
16-21) as well as its Overriding Principles presented in this chapter are prior to their 
submission to the external reviewers for evaluation and feedback discussed in Chapter 
5. 
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Figure 15. The abstract representation of the CDFIPM 
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Figure 16. The Readiness, Incident Detection and First Response Processes 							
Incident	Detection	
Detect 
incident. 
Report 
incident. 
Validate 
incident. 
Assess 
incident. 
Possible information 
security incident?   
Confirmed 
information security 
incident?   
Improve. 
Describe 
incident. 
Classify 
incident. 
Review 
incident. 
No 
Yes 
No Yes 
1- Type of incident 
2- Scope of the incident 
3- Severity of the incident 
Reduction of 
false alarm 
First	Response	
Address safety 
issues. 
Go/input to the 
Planning Process. 
Secure crime 
scene. 
Document the  
crime scene. 
Isolate and contain. 
Secure physical and 
digital evidence. 
Eradicate. 
Monitor 
network. 
Carry out preliminary 
interviews. Coordinate 
Managerial, human, 
legal and law 
enforcement resources 
Readiness	
Policy/ Procedure 
Operational 
Readiness 
Infrastructure 
Readiness 
		 131	
	
Figure 17. The Planning and Preparation Processes 
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Figure 18. The Secure and Evaluate Crime Scene and Identification Processes 
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Figure 19. The Acquisition and Collection Process 
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Figure 20. The Examination, Analysis, Interpretation, Event Reconstruction and Reporting Processes 
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Figure 21. The Presentation, Investigation Closure and Future Readiness Processes 		 	
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3.5	 Readiness	Process	Class	
A digital forensic investigation is often utilised as a post-mortem after a computer crime 
or an information security breach has occurred.  However, careful planning in advance 
could significantly enhance the quality and availability of digital evidence collected and 
at the same time, minimise organisational cost and load.  This can be materialized 
through an organisation’s Digital Forensic Readiness.  Rowlingson (2004) and Tan 
(2001) define Forensic Readiness as “the ability of an organisation to maximise its 
potential to use digital evidence whilst minimising the costs of an investigation”.  This 
definition is widely accepted and adopted by the digital forensic community.  ISO/IEC 
27043 builds upon Rowlingson and Tan’s definition of Forensic Readiness and suggests 
that Forensic Readiness is “the ability to maximise the use of the potential digital 
evidence, minimize the costs of the investigation, minimise the interference with and 
prevent the interruption of business processes and to preserve or improve the current 
level of information systems security (ISO/IEC 27043, 2015)”.   
 
The two widely accepted aforementioned definitions of Forensic Readiness were used 
to develop the Phases contained in the Readiness Process of the CDFIPM.  The 
Readiness Process of the CDFIPM is focused on the victim organization, and not the 
investigator, who is presumably separate from the victim (either functionally, or 
organizationally). Investigators focus their preparation activities on the Planning 
Process, technical capability development, training, and evidence preservation handling 
procedure development.  Thus, in the CDFIPM, the Readiness Process Class is used to 
refer to the pro-active steps that organisations should undertake in advance of a 
potential digital crime to increase the chances of digital evidence availability with the 
aim of deterring, detecting, responding, investigating and prosecuting computer crimes.  
The pro-active steps consist of improved system and staff monitoring, physical and 
procedural equipment (Rowlingson, 2004), means to preserve data to evidential 
standards of admissibility (Kohn et al., 2013), processes and procedures in order to 
ensure that the staff recognise the importance (including the legal significance) of 
evidence (Casey et al., 2011) and appropriate legal advice and communication with law 
enforcement (Adams, 2012). 
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The Readiness Process Class in the CDFIPM contains only one further lower layer, 
namely Phases, and requires the organisations to focus their efforts on establishing two 
components including Operational Readiness and Infrastructure Readiness.  Figure 22. 
represents the UML Activity Diagram of the Readiness Process followed by the 
description of the Phases contained in this Process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. The UML Activity Diagram of the Readiness Processes 	
3.5.1			Operational	Readiness	
Under the Operational Readiness, corporates should have a proper initial policy and 
procedure documents before they can successfully launch an effective digital forensic 
investigation.  The documents and procedures should include a concise description of 
how the organisation will deal with the digital evidence so that a minimum standard of 
integrity is maintained when dealing with digital evidence.   
 
3.5.2			Infrastructure	Readiness	
Infrastructure Readiness, on the other hand, is determined by elements external and 
internal to the organisation (Kohn et al., 2013).  Examples of external elements consist 
of the legal system, territory legislation, rules of evidence and types of investigation 
carried out.  An example of an internal element is the training of appropriately qualified 
personnel.  The Readiness Process of the CDFIPM is optional to the rest of the digital 
investigation processes, and are mainly focused on the victim organization and not the 
investigator who is likely to be separate from the victim organisation either functionally, 
or organizationally.  Moreover, regardless of the field of the digital forensics in which a 
Readiness	
Policy/ Procedure 
Operational 
Readiness 
Infrastructure 
Readiness 
Output to Initialization Processes Class 	
		 138	
digital forensic practitioner operates, the CDFIPM requires investigators to focus their 
activities on the Planning Process of the CDFIPM, and not the Readiness Process.   
 
3.6	 Initialization	Processes	Class	
Initialization Processes Class represents the first layer of the CDFIPM, the aim of which 
is to deal with the initial stages of a digital investigation.  This Class is multi-layered 
containing three further lower layers including Processes, Phases and Sub-Phase.  There 
are four Processes included in the Initialization Processes Class consisting of Incident 
Detection, First Response, Planning and Preparation.  This section describes these 
Processes and their associated lower layers, namely Phases and Sub-Phases.  Figure 23 
represents the UML Activity Diagram of the Initialization Class Processes in their 
abstract level.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. The UML Activity Diagram of Initialization Class Processes in their abstract level  
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In the following sections the Initialization Processes Class will be broken down to 
describe its lower-level components, i.e. Processes.  In turn, each Process will be further 
refined in greater details to specify and describe its lower-layer components, i.e. Phases 
and Sub-Phases. 
 
3.6.1			Incident	Detection	
In the CDFIPM, the output of the Readiness Process, discussed in the previous section, 
becomes the input to the Incident Detection Process, which is a multi-layered Process 
consisting of both Phases and Sub-Phases.  The Incident Detection Process is 
introduced as the first Process of the digital investigation in the CDFIPM denoting that 
the actual digital investigation starts with this Process.  Although authors of few 
existing models have discussed Incident Detection to some extent, they have often 
incorrectly suggested Incident Detection as an activity within “Preparation” or 
“Planning” Phase.  In contrast, in the CDFIPM, Incident Detection is introduced as a 
separate Process with its associated lower-level components, i.e. Phases and Sub-
Phases.  This is due to the fact that forensic investigators can never know whether each 
system they work on has digital investigation readiness activities implemented or not.  
Figure 24 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the Incident Detection Process.  
 
Figure 24. The UML Activity Diagram of the Incident Detection Process 
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3.6.1.1				Incident	Detection	Process	Components	
During the Incident Detection Process, an incident is detected by either internal or 
external events.  Internal events include, but are not limited to, intrusion detection 
system, intrusion prevention systems, log-analysing systems and change-tracking 
systems.  An example of external events includes crime being reported to the police.  
After the incident is detected, it should be reported to the relevant individuals or 
authority such as the management in the company or the law enforcement.  The incident 
will then need to be assessed to confirm or refute its occurrence.  If its occurrence is 
refuted, the improvement will need to be made to ensure the reduction of false alarms.  
However, if the occurrence of the incident is confirmed, the incident will then need to 
be classified and described to determine its type. 
 
Authors of the existing models have neither discussed nor assigned any component to 
the Incident Classification and Incident Description within their models.  They simply 
reduce their discussions to the statement that incidents need to be detected without 
elaborating on this process.  This is a grave weakness because the events causing the 
investigation could significantly determine the type of investigation required.  For 
instance, the digital investigation could take a completely different course if the incident 
were categorized as using the computer to distribute child pornography than if it were 
classified as an unauthorised access to the root account of the operating system.  
Therefore, since Incident Classification and Incident Description could have significant 
impact on the rest of the Processes in a digital investigation, two separate Phases, 
namely Classify Incident and Describe Incident, have been assigned to these two 
components.  Investigators must ensure that these two Phases do not contain any 
activity that might modify data at the information system where the incident has taken 
place.  This is to ensure that the digital evidence can be preserved.  Finally, the incident 
needs to be reviewed.  The output of the Incident Detection Process becomes an input to 
the First Response Process, discussed in the following section.  
 
3.6.2			First	Response	Process	
In the CDFIPM, the First Response Process only applies to the investigations within 
corporate settings and not to the law enforcement investigations.  This is why some 
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Phases within the CDFIPM’s First Response Process and Secure and Evaluate Crime 
Scene Process (See Section 3.7.1) might appear to be repetitive at first glance.  In 
corporate settings, often organisations have their own in-house first response team who 
are called upon to respond to an incident or crime that has targeted an organisation’s 
resources or employees of that organisation.  Thus, when an incident is detected within 
the corporate setting, the first people who respond to the incident or crime are the 
organisation’s own response team.  In contrast, in a law enforcement investigation, 
digital forensic investigators are often called upon to assist individuals or organisations 
outside of law enforcement who have become the victim of a crime.   
 
The rationale for developing two different processes associated with the first response 
activities is due to the context in which the investigation is carried out and also the 
ordering of events.  Thus, in the CDFIPM, the First Response Process is the initial step 
that the first responders within corporate settings must take to respond to the incident 
that has been detected.  Due to the fact that incident response and digital forensics 
domains overlap (Freiling and Schwittay, 2007), the first response to an incident or 
crime should fall within the scope of any digital forensic investigation. Therefore, the 
First Response Process has been incorporated into the CDFIPM to enable the first 
responders to ensure the integrity of potential digital evidence in corporate 
investigations.   
 
Unlike the previous DFIPMs, in the CDFIPM, the First Response is a multi-layered 
process which contains both phases and sub-phases.  In almost all of the existing 
DFIPMs, no lower-level components have been defined under the First Response 
Process.  This might be due to the fact that specifying Phases and Sub-Phases for this 
Process is a difficult task to achieve as these can vary significantly depending on the 
type of target information system and the data contained in the target information 
system.  Another reason for this might be due to the fact that many researchers within 
the domain of digital forensics view incident response and digital forensics as two 
complete separable fields.  Although the scope of the First Response activities could 
include a whole new project, nevertheless the thesis author has attempted to identify 
generic Phases and Sub-Phases which could be relevant to all types of target 
information systems.  The identification of lower-level details for the First Response 
Process of the CDFIPM has been achieved by relying mainly upon the field of Incident 
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Response as well as feedback acquired from experts operating within this field.  Figure 
25 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the First Response Process contained 
within the CDFIPM.  
 
Figure 25. The UML Activity Diagram of the First Response Process 	
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incident accurately in the initial drafting of documentation using photographs, video and 
sketches.  Contingent on the type of investigation and authorisation, preliminary 
interviews should be carried out with the suspect to gain knowledge which could assist 
the investigation.  Under the Coordinate Phase, human resources should be coordinated 
by arranging for the relevant personnel to participate in the investigation.  The output of 
the First Response Process becomes the input to the Planning Process, discussed in the 
following section. 
 
3.6.3			Planning	Process	
The Planning Process is one of the most important processes in a digital investigation 
and is often common across different fields in which DFIs operate.  Casey emphasizes 
the importance of this Process, stating that planning is crucial in particular in 
circumstances where computers are involved (Casey, 2011).  Since the Planning Process 
can have a significant impact on the efficiency and success of all the other stages in a 
digital investigative process, a ‘discrete’ Process has been assigned to the Planning in 
the CDFIPM.  In the existing DFIPMs, Planning and Preparation are often used 
interchangeably to refer to the same Process incorrectly even though they are two 
different Processes.  In line with ISO/IEC 27043 (2015), Planning and Preparation have 
been distinguished and assigned two discrete Processes in the CDFIPM, with each 
Process being refined with lower-level details, i.e. Phases and Sub-Phases.   
 
An exception to the existing DFIPMs where Planning and Preparation are considered 
the same Process is the model developed by Valjarevic and Venter (2015), in which 
Planning and Preparation are considered two separate Processes.  However, Planning 
and Preparation Processes in Valjarevic and Venter’s model do not provide any lower-
level components necessary to assist DFIs in conducting forensically sound digital 
investigations.  Regarding the Planning Process, Sammes and Jenkinson (2007), as cited 
by Adams (2012), state that it is very important that the number of computers, their 
types, operating systems and connections are all known before entering the scene of 
crime.  Although this might be true to a large extent in an ideal world, DFIs often have 
little idea about the computer systems, quantity and location of data, types of hard disk 
or the operating systems involved, prior to visiting the crime scene (Adams, 2012). 
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Also, because the initial information concerning the specific online environment might 
be scarce, insufficient or imprecise, the Planning Process must therefore focus on 
preparing for as many likely scenarios as possible (Adams, 2012, Brown, 2006).  
Therefore, it would be unreasonable to expect DFIs to produce anything beyond a rough 
outline of a plan at this stage of investigation, a view supported by Adams (2012).  
 
In the existing DFIPMs, the Planning Process often requires DFIs to plan only for the 
activities that need to be carried out at the crime scene.  However, the Planning Process 
in the CDFIPM provides guidance on the potential planning that DFIs should carry out 
during the entire investigative process.  Various considerations need to be made at the 
Planning stage even though DFIs have little understanding of what they should expect. 
This includes constructing the relevant procedures, defining methodologies, the choice 
of tools to be used, planning for the use of appropriate human resources that should be 
involved in the investigation, and planning all activities during other Processes.  In 
some circumstances, DFIs also need to plan for some ‘on-scene’ processing of digital 
evidence (Casey, 2011; Rogers et al., 2006).  For example, when DFIs do not have 
authority to seize every computer system, investigators must perform some on-scene 
keyword searching of many computers to identify which ones are relevant to the 
investigation.  Another example includes planning for ‘onsite triage’ where an on-scene 
examination of a digital system will be required in cases such as child abduction. 
   
Since it is not feasible to develop specific planning tailored to every possible situation 
(Kent et al., 2006), the Planning Process in the CDFIPM has focused on generic 
activities so that it can be suitable for different investigations.  In circumstances where 
digital device has already been seized by law enforcement officers and presented to the 
laboratory for examination, this Process will become brief as it will not be necessary to 
preform many of the preceding activities (Adams, 2012).  Also in the CDFIPM, the 
Planning Process and Readiness Process are different in that the activities in the 
Readiness Process are planned and implemented by the organisation, whereas the 
Planning Process is carried out by the DFIs who draw their own plan of actions.  
However, if the digital investigation readiness measures were implemented correctly, 
then the DFIs should plan how to use the results of those measures in order to maximise 
the success of the digital investigation process. 
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Figure 26 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the Planning Process followed by 
the description of its lower-level components.  
 
Figure 26. The UML Activity Diagram of the Planning Process 	
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Access	to	Property	
This Sub-Phase involves physical access to the resources where data is being contained.  
The need to have a physical access to the resources containing data is the case in the 
majority of circumstances.  However, obviously, there are cases in which data can be 
accessed through the Internet or external networks24.  Commercial buildings often have 
security measures in place necessitating keys, cards or door access codes to allow the 
access to the building.  Private sites might have restricted access and parking with 
security gates.  Therefore, lawyers may need to discuss the entry with the occupants so 
that they can enter and serve the instructions and initiate the CDFIPM’s Secure and 
Evaluate the Crime Scene Process (Adams, 2012). 
 
Multiple	Locations	
Data might be held at resources at more than one site or at different offices across 
multiple floors in the same site.  Thus, Multiple Locations has been included under 
Consider Physical Constraint as a Sub-Phase to enable the investigative team to 
determine how many sets of equipment is required and how many DFIs are needed to 
attend the scene to carry out the digital data acquisition (Adams, 2012).  
 
3.6.3.2				Consider	Timing	Constraint		
A ‘Consider Timing Constraint’ has been suggested as a Phase within the Planning 
Process due to its significance (Adams, 2012).  Although some of the previous research 
and standards discuss practical considerations to some extent (ISO/IEC 27043 2015; 
Kohn et al., 2013; Casey, 2011 and 2004; Wiles, 2007), they do not include the timing 
as part of the Planning.  The CDFIPM requires DFIs to consider three elements of 
timing constraint including: ‘court orders and warrants’, ‘private sites’ and ‘commercial 
sites’ (Adams, 2012).  In relation to court orders and warrants, these often impose time 
restrictions within which the Acquisition Process must be carried out regardless of 
whether the process has actually been completed or not.  Concerning the circumstances 
where private premises are involved, the investigators might need to arrive at the scene 
before the subject of investigation leaves the premises but preferably after the partners 
and/or children have left the building (Adams, 2012).   																																																								
24 In cases of accessing data through external networks, there must be a justifiable reason why data needs 
to be accessed remotely as opposed to employing a DFI onsite to access the data. 
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Also, in cases where commercial premises are involved, a key holder will need to arrive 
and provide the investigators with access to the offices after they have checked the court 
orders or warrants.  In cases of covert investigations where the subject of the 
investigation should be left unaware of the investigation or the need to avoid business 
disruptions, DFIs are often required to arrive at the premises after working hours and 
complete the acquisition of the data before employees return (Adams, 2012).  This 
ensures that business flow is not disrupted or the suspect is not able to destroy data 
representing potential digital evidence.  The business disruption element has been 
considered also by other researchers including Sammes and Jenkinson (2007), as cited 
by Adams (2012).  For instance, Sammes and Jenkinson (2007) recommend a search 
briefing which consists of both the assignment of tasks and the key objectives as well as 
recognition of the provisions of the warrant or court order.  Adams (2012) state that in 
cases where data is held at various sites, an appropriate period of time must be 
permitted so that all the forensic teams will be able to match their arrival to ensure that 
no individual is informed of the investigation before a team have arrived.  
 
3.6.3.3				Consider	Data	Constraint		
In the context of the ‘Consider Data Constraint Phase’ (Adams, 2012), data is the digital 
information which represents the potential digital evidence that is the subject of the 
Acquisition Process.  Data can take various forms such as a text file, a still image and 
video or audio file, etc.  As with other Phases and Sub-Phases of the Planning Process 
in the CDFIPM, it is not often obvious at the beginning whether there will be any data 
associated with the investigation or where this data can indeed be found.  Various 
authors in the previous research have provided a list of different types of digital data 
and recommended different location in terms of where data can be found (Casey, 2011; 
Marcella and Menendez, 2007; Jones et al., 2005; Farmer and Venema, 2005).  
Although this level of detail is not included in the proposed model, the CDFIPM 
nevertheless suggests three data elements regarding possible quantity of data which 
might be needed, as originally suggested by Adams (2012).  These are set out below. 
 
Identification	of	Data	
Prior to data acquisition, it might be required that a DFI previews data through a write-
blocking device using certain specialist software which he has already installed on a 
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forensic workstation.  In such cases, the DFI must consider the means of identifying 
data which will be relevant to the investigation (Adams, 2012).  One of the 
considerations that DFIs should take is to apply appropriate techniques when attempting 
to identify the relevant data.  For example, if the data representing potential digital 
evidence was in an image format, it would then be inappropriate for DFIs to use a 
search term to find such a data.  The activities performed under this Sub-Phase have an 
important effect on the times needed to carry out the investigation (Adams, 2012).  
 
Amount	of	Data	
The amount of data that needs to be acquired will have a direct impact on the amount of 
storage space as well as the amount of time required to perform the data acquisition 
itself (Adams, 2012).  Although nowadays even a large disk space is rather inexpensive, 
there might be difficulties concerning physically managing a large number of disks.  In 
cases of the live acquisition of data, it is very probable that the network performance 
will be affected negatively (Adams, 2012).  Therefore, DFIs will need to ensure that 
they communicate the impact of this to the clients and lawyers in order for the effect on 
the business holding the data to be considered.  This might result in negotiations in 
terms of how and when the live data acquisition will be performed (Adams, 2012). 
 
Location	of	Data	
Data location varies; there are certain data locations which might be challenging to DFIs 
such as data held on backup tapes or held by a third-party provider of a cloud solution.  
In cases of the backup tapes, DFIs will need to take into account the appropriate means 
of restoring the relevant backup tapes or consider putting into place a plan to remove 
and duplicate the tapes offline (Adams, 2012).  Providing the details of such operation 
is outside the scope of the CDFIPM.  Concerning the data that is held by a third-party as 
part of cloud solution, the data obviously should be accessed via the Internet.  This 
poses various challenges especially regarding authorisation; also in terms of 
geographical location, it is also possible that DFIs might not be able physically to 
access the place in which data is stored (Adams, 2012).  
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3.6.3.4				Consider	Authorisation		
DFIs need to ensure that they have the proper authorisation to be able to conduct the 
work.  The type of authorisation required for an investigation to proceed will not be 
known unless the type of investigation is determined first.  The authority can include 
both internal and external authorizations (Ciardhuáin, 2004).  Internal authorisation can 
come from the organisation which provide the services whereas the external 
authorization is the authority in law and the authority from the owner of the resources 
which contain the material to be acquired (Adams, 2012). 
 
Internal	Authorisation	
Depending on the specific organisation involved, the internal authorization has different 
forms.  If the provider of the digital forensic services is a small organisation, the 
procedure of the internal organisation is rather straightforward and could include a 
signed agreement specifying the services intended to be provided.  In contrast, for a 
large organisation which might be part of a larger service provider, the process of 
authorization is often more complicated.  In this case, different conflicting instructions 
and risk assessments will be required to be carried out in order to reduce conflicts of 
interest which focus on legislative regulations or commercial considerations (Adams, 
2012).  Previous research, as cited by Adams (2012), assumes by default that DFIs are 
employed in the organisation which owns the resources to be investigated and therefore 
presume that the authorization has already been granted (Wiles, 2007; Steel, 2006).  
However, this previous research has not covered the third-party providers of digital 
forensic service in relation to process models (Adams, 2012). 
 
Authority	in	Law	
DFIs who operate within the field of commerce are required to ensure that they have 
acquired proper legal authority to offer the services in a way that they have been 
requested.  This might involve the investigators’ names being placed on the court orders 
or other documents (Adams, 2012).  In terms of DFIs who work within the field of law 
enforcement, they will need to confirm the details of the proper authorization and any 
restrictions imposed.  Moreover, DFIs will need to examine any court orders closely 
allowing access to a third party’s property.  This is because if DFIs conduct any action 
that is not allowed by the law, they may become the subject of lawsuit themselves.  
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DFIs must also take into account the potential discovery of materials which are covered 
by the criminal law such as child pornography.  If such materials are found, DFIs will 
need to inform the client of such a discovery and consult the appropriate law 
enforcement. 
 
External	Authority	
If a DFI has been asked to conduct the investigation for a company, the system of which 
needs to be accessed, the DFI must ensure that the individual(s) who provides 
instructions is allowed to access the system involved.  This is because data from more 
than one entity might have been stored on a single computer system.  For example, the 
resources might be held at a third-party provider of IT services (Adams, 2012). 
 
3.6.3.5				Create	the	Outline	Plan		
The outcome of all the Phases and their associated Sub-Phases within the Planning 
Process will be the Create the Outline Plan Phase.  Since DFIs have not yet attended and 
surveyed the crime scene at this stage, only a rational prediction can be made with 
certain contingency plans being put in place.  For example, some personnel need to be 
tasked with remaining on standby to collect and deliver additional storage devices, 
application software or other resources (Adams, 2012).  Some researchers have 
previously considered the creation of the outline plan.  For example, Sammes and 
Jenkinson (2007) implicitly refer to the creation of the outline plan by discussing a 
“Search Briefing”.  Although Sammes and Jenkinson (2007), as cited by Adams (2012), 
approach the search briefing from the point of view of law enforcement, this activity is 
still relevant to the commercial field as well.  This is because it ensures that all 
individuals implicated know about the available information at the time including any 
constraints imposed by court orders or other authorities (Adams, 2012). 
 
According to Sammes and Jenkinson (2007), DFIs should be able to address the 
following questions:     
 
1. How many trained personnel are needed? 
2. How many teams are required; where do they need to be and at what date/time?  
3. How many sets of equipment are required, and what should be in the toolkits? 
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4. What specialist skills are required (e.g. someone with mainframe server 
knowledge may need to be at a specific location)? 
5. How much storage media is required at each location, and how can this be 
supplemented if necessary? 
6. Will the services of another employee/contractor be required (e.g. a system IT 
administrator to assist with shutting down servers or locating backup tapes)? 
 
Adams (2012) is more explicit about the need for the creation of an outline plan and 
suggests six main types of activities as follows:  
 
• The number of trained investigators needed; 
• The type and set of equipment needed at each site including software, dongles, 
write-blockers and image storage media; 
• The start time at each site and the estimate of the duration of acquisition stage; 
• The details of personnel involved including contact numbers of team 
leaders/lawyers/client liaison distributed;  
• The acquisition plan detailing target storage locations, protocol and key words; 
and  
• The applicable constraints – authorisation, physical, timing and data. 
 
Therefore, the Create Outline Plan of the Planning Process must detail the activities 
suggested by Adams (2012) and Sammes and Jenkinson (2007) as described above.  
Providing the details about what needs to be included in the toolkit that should be taken 
to the crime scene is beyond the scope of the CDFIPM.  Valuable resources providing 
detailed description of what equipment needs to be taken onsite can be found in the 
research conducted by Sammes and Jenkinson (2007), Brown (2006) and Jones et al. 
(2005).  It is argued that the content of the toolkit which needs to be taken to the crime 
scene should be determined by DFIs themselves (Adams, 2012).    
 
3.6.4			Preparation	Process	
Preparation Process involves implementing the planning and procedures outlined in the 
Planning Process.  The aim of this Process is to prepare the organisation and DFIs for 
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carrying out the activities in the following Processes in the CDFIPM.  This includes, but 
is not limited to, preparing appropriate equipment (both hardware and software), 
infrastructure, human resources, raising awareness, training and documentation.  Figure 
27 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the Preparation Process.  
 
Figure 27. The UML Activity Diagram of the Preparation Process 	
Although Preparation has been assigned a discrete Process, it has also been considered 
as an Overriding Principle within the CDFIPM.  The discrete Preparation Process refers 
to the generic preparation necessary throughout the investigation. In contrast, 
Preparation as an Overriding Principle refers to the preparation that DFIs should carry 
out for each given Process concurrently throughout other Processes within the 
CDFIPM, a view supported by Casey (2011), who states “Preparation is needed at every 
step of an investigation.”  Preparation Process has been included in the CDFIPM to 
enable DFIs to be better equipped to conduct more effective digital investigations.  
Moreover, it will ensure that the integrity of potential digital evidence is not 
compromised because of the lack of possible preparedness by DFIs.  
 
Preparation	
Prepare equipment. 
Prepare techniques. 
Prepare infrastructure. 
Prepare human 
resources. 
Obtain proper legal 
authority. 
Raise awareness. 
Monitor authorisation and 
management support. 
Search warrant 
Subpoena 
Etc. 	
Go /input to the Secure and 
Evaluate Crime Scene Process 
Output from the 
Planning Process  	
		 153	
3.7	 Acquisitive	Processes	Class	
Acquisitive Processes Class represents the first layer of the CDFIPM, the aim of which 
is to secure the crime scene, identify, acquire and collect both physical and digital 
evidence.  Similar to other Classes of the CDFIPM, the Acquisitive Processes Class is 
also multi-layered containing three further lower layers including Processes, Phases and 
Sub-Phase.  There are three Processes included in the Acquisitive Processes Class 
consisting of Secure and Evaluate the Crime Scene, Identification, and Acquisition and 
Collection.  This section describes these Processes and their associated lower layers, 
namely Phases and Sub-Phases.  Figure 28 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the 
Acquisitive Class Processes in their abstract level.   
 
Figure 28. The UML Activity Diagram of Acquisitive Class Processes in their abstract level 
 
In the following sections the Acquisitive Processes Class will be broken down to 
describe its lower-level components, namely Processes.  In turn, each Process will be 
further refined in greater detail to specify and describe its lower-layer components, i.e. 
Phases and Sub-Phases. 
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3.7.1			Secure	and	Evaluate	Crime	Scene	Process	
Once the proper planning and preparation have been finalised, DFIs will now need to 
attend the crime scene where the data representing potential digital evidence might be 
stored in a digital system.  At this stage, the Initialisation Process moves to those Phases 
that directly deal with the actual suspect and the crime scene.  During this stage, an 
outline plan for the subsequent Acquisition Process is created.  In order to demonstrate 
in a court that the digital evidence was acquired in a forensically sound manner, first 
DFIs must be able to show that the crime scene from which the digital evidence was 
acquired was left unaltered.  Thus, there must be a distinct process which details the 
steps that DFIs should undertake prior to the ‘identification’ and ‘acquisition’ of digital 
evidence in order to preserve the crime scene securely.  Lack of such a discrete Process 
is most likely to invite challenge to the way that the digital evidence has been acquired 
and ultimately render the incriminating evidence futile.  
  
Unfortunately, the authors of the existing models have inappropriately skipped this vital 
stage of digital investigation by not assigning a separate Process to ‘Securing the Crime 
Scene' prior to the ‘Identification’ and ‘Acquisition’ Processes.  They have often 
reduced their discussions to the statement that digital evidence needs to be identified 
and acquired without providing necessary details on the steps required to be undertaken 
by DFIs prior to the identification and acquisition of digital evidence.  In the existing 
models, often one single Process is assigned to cover the three elements of 
‘Preservation’, ‘Identification’ and ‘Acquisition’.  Although some authors such as 
Casey (2011) have discussed preserving the crime scene briefly, they have not provided 
an explicit Process to accommodate the activities related to securing the crime scene.   
 
Therefore, the Secure and Evaluate Crime Scene Process with its associated lower-level 
components has been designed and incorporated into the CDFIPM as a separate Process 
to assist DFIs in securely preserving the crime scene prior to the Identification and 
Acquisition Processes.  The development of this Process is another novel contribution 
of this research to the field of digital forensics.  Other two separate Processes of the 
CDFIPM, namely Identification and Acquisition (discussed later), with their lower-level 
details that will need to be carried out at the crime scene are further contributions of this 
research to the field of digital forensics.  Figure 29 represents the UML Activity 
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Diagram of the Secure and Evaluate the Crime Scene Process followed by the 
description of its Phases and Sub-Phases.  
 
Figure 29. The UML Activity Diagram of the Secure and Evaluate Crime Scene Process 	
3.7.1.1				Address	Safety	Issues		
In line with ACPO (2012) Good Practice Guide, Adams (2012) and Brown (2006), the 
CDFIPM requires the investigators to address the safety issues prior to conducting any 
of the Phases of the Secure and Evaluate Crime Scene Process.  Safety issues should 
cover both investigators and witnesses as well as the materials under the investigation. 
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3.7.1.2				Preserve	and	Secure	Crime	Scene		
In order to demonstrate in a court that the activities associated with the Secure and 
Evaluate the Crime Scene Process were carried out in a forensically sound manner, 
DFIs must be able to show that the crime scene was preserved unaltered.  Thus, if 
possible and practicable, the investigators must enforce a lock down of the entire crime 
scene in order to achieve what Casey (2011) calls a “pristine environment” to preserve 
the integrity of both the digital device(s) and the potential evidence contained in it.  
Other steps that DFIs should take include preventing individuals from entering or 
leaving the crime scene, and preventing unauthorised people (including the suspect) 
from tampering with the digital device and materials under investigation.   
 
In terms of preserving the digital crime scene, this can include, but is not limited to, 
blocking the network connectivity.  A computer system attached to a network that is 
running can be regarded as fragile evidence due to the fact that its data representing 
potential digital evidence could be deleted with commands from a remote system.  
Examples of procedures to preserve the content of a computer in this situation are to 
unplug the computer from the network when it is found, or to utilise a network monitor 
to view what data is being sent to the system until the full investigation begins (see also 
section 3.6.2 for an example of preserving the crime scene in corporate investigations). 
 
3.7.1.3				Interview	the	Suspect		
Interviewing the suspect is an extremely important aspect of the Secure and Evaluate 
the Crime Scene Process.  If the investigation is not covert and the suspect is at the 
crime scene, he/she must be detained and interviewed.  Suspects often would be 
psychologically more vulnerable within the first few hours of their initial encounter 
with the police (Black, 2014), particularly when this encounter takes place in their place 
of business or dwellings (Yeschke, 2002).  Due to the shock that they have received, 
they often tend to be more compliant and open to answering the police questions even 
after they have been “mirandized” (Rogers et al., 2006; Memon et al., 2003).  Based on 
an examination of 600 taped police interviews of suspects in England, Baldwin (1993) 
reported that in the majority of cases (80 per cent), suspects were thoroughly 
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cooperative and answered police questions of any significance in the initial periods after 
the raid into their dwellings or places of work.   
 
Therefore, investigators should capitalize upon the initial status of the suspects and their 
willingness to cooperate in order to extract information that could assist the ongoing 
investigation.  Such a compliance could be crucial in certain circumstances such as 
abductions and sexual predatory offenses.  At this stage into the investigation, what is 
critical to the investigators is the knowledge of the full extent of the crime or 
involvement of the suspect and triggers that further increase the suspect’s willingness to 
talk and cooperate.  These triggers might originate in the digital evidence stored on the 
suspect’s digital device such as email correspondence, digital maps, pictures and chat 
logs.  It is very important that investigators and interviewers who are dealing directly 
with the suspect provide direct input to the digital forensic examiners at this stage.  This 
ensures that correct prioritizations and assumptions are being made in relation to the 
potential digital evidence identification and acquisition activities.  
 
3.7.1.4				Carry	out	the	Preliminary	Survey		
Once the crime scene has been securely preserved, investigators attending the crime 
scene will need to conduct a ‘preliminary survey’ of the physical crime scene to obtain 
an idea about how to process the physical and digital crime scenes and what kind of 
special skills are required.  The aim of the Carry out the Preliminary Survey Phase is to 
collect and analyse the physical evidence and reconstruct the events that occurred 
during the incident or crime.  The fundamental purpose of a digital investigation is to 
identify people responsible for an incident or crime; therefore, physical evidence is 
needed.  In the context of law enforcement investigations, a physical crime scene expert 
often works alongside the primary investigators and digital forensic investigators. In 
corporate investigations, the response team or the physical security team might need to 
complete the activities under this process. 
 
In terms of surveying the physical crime scene, investigators should walk around the 
crime scene to identify obvious pieces of evidence and pieces of evidence that might be 
short-lived.  During this Phase, initial observation of who, what, where, when, and how 
needs to be documented, and an initial theory must be developed.  Although conducting 
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a preliminary survey is vital while attending the crime scene, the existing research has 
hardly paid attention, if any, to a systematic search for and identification of the digital 
devices containing potential digital evidence.  Those authors who have spent efforts 
discussing the survey of the crime scene have simply sufficed their discussions to the 
fact that the digital device containing potential digital evidence must be identified 
without elaborating on the details.  Therefore, to address this issue, in the CDFIPM, a 
discrete Phase, Carry out the Preliminary Survey, has been designed and incorporated 
into the Secure and Evaluate Crime Scene Process aiming to enable the DFIs: 
 
• to identify the obvious pieces of physical evidence by walking around the crime 
scene (Casey, 2011; Carrier and Spafford, 2003);  
• to identify the fragile pieces of physical evidence that might be short-lived 
(Carrier and Spafford, 2003); 
• to identify any technical issues (Adams, 2012); 
• to survey the digital crime scene to identify data of interest that represents 
potential digital evidence; 
• to determine the mixture of onsite and offsite acquisition (Adams, 2012); and 
• to develop and initial theory about the incident or crime. 
 
Newman (2007) and Carrier and Spafford (2003) have suggested various activities that 
DFIs will need to undertake while surveying the physical crime scene.  These activities 
have been refined and incorporated as ‘Sub-Phases’ into the Secure and Evaluate the 
Crime Scene.  The activities in question that DFIs should undertake when surveying the 
physical crime scene include:  
 
• determining all the locations that might need to be searched; 
• identifying the number and location of computers, what network connections the 
computers have, PDAs, cell phones, passwords on pieces of paper, and CD-
ROMs or other removable media;  
• identifying any specifics that must be addressed relating to hardware and 
software; 
• identifying possible personnel and equipment needs for the investigation;  
• determining which devices can be physically removed from the site; and  
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• identifying all of the individuals who had access to the computer or digital 
resources.  
 
The outcome of this Phase should be that the investigators have acquired an idea about 
how they should process the physical crime scene and what special skills are required. 
A computer system that is running and plugged into a network can be considered as 
fragile evidence (Carrier and Spafford, 2003) since its digital evidence could be deleted 
with commands from a remote system.  Thus, some measures include unplugging a 
computer from the network when it is found or deploying a network monitor to view 
what data is being sent to the system until the full investigation begins (Carrier and 
Spafford, 2003). 
 
3.7.1.5				Update	the	Outline	Plan		
After carrying out all the Phases of the Secure and Evaluate the Crime Scene Process, 
investigators will need to review and update the outline plan now that its various 
assumptions can be assessed (Adams, 2012).  Often, there will exist areas of the plan 
that could not be completed at all during the Planning Process before attending the 
crime scene where potential digital evidence can be found.   
 
3.7.1.6				Document	the	Scene		
It is extremely important to document all of the activities carried out throughout the 
Secure and Evaluate the Crime Scene Process in order to enable other investigators to 
authenticate the process and results.  It is therefore imperative to maintain a detailed 
record of what was performed on the computer system and what information was 
acquired.  Maintaining a detailed documentation will enable DFIs: 
 
• to preserve chain of custody in a forensically sound manner; 
• to increase the possibility of a successful investigation; and  
• to record all information produced during this process to support decision 
making and the legal, administrative processing of those decisions. 
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During the Document Phase, DFIs will need to take photographs, sketches and videos 
of the crime scene (both physical and digital).  The aim of this Phase is to obtain as 
much information as possible in order to preserve and record the layout and vital details 
of the crime scene.  For instance, investigators will need to document and photograph 
the connections on the computer and the state of the computer.  Also, if possible, 
investigators should also document the number and size of the hard drives and the 
amount of memory.  In some cases, as suggested by Carrier and Spafford (2003), 
investigators must record the hardware MAC address of the network cards in order that 
DHCP logs can be used to identify system activity.  It might also be useful to record 
serial numbers and asset tags during this phase.  As a general principle, investigators 
must record anything that could be valuable to the DFL and subsequent reconstruction.  
Some authors (Carrier and Spafford, 2003) have suggested that Chain of Custody forms 
must also be created during the documentation.  However, this seems to be 
inappropriate considering the limited time that DFIs have.  Moreover, investigating 
organisations within which DFIs operate should have already developed Chain of 
Custody forms as part of their Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). 
 
The Document Scene Phase in the Secure and Evaluate Crime Scene Process is limited 
only to a single stage in time.  In contrast, Documentation as an Overriding Principle 
(discussed later) must be maintained concurrently throughout the entire investigative 
process.  Finally, the components designed and incorporated into the Secure and 
Evaluate Crime Scene Process have been defined in such a generic manner so that they 
can be relevant to both law enforcement and corporate investigations.  Because of its 
level of details and generic approach, the Secure and Evaluate Crime Scene Process 
provides a smooth transition to the Identification Process of the CDFIPM, discussed in 
the next section.  Also, this Process might become irrelevant in circumstances where a 
digital device has already been seized and transported back to a DFL (Adams, 2012).  In 
these situations, investigators can simply skip this process without negatively affecting 
the results of the investigation.  
 
3.7.2			Identification	Process	
Once the crime scene has been securely preserved, DFIs will need to identify the items 
that might contain potential evidence related to the investigation.  During this stage, all 
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the gaps in knowledge with regards to the location, size and format of digital systems 
containing the digital data are filled in (Adams, 2012).  McKemmish (1999) highlights 
the significance of the Identification “Activity” by stating that it is impossible to 
establish the most appropriate process for the acquisition of digital evidence until the 
location and storage format of digital evidence are identified Adams (2012).  It is, 
therefore, important to identify potential digital evidence at the crime scene since the 
identification of digital evidence has a significant impact on the rest of the processes.  If 
DFIs do not identify potential digital evidence at this stage, it might not exist at later 
stages in the process.  This is particularly essential when the crime takes place in a 
networked environment in which live investigations should be carried out, in a cloud 
environment or in any environment that involves large amount of data to deal with.  
 
Once the ‘potential digital evidence’ has been identified, it becomes ‘digital evidence’ 
from this point onwards since it has been identified as such during the Identification 
Process (Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; ISO/IEC 27043, 2015).  As with the Secure and 
Evaluate Crime Scene Process (discussed in the preceding section), in certain 
circumstances the Identification Process at the crime scene will also become irrelevant 
when the digital device has already been seized and submitted to a DFL for analysis.  In 
the existing models, the term “identification” has often been used to refer to different 
types of activities.  For example, Kent et al. (2006) refers to “identification” as the 
recognition of digital devices in a physical crime scene whereas Kohn et al. (2013) use 
the same term to refer to the identification of the potential digital evidence contained in 
a digital device.  In the CDFIPM, the Identification Process refers to the recognition of 
both the digital device containing the potential digital evidence and the recognition of 
the digital evidence itself.  
 
Furthermore, as stated in the preceding section, many of the previous models have not 
assigned a discrete stage to the Identification Process.  Although there are few models 
which have considered identification as an “activity”, they have not provided sufficient 
details for this process by simply reducing their discussions to the statement that the 
digital device containing evidence must be identified.  Therefore, in the CDFIPM, a 
more thorough and detailed approach has been taken by creating a discrete Process for 
the identification of both the digital device and digital evidence that contains lower-
level details i.e. Phases and Sub-Phases.  In the new model, Identification Process 
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requires DFIs to search for, identify, prioritize and document digital evidence.  Digital 
evidence can be both in physical and logical form.  The physical form refers to the 
representation of data in a tangible device.  However, the logical form includes the 
virtual representation of data in a device.  Figure 30 represents the UML Activity 
Diagram of the Identification Process, contained in the CDFIPM, followed by the 
description of its lower-level components i.e. Phases and Sub-Phases.  
 
Figure 30. The UML Activity Diagram of the Identification Process 	
3.7.2.1				Search		
This phase involves investigators embarking upon a detailed and thorough search of the 
crime scene for additional physical evidence to be collected, and also any particulars 
that need to be dealt with concerning hardware and software now that the initial Carry 
out Preliminary Survey Phase has been carried out.  During this Phase, investigators 
must use search patterns in order to identify additional evidence that was not discovered 
in the Carry out Preliminary Survey Phase in the ‘Secure and Evaluate the Crime Scene 
Process’.  Investigators will need to use the theory that they developed during the ‘Carry 
out Preliminary Survey Phase’ in order to look for particular pieces of evidence that are 
still missing.  Also, because not all of the physical objects can be seized from the crime 
scene and transported back to a DFL, the Search Phase must be systematic and detailed 
enough to collect only the required evidence to avoid overloading the DFL with 
irrelevant objects.  
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At this stage, the search can be directed towards missing pieces of physical evidence or 
additional media and digital devices at the crime scene.  It is very important that 
investigators follow a systematic and stringent search patterns during this Phase.  The 
search should also include contacting people to preserve and acquire access logs for 
doors of a data center, change logs for server updates, firewall logs, IDS logs, and 
remote access logs.  Thus, the Search Phase enables the investigators to conduct a 
thorough search and to complete essential documentation, and uses the investigators’ 
experience to identify pieces of evidence valuable to the investigation.  
 
3.7.2.2				Identify		
The Identify Phase requires DFIs to identify both the storage media and processing 
devices that could contain potential digital evidence and also the digital evidence itself.  
Since certain types of digital storage media are difficult to identify and locate, DFIs 
must ensure that during this process they do not overlook any of the digital devices due 
to their small size, disguise or blend within irrelevant items.  Consequently, it is 
essential that DFIs methodically conduct a detailed search to identify the devices that 
could hold potential digital evidence. 
 
3.7.2.3				Prioritize	
Due to the fact that in certain circumstances the time is crucial, it is extremely important 
that DFIs perform some sort of initial prioritisation in which items of evidence or 
potential containers of evidence that are the most important or the most volatile are 
dealt with first.  The Prioritize phase is central to the Identification Process or indeed 
the remaining investigation.  It is the foundation upon which all the other Processes are 
built.  During this Phase, digital sources that might contain potential digital evidence 
will need to be prioritised based upon the criteria of potential applicable evidence that 
can be acquired within a short period of time, and evidence with a short time to live 
(e.g. data in volatile memory, process tables, routing tables, temporary files systems).  
One of the benefits of the prioritisation is that it will enable DFIs to ensure the precise 
order of Phases and Sub-Phases in the Acquisition Process in the next stage so that the 
digital evidence is not contaminated and DFIs can obtain the best evidence.  
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3.7.3			Acquisition	and	Collection	Process	
3.7.3.1				Considerations	towards	Data	Acquisition	Process		
The Acquisition Process has a significant bearing on the entire digital investigative 
process. The Acquisition Process is often challenged by the courts concerning 
infringements during the chain of custody (Kruse and Heiser, 2001), documentation 
(Jones et al., 2005), the integrity of the evidence (Brown, 2006) and the methods and 
procedures utilised to acquire the digital evidence (Kessler, 2010).  If the court doubts 
the initial collection and management of digital evidence, the entire digital investigative 
process will be subject to dispute.  Therefore, since digital evidence might be rendered 
unusable when appropriate procedures are not adhered to, the CDFIPM requires DFIs to 
maintain the strict legal regulations during the Acquisition Process.  Moreover, since the 
documentation is of extreme importance, DFIs must ensure that they maintain a detailed 
record of all the activities that they perform during this process at all times.  Prior to 
describing the Acquisition Process of the CDFIPM, it is important to outline various 
important points in this section to enable DFIs to conduct data acquisition in a 
forensically sound manner.   
 
There exist three scenarios in which data acquisition might need to be conducted.  These 
include: 
 
• when digital devices are powered on; 
• when digital devices are powered off; and  
• when digital devices are powered on but cannot be powered off (such as 
mission-critical digital devices).   
 
All the three above scenarios have been applied to the Acquisition and Collection 
Process of the CDFIPM (see Figure 31).  In all the three scenarios, DFIs following the 
CDFIPM are required to make an accurate digital copy of the storage media containing 
potential digital evidence.   
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Powered-on	Devices	
When performing digital evidence acquisition on powered-on digital devices, DFIs must 
consider the below five baseline activities:  
 
1. DFIs should consider acquiring potential digital evidence that may otherwise be 
lost if the digital device is powered off.  This is also known as volatile data such 
as data stored on RAM, running processes, network connections and date/time 
settings.  
 
2. Performing live acquisition is necessary to acquire live data from devices that 
are still running.  Live acquisition of volatile data in RAM may enable recovery 
of valuable information such as network status, decrypted application and 
passwords.  Live acquisition can be conducted on the console or remotely via 
the network. The processes are different, and require the use of different sets of 
tools.  
 
3. DFIs should never trust the programs on the systems.  For this reason, trusted 
tools obtained by DFIs (static binaries) are recommended whenever possible. 
DFIs should be competent to use validated tools and be competent to account for 
the effects such tools may have on the system (e.g. displacement of potential 
digital evidence, or the content of memory being paged out when software is 
loaded).  All the actions performed and the resulting changes made to the 
potential digital evidence should be documented and understood.  If it is not 
possible to determine the likely effect of introducing tools to the system, or the 
resulting changes cannot be determined with certainty, this should also be 
documented.  
 
4. When acquiring volatile data, DFIs should adopt the use of a logical file 
container, and where possible document its hash value once it contains the 
volatile data file(s).  Where this is not possible, a container such as a ZIP file 
should be used, and then this file should be hashed and the value documented. 
The resulting file containers should be stored on a digital storage medium that 
has been prepared for this purpose, i.e. formatted.  
		 166	
5. In circumstances where it is necessary to acquire non-volatile data from devices 
that are still running, DFIs must execute the imaging process on the live non-
volatile storage using a validated imaging tool.  The resulting digital evidence 
copy should be stored on a digital storage medium that has been prepared for 
this purpose.  The use of digital evidence copies from validated processes 
ensures the integrity of data when reconstructed.  Therefore, whilst it is 
preferable to use a new digital storage medium, a digital storage medium that 
has been sanitized will also suffice.  If the image has to be stored in a logical file 
container, DFIs must ensure that the image cannot be corrupted or damaged.  
 
In situations where the device is locked down, physical access may be conducted via 
other means that has direct memory access enabled, e.g. Firewire interface.  
 
Powered-off	Devices	
DFIs must consider the following baseline activities when conducting digital evidence 
acquisition on powered-off digital devices:  
 
1. DFIs must ensure that the device is indeed powered off. 
2. DFIs must remove the storage from the powered off digital device if it is not yet 
removed, label the storage as suspect storage and document all the details such 
as make, model name, serial number and size of the storage. 
3. DFIs must execute the imaging process by using a validated imaging tool to 
create a digital evidence copy of the suspect disk. 
 
In some cases, the storage media should not be removed from the digital device until 
data acquisition is performed on the storage media.  This is because removing storage 
media might increase the risk of damage or confusing it with another storage media.  
Organisations within which DFIs operate should already have their own internal SOPs 
to follow regarding the need to remove hard disks. 
 
Mission-Critical	Devices	
In some cases, digital devices cannot be powered off due to the critical nature of the 
systems.  These systems such as servers at data centres that could be serving innocent 
clients, surveillance systems, medical systems and many others might be critically 
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affected if they are interrupted or powered off.  Special care should be taken when 
dealing with such systems.  In circumstances in which the digital device cannot be 
powered off, DFIs must conduct live (as discussed previously) and/or partial 
acquisition.  Partial acquisition may be performed due to several reasons such as: 
1. The system storage is too large to be acquired (e.g. database server). 
2. A system is too critical to be powered down. 
3. Only selected data to be acquired contains other irrelevant data within the same 
system. 
4. Data acquisition is constrained by legal authority such as a search warrant that 
limits the scope of the acquisition. 
 
When a decision has been made to do partial acquisition, the activities for acquisition 
should include, but are not limited to, identifying folders, files or any relevant 
proprietary system options available to acquire the desired data, and conducting logical 
acquisition on the identified data. 
 
3.7.3.2				Contribution	of	the	CDFIPM’s	Acquisition	Process	
Before the CDFIPM’s Acquisition Process is presented and discussed in the next 
section, it is also worthwhile discussing in this section some limitations of the existing 
models in relation to this important process, and also to outline further contributions of 
this research through the approach taken to address these limitations.  One of the 
shortcomings of the previous models concerning their data acquisition activity is due to 
the superficial level of details provided concerning this process.  These models (e.g. 
Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; Adams et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2013; Bulbul et al., 2013, 
etc.) often provide a high-level, single phase stating that the data needs to be collected 
without providing lower-level and useful details necessary to assist DFIs in acquiring 
digital evidence in a forensically sound manner.  The activities and techniques of the 
data acquisition are often left to be determined by DFIs themselves.  This has resulted in 
inconsistencies in terms of the number and types of activities required under this 
process. 
 
Another limitation of the existing models related to the data acquisition process is the 
fact that they do not explicitly distinguish ‘live’ data acquisition from ‘static (dead)’ 
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data acquisition where each activity requires a different set of components and 
procedures.  Also, although there are some models that refer to ‘live acquisition’ to 
some extent, they often tend to discuss the live acquisition of ‘volatile data’ without 
making any reference to the live acquisition of ‘non-volatile data’ which can be as 
important.  Moreover, the authors of the existing models imply that the acquisition of 
digital evidence should be performed in an ideal environment such as a DFL.  However, 
in many circumstances such an ideal environment is far from practice, for example in 
cases of live acquisition where the seizure of the system cannot be authorised.    In order 
to address the stated shortcomings associated with the Acquisition Process, the 
following considerations were made when designing the Acquisition and Collection 
Process of the CDFIPM: 
• Static acquisition and live acquisition have been differentiated in the CDFIPM; 
therefore, relevant and discrete components have been assigned to each process. 
• The CDFIPM has further distinguished between a static data acquisition onsite 
and a dead data acquisition in a DFL, and has assigned discrete components to 
each aspect accordingly.  
• The live data acquisition process has been further broken down into both ‘live 
acquisition of volatile data’ and ‘live acquisition of non-volatile data’, and as 
such relevant components have been assigned to each aspect accordingly. 
 
Thus, in the Acquisition and Collection Process of the CDFIPM, live acquisition 
pertains to the acquisition of both volatile and non-volatile data from a running device, 
whereas the dead acquisition relates to the static acquisition of data from a powered-off 
device onsite or in a DFL.  It is contended that the Acquisition and Collection Process 
developed and incorporated into the CDFIPM is the ‘most accurate’ and ‘detailed’ 
acquisition process presented to date.  It is also argued that the CDFIPM’s Acquisition 
and Collection Process has been developed in such a generic way that it could be 
applied in the different fields of digital forensics and employed for a large number of 
potential scenarios.   
 
3.7.3.3				Data	Acquisition	Representation	and	Discussion	
Figure 31 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the CDFIPM’s Acquisition Process 
followed by the description of its lower-level components, i.e. Phases and Sub-Phases. 
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Figure 31. The UML Activity Diagram of the Acquisition and Collection Process 
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Laboratory	Data	Acquisition	
In the CDFIPM, before digital evidence acquisition can be initiated, DFIs need to have 
already determined the data to be acquired and the digital device to be collected from 
the two preceding Processes.  If the digital device has already been seized, phases which 
would need to be completed onsite if the device were not seized would become 
irrelevant and data acquisition will need to take place in a DFL.  However, in cases 
where the device has not already been seized, DFIs will need to determine whether to 
carry out an onsite or offsite data acquisition.  Various factors will influence such a 
decision including the type of authorisation, the type of environment in which the 
device is operating and also the type and size of storage media.  For instance, if data 
resides on a mission-critical server at a hospital, it will be very unlikely that the seizure 
of the device would be authorised.  In such circumstances, onsite acquisition would be 
required.  
 
If it has been determined that onsite data acquisition is not needed and data should be 
acquired in a DFL25, DFIs must then find out whether the device subject to the data 
acquisition is running or not.  If the device is running, DFIs must determine whether the 
data residing on the device is stable or not before powering it down.  If data residing on 
the device is stable, DFIs will need to remove the power source directly from the 
device.  However, if data residing on the device is not stable, a normal shut down must 
be performed.  In both cases where the device was running and then shut down or the 
device was already in powered-off state, DFIs must record, remove, secure and label the 
connection for the device before packaging the device for transportation back to a DFL 
or a secure storage.  It is essential for DFIs also to collect any material which might be 
associated with the potential digital information.  These materials can include, but are 
not limited to, paper containing passwords, cradles and power connectors for embedded 
system devices, etc.  When labelling the digital device, DFIs will need to ensure that 
evidence labels are not placed directly on the mechanical parts of the digital media, and 
that they do not conceal important information such as the serial number, model number 
and part number. 
 																																																								
25 In certain circumstances, in accordance with the legal requirements, the digital evidence must be stored 
for a certain period of time prior to data acquisition, examination and analysis (Cohen, 2009; Ciardhuáin, 
2004). 
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The device will then need to be transported and stored in a secure and suitable facility 
for subsequent laboratory data acquisition, examination and analysis.  Preserving the 
integrity of evidence and chain of custody while the evidence is being kept in storage is 
of extreme importance (Montasari, 2015; Cohen 2009; Ciardhuáin, 2004).  Prior to 
conducting the data acquisition in a DFL, the investigator assigned with this task must 
check the documentation and the condition of the device to ensure that it has not been 
damaged due to factors such as shock, temperature, pollution, loss of power and 
malfunction.   
   
In order to acquire data, the investigator must then decide on the most appropriate 
means of acquiring data based on the Standard Operating Procedures of the organisation 
within which he operates as well as his own training, skills and experience.  When 
selecting the most appropriate methods of data acquisition, DFIs should also consider 
the common practices suggested by ISO/IEC 27043 (2015); ISO/IEC 27037 (2012); 
ISO/IEC 10118-2 (2010); ACPO (2012).  At all times, DFIs must be able to justify their 
reasons for the selection of a particular method or tool over the other methods or tools.  
Only those data acquisition methods that can be reproducible or verifiable by different 
DFIs should be selected.  DFIs must perform the evidence acquisition in such a way that 
its integrity is preserved.  This is especially important if digital evidence is intended to 
be used at a later stage to draw formal conclusions in a report presented to a court of 
law.   
 
Therefore, the potential digital evidence must be acquired in the least intrusive manner 
in order to avoid altering or spoiling the evidence.  In cases where the alteration to 
digital data is unavoidable, DFIs should document the activities performed to justify the 
alterations made to digital data.  Depending on the type and urgency of the 
investigation, the CDFIPM suggests that the methods selected for data acquisition 
should be based on the situation, and the costs incurred and time required in order to 
ensure an effective digital investigation.  After deciding on the most appropriate 
methods of acquiring data, the investigator will need to acquire the master copy of the 
raw data representing the potential digital evidence by creating a verifiable image of all 
the bits and bytes contained within the digital device.  A duplicate copy of the acquired 
data should also be created to become the working copy in order to preserve the master 
copy in case it is needed to make further copies at a later stage from the master copy.   
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The original source and the digital evidence copies should then be verified with a 
proven function such as MD5 or SHA1.  The hash value of both data sets must be 
exactly the same to ensure that the original data has not been modified.  Verifying the 
extracted data as genuine attains legal validity (Kohn et al., 2013, Casey, 2011, Cohen, 
2009).  As already stated, in certain circumstances, it is not practical or permissible to 
acquire a digital evidence copy of the entire evidence source due to its large storage 
size.  In such circumstances, DFIs employing the CDFIPM should perform a logical 
acquisition that targets only specific data types, directories or locations.  Having 
performed data acquisition and image verification, the investigation moves to the next 
stage of the CDFIPM, the Examination Process (discussed later), where DFAs take over 
to conduct the subsequent Processes of the CDFIPM.  
 
Onsite	Data	Acquisition	
If it has been determined that the onsite data acquisition is required, DFIs must then 
decide whether the device from which the data is to be acquired is running or not.  In 
turn, knowing the state of the device will determine whether live data acquisition should 
be conducted or not.  If the device is not running, to acquire data, DFIs must undertake 
the same data acquisition steps as those described under the DFL data acquisition.  The 
only difference would be that the static data acquisition must be performed onsite as 
opposed to offsite in a DFL.  Similarly, if the authorisation permits for the device to be 
seized, the same procedures as described under DFL acquisition should be followed 
concerning securing, labelling, packaging, transporting and storing the evidence.   
 
In the CDFIPM, the transportation of digital evidence acquired onsite can differ from 
that of the physical device described in the preceding section.  As discussed, in cases 
where onsite data acquisition is not required, the physical device has to be transported 
physically to a secure location for subsequent data acquisition, examination and 
analysis.  However, digital evidence acquired at the crime scene can be transported both 
physically and electronically.  In cases in which digital evidence is to be transported 
electronically, DFIs must take special precautions such as encrypting and digitally 
signing data in order to preserve the integrity and chain of custody (Montasari et al., 
2015).  If the device is running, DFIs must determine whether live data acquisition is 
required or not.  If live acquisition is not needed, DFIs must then follow the same 
procedures as described in the preceding section concerning powering down the device 
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and acquiring, preserving, transporting (both physically and digitally) and storing the 
evidence. 
 
However, if live data acquisition is required, DFIs must determine whether to carry out 
live data acquisition on volatile data, non-volatile data or both.  As with the static data 
acquisition, the acquired data from live acquisition of both volatile data and non-volatile 
data must be duplicated and verified using a proven function such as MD5 or SHA1.  
Imaging a running computer system might cause some files pertaining to the imaging 
application to be written to the hard drive, therefore modifying the original evidence 
prior to the completion of the imaging process (Casey, 2011; Brown, 2009).  In such 
circumstances, courts would need to be reassured that whatever information was lost 
because of live imaging process will not contain an adequate volume of incriminating or 
exculpatory evidence to make a difference in arriving at a fair conclusion of the case at 
hand (Kessler, 2010; Kenneally and Brown, 2006).          
 
Regardless of the static and live data acquisition performed onsite, the CDFIPM also 
requires DFIs to ensure that all of the required data representing potential digital 
evidence has been acquired.  At the end of each onsite data acquisition activity, DFIs 
are presented with a condition, ‘Has all the data been acquired?’, to determine whether 
all the required data has been acquired or not.  If all data has been acquired, DFIs can 
proceed with the next activity.  However, if all data has not been acquired, DFIs must 
perform all the previous steps until they ensure that all of the required data has been 
acquired.  After DFIs have ensured that all of the required data has been acquired, they 
must then determine whether the device containing the digital evidence can be seized or 
not based on the authorisation.  If the authorisation does not permit the seizure of the 
device, it will need to be returned to its rightful owner.  However, if the authorisation 
allows the seizure of the device, DFIs must then take the same steps described in 
preceding section to proceed with seizing the device.  At this stage, the Acquisition and 
Collection Process of the CDFIPM has been completed and investigation moves to the 
Examination Process, where DFAs initiate the Examination Process of the CDFIPM in 
a DFL.  
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3.8	 Investigative	Processes	Class	
The Investigative Processes Class represents the first layer of the CDFIPM which 
consists of those Processes that pertain to investigating the incident or crime that has 
been the reason for the digital forensic investigation.  As with other Classes of the 
CDFIPM, the Investigative Processes Class is also multi-layered containing three 
further lower layers including Processes, Phases and Sub-Phase.  There are six 
processes included in the Investigative Processes Class including: Examination, 
Analysis, Interpretation, Event Reconstruction, Reporting, Presentation, and 
Investigation Closure.  Figure 32 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the 
Investigative Class Processes in their abstract level.   
 
Figure 32. The UML Activity Diagram of Investigative Class Processes in their abstract level 
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3.8.1			Examination	Process	
The largest amount of investigation time is spent on the Examination Process as well as 
the Analysis Process (discussed later).  During this Process, a large number of 
techniques need to be used in order to access, find and extract the acquired data 
representing the potential digital evidence into a human-readable format.  Authors of 
many of the existing DFIPMs such as Carrier and Spafford (2003) state that there 
should be one single Phase assigned to the Examination and Analysis activities.  They 
argue that these Phases can be confusing as their meaning is only slightly different, and 
it is common to have two investigators who are referring to the same tasks when they 
say that they are “analyzing a system” or “examining a system”.   
 
This argument is invalid on the basis that the Examination and Analysis stages have 
different aims and therefore should be assigned two separate Processes.  The 
Examination Phase should involve activities regarding the extraction of potential digital 
evidence from the acquired data, whereas the Analysis Phase should involve those 
activities associated with the methodical analysis of digital evidence as well as the 
construction of the incident.  Therefore, in the CDFIPM, the Examination and Analysis 
have been assigned two separate processes with their own lower-level phases and sub-
phase.  This approach is supported by Casey (2011), who states “Examination is the 
process of extracting and viewing information from the evidence and making it 
available for analysis”, whereas “Analysis is the application of the scientific method and 
critical thinking to address the fundamental questions in an investigation: who, what, 
where, when, how, and why”.   
 
Figure 33 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the CDFIPM’s Examination Process 
followed by the description of its lower-level components, i.e. phases and sub-phases.  
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Figure 33. The UML Activity Diagram of the Examination Process 	
3.8.1.1				Survey	Digital	Crime	Scene	
The Survey Digital Crime Scene Phase has been developed and included in the 
Examination Process to enable DFAs to find apparent pieces of digital evidence for a 
particular category of crime in a swift manner, and also to assist them in ascertaining 
the skill level of the suspect.  Determining the suspect’s skill level in turn will allow 
DFAs to decide what examination and analysis techniques are required in the next 
process of the CDFIPM, the Analysis Process (discussed later).  During the 
Examination Process, the first step that investigators will need to undertake is to survey 
the digital crime scene to identify and locate potential evidence, possibly within 
unconventional locations on the system (Montasari and Peltola, 2015).  It is preferable 
to carry out the Survey Digital Crime Scene Phase in a DFL as it provides a controlled 
environment, and the results can be repeated with another copy of the system.  To carry 
out this Phase in a DFL, DFAs must use the image (working copy) of the system 
acquired from the CDFIPM’s Acquisition and Collection Process.      
 
However, in certain circumstances, investigators employing the CDFIPM might be 
required to perform this phase on a live system to determine whether or not the system 
should be brought back to a DFL for a full examination and analysis.  In such cases, 
investigators must perform field searches (Montasari, 2016, c; Montasari, in press) by 
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booting the system into what Carrier and Spafford (2003) call a “trusted environment”.  
In cases where the Survey Digital Crime Scene Phase is to be conducted on a live 
system, the CDFIPM still requires the investigators to image the system so that any 
digital evidence could also be acquired in a controlled DFL environment.  Components 
incorporated into the CDFIPM’s Acquisition and Collection Process (see section 3.7.3) 
facilitate the forensic imaging of digital systems.  Whether the Survey Digital Crime 
Scene Phase is to be carried out on a live system or in a controlled DFL environment, 
DFAs must adapt their investigative techniques based on the specific category of crime.  
This is to expedite the subsequent Examination and Analysis activities as there is often 
a large volume of data to deal with.   
 
For instance, in cases where the computer has been used to store or distribute 
contraband images, DFAs must in the first place look for graphics with image file 
extensions and ascertain those that could be relied upon as incriminating evidence.  
Another example includes server intrusion where investigators should search for 
apparent signs of a rootkit installation, examine application logs and also search for new 
configuration files.  In other types of investigations such as terrorism where 
investigators suspect that the system might contain the communication by the suspect, 
investigators must perform keyword searching to identify any leads related to the 
investigation.  Yet another example derived from Carrier and Spafford (2003) is when 
analysing network traffic about an incident; the Survey Digital Crime Scene Phase 
might analyse traffic for the incident time frame and filter out certain ports and hosts.  
In other cases, as suggested by the thesis author in Montasari and Peltola (2015), the 
investigators should also analyse the “common” and “uncommon” locations on the 
system that might contain artefacts related to the suspect’s browsing activities.  
 
3.8.1.2				Examine	Acquired	Data	
Having surveyed the digital crime scene, DFAs will need to perform a detailed 
examination on the image of the system (working copy) acquired from the CDFIPM’s 
Acquisition and Collection Process.  During the Examination Phase, digital evidence 
needs to be made visible by extracting data into a human-readable form (Montasari, 
2016, c).  DFAs should use the outcome of the Survey Digital Crime Scene Phase to 
direct their attention towards additional examination types.  As an example, they will 
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need to conduct a keyword search once keywords are identified from other evidence.  
DFAs will also need to extract and process unallocated file system space for deleted 
files. Moreover, they should examine a low-level timeline of file activity to trace a 
user’s activity. 
 
Since there might be large volumes of data to be examined (Kohn et al., 2013 and 
Ciardhuáin, 2004), automated techniques should be employed using tools such as FTK 
(AccessData, 2016) or EnCase (Guidance Software, 2016) in order to support the 
investigators.  Furthermore, a large number of techniques might be performed to 
process the obfuscated data such as deleted or hidden data utilising sound digital 
forensic methods26, as File Allocation tables or disk indexing might be deleted in some 
investigations.  Therefore, this Phase will enable DFAs to ensure that files such as 
partially deleted files are recognized from the original evidence.  During this Phase, 
DFAs can also reverse engineer suspicious executables and examine encrypted files 
(Carrier and Spafford, 2003).  They must also examine all the network packets that were 
acquired by monitoring software.  In certain circumstances, it might be necessary for 
DFAs to examine the contents of every cluster (physical search) or every file (logical 
search) (Casey, 2011).  They will also need to ensure that they employ different search 
techniques, when appropriate, when preforming this Phase. 
 
3.8.1.3				Harvest	Data	
After all data including partially discovered files and folders has been made visible in 
the Examine Acquired Data Phase, data then needs to be harvested by giving a logical 
structure to the entire data set.  During this Phase, the file and folder structure is indexed 
to provide structure to data which was acquired in the Acquisition and Collection 
Process of the CDFIPM.  In this phase, raw data will be shown as information, and the 
partially deleted files which were processed during the Examine Acquired Data Phase 
will become visible to the degree that they were rendered visible during the Examine 
Acquired Data Phase.  The result of the Harvest Data Phase is the production of a 
logical structured data set (Kohn et al., 2013) where the extracted raw data has now 
																																																								
26  Providing details on specific methods is outside the scope of this thesis.  It is assumed that 
organisations within which the DFAs operate already have their own Standard Operating Procedures 
associated with digital data examination which the DFAs can follow.   
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become structured information (Cohen, 2009).  Therefore, the harvested information 
can now be displayed by the original file systems such as Mac OS, FAT or NTFS. 
 
3.8.1.4				Reduce	Data	
The data examined and analysed in the course of a digital forensic investigation can be 
very large.  Consequently, this data needs to be reduced to expedite the Examination 
Process.  Identifying known elements can enable the investigators to reduce data. 
Investigators will need to use the metadata and unique identifiers, such as MD5, in 
order to remove known system files and different other application data (Casey, 2011; 
Cohen, 2009; Beebe et al., 2009).  Data that remains will be modified data or data that 
could be uniquely attributed to the users of a specific computer system.  Digital 
evidence with similar identifying patterns should also be classified based on the types of 
investigation. 
 
3.8.1.5				Identify,	Classify	and	Organise	Digital	Evidence	
During the Identify Digital Evidence Phase, DFAs must use the known digital evidence 
data in order to identify the possible incident to be investigated.  The outcome of this 
Phase will be the identification of the potential digital evidence from data that has been 
examined, harvested and reduced.  In the Classify Digital Evidence Phase, DFAs should 
group together digital evidence with similar identifying pattern based on the types of 
investigation.  This phase will enable the speeding up of the Analysis Process discussed 
in the next section.  During the Organise Digital Evidence Phase, DFAs will need to 
organise digital evidence in a way so that digital forensic investigation can be 
accelerated.  This can be materialized by focusing on the incident type identified and the 
data classified.  DFAs should restructure digital evidence in order to conduct the 
identified investigation more appropriately.  If similar types of incidents or crimes have 
taken place in the past and are known to DFAs, they should then use the known 
classification in order to compare the current digital forensic data (representing potential 
digital evidence) to the similar past incidents or crimes.  At this stage, the Examination 
Process of the CDFIPM is completed, and its output becomes the input to the Analysis 
Process, discussed in the following section. 
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3.8.2			Analysis	Process	
Based upon the results of the Examination Process, DFAs must now be able to define 
what the exact characteristics of the incident are and who is to be held accountable for 
the incident.  The aim of the CDFIPM’s Analysis Process is to enable the investigators 
to reconstruct fragments of data based on their significance and to determine a possible 
root cause of the incident (Montasari, 2016, c; Montasari et al., 2015).  The Analysis 
Process is the most time-consuming stage of the investigative process.  Because of the 
volume, diversity and complexity of data to be analysed in present time digital 
investigations, the analysis of evidence becomes a challenge.  Therefore, DFAs 
following the CDFIPM should use accredited automated techniques during this Process 
to complement manual validation techniques in order to expedite this Process.  Figure 
34 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the CDFIPM’s Analysis Process followed 
by the description of its lower-level components, i.e. Phases and Sub-Phases.  
 
Figure 34. The UML Activity Diagram of the Analysis Process 	
3.8.2.1				Develop	a	Hypothesis	
Up to this point in the investigation, DFAs have only dealt with what is possibly known 
from the digital evidence (Montasari et al., 2015).  Now, DFAs must be able to 
formulate a hypothesis of how the incident took place by reconstructing a sequence of 
events which have resulted in the current state of the system under investigation.  In 
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order to develop a hypothesis for the incident or crime, DFAs should base their theory 
on the followings:  
 
• The assumptions that they have deduced from the phases contained in the 
Examination Process;  
• Digital evidence that they have already organised from the Organise Digital 
Evidence Phase contained in the Examination Process; and 
• The documentation of the crime scene that they have maintained.  
 
3.8.2.2				Analyse	Digital	Evidence	
After DFAs have formulated the hypothesis, they will need to perform the Analyse 
Digital Evidence Phase.  During this Phase, DFAs must thoroughly investigate and test 
data that was organised in the Examination Process against the hypothesis that was 
formulated in the Develop a Hypothesis Phase in the Analysis Process.  DFIs must also 
question the legal validity of the possible digital evidence by considering issues such as 
relevance, admissibility and weight as discussed in section 2.3.2.  This will enable them 
to test the hypothesis by identifying the best possible evidence.    
 
3.8.2.3				Attribute	
Digital evidence should then be linked and attributed to a specific user or the event 
which is the root cause of the incident or crime.  In order to link an individual to the 
incident or crime, DFAs must be able to correlate the results of the digital crime scene 
with physical evidence.  For instance, in some investigations DFAs are likely to need to 
correlate data center access logs to logins, linking online chat activities found on the 
computer with the activity with an undercover officer, and correlating activity on a 
compromised server with activity on the suspect's home system and network activity 
recorded by an ISP. 
 
3.8.2.4				Evaluate	Analysis	Results	
After the attribution has been made, during the Evaluate Analysis Results Phase, the 
DFAs must then evaluate their findings in order to ensure that the hypothesis they have 
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developed holds true.  Finally, in order for the Analysis Process to be most effective, 
DFAs might need to request other digital crime experts to assist them in correlating the 
event from numerous sources of digital evidence.  At this stage of the Investigative 
Process, backtracking from the Analysis Process to the Examination Process is often to 
be expected as the investigators acquire a better understanding of the events which 
resulted in the investigation in the first place.  Having completed all the Phases of the 
Analysis Process, this Process is now complete, and DFAs must start preparing for the 
interpretation of the analysis in the next process.  The output of the Analysis Process 
will become the input to the Interpretation Process discussed in the next section.  
 
3.8.3			Interpretation	Process	
The main purpose of the Interpretation Process is to use scientifically proven methods to 
explain facts discovered throughout the Analysis Process within the context of the 
investigation (Montasari, 2016, c; Palmer et al, 2001).  Therefore, after investigators 
have evaluated their findings in the Analysis Process and have determined that the 
hypothesis they formulated holds true, they will need to interpret the digital evidence in 
order to produce meaningful statements in the legal context for later reporting and 
presentation.   
 
During this Process, DFAs must be able to reconstruct the events associated with the 
digital investigation aspect.  They should now be able to employ the results of the 
analysis techniques that they performed during the Analysis Process to put together the 
pieces of digital puzzle so that an accurate reconstruction of events can be made.  Figure 
35 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the CDFIPM’s Interpretation Process 
followed by the description of its lower-level components, i.e. Phases and Sub-Phases.  
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Figure 35. The UML Activity Diagram of the Interpretation Process 	
3.8.3.1				Interpret	Analysis	Results	
Interpretation of any evidence should depend on the available information regarding the 
circumstances surrounding the creation of that item of digital evidence (Valjarevic and 
Venter, 2015; ISO/IEC 27043, 2015).  Investigators will need to obtain information 
from individuals involved in the day-to-day operation of the system under investigation.  
This will enable them to carry out a more effective interpretation of evidence.  
Moreover, investigators must consider information concerning the goal as well as the 
scope of the investigation.  In cases where the contextual information changes, 
investigators might also need to change the interpretation so that the interpretation can 
reflect any such changes regarding the contextual information.  Finally, during this 
process, DFAs must utilise link analysis and timeline tools to enable them in the digital 
reconstruction (see Appendix A). 
 
3.8.3.2				Classify	and	Organise	the	Interpreted	Evidence	
Having interpreted the analysis results, investigators will now need to classify and 
evaluate the interpreted evidence in order to ascertain the amount of trust that they can 
place in it.  DFIs will also need to organise the interpreted digital evidence according to 
relevance in such a way that they can differentiate which digital evidence items are 
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more important than the others.  DFIs following the CDFIPM should perform the 
Classify the Interpreted Evidence Phase and Organise the Interpreted Evidence in the 
Interpretation Process in parallel.  This is due the fact that although both phases have 
different activities, they have the same aim.  Finally, during the Analysis Process, DFAs 
will need to employ scientific methods in order to prove or refute theories based on 
digital evidence.  After performing this process, DFAs should be able to determine how 
digital evidence came into existence and what its presence denotes.  After completing 
the Interpretation Process, DFIs will need to reconstruct the events in the next process 
of the CDFIPM.  Therefore, the output of the Interpretation Process will become the 
input to the Event Reconstruction Process discussed in the next section. 
 
3.8.4			Event	Reconstruction	Process	
In the CDFIPM, the Event Reconstruction Process and Interpretation Process are 
closely related in that both Processes will require DFAs to reconstruct the events 
associated with the digital investigation.  Similar to the Interpretation Process, the Event 
Reconstruction Process requires DFAs to employ scientific methods in order to prove or 
refute theories based on the results of the analysis, and digital evidence that they have 
discovered.  The only difference between the two Processes is that in the Event 
Reconstruction Process, DFIs will need to consolidate, review and test their findings 
against the original hypothesis that they formulated in the Analysis Process. 
 
Having completed the Interpretation Process in the previous stage, DFAs should now be 
able to reconstruct a possible event sequence under the Event Reconstruction Process 
which reflects the incident result as accurately as possible.  In order to reconstruct the 
events, DFIs will need to utilise the series of events that they have deduced from digital 
evidence which is known to them.  During this Process, DFAs must ensure that they are 
not dealing with reconstruction as a finding based on the original digital evidence (Kohn 
et al., 2013).  Moreover, as Kent et al. (2006) state, Event Reconstruction should not be 
established as factual.  Instead, DFAs who perform the Event Reconstruction Process 
should use this Process to explain how the incident might have taken place.  Figure 36 
represents the UML Activity Diagram of the CDFIPM’s Event Reconstruction Process 
followed by the description of its lower-level components, i.e. Phases and Sub-Phases.  
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Figure 36. The UML Activity Diagram of the Event Reconstruction Process 	
3.8.4.1				Event	Reconstruction	Components		
During the Event Reconstruction Process, the investigation findings must be 
consolidated and refined prior to assessing the review results against the original 
hypothesis, which was formulated in the Analysis Process.  This will be to determine 
whether DFAs have acquired all the evidence required to support the original 
hypothesis.  If all the evidence has not been captured, DFAs will need to backtrack to 
the Survey Digital Crime Scene Phase in the Examination Process, in which this Phase 
and subsequent Phases form a cycle that needs to be repeated until DFAs can identify 
additional evidence and explain the incident.   
 
As an example, in cases where a server intrusion has taken place, this iteration would 
involve DFIs linking the exploitation of a service that is open to attack with the 
installation of a rootkit and utilization of a network sniffer.  The source IP address of 
network connections could result in the acquisition of additional digital evidence to 
examine.  If there is no need to iterate to the Examination Process at this stage, DFAs 
must identify any areas of improvement and address those required improvements.  In 
order to press charges against the perpetrator and explain the incident in a court, DFAs 
must have a valid hypothesis accompanied by relevant admissible digital evidence to 
support the findings that they have deduced.  Finally, during the Event Reconstruction 
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Process, DFAs might benefit from using link analysis and timeline tools to assist them 
in the digital reconstruction.  The Event Reconstruction Process of the CDFIPM is 
completed at this stage and DFAs should prepare for the next Process where they will 
need to compile a report to be presented in a court or the management in a company.  
The output of the Event Reconstruction Process will become the input to the Reporting 
Process, discussed in the next section.  
 
3.8.5			Reporting	Process	
After conducting the Event Reconstruction Process, DFAs will need to compile, write 
and print out on paper a detailed and concise report in the Reporting Process.  
Regardless of digital evidence or physical evidence, a forensic report must contain 
conclusions that can be reproduced by independent third parties.  Forensic reports that 
include opinions based on accurately documented digital sources are much more likely 
to withstand judicial scrutiny than opinions based on less reliable sources (Garrie, 
2014).  DFAs following the CDFIPM must detail in their report all the findings and 
results of the entire digital investigative process including the Concurrent Processes 
(Overriding Principles) of the CDFIPM such as documentation, chain of custody, digital 
evidence preservation, authorisation and management, and ultimately the investigators’ 
findings that are constructed in an opinion to be presented in a court.   
 
In addition, the forensic report should follow “the ‘ABC’s of writing’ (accuracy, 
brevity, and clarity)” and be restricted only to what is known (Beebe and Clark, 2005).  
DFAs will need to write their report in such a manner that it contains conclusions that 
can be reproduced by independent third parties regardless of digital or physical 
evidence.  Also, since digital forensic investigation might produce many incriminating 
digital evidence items, DFAs must therefore ensure that they list all digital evidence 
items in the report so that no valuable item of evidence is left out.  Furthermore, DFAs 
must ensure that they include in the report all other relevant documentation that was 
compiled during the investigation and that might be relevant in reaching a decision.  
Figure 37 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the CDFIPM’s Reporting Process.  
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Figure 37. The UML Activity Diagram of the Reporting Process 	
DFAs should also ensure that they reference accepted and known protocols and 
methods applied during the Examination, Analysis, Interpretation and Event 
Reconstruction Processes in order to increase the credibility of the investigation and its 
results.  Finally, DFAs employing the CDFIPM must ensure that their report is in a 
simple language and is well-defined, concise and unambiguous in order for the lay 
person to be able to understand it.  After DFIs have compiled the report and are satisfied 
with its content, the report will then need to be presented in a court.  The output of the 
Reporting Process becomes the input to the Presentation Process of the CDFIPM, 
discussed in the next section.  
 
Notice: See Appendix A for an example of a forensic report in which the activities 
performed throughout a hypothetical digital forensic investigation are explained to a 
hypothetical court of law.  This hypothetical digital investigation, presented in the 
Appendix A, has been carried out along with the use of case studies, presented in 
Chapter 4, to demonstrate the application of the CDFIPM.  
 
3.8.6			Presentation	Process	
The output of the Reporting Process in the form of a well-written report must be 
presented to a wide variety of audiences such as courts, legal personnel, law 
enforcement, technical personnel and management.  Presenting the report can be carried 
out in the form of the expert report or can be accompanied by other formats such as 
multimedia presentation, deposition and expert witness (testimony).  During the 
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Presentation Process, DFAs will need to be able to prove the hypothesis that they 
formulated during the Analysis Process using supporting evidence.  In order to prove 
that all of the CDFIPM’s previous Processes were conducted accurately, evidence that 
DFAs present must hold up in a court.  
 
Although Presentation Process is very important in that it meets the main requirement 
needed by the definition of the word ‘forensic’, authors of the existing models have paid 
little attention, if any, to this Process.  Researchers have often taken a cursory approach 
when dealing with the Presentation Process and have often confused this Process with 
the Reporting Process.  In the existing models, Presentation Process and Reporting 
Process are regarded the same, and as a result they are assigned one single process 
under the naming either “Report” or “Presentation”.  This approach is flawed on the 
basis that the Reporting Process and Presentation Process are carried out at different 
times and under different circumstances during the course of an investigative process 
and as a result have different aims.  The purpose of the Reporting Process should be to 
document relevant information deduced from the findings and results of the 
investigative process, whereas the aim of the Presentation Process should be to 
communicate such information and findings to the said audience.  Therefore, in the 
CDFIPM, the Presentation Process has been distinguished from the Reporting Process, 
and as a result each has been assigned a separate and discrete Process in the model. 
 
Moreover, the “Report/Presentation” in the existing models is often a high-level Process 
without providing adequate details to assist DFAs in effectively preparing for this 
important Process.  Since careful planning is essential especially when the investigation 
findings are to be presented in a court, the Presentation Process of the CDFIPM has 
incorporated lower-level and generic phases to guide the DFIs on how to prepare for 
this Process.   
 
During the Presentation Process, DFAs must communicate their findings in such a way 
that facilitates future validation and that can be understood by both technical and non-
technical audience.  Mumba and Venter (2014) state that during the Presentation 
Process, it is vital that all of the processes are utilised to prove that the investigation was 
conducted in a forensically sound manner.  Beebe and Clark (2005) highlight that a 
presentation should be based on “careful consideration about how to best communicate 
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information to various audiences”.  Therefore, during the Presentation Process, DFAs 
following the CDFIPM must provide both concise and detailed confirmatory 
information obtained from the Interpretation and Event Reconstruction Processes of the 
model concerning the data examined and analysed in the Examination and Analysis 
Processes of the model.  The presentation must also include relevant documentation and 
processes conducted during the investigative process, as well as any relevant physical 
evidence that can further consolidate the case against the perpetrator.  Figure 38 
represents the UML Activity Diagram of the CDFIPM’s Presentation Process followed 
by the description of its lower-level components, i.e. Phases and Sub-Phases.  
 
Figure 38. The UML Activity Diagram of the Presentation Process 	
3.8.6.1				Components	of	the	Presentation	Process		
Prior to delivering the presentation, DFAs must address the following four issues:  
 
• choosing their main points carefully based on the results of the CDFIPM’s 
Interpretation and Event Reconstruction Processes;  
• selecting their supporting information; 
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• developing a conclusion; and 
• reviewing their presentation prior to its delivery.   
 
Since the judge and jury or other interested parties are very likely to be non-technical 
users, DFAs must ensure that in their presentation they avoid complex arguments, 
unless providing the audience with significant help so that they understand the technical 
points made.  DFAs must deliver their conclusion in a logical and structured manner 
and build upon their previous points.  In addition to preparing the presentation itself, 
DFAs will also need to prepare supporting information in order to assist the audience in 
better understanding the points they make.  This should include the factual data itself 
that they have deduced from Interpretation and Event Reconstruction Processes and also 
the explanation of the process.  DFAs might also need to use diagrams, pictures and 
video if it enables the audience to understand the explained concepts more clearly.  
Another important stage in the Presentation Process is the conclusion that DFAs have 
arrived at.  They must ensure that they remind the audience of their main points and 
leave the audience with a clear understanding of them and their judgments on the case.   
 
After preparing the presentation and prior to appearing before the relevant audience, 
DFAs will need to review their presentation to ensure that its content meets the 
objectives of the report, is logically structured and contains the material at the right 
level for the audience.  In cases where DFAs will have to appear before judge and jury 
to give expert witness, they must ensure that they are fully aware of the jurisdiction 
legal requirements (the U.K. in the context of this research) concerning the digital 
evidence.  Not being aware of the legal requirements might render the incriminating 
evidence being thrown out of the court.  Moreover, DFAs must find out in advance what 
legal proceedings will concern the appeal process so that they can be better prepared in 
case they might need to reappear before the court.  Often the person who presents the 
findings of the case is not often involved in various stages of the investigative process 
such as Acquisition, Examination, Analysis, Interpretation and Event Reconstruction 
Processes.  Therefore, DFA who is required to appear before a court as an expert 
witness must determine who his target audience are prior to preparing the presentation if 
this is not already known.   
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Investigators also need to ensure that they identify the exhibits (i.e. digital evidence) by 
a label or other mark.  The exhibit must also be properly described in the report as 
discussed in the Reporting Process section.  When delivering the presentation, DFAs 
must take into account that the target audience are often non-technical and might have a 
variety of experiences and level of knowledge concerning the digital investigations.  
Therefore, in order to help the audience to understand the explained concepts better 
while giving the presentation, DFA might need to link their investigation findings to the 
things that the audience already understand. DFAs need to ensure that they have 
targeted their findings at the right level for the needs of the audience.  They must also 
avoid using technical jargon and should attempt to explain the abstract concepts with 
clear practical examples.   
 
During the presentation, often the hypothesis27 is challenged by the defence lawyers.  A 
contradicting hypothesis and supporting evidence are placed before judge and jury.  
DFAs will need to prove the credibility of their hypothesis and to be well-prepared to 
defend the hypothesis against criticism and challenge.  In circumstances in which 
challenges are successful, investigators will need to backtrack to the earlier stages to 
obtain and examine more evidence and develop a better hypothesis.  The case will be 
decided based on the presentation report.  If the decision is made in a court, it will be 
decided whether to convict the accused or whether to refute the allegations.  If the 
decision is made in the context of an organisation, it will be decided what disciplinary 
actions must be taken if the incident can be attributed to the individual under 
investigation.  At this stage, the Presentation Process of the CDFIPM is concluded, and 
its output becomes the input to the Investigation Closure Process, discussed in the 
following section. 
 
3.8.7			Investigation	Closure	Process	
It is vital not only to close the investigation and apply the decisions associated with it 
but also to maintain the knowledge obtained to improve subsequent investigations 
(Beebe and Clark, 2005).  As the title suggests, the Investigation Closure Process of the 																																																								
27 The hypothesis must be presented to persons other than the investigators.  For a police investigation, 
the hypothesis will be placed before a jury, while an internal company investigation will place the 
hypothesis before management for a decision on action to be taken. 
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CDFIPM involves concluding the investigation and also the decision-making on the 
credibility of the hypothesis presented in the Presentation Process.  This denotes that 
after completing the Investigation Closure Process, investigators can backtrack to any of 
the preceding processes that follow the First Response Process.  Figure 39 represents 
the UML Activity Diagram of the CDFIPM’s Investigation Closure Process followed 
by the description of its lower-level components, i.e. Phases and Sub-Phases.  
 
Figure 39. The UML Activity Diagram of the Investigation Closure Process 	
3.8.7.1				Review	the	Outcome	of	the	Case		
After the case has been presented to the appropriate audience and decided in the 
Presentation Process, the outcome of the investigation will need to be used to review the 
existing policies and procedures of the organisation.  The aim of this Phase should be to  
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make and act upon the outcome of the decisions reached from the CDFIPM’s 
Presentation Process.  During this Phase, the investigating organisation will also need to 
collect and maintain all the information associated with the case that has been 
investigated. 
 
3.8.7.2				Accept	or	Reject	the	Hypothesis		
Since the CDFIPM is an iterative process model, it will allow investigators to backtrack 
to any of the preceding Processes in the model.   Having carried out the initial review, at 
this stage the investigators can return to any of the CDFIPM’s previous Processes that 
follow the First Response Process if required. 
 
3.8.7.3				Conduct	a	Critical	Review		
During the Conduct a Critical Review Phase, the entire investigative process detailed in 
the CDFIPM must be reviewed to identify any lessons learnt and potential areas of 
improvement.  During this Phase, the investigating organisation will also need to 
address issues such as what went well, what did not go well and how things could have 
been carried out better, etc.  Based on this information, the investigating organisation 
will need to identify and learn the lessons from the incident or crime in order to be able 
to apply the findings and be better prepared for the future incidents or crimes.  Also 
under this phase, the outcomes and their ensuing interpretation must be used for refining 
the Acquisition, Examination, Analysis, Interpretation and Event Reconstruction of 
digital evidence in future investigations.  As already stated, often backtracking between 
Examination, Analysis, Interpretation and Event Reconstruction Processes are to be 
expected in order to obtain the full picture of the incident or crime.  Such information 
could also assist law enforcements’ HTCUs and corporates in establishing more 
effective policies and procedures. 
 
3.8.7.4				Evidence	Management		
A decision will also need to be made to determine whether digital and physical evidence 
should be returned to the proper owner or not and to determine what criminal evidence 
must be removed.  This is a complicated issue and not an explicit step in a digital 
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forensic investigation.  However, any of the existing models that has emphasized the 
seizure of evidence has seldom addressed this aspect.  Jurisdiction in which the 
investigation is taking place (in the context of this thesis, the U.K.) and the type of 
authorisation determine whether the evidence should be returned, cleansed and reused 
or destroyed or whether the evidence should be stored for a certain period of time before 
any of the three possibilities can be applied. 
 
3.8.7.5				Record	the	Case	Decision		
Under the Record the Case Decision Phase, DFIs will need to record (ideally on a 
database) the investigation results, case decision as well as all the evidence that might 
be used for reference in the future and for training purposes.  For instance, the results 
could be recorded by the category of evidence found as follows: 
 
• Evidence of refutation or defence; 
• Evidence vital to the case; 
• Evidence important to the case; 
• Evidence that supports other evidence; 
• Evidence peripheral to the case; 
• Evidence that is intelligence only; and 
• No evidence found. 
 
Such an approach could also benefit authorities in other jurisdictions in circumstances 
in which the case will be likely to have some kind of connection with their 
investigation.     
 
3.8.7.6				Disseminate	the	Investigation	Results		
In the final part of the Investigation Closure Process, relevant information concerning 
the entire investigation will need to be disseminated and communicated to all 
stakeholders.  This includes communicating the need to return to a previous Process, 
deciding on the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis or providing any reports or 
documents from the Presentation Process.  During this Phase, the investigating 
organisation might decide to make some information available only within the 
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organisation, whereas they might decide to disseminate other information more widely.  
According to Ciardhuáin (2004), the investigating organisation’s policies and 
procedures should determine the details in this regard.  The information will have an 
impact on future investigations and might have an effect on the policies and procedures.   
 
Thus, the accumulation and preservation of this information is a key part of supporting 
the work of investigators and might be a productive aspect for the development of 
innovative applications that integrate techniques such as data mining and expert 
systems.  Hauck et al. (2002) provide a detailed example of the dissemination activity 
where they define a system titled Coplink, that provides real-time support for law 
enforcement DFIs through an analysis application on the basis of a large accumulation 
of information from past investigations.  An additional example is provided by Harrison 
et al. (2002), whose system is not real-time, but instead delivers an “archival function” 
database to support investigators.  At this stage, the Investigation Closure Process of the 
CDFIPM is concluded, and its output becomes the input to the Future Readiness 
Process Class, discussed in the following section. 
 
3.9	 Future	Readiness	Process	Class	
The aim of the Future Readiness Process Class is to enable both the investigating 
organisation and victim organisation to prepare for and mitigate the risks of potential 
future incidents.  This class is optional; however, implementing it could increase the 
efficiency of the said organisations.  Figure 40 represents the UML Activity Diagram of 
this class. 
 
Figure 40. The UML Activity Diagram of the Future Readiness Process Class 
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The Future Readiness Process Class involves investigating and victim organisations 
applying the lessons learnt and also improving their existing policies and procedures 
based on the critical review of the entire investigative process performed in the 
Investigation Closure Process.  During this Class, case studies should also be developed 
for future reference to enable both investigating organisations as well as the victim 
organisations to learn from the incident which has been investigated. 
 
3.10	Overriding	Principles	
In order to ensure the admissibility of digital evidence in courts, a set of eight 
Overriding Principles or Concurrent Processes have also been developed and grouped 
into a unique class, entitled Concurrent Processes Class (see Figure 15).  These eight 
Principles are objectives that need to be achieved in a given digital investigation and 
should be performed concurrently throughout the whole or parts of the other Processes 
in the CDFIPM.  The inclusion of the proposed Overriding Principles or Concurrent 
Processes is justified by their significance and applicability to other digital investigation 
processes.  Thus, due to their extreme importance, investigators must maintain these 
Principles at all times throughout the whole or parts of the digital investigative process.  
Since the CDFIPM is aimed at the U.K. jurisdiction, the proposed Overriding Principles 
are based on the following standards: ISO/IEC 27043 (2015), ISO/IEC 27037 (2012) 
and ACPO (2012), as well as other relevant scientific papers such as Montasari (2016, 
c), Montasari et al. (2015), Valjarevic and Venter (2015), Casey (2011), Beebe and 
Clark (2005), Ciardhuáin (2004) and Carrier and Spafford (2003). 
 
3.10.1			Preserve	Digital	and	Physical	Evidence	
Preservation is the process to maintain and safeguard the integrity and original 
condition of both physical and digital evidence.  In order for evidence to be able to 
withstand scrutiny in courts, investigating organisations will need to prove that both 
digital device and digital evidence that they have handled during an investigation have 
not been altered, or justify their actions if unavoidable changes were made.  In the best-
case scenario, there should be no contamination to data itself or any metadata associated 
with it (e.g. date and time-stamps).   
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In some cases, the confidentiality of digital evidence is a requirement, either a business 
requirement or a legal requirement (see Section 2.3.2).  This denotes that digital 
evidence should be preserved in a manner that ensures the confidentiality of data.  Thus, 
since the correct handling of evidence is essential in any digital investigation 
(Montasari, 2010, c; Montasari, in press; Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; ACPO, 2012; 
ISO/IEC 27037, 2012; Holder et al., 2009), this Overriding Principle or Action 
Principle has been incorporated into the CDFIPM to enable investigating organisations 
to preserve the integrity of both digital and physical evidence throughout the entire 
investigative process in a forensically sound manner. Preserving this Overriding 
Principle will enable investigating organisations to protect both physical and digital 
evidence from being tampered with, contaminated or altered and as a result to ensure 
the efficacy of evidence presented to a court.  
 
Almost all the existing models have undertaken a flawed approach towards the issue of 
preservation and have provided a superficial discussion of this aspect of digital 
investigative process by simply stating that digital evidence needs to be preserved 
without elaborating on this important aspect.  Moreover, preservation in some existing 
DFIPMs refer only to preservation of physical evidence or crime scene (Casey, 2011; 
Carrier and Spafford, 2003) while in some other models it refers to preservation of only 
digital evidence (Kohn et al., 2013; Carrier and Spafford, 2003; Reith et al., 2002), or 
digital evidence during the transportation or storage (Valjarevic and Venter, 2015; 
Ciardhuáin, 2004; Reith et al., 2002).   
 
Although some existing models (Casey, 2011; Carrier and Spafford, 2003) have 
discussed preservation in more depth, their approach of dealing with this principle is 
still flawed as the “preservation activity” in these models is restricted to a ‘single Phase’ 
at a particular stage of the investigative process.  It is however argued that preservation 
has a much wider scope beyond being limited to a single point in time.  Each stage of 
investigative process requires digital and physical evidence to be preserved in a 
different manner.  In order to address the stated issues, in the CDFIPM, preservation has 
been introduced as an Overriding Principle or Actionable Principle that should be 
applied concurrently throughout the entire investigative processes of the model from the 
time the incident is detected in the Incident Detection Process up to and including the 
time when the investigation is formally completed in the Investigation Closure Process.  
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Preservation does not need to be applied during the Readiness and Future Readiness 
Processes on the basis that evidence (both physical and digital) is not handled during 
these two Processes.  The remainder of this section provides some practical examples of 
how the investigating organisations should apply the preservation aspect of the 
investigative process throughout the entire stages of the CDFIPM.  
 
During the CDFIPM’s Secure and Evaluate the Crime Scene Process, the preservation 
might involve investigators preventing unauthorised people from entering or leaving the 
crime scene, isolating the system from the network, acquiring the volatile data that 
would be lost after the system is powered down, and detecting suspicious processes that 
are running on the system, etc.  During the Acquisition and Collection Process, 
preservation involves DFIs securing log files in case that they are lost before the system 
is imaged.  Preservation also requires DFIs to make a full forensic image backup28 of 
the system so that it can be examined and analysed at a later stage in a DFL.  DFIs must 
note that a full forensic image of the system preserves the whole digital crime scene 
whereas copies that are system backups preserve only the allocated data within the 
digital crime scene.  Moreover, in terms of preserving the state of the network, this can 
be achieved by network monitors when they save network traffic.  
 
Finally, as part of preservation, investigating organisations will also need to establish 
and maintain certain strict procedures (Valjarevic and Venter, 2015), effective quality 
systems such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) (Bulbul et al., 2013) or 
procedural workflows (Mukasey et al., 2008).  
 
3.10.2			Preserve	Chain	of	Custody	
The processes for documenting, collecting and protecting both physical and digital 
evidence are called the establishing of the chain of custody.  Establishing a chain of 
custody during the course of an investigation is of extreme importance since digital 
evidence is very likely to be handled by various parties.  Cases where Chain of Custody 
has not been properly preserved have been easily challenged in courts and rejected 																																																								
28 Depending on the type of crime and authorisation, a critical system can be rebuilt after investigators 
have created a forensic image in order that it can be swiftly placed back online (Carrier and Spafford, 
2003).  In contrast, in other circumstances, the original hard disk must remain as physical evidence during 
the entire duration of the case. 
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irrespective of evidence discovered from the suspect’s computer system.  Therefore, due 
to its extreme importance in relation to conducting a successful investigation, Chain of 
Custody has been incorporated into the CDFIPM as an Overriding Principle, namely 
Preserve Chain of Custody, that will need to be applied concurrently throughout other 
Processes of the CDFIPM.  In order to preserve Chain of Custody, DFIs will need to 
adhere to all legal requirements and must document each given process of the CDFIPM 
thoroughly.  Documentation (discussed later) is a vital aspect of a Chain of Custody as 
it will need to detail the activities associated with the chronology of the movement and 
handling of evidence such as those associated with the seizure, custody, control, 
transfer, examination, analysis and disposition of both physical and digital evidence.  
 
The issue of establishing Chain of Custody has been ignored by almost all the existing 
models, a problem identified also by Kohn et al. (2013), Ciardhuáin (2004) and Carrier 
and Spafford (2003).  Although Chain of Custody has been addressed to some extent by 
four guidelines and standards including: ACPO (2012), ISO/IEC 27037 (2012), 
ISO/IEC 27035 (2015) and ISO/IEC 27043 (2015), these appear to be contradictory in 
terms of the point at which Chain of Custody will need to be established during an 
investigative process.  For example, according to ISO/IEC 27037 (2012) and ACPO 
(2012), Chain of Custody should be initiated from the Acquisition Process onwards, 
whereas ISO/IEC 27043 (2015) and ISO/IEC 27035 (2015) state that Chain of Custody 
must be maintained throughout the entire investigative process. 
 
The approach taken by ISO/IEC 27037 (2012) and ACPO (2012) is flawed on the basis 
that digital device containing potential digital evidence is identified in the incident 
detection stage prior to the Acquisition Process.  It is in the Incident Detection stage that 
the investigating organisations will need to process both physical (where items of 
evidentiary value exist) and digital crime scenes and therefore initiate the chain of 
custody.  Consequently, in line with ISO/IEC 27043 (2015) and ISO/IEC 27035 (2015), 
DFIs following the CDFIPM must observe this Overriding Principle from the Incident 
Detection Process, during which incident is detected, up to and including the 
Investigation Closure Process, where incident is formally closed.   
 
One of the benefits of such an approach taken by the thesis author is that it will enable 
DFIs to trace back the history of any digital device containing evidence to the time that 
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it was first identified until its present status and location.  Another benefit of this 
approach is the enabling of the identification of access and movement of potential 
digital evidence at any given point in time.  
 
In any type of investigation, investigators within the investigating organisations are 
often accountable for all the acquired evidence (both physical and digital) during the 
period in which evidence is within their custody.  The CDFIPM’s Preserve Chain of 
Custody Principle also requires DFIs to keep records of who was responsible for 
handling both physical and digital evidence.  Investigators must keep a record of all 
information associated with different activities undertaken in relation to Chain of 
Custody.  The Chain of Custody record itself may comprise more than one document 
and include a series of related documents.  For instance, for potential digital evidence, 
there should be a contemporaneous document recording the acquisition of digital data to 
a particular device, the movement of that device and documentation recording 
subsequent extracts or copies of potential digital evidence for analysis or other 
purposes.   
 
An example of preserving Chain of Custody is when evidence copies are required to be 
shared with other experts in other locations.  This handling of evidence must be 
properly documented to preserve Chain of Custody.  Another example of Chain of 
Custody is when the first responders (who are the first custodian to preserve Chain of 
Custody of potential digital evidence) arrive at the crime scene where they will need to 
describe the scene in the preliminary drafting of documentation.  These include taking 
photographs, videos and sketches.  
   
The CDFIPM’s Preserve Chain of Custody Principle does not impose any particular 
format in which information related to Chain of Custody should be recorded.  The 
documents detailing Chain of Custody can be in the form of digital data or other formats 
such as paper notes, depending on the organisation or the agency conducting the 
investigation.  The CDFIPM’s flexibility allows investigating organisations to design 
and incorporate into the model their own Chain of Custody forms according to their 
needs.  A Chain of Custody form that has been designed and used as part of a 
hypothetical digital investigation is still provided in Appendix A that investigating 
organisations can employ.  
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3.10.3			Manage	Information	Flow	
One of the major issues with the existing models is the lack of identifying ‘Information 
Flow’ which could have a negative impact on the other processes such as Chain of 
Custody.  In this regard, Ciardhuáin (2004) criticizes the past models stating, “The 
single largest gap in the existing models is that they do not explicitly identify the 
information flows in investigations.”  Ciardhuáin (2004) proceeds to propose what 
would become one of the most widely referenced research papers in relation to 
Information Flow within a digital investigation.  In his research paper, Ciardhuáin 
(2004) is able to define, identify and describe Information Flows within his process 
model so that its stages can be protected and supported technologically.  Moreover, he 
clearly shows Information Flow that must exist amongst various stakeholders.    
 
Due to the fact that the subject of Information Flow within the field of digital forensics 
has been extensively covered by the aforementioned reference, this thesis does not aim 
to focus on Information Flow in any further detail.  However, due to its importance in a 
digital investigation, Information Flow has been incorporated into the CDFIPM as an 
Overriding Principle, namely Manage Information Flow, which needs to be managed 
concurrently throughout the entire processes of the CDFIPM. Investigating 
organisations employing the CDFIPM must manage Information Flow from the 
Readiness Process up to and including the Future Readiness Process.  The rationale for 
including this principle in the CDFIPM is to enable investigating organisations to deal 
with the different laws, practices, languages, etc. correctly in digital investigations.  An 
example of Information Flow could be the interaction between two investigators 
involved in the same investigation, or the exchange of digital evidence between various 
parties during digital investigation process.  Information Flow can be protected, for 
instance, by utilising trusted public key infrastructure (PKI) and time stamping to 
identify the different investigators and authenticate evidence in addition to protecting 
the confidentiality of the evidence through PKI-based encryption. 
 
3.10.4			Maintain	a	Detailed	Case	Management	
As the title suggests, Case Management refers to managing the case under investigation 
and keeping track of evidence items, events and vital forensic discoveries.  Case 
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Management mainly pertains to the tasks that a case officer should undertake 
throughout the entire investigative process in an investigation, and also to some extent 
relates to the responsibilities of the case officer’s investigative team members.  
Activities associated with the Case Management can have significant impact on the 
entire investigative process tying together all of the activities and their outcomes.  
Casey (2011) highlights the importance of the Case Management stating, “Effective 
case management is one of the most important components of scaffolding, helping 
digital investigators bind everything together into a strong case.”  Similarly, Khatir et al. 
(2008) proclaim that the effectiveness of a digital investigation is reliant upon Case 
Management.   
 
The lack of effective Case Management methods will result in investigative 
opportunities being easily neglected, digital evidence being disregarded or lost, and 
incriminating information representing potential digital evidence remaining 
undiscovered or not being passed onto decision makers.  Therefore, due to its 
importance in a digital investigation, Case Management has been incorporated into the 
CDFIPM as an Overriding Principle, namely Maintain a Detailed Case Management, 
that will need to be applied from the Readiness Process up to and including 
Investigation Closure Process.  The rationale for including this principle into the 
CDFIPM is as follow: 
 
• to outline the responsibilities and certain important tasks that both a case officer 
and his investigative team members will need to undertake in order to ensure a 
successful investigation (Khatir, et al., 2008);  
• to enable a smooth transition between different Processes of the model; and 
• also to ensure that all applicable information that results from each Process is 
acquired, documented and intertwined together in order to reconstruct the events 
associated with the crime or incident in a vivid and compelling manner.  
 
The remainder of this section provides some examples of the tasks and types of 
responsibilities that a case officer and his investigative team members are to undertake 
under this Overriding Principle, Maintain a Detailed Case Management.  
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The tasks of a case officer start after the incident has been reported in the Incident 
Detection Process, where he needs to decide whether to accept or reject the case and 
determine the time and budget required to carry out the investigation.  The case officer 
will subsequently need to develop an accurate and detailed plan that investigators can 
follow; this plan must define clearly the milestones, goals and sub-goals within the 
investigative process (Khatir, et al., 2008).  The case officer must also allocate tasks to 
individual team members29, oversee these tasks as well as drawing a complete picture of 
the entire investigative process and its outcomes so that the investigation does not 
deviate from its correct course.  In circumstances where the investigation has deviated 
from its correct course, the manager will need to identify the root cause of the deviation 
and guide the team members into the correct path.  Case officers will also be 
responsible for obtaining written authorisation so that the investigation can proceed as 
well as determining what level of attention to give to a particular case comparative to all 
of the other cases that they are dealing with (Khatir et al., 2008).   
 
As already stated, in addition to the case officers, the Maintain a Detailed Case 
Management Principle also pertains to the investigative team members who will need to 
undertake various tasks under this Overriding Principle.  These include communication 
and prioritization such as sharing information amongst DFIs, meeting the requirements 
of non-technical stakeholders, prioritizing and assigning administrative tasks amongst 
multiple DFIs in a digital investigation, etc.  In certain investigations, communication 
becomes a key aspect of case management (Khatir et al., 2008).  For example, in 
complex investigations that might last for long time, daily or weekly status meetings are 
required in order to discuss and analyse progress, combine up-to-date information and 
discuss and review the following steps in the investigation.  Finally, logging digital 
evidence in archives is another important factor in managing an investigation 
effectively.  This task can be carried out by both the case officer or the investigative 
team members (Khatir et al., 2008).    
 
																																																								
29 The team setup is required due to the fact that different stages of the investigative process require a 
diverse set of investigators with different expertise such as digital forensic examiners, first responders, 
digital forensic practitioners, digital forensic examiners and digital forensic analysts.   
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3.10.5			Prepare	and	Test	Tools	and	Techniques	
It is vital that DFIs prepare an appropriate set of tools and techniques during the course 
of an investigation so that each process of the investigative process can be carried out 
effectively.  DFIs might require different sets of tools and techniques to be able to carry 
out each given process in the investigative process.  Therefore, this aspect of the digital 
investigative process has been incorporated into the CDFIPM as an Overriding 
Principle, namely Prepare and Test Tools and Techniques, that will need to be followed 
throughout all the other Processes of the model.  This Principle has been extensively 
covered in technical standard documents such as ISO/IEC 27001 (2013) and ISO/IEC 
17799 (2005), guidelines such as National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST, 2015; Kent et al., 2006), as well as technical reports such as Information 
Assurance Advisory Council (IAAC) (Sommer, 2008).   
 
For instance, under a comprehensive project, entitled CFTT (Computer Forensics Tools 
Testing), carried out by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, 
2015), various methodologies have been established for testing computer forensic 
software tools through the development of general tool specifications, test procedures, 
test criteria, test sets, and test hardware.  This detailed guideline provides necessary 
information for digital forensic tools developers to improve their tools, and also enable 
DFIs to make informed choices about obtaining and testing digital forensic tools and 
understand the tools’ capabilities.   
 
Therefore, due to the fact that tools and techniques testing and preparation have already 
been covered in detail, this thesis does not aim to focus on this aspect of the 
investigative process in more details.  However, some examples on certain steps that 
DFIs will need to undertake in relation to this Overriding Principle will still be provided 
only for illustrative purposes.  Some activities that DFIs will need to perform in relation 
to Prepare and Test Tools and Techniques Principle include, but are not limited to: 
 
• determining which tools must be used for each given Process of the CDFIPM; 
• identifying which tools must be utilised for different data analysis tasks; 
• investigating and establishing which tools have been scientifically tested; and 
• identifying the degree of error in connection with tools.  
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Cases where untested tools have been used to carry out digital investigations are easily 
challenged in courts.  Therefore, one key element that DFIs will need to consider at all 
times under this Principle is the need to select tools that are court-proven such as 
EnCase, AccessData FTK, ProDiscover, Sleuthkit and Autopsy.  Another important 
aspect that investigators will need to adhere to under this Overriding Principle is the 
need to have up-to-date training on how to use the latest versions of different forensic 
tools in order to make effective use of them. 
 
Finally, as already stated, each Process within an investigative process might require 
different sets of tools.  For example, to conduct the Examination Process, the software 
tools such as FTK and EnCase, that are capable of revealing hidden, deleted, swapped 
and corrupted files or performing data carving, will need to be utilised (see Appendix A 
for a practical illustration).  In terms of techniques, for example in cases where public 
and private IP addresses need to be acquired and mapped to the country and institutions, 
IP addresses can be readily acquired by performing the following commands: ping, 
nslookup, dig, tracert from a DNS server.  Moreover, DFIs can easily locate a county by 
various online tools such as IP Location (2016) or WhatIsMyIPAddress (2016) (see also 
Appendix A for a practical illustration). 
 
3.10.6			Obtain	and	Adhere	to	Authorisation	
Any digital investigation that is commissioned to be carried out necessitates proper 
authorisation, whether it is an internal or an external authorisation.  In fact, each single 
stage of digital investigation should be authorised, and therefore an authorisation is 
required for each given process.  Due to its significance on the investigative process, 
authorisation has been incorporated into the CDFIPM as an Overriding Principle, 
namely Obtain and Adhere to Authorisation.  This Overriding Principle requires 
investigating organisations to obtain proper authorisation from one of the following 
groups: government authorities, system owners, system custodians, principles or users 
etc., when undertaking a digital investigation.  The significance of this Principle for 
activities carried out during the digital investigation processes is justified by the fact 
that the rights of the system owners, custodians, principles or users should not be 
infringed.  Moreover, this principle ensures that no law is violated.  The environment in 
which digital investigation is carried out determines the type of authorisation required.  
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The authorisation might be needed both within a legal environment or an organisational 
environment.  Authorisation for investigations involving law enforcement often requires 
a search warrant or other legal approval that requires sufficient evidence or suspicion 
(see section 2.3.2).  For corporate incidents, search warrants are not usually required so 
long as the proper privacy policies are in place.  This Overriding Principle must be 
adhered to concurrently throughout all the other Processes of the CDFIPM.  
 
3.10.7			Maintain	a	Detailed	Documentation	
It is extremely important to document all the activities carried out throughout the entire 
investigative process in order to enable other investigators to authenticate the process 
and results.  As well as being incorporated as a single Phase, documentation has also 
been incorporated into the CDFIPM as an Overriding Principle, namely Maintain a 
Detailed Documentation, that will need to be applied throughout the whole investigative 
process.  The aim of this Overriding Principle is to record all information applicable or 
produced during the investigative process to support decision making and the legal, 
administrative processing of those decisions. This Overriding Principle involves 
documenting both physical and digital crime scene.  For instance, documentation of the 
physical crime scene involves creating sketches and making video of a physical crime 
scene, while documentation of digital crime scene involves investigators properly 
documenting each item of digital evidence when it is discovered.  See section 3.7.1.6 
for more details on documentation.  
 
3.10.8			Interact	with	Physical	Investigation	
A digital investigation and a physical investigation are often interrelated and dependent 
on one another (Carrier and Spafford, 2003).  In cases where a physical investigation 
requires an assistance from a digital investigation, an example can be to use a digital 
forensic investigation to reveal communications between terror suspects via computers, 
mobile phones, online social network activities, email communication, communication 
via chat rooms and forums, etc. (Montasari, 2016, c; Valjarevic and Venter, 2015).  An 
example of digital investigation being dependent on a physical investigation is when a 
suspect is interviewed to provide a password to a system under investigation (Valjarevic 
and Venter, 2015).  In the CDFIPM, Interact with Physical Investigation has been 
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included as an Overriding Principle since defining the relationship between a digital 
investigation and a physical investigation is required to preserve chain of custody, 
preserve the integrity of the digital evidence, protect the digital evidence from damage 
and ensure an efficient investigation.  
 
3.11	Summary	of	the	Chapter	
This chapter covered the Design and Development phase of the thesis and proposed a 
Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Process Model (the CDFIPM), covering 
the entire digital investigative process.  The CDFIPM is the most comprehensive, 
detailed and structured DFIPM presented to date.  Each Process of the model was 
discussed and justified in this chapter.  Due to its top-down approach, an overview of 
the model was firstly formulated specifying the first-level components, i.e. Classes.  
Each first-level component was further broken down to specify the second-level 
components, i.e. Processes.  In turn, each second-level component was further refined in 
greater details to specify the third-level and forth-level components, namely Phases and 
Sub-Phases respectively.  The CDFIPM is also both generic and formal, enabling DFIs 
to reach conclusions that are reliable, repeatable and well-documented.  Due to its 
scientific approach, the CDFIPM will enable DFIs to follow a uniform approach, to 
overcome biased and predetermined theories, and authenticate their discoveries by 
attempting to prove themselves wrong.  This, in turn, will result in well-established 
conclusions that support expert testimony in courts of law. 
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Chapter	4:	 Demonstration	
4.1	 Introduction		
This chapter follows the Demonstration activity of the Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP, 
used in this research, and discusses the methods employed to demonstrate the potential 
deployment of the CDFIPM.  The Demonstration activity of the DSRP requires a 
researcher to apply the artefact in an appropriate environment such as 
“experimentation” and “case study” to solve the stated problem (Hevner et al., 2010; 
Peffers et al., 2006).  Resources needed for the Demonstration activity include effective 
knowledge of how the artefact should be applied to solve the stated problem.  In order 
to assess how the CDFIPM addresses the stated research problem, two approaches have 
been adopted.  The first approach, discussed in the Appendix A, involves conducting a 
hypothetical digital forensic investigation in a digital forensic laboratory (DFL), and the 
second approach, discussed in this chapter, involves applying the CDFIPM to three case 
scenarios and performing a walkthrough of the model.  The two approaches followed 
are identified as being appropriate for evaluating “simulations” and “model” (Hevner et 
al., 2010; Adams, 2012; Peffers et al, 2006; Balci, 2004).  The Demonstration activity 
was carried out prior to the model being submitted to the experts for independent 
evaluation (discussed in Chapter 5).   
 
4.2	 Case	Scenario	Implementation	of	the	CDFIPM		
For this part of the Demonstration activity, the ‘case scenario approach’, three case 
scenarios are followed in order to conduct a walkthrough of the entire processes of the 
CDFIPM to assess the model’s efficacy in solving computer crimes.  Each of the case 
scenarios demonstrates how the CDFIPM could be associated with specific aspects of 
an investigation being conducted in the three fields of law enforcement, commerce and 
incident response.  All the three case scenarios are based on actual situations and are 
intended to demonstrate the potential deployment of the CDFIPM.  Case scenario one 
involves a DFI working for a third-party digital forensic service provider and is derived 
and modelled after Adams (2012).  Case scenario two pertains to the possession of 
contraband material (child pornography) and is modelled after Beebe and Clark’s 
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(2005) and Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) law enforcement contraband scenarios.   Case 
scenario three relates to the exploitation of a vulnerability found in an online service 
operated by a bank and is modelled after Ciardhuáin (2004).  
 
4.2.1			Case	Scenario	One	
ValidPath is a small size company which provides financial services to its customers.  
The company does not have an in-house incident response team, nor does it have 
procedures for forensic readiness and incident detection implemented.  There are only 
one IT manager and an additional IT staff member to maintain ValidPath’s network and 
IT systems.  ValidPath suspects one of its ex-employees, Mr. Davis, of stealing the 
company’s confidential data such as price lists and customers’ information prior to his 
departure to set up his own company in direct competition.  ValidPath contacts their 
solicitor, Mr. Duncan, to raise the issue; in order to investigate the matter, Mr. Duncan 
contacts a third-party digital forensic service provider, RMDFSP, to investigate the 
issue.   
 
Since this digital investigation does not appear to be large in scope as there is only one 
PC involved, the head of the digital forensic investigation team at RMDFSP, 
investigator R, assigns only one more person, investigator P, to this investigation.  
Moreover, due to the fact that ValidPath does not have an in-house incident response 
team and has not implemented forensic readiness and incident detection procedures in 
advance, this investigation will start from the Planning Process of the CDFIPM, where 
the investigative team from the third-party will carry out the planning and preparation 
for this investigation.  Throughout the following stages of the digital investigative 
process, investigator R and investigator P adhere to all the eight Overriding Principles 
of the CDFIPM (see section 3.10).  
 
Planning	Process	
• Investigator R holds a meeting with Mr. Duncan and the directing manager of 
the ValidPath Company to understand what is required.  During the meeting, it 
becomes clear that investigator R is required to examine and analyse a desktop 
computer running Microsoft Windows 7 Operating System which was last used 
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by Mr. Davis and also ValidPath’s network data related to Mr. Davis.  
Investigator R is required to find out whether there exists any evidence showing 
that Mr. Davis has accessed and removed any of ValidPath’s confidential data 
prior to his departure.  Investigator R also discusses the legal implication of this 
investigation with Mr. Duncan, the legal representative of ValidPath. 
 
• Investigator R determines the number and the location of the system required to 
be analysed prior to attending the offices of ValidPath.  It becomes apparent that 
there is only one PC involved running Window 7 Operating System, and the PC 
is located in one of ValidPath’s offices. 
 
• There is no restriction in terms of timing. 
 
• Type of investigation is classified as an internal investigation at this point, and 
thus investigator R will require a written authorisation from both ValidPath as 
well as RMDFSP to start the investigation.  Investigator R also determines that 
there is no external authorisation needed for this investigation. 
 
• Investigator R performs a risk assessment to identify any safety issues 
concerning the safety of personnel and equipment.   
 
• As part of planning logistics, investigator R has already selected one more 
person, investigator P, to assist him in conducting this investigation.  He also 
plans the equipment, storage and the transportation of the device. 
 
• Having conducted the previous activities, investigator R is now able to create an 
outline plan to carry out this digital investigation. 
 
• Investigator R confirms that all aspects of the CDFIPM’s Planning Process have 
been completed and therefore signs and dates a copy of the UML Activity 
Diagram for this Process as a file note.   
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Preparation	Process	
• Referring to the CDFIPM’s Preparation Process, investigator R now implements 
the investigation plans that he drew from the previous Process. 
 
• Investigator R obtains an internal written authorisation from both his company 
as well as the ValidPath to carry out the investigation.  
 
• Based upon RMDFSP’s procedures, investigator R prepares appropriate imaging 
tools as well as two blank external hard drives which have already been verified 
for integrity. 
 
• Investigator R tasks investigator P to conduct the data acquisition. 
 
• RMDFSP issues the ValidPath a letter of engagement setting out the terms and 
conditions under which the investigation will be conducted in addition to 
describing the scope of the work required. 
 
• Investigator R confirms that all aspects of the CDFIPM’s Preparation Process 
have been completed and therefore signs and dates a copy of the UML Activity 
Diagram for this Process as a file note.   
 
Secure	and	Evaluate	Crime	Scene	Process	
• Investigator R and investigator P attend the offices of ValidPath with the 
equipment that they have already prepared as part of the logistical preparation 
from the previous Process. 
 
• The first step that they take into account is to address safety issues to ensure that 
there is no danger to their own safety as well as the safety of the ValidPath 
Company’s employees and the equipment. 
 
• Throughout the entire process, a detailed documentation of all activities is 
maintained. 
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• As part of carrying out an onsite preliminary survey, investigator R consults 
with the ValidPath’s IT manager, who is involved in the day-to-day operation of 
the company’s IT systems, in order to obtain information concerning the 
location of the desktop computer under investigation and the potential digital 
evidence.   
 
• The IT manager directs investigator R and investigator P to the location of the 
desktop computer.  In order to preserve data held on the desktop computer, 
investigator R isolates the PC with the co-operation of investigator P and the IT 
manager.  
 
• Now that the preliminary survey has been carried out and all the necessary 
information has been obtained, investigator R is able to update the outline plan 
to create a plan for data acquisition onsite. 
 
• The plan for onsite data acquisition includes the onsite acquisition of data on 
Mr. Davis’ desktop computer which is running at this point and also the live 
acquisition of Mr. Davis’ profile data stored on ValidPath’s fileserver.   
 
• Investigator R confirms that all aspects of the Secure and Evaluate Crime Scene 
Process of the CDFIPM have been completed.  A copy of the UML Activity 
Diagram for this Process is signed and dated by investigator R as a file note to 
show that this Process is now complete.  
 
Identification	Process	
• Investigator R instructs investigator P to acquire data from the hard drive of Mr. 
Davis’ desktop computer. 
 
• Investigator P surveys and searches the digital crime scene to identify any data 
representing potential digital evidence. 
 
		 213	
• Since it is not a law enforcement investigation and there is no timing constraint 
imposed to acquire data, investigator R instructs investigator P not to carry out 
an onsite triage. 
 
• Investigator R signs and dates a copy of the Activity Diagram for the 
Identification Process to confirm that this Process has been completed. 
 
Acquisition	and	Collection	Process	
• Investigator R confirms that the desktop computer used by Mr. Davis prior to his 
departure has not been seized by ValidPath’s IT manager and is currently in 
operation. 
 
• Referring to the UML Activity Diagram for the CDFIPM’s Acquisition and 
Collection Process, investigator R considers it the most appropriate that both a 
live and a static data acquisition must take place onsite.   
 
• Investigator R determines that live data acquisition from ValidPath’s network 
should be performed to acquire the profile data concerning Mr. Davis’ activities. 
 
• Investigator R attaches a forensically clean external hard drive (the master hard 
drive) which has already been verified for integrity and labelled based on the 
RMDFSP’s procedures to a computer connected to ValidPath’s network. 
 
• Using the FTK Imager, based on the RMDFSP’s procedures for acquiring live 
network data, investigator R captures the profile data related to Mr. Davis from 
the ValidPath’s fileserver.  This forensic image is created on the master hard 
drive. 
 
• Investigator R duplicates the acquired master image and creates a back-up image 
(working copy) which is placed on a different blank hard drive (back-up hard 
drive) that has already been checked for integrity and labelled based upon the 
RMDFSP’s procedures. 
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• Hash verification values for both the master copy and the working copy of the 
network data image are then calculated and recorded on the Evidence 
Acquisition form produced by RMDFSP.  
 
• At this point, investigator R confirms that the live data acquisition from the 
ValidPath’s network has been completed.   
 
• In addition to performing live acquisition of the network data, investigator R 
also considers it most appropriate that an onsite static data acquisition must be 
performed from the hard drive of the desktop computer last used by Mr. Davis 
prior to his departure. 
 
• Investigator R instructs investigator P to perform an onsite data acquisition from 
the hard drive of the desktop computer after it has been shut down. 
 
• Investigator P checks and confirms that the desktop computer is running.  He 
photographs the PC including its screen and records its details such as serial and 
model number, etc. on an Evidence Acquisition form produced by RMDFSP.  
 
• Based on the RMDFSP’s SOPs, investigator P confirms that data held on the 
computer is stable; therefore, he removes the power source directly from the 
back of the desktop computer and shuts down the PC. 
 
• According to the CDFIPM’s requirement for forensically sound data acquisition 
and based upon the RMDFSP’s SOPs, prior to the data acquisition, investigator 
R utilises a physical write-blocking tool to avoid altering the original data 
contained in the desktop’s hard drive. 
 
• Referring to the steps shown in the Acquisition and Collection Process of the 
CDFIPM for acquiring a forensic image of a hard drive, investigator P images 
the hard drive of the desktop using a court approved forensic tool (such as 
AccessData FTK Imager or EnCase) based on the RMDFSP’s SOPs. 
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• Using an appropriate imaging tool, investigator P creates a raw image of the 
desktop’s hard drive (the master image) on a forensically clean hard disk (the 
master disk) that has been checked in advance for integrity and labelled based on 
the RMDFSP’s digital forensic procedures.  
 
• Investigator P also duplicates the acquired image of the desktop computer’s hard 
drive (the master image) and creates a working copy on which the subsequent 
examination and analysis will be performed.  The working copy of the master 
image is created on a separate blank hard drive which has also been verified in 
advance for integrity. 
 
• Hash verification values for both the master copy and the working copy of the 
hard drive image are then calculated and recorded on the Evidence Acquisition 
form produced by RMDFSP.  
 
• Investigator P reports back to investigator R that the static data acquisition from 
the hard drive of the desktop computer previously used by Mr. Davis has now 
been completed. 
 
• Investigator P reassembles the desktop computer and returns it to the IT 
manager who checks that the PC is operational and connects it to ValidPath’s 
network. 
 
• Investigator R instructs investigator P to label and package the external hard 
drives containing the forensic images of both the network data as well as the 
desktop’s hard drive data for transportation. 
 
• Investigator P packages and labels the two hard drives and confirms that the 
documentation associated with the two hard drives are accurate.  Based on the 
CDFIPM’s Overriding Principles, investigator P also completes a Chain of 
Custody form produced by RMDFSP for the two external hard drives. 
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• The two hard drives are transported and stored in a secure storage facility at the 
RMDFSP for later examination and analysis.  
 
• Investigator R confirms that the Acquisition and Collection Process of the 
CDFIPM is now complete by signing and dating a copy of the Activity Diagram 
for this Process as a file note.   
 
Examination	Process	
• Back at RMDFSP, investigator R tasks one of his digital forensic analysts 
(DFA), investigator B, with examining and analysing the acquired data to 
determine whether there is any evidence linking Mr. Davis to the removal of the 
confidential data from ValidPath.   
 
• Investigator R provides investigator B with a Job Request Document form 
produced by RMDFSP outlining the description of work to be carried out.  
Furthermore, based on the RMDFSP’s SOPs, investigator B is provided with an 
Evidence Sought form outlining the types of evidence needed to link Mr. Davis 
with stealing ValidPath’s confidential data.    
 
• Investigator B takes the custody of the back-up hard drive containing the 
working copies of the acquired data from the storage facility and signs and dates 
a Chain of Custody form produced by RMDFSP indicating that he has taken the 
custody of the device.  
 
• Prior to starting the examination of the acquired hard drive and network data, 
investigator B prepares a plan of action based upon the steps outlined in the 
Examination Process of the CDFIPM.  As part of the preparation, investigator B 
prepares a forensic workstation with sanitized storage space and installs legally 
approved forensic tools on the workstation.  Other preparation activities that 
investigator B performs include: keeping an audit trail of all of the steps 
undertaken during this process in the form of note taking, developing an initial 
hypothesis and prediction based on the information received by investigator B, 
and experimentation and testing. 
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• Once the preparation has been completed, investigator B initiates the 
Examination Process by importing each set of digital evidence to the forensic 
examination software installed on the forensic workstation separately.  Referring 
to the Examination Process of the CDFIPM, investigator B applies each step of 
the Examination Process to each data set to develop a more comprehensive and 
methodical approach to this forensic investigation.  
 
• Investigator B extracts each data set (makes the potential digital evidence 
visible) into a readable form by mounting it on the forensic software which he 
has previously installed on the forensic workstation.  Using the automated 
function of the forensic software, investigator B indexes files and folders to give 
structure to each acquired data set and retrieves obfuscated data such as partially 
deleted files from the original desktop computer used by Mr. Davis. 
 
• Referring to the Examination Process of the CDFIPM, investigator B surveys 
each acquired data set in order to develop an overall familiarity with the totality 
of evidence to find items of potential relevance to the investigation.  While 
examining data acquired from both the hard drive of the desktop used by Mr. 
Davis and ValidPath’s network, investigator B identifies several confidential 
documents related to ValidPath’s price lists and customers’ data. Also, 
examining ValidPath network’s log files, investigator B is able to link the 
downloads of the company’s confidential files to the IP address of the desktop 
computer that Mr. Davis had logged onto.   
 
• Referring to other Phases within the Examination Process of the CDFIPM, 
investigator B performs data harvesting, organisation, reduction and 
classification in order to produce a reduced and organized dataset which will be 
fed into the Analysis Process at a later stage in the investigation to expedite the 
Analysis Process.  
 
• Investigator B records items of evidence found during this Process on an 
Evidence Record form produced by RMDFSP. 
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• Investigator B confirms that all activities related to the Examination Process of 
the CDFIPM is now complete by signing and dating a copy of the Activity 
Diagram for this Process as a file note. 
 
Analysis	Process	
• Investigator R joins investigator B to perform the Analysis Process of the 
CDFIPM. 
 
• Referring to the Analysis Process of the CDFIPM, the investigative team are 
now able to formulate a detailed hypothesis which is based on the facts deduced 
from the Examination Process. 
 
• The investigative team test the data which they reduced and organised in the 
previous Process against the hypothesis to determine the legal validity of the 
digital evidence. The investigative team is able to attribute the theft of 
ValidPath’s confidential data to Mr. Davis. 
 
• The investigative team also determine that their formulated hypothesis proving 
that Mr. Davis has indeed stolen ValidPath’s confidential data holds true.  
 
• At this stage, investigator R confirms that the Analysis Process of the CDFIPM 
is complete and signs and dates a copy of the Activity Diagram for this Process 
as a file note.  
 
Interpretation	Process	
• Now that the investigative team have been able to evaluate their findings, and 
their hypothesis holds true, by referring to the Interpretation Process of the 
CDFIPM, the investigative team interpret the evidence and produce meaningful 
statements for use in legal proceedings. 
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• The investigative team describe the facts that they have found during the 
Analysis Process and compare and prioritize digital evidence artefacts they have 
gathered. 
 
• Investigator R confirms that the Interpretation Process of the CDFIPM is 
complete by dating and signing a copy of the Activity Diagram for this Process 
as a file note. 
 
Event	Reconstruction	Process	
• Referring to the Event Reconstruction Process of the CDFIPM, the investigative 
team consolidate and review their findings.  Their assessment of their developed 
hypothesis shows that they have acquired all the necessary evidence which 
shows that Mr. Davis has indeed stolen the ValidPath’s confidential data. 
 
• The investigative team use the sequence of events that they have deduced from 
the digital evidence, and reconstruct a sequence which shows the investigation 
results accurately.   
 
• The investigative team are able to explain how Mr. Davis was able to remove 
confidential data from ValidPath’s network. 
 
• Investigator R confirms that the Event Reconstruction Process of the CDFIPM is 
complete and signs and dates a copy of the Activity Diagram for this Process. 
 
Reporting	Process	
• Investigator R tasks investigator B to produce a forensic report detailing not 
only the outcome of the Analysis Process but also the entire investigation.  A 
copy of this report is also kept with the RMDFSP as a classified document. 
 
• Investigator B confirms that the Reporting Process of the CDFIPM is complete 
and signs and dates a copy of the Activity Diagram for this Process. 
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Presentation	Process	
• Investigator R meets initially with the RMDFSP’s management and presents the 
findings of this investigation.  He then holds a meeting with ValidPath and their 
legal representative, Mr. Duncan, and presents the investigation findings.   
 
• During the meeting, various issues such as financial damage to ValidPath and 
legal implications concerning the investigation are discussed.  
 
• Investigator R confirms that the Presentation Process of the CDFIPM is 
complete and signs and dates a copy of the Activity Diagram for this Process. 
 
Investigation	Closure	Process	
• Investigative R reviews the outcome of the investigation and confirms that all of 
the necessary evidence has been acquired. 
 
• ValidPath accepts the hypothesis that investigator R has presented to them as the 
acquired digital evidence against Mr. Davis is strong in terms of relevance, 
admissibility and weight.   
 
• Based upon the findings presented by RMDFSP, ValidPath’s management 
decide to report the incident to the police and seek to bring charges against Mr. 
Davis.  RMDFSP confirms to ValidPath, through investigator R, their desire to 
give evidence in a court if the need arises.    
 
• ValidPath identifies the lessons learnt and realise that they should implement 
forensic readiness procedures as well as mechanisms for an early incident 
detection.  
 
• Back at RMDFSP, investigator R communicates the results of findings also to 
the RMDFSP’s management and records the findings of this investigation on a 
database for the future reference. 
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• As far as RMDFSP is concerned, this digital investigation is complete from their 
end as the law enforcement will be involved from this point forward. 
 
• Investigator R confirms that the Investigation Closure of the CDFIPM is now 
complete and signs and dates a copy of the Activity Diagram for this Process as 
a file note. 
 
Future	Readiness	Process	
• ValidPath starts applying the lessons that they have learnt from this incident by 
seeking to implement appropriate forensic readiness procedures and incident 
detection systems. 
 
• Investigator R provides ValidPath with a set of recommendations on how they 
can improve in terms of securing their digital data assets. 
 
• Investigator R tasks his investigative team to develop a case study based on this 
investigation for future training of other investigators. 
 
• Investigator R confirms that the Future Readiness Process of the CDFIPM is 
complete and signs and dates a copy of the Activity Diagram for this Process as 
a file note. 
 
• RMDFSP, through investigator R, offers to provide further services to 
ValidPath, expressing their desire to give expert witness in a court in case Mr. 
Davis appears before a judge due to his theft of company’s confidential data. 
 
4.2.2			Case	Scenario	Two	
Based on gathered intelligence and a search warrant acquired, police raids the residence 
of Mr. Thomson, who is suspected of having downloaded and distributed indecent 
images of minors.  During the police raid, a single desktop computer which is powered 
off, and that is thought to contain potential evidence is found.  Upon questioning Mr. 
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Thompson, it is confirmed that the desktop computer belongs to him.  Police seizes the 
desktop computer and arrests Mr. Thompson.  The Case Officer, the head of the High-
Tech Crime Unit (HTCU), Officer Lloyd, who is in charge of the digital investigation, 
is requested to analyse the content of the seized desktop computer. 
 
Readiness	Process	
• The HTCU has already developed both operational and infrastructure readiness 
capabilities and has its own Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). 
 
• The Case Officer, Officer Lloyd, dates and signs a physical copy of the UML 
Activity Diagram for the CDFIPM’s Readiness Process to confirm that this 
process has already been implemented prior to this incident. 
 
Incident	Detection	Process	
• Mr. Thompson’s wife discovers that he has downloaded and stored incident 
images of minors on his computer, and as a result she reports him to the police. 
 
• Police confirm the initial reporting of the crime30 and prepares for further action. 
 
• Referring to the Incident Detection Process of the CDFIPM, police classify the 
incident as severe, and the incident is described as the possession and 
distribution of indecent images of minors.  
 
• The Case Officer, Officer Lloyd, confirms that the Incident Detection Process of 
the CDFIPM is complete by dating and signing a copy of the Activity Diagram 
for this process as a file note.  
 
																																																								
30 For instance, they might have already covertly monitored Mr. Thomson’s online browsing activities 
and chat logs based on a proper authorisation that they have acquired. 
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First	Response	Process	
• Referring to the First Response Process of the CDFIPM, the Case Officer, 
Officer Lloyd, confirms that this Process is not applicable 31  to the law 
enforcement by dating and signing a copy of the Activity Diagram for this 
Process as a file note.  
 
Planning	Process	
• Officer Lloyd, confirms that his unit is required to examine and analyse the 
content of the desktop computer belonging to Mr. Thompson which is suspected 
of storing indecent images of children.  Officer Lloyd and his investigative team 
are expected to find out whether there exists any evidence proving that Mr. 
Thompson has downloaded and distributed indecent images of minors. 
 
• Based on the CDFIPM’s Planning Process, the type of investigation is classified 
as criminal; thus, it is determined that a search warrant is required to allow the 
police to search Mr. Thompson’s property and to seize his desktop computer.   
 
• Officer Lloyd considers the physical, timing and data constraint.  It is 
determined that there is only one single property to search and only one single 
desktop computer involved.  The type of data that the police is interested in is 
also determined.  This includes, but is not limited to, JPG, PNG and GIF or 
other image file formats, as well as logs containing records of Mr. Thompson’s 
online chat sessions. 
 
• Officer Lloyd also performs a risk assessment concerning the personnel and the 
equipment safety.  As part of this assessment, Officer Lloyd discovers that Mr. 
Thompson has had the history of violence in the past.  He, therefore, requests 
additional back up officers. 
 
																																																								
31 In the context of law enforcement investigations, the CDFIPM’s “Secure and Evaluate Crime Scene 
Process” covers activities associated with the first response.   
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• Officer Lloyd also plans the logistics for the transportation and storage of the 
evidence.  Officer Lloyd selects two additional personnel from the HTCU to be 
involved in the investigation and assigns them different roles based on their 
training and skills.  Officer Wilson is to conduct the data acquisition, and Officer 
Morris is to perform the subsequent data analysis.   
 
• Referring to the CDFIPM’s Planning Process, Officer Lloyd creates an outline 
plan for this digital investigation based on all the planning activities that he has 
carried out. 
 
• Officer Lloyd confirms that this process is complete by dating and signing a 
copy of the UML Activity Diagram for the CDFIPM’s Planning Process as a file 
note. 
 
Preparation	Process	
• Referring to the CDFIPM’s Preparation Process and based on the HTCU’s 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Officer Lloyd implements the planning 
activities that he has drawn in the Planning stage of the CDFIPM.   
 
• The search warrant is acquired and the equipment prepared according to the 
HTCU’s SOPs.  
 
• Referring to the CDFIPM’s Preparation Process and based on the HTCU’s 
SOPs, Officer Wilson and Officer Morris prepare and validate forensically 
sound techniques based on the roles which they have been assigned. 
 
• To confirm that the Preparation Process of the CDFIPM is complete, Officer 
Lloyd dates and signs a copy of the UML Activity Diagram for this Process as a 
file note.    
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Secure	and	Evaluate	Crime	Scene	Process	
• Police raids Mr. Thompson’ residence.  Along with the other police officers32, 
Officer Lloyd and Officer Wilson also attend the crime scene.  Officer Wilson 
has been assigned with the task of data acquisition.  
 
• Referring to the CDFIPM’s Secure and Evaluate Crime Scene Process and based 
on the HTCU’s SOPs, Officer Lloyd addresses the safety issues in collaboration 
with other officers. 
 
• Officer Lloyd instructs other police officers not to tamper with any digital 
device they encounter in order to preserve the crime scene.   
 
• Mr. Thompson is detained and questioned briefly about the location of his 
desktop computer or any additional digital device he might possess.  It is 
confirmed that he possesses only one single desktop computer. 
 
• Officer Lloyd carries out a preliminary survey which includes the consideration 
for a mixture of both onsite and offsite data acquisition and identification of any 
technical issues. 
 
• Officer Lloyd updates the initial Outline Plan he created in the Planning Process, 
now that he has attended the site of crime scene and has a better picture of the 
incident. 
 
• Officer Lloyd dates and signs a copy of the UML Activity Diagram for the 
Secure and Evaluate Crime Scene Process to confirm that this Process is 
complete.  
 
																																																								
32 This refers to the primary officers and not the digital forensic investigators. 
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Identification	Process	
• Referring to the activities included in CDFIPM’s Identification Process, officers 
locate Mr. Thompson’s desktop computer, suspected of containing indecent 
images of minors.   
 
• Since the collected intelligence does not suggest any child abduction or 
exploitation, missing person or a life-threatening circumstance, Officer Lloyd 
determines that there is no need to perform an onsite examination of the desktop 
computer.  
 
• Officer Wilson assigned with the data acquisition task determines that the 
desktop computer is already powered off.  Since the warrant permits the seizure 
of the computer, it is decided to carry out the data acquisition back at the 
forensic laboratory. 
 
• To confirm that the Identification Process of the CDFIPM is complete, Officer 
Lloyd dates and signs a copy of the UML Activity Diagram for this Process as a 
file note.    
 
Acquisition	and	Collection	Process	
• Referring to the Acquisition and Collection Process of the CDFIPM, Officer 
Wilson confirms that the desktop computer that is to be seized is in off state.  He 
photographs the desktop computer and notes down its serial and model number. 
 
• In accordance with the Acquisition and Collection Process of the CDFIPM, 
Officer Wilson records, removes and secures the desktop connection based on 
their own SPOs.  He proceeds with labelling and packaging the desktop 
computer including its accessories. 
 
• The desktop computer is transported back to the police department where it is 
stored in a safe storage facility. 
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• Officer Lloyd instructs Officer Wilson to obtain the desktop computer from the 
storage and perform the data acquisition.  Officer Wilson takes the custody of 
the desktop computer and signs a Chain of Custody form, checks the 
documentation and condition of the device and confirms that he has not detected 
any sign of damage.  
 
• Referring to the CDFIPM’s Acquisition and Collection Process, based on the 
HTCU’s SOPs, Officer Wilson decides on the most appropriate means of 
acquiring data and performs a data acquisition on the desktop’s hard drive.   
 
• The acquired image is created on a forensically clean external hard drive that has 
already been verified for integrity.  Officer Wilson also duplicates the acquired 
image on a different forensically clean external hard drive to become the 
working copy. 
 
• Referring to the Acquisition and Collection Process of the CDFIPM, Officer 
Wilson verifies the two sets of acquired images and confirms that neither the 
original evidence nor the working copy has been modified.  The calculated hash 
verification values are recorded for both the master copy and the working copy 
on the Evidence Acquisition form produced by the HTCU.  
 
• Officer Lloyd confirms that the CDFIPM’s Acquisition and Collection Process 
in now complete by dating and signing a copy of the UML Activity Diagram for 
this Process as a file note.  
 
Examination	Process	
• Officer Lloyd tasks Officer Morris, who has an extensive expertise in the digital 
evidence analysis, to conduct the examination and analysis of the acquired data. 
 
• Officer Morris takes the custody of the hard drives containing the master image 
and working image of the original evidence.  He checks the state of the devices 
and confirms that he has not detected any damage to the hard drives by dating 
and signing a Chain of Custody form produced by the HTCU. 
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• Based on the HTCU’s SOPs, Officer Morris prepares a forensically clean 
workstation with appropriate software installed on it into which the acquired 
working copy will be imported for the forensic examination and analysis of the 
acquired data. 
 
• Prior to carrying out the Examination Process, Officer Morris checks the 
Acquisition and Collection form filled in by Officer Wilson and confirms that 
the acquired data has already been verified for integrity. 
 
• Referring to the Examination Process of the CDFIPM, Officer Morris carries out 
the digital evidence examination using appropriate and court approved forensic 
tools based on the HTCU’s SOPs.   
 
• Officer Morris is able to recover many artefacts showing that Mr. Thomson 
possessed and distributed pornographic images of children. Various documents 
with JPG, GIF and PNG file formats depicting indecent images of minors are 
discovered from various locations on the computer’s hard drive.  Officer Morris 
also finds certain chat logs showing Mr. Thompson’s conversation with other 
individuals with the same motives.  
 
• Referring to the activities contained in the Examination Process of the CDFIPM, 
due to a large amount of data to be examined, Officer Morris reduces, harvests 
and organises the data in order to expedite the investigation in the Analysis 
Process, where he will look into the discovered evidence in more details. 
 
• Officer Morris records the details of the evidence he has found on the Evidence 
Found form produced by the HTCU.  
 
• He then confirms that the Examination Process of the CDFIPM is now complete 
by dating and signing a copy of the Activity Diagram for this Process as a file 
note. 
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Analysis	Process	
• Referring to the Analysis Process of the CDFIPM, Officer Morris now performs 
further analysis on digital evidence that he has recovered from the working 
image. 
 
• He formulates a hypothesis based on the investigation findings in which he is 
able to attribute the downloaded indecent images stored on the desktop 
computer’s hard drive to Mr. Thomson. 
 
• To confirm that the Analysis Process of the CDFIPM is now complete, he dates 
and signs a copy of the Activity Diagram for this Process as a file note.  
 
Interpretation	Process	
• Based upon the Interpretation Process of the CDFIPM, Officer Morris interprets 
digital evidence resulting from the Examination Process and the Analysis 
Process and produces meaningful statements in the legal context.  
 
• He then describes the facts that he has found during the Analysis Process and 
compares and prioritizes digital evidence artefacts he has gathered. 
 
• Officer Morris confirms that the Interpretation Process of the CDFIPM is now 
complete by dating and signing a copy of the Activity Diagram for this Process 
as a file note. 
 
Event	Reconstruction	Process	
• Now that Officer Morris has completed the Interpretation Process of the 
CDFIPM, he is able to reconstruct a possible event sequence which reflects the 
incident result accurately.  To do so, he uses a series of events that he has 
deduced from digital evidence.    
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• To ensure that he has acquired all the evidence required to support his 
formulated hypothesis, Officer Morris asks one of his colleagues in the HTCU 
with the same expertise, investigator Anderson, to test the review results 
independently against the original hypothesis.  Investigator Anderson tests the 
review results against the original hypothesis and confirms that all the evidence 
has been acquired. 
 
• Officer Morris confirms that the Event Reconstruction Process of the CDFIPM 
is now complete, and he dates and signs a copy of the Activity Diagram for this 
Process as file note.  
 
Reporting	Process	
• Referring to the CDFIPM’s Reporting Process, Officer Morris writes a detailed 
report detailing the outcome of his analysis and the investigation as a whole.  
 
• He then confirms that the CDFIPM’s Reporting Process is complete by dating 
and signing a UML Activity Diagram for this Process as a file note. 
 
Presentation	Process	
• Referring to the Presentation Process of the CDFIPM, the Case Officer, Officer 
Lloyd, holds a meeting with both Officer Wilson and Officer Morris instructing 
them that they are required to prepare an expert testimony based on the report 
produced. 
 
• Officer Lloyd confirms the main target audience as judge, jury, the prosecutor, 
the accused, Mr. Thompson and his legal representative, as well as other police 
personnel.  Also, during the meeting, Officer Lloyd and the two other officers 
discuss the appeal process and the legal implications of this phase of the 
investigation during the meeting. 
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• Officer Wilson and Officer Morris prepare the expert testimony which will be 
delivered to the court along with the produced report and all the relevant 
evidence collected and analysed during this investigation. 
 
• In the court, the digital evidence is challenged by the defence.  However, since 
the Officers adopted scientific methods employing the CDFIPM to conduct the 
digital investigative process, the jury finds Mr. Thompson guilty. 
 
• Officer Lloyd now confirms that the CDFIPM’s Presentation Process is 
complete by signing a copy of the Activity Diagram for this Process as a file 
note. 
 
Investigation	Closure	Process	
• Officer Lloyd and his investigative team hold a meeting and review the entire 
investigation and discuss any lessons they have learnt from this particular 
investigation.  Areas of improvement for future investigations are discussed and 
addressed. 
 
• It has also been decided that Mr. Thompson’s desktop computer is stored for a 
period of time before it will be destroyed. 
 
• Officer Lloyd holds a meeting with his senior manager to communicate the 
results of the investigation. 
 
• He also tasks Officer Morris to record the case decision on a database as a 
record for the future reference. 
 
• To confirm that the Investigation Closure Process of the CDFIPM is now 
complete, Officer Lloyd dates and signs a copy of the Activity Diagram for this 
Process as a file note. 
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Future	Readiness	Process	
• Referring to the Future Readiness of the CDFIPM, Officer Lloyd makes a set of 
recommendations to his team members concerning the areas of improvements.  
He also tasks Officer Morris and Officer Wilson with developing a case study 
based on this investigation to assist the future investigations. 
 
• Officer Lloyd dates and signs a copy of the Activity Diagram for the Future 
Readiness Process of the CDFIPM as a file note to confirm that this process is 
now complete. 
 
• Finally, Officer Lloyd confirms that this investigation is now complete by dating 
and signing an Investigation Closure Document form produced by the HTCU. 
 
4.2.3			Case	Scenario	Three	
This investigation started when Bank X in London (England) received an email 
claiming to have found a vulnerability in an online service operated by the bank.  The 
email offered to provide details of the vulnerability in exchange for payment.  On 
checking their logs, Bank X concluded that an unauthorised access had been made to 
their web server. The bank received further emails threatening to reveal the 
vulnerability to the press and public, including a link to a website which the suspect 
intended to use to disclose the vulnerability.  Bank X reported the issue to the police in 
London who initiated the investigation.  It became obvious that the compromised web 
server was located in Manchester (England) from Bank X’s headquarters and that the 
source of the emails was in Cardiff (Wales).  Therefore, another police force, namely 
SWP (the South Wales Police), took up the case to start the investigation.   
 
Readiness	Process	
• Bank X has already implemented both operational and infrastructure readiness 
capabilities, and has an in-house incident response team and procedures for 
forensic readiness and incident detection implemented.  The bank also has its 
own Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). 
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Incident	Detection	Process	
• The first step in this investigation is the Incident Detection and the creation of 
awareness that the investigation is needed.  In this case, the incident has been 
reported by the suspect himself to Bank X.  After the incident has been detected, 
the bank requests its senior IT Administrator, Mr. Thompson, to look into the 
issue to confirm or refute the validity of the incident as this might be a hoax.  
Mr. Thompson contacts the head of the incident response team for assistance in 
this matter.  To validate and assess the incident, Mr. Thompson and the incident 
response team examine the emails and log files and confirm that the system’s 
security has been compromised.   
 
Bank X then reports the incident to the London MPS (Metropolitan Police 
Service), who initiates the investigation of its own.  It becomes clear that the 
compromised web server is based in Manchester and that the suspect is located 
in Cardiff; therefore, the investigation is passed to SWP (the South Wales 
Police).  Up to this point, the reporting of the incident has taken place three 
times: when Bank X receives the emails, when the bank reports it to the MPS, 
and when the investigation is passed to the second police force, SWP.  During 
this Process, both internal and external authorisation are needed.  The internal 
authorisation is obtained when Bank X instructs its senior IT administrator to 
conduct the investigation.  The external authorisation is acquired when the MPS 
realizes that SWP are the police force who are authorised to carry out the 
investigation. The search warrant is the example of this authorisation.  
Moreover, during this process detailed and contemporaneous documentation are 
made. 
 
First	Response	Process	
• Due to the fact that this incident involves law enforcement and is investigated 
externally, this Process is only partly applicable to this case scenario.  The 
application of this process is when the incident response team assists the senior 
IT administrator in examining the log files. 
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Planning	Process	
• The Planning activity is conducted by both Bank X and the two police forces.  
This activity takes place in the bank’s investigation when they perform an 
examination of the logs and decide to involve the police based on what they 
have found.  The Planning activity also takes place in the two police forces 
investigations where they plan their own respective approaches to be undertaken 
to identify the suspect and collect the needed evidence.  Under the Planning 
stage, the two police forces consider data constraint, timing constraint, physical 
constraint, and authorisation, as well as performing risk assessment, planning 
logistics and creating their own outline plans.  
 
Preparation	Process	
• Under the Preparation activity, Bank X and the two polices forces simply 
implement the plans that they have drawn in the Planning stage.   
 
Secure	and	Evaluate	Crime	Scene	Process	
• This activity takes place when the SWP police officers raid the premises of the 
suspect’s place of employment.  The first step they take is to address the safety 
issues such as the safety of the officers and employees, followed by preserving 
the crime scene.  Since the suspect is at the crime scene, he is detained and 
briefly interviewed as the authorisation allows the questioning of the suspect.  
Investigators then survey the crime scene in order to determine the location of 
digital device(s) and establish the combination of onsite and offsite data 
acquisition.  Throughout the entire process, detailed contemporaneous notes of 
all activities are maintained.     
 
Identification	Process	
• Identification initially takes place when Bank X identifies their log files to 
determine what has occurred.  Both police forces, MPS and SWP, later carry out 
the same activity to locate the sources of the emails.  Moreover, SWP conducts a 
physical search which results from the information obtained from the previous 
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searches.  Secure and Evaluate Crime Scene Process and Identification 
Processes both overlap as each Process requires searching the physical crime 
scene.   
 
Acquisition	and	Collection	Process	
• This Process takes place when the search of the employer’s premises in the 
previous Process led to the seizure of a computer.  Since the suspect’s computer 
system is not a mission-critical system and the authorisation permits its seizure, 
the investigators decide to size the system and conduct an offsite data 
acquisition in the police forensic laboratory.  However, since the system is 
running, officers decide to conduct a live acquisition of volatile data first prior to 
shutting down the system in case the RAM might contain valuable information 
which might be lost after powering down the system.  Using FTK, the officers 
perform a live acquisition of the volatile data and duplicate the master copy of 
the captured image of RAM.  Both copies are then verified using MD5 and 
SHA1 checksums.  Since the data on the system is stable, the officers remove 
the power source directly from the suspect’s computer.  They then record, 
remove and secure connections prior to labelling and packaging the system.   
 
The Transport Phase takes place when the system is seized and physically 
transferred to the police.  This phase also occurs in three other occasions 
including: when the captured image of the RAM is taken to the police, when log 
files are transferred from server to the police for later examination and analysis 
and when the emails are transferred from the bank to the police.  The Storage 
Phase occurs when the police retain the seized computer, the captured images of 
both hard drive and RAM, log files as well as emails in a secure storage facility.  
In the forensic laboratory, the investigators image the hard drive of the system 
and verify it using MD5 and SHA1 checksums.  They also duplicate the master 
copy to become the working copy on which the subsequent Examination and 
Analysis will be performed.  
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Examination	Process	
• This activity initially occurs when the bank examines their log files.  It also 
occurs when the police examine log files, emails and the working copy of both 
hard drive and RAM images of the suspect’s system in the forensic laboratory.  
During the Examination Process, investigators process the deleted and hidden 
data to ensure that emails and log files are recognised from the evidence.  
Investigators also harvest data to provide structure to data which they are 
interested in so that it can be mounted on the investigating machine.  Since the 
suspect’s system contains large amount of data such as known systems files, 
investigators use metadata and unique identifiers to reduce the data by removing 
known system files and different other application data.  The investigators are 
now left with the log files and the emails that the suspect sent to Bank X.  Now, 
the emails can be uniquely attributed to the suspect who has been the user of that 
specific system. 
 
Analysis	Process	
• This Process initially takes place when Bank X’s system administrator, Mr. 
Thompson, and the incident response team conclude from the log files that an 
unauthorised access has been made to their web server.   Later on, this Process is 
conducted in a forensic laboratory by investigators who develop the initial 
hypothesis for the identity of the suspect and for the manner in which the 
incident has taken place. 
 
Interpretation	Process	
• This Process occurs after investigators evaluate their findings in the Analysis 
Process and determine that their formulated hypothesis is true.  During this 
Process, investigators interpret digital evidence to produce meaningful 
statements for later reporting and presentation regarding how the suspect made 
an unauthorised access to Bank X’s web serve.  As part of this Process, 
investigators classify and organize the interpreted evidence such as log files and 
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emails according to their relevance in order to distinguish which digital evidence 
items are more important than the others.     
 
Event	Reconstruction	Process	
• This process occurs when investigators reconstruct the events which led to the 
identification of the suspect and the subsequent seizure of the suspect’s 
computer.  This entails the investigators iterating in the CDFIPM, and results in 
a more detailed hypothesis.  Through this Process, investigators are able to 
explain how the suspect has carried out the intrusion to Bank X’s web server.  
Investigators consolidate and review their findings prior to assessing the results 
of their review against the original hypothesis that they have formulated.  
Through this assessment, investigators ensure that they have gathered all 
relevant evidence related to that attack to support their hypothesis.   
 
Reporting	Process	
• This Process takes place when investigators compile a report based on their 
findings to be presented in a court.   
 
Presentation	Process	
• This Process occurs five times during the entire investigation.  This includes: 
when the bank’s IT Administrator presents the evidence to the management 
within the bank, when the bank approaches the MPS Police and present their 
evidence to investigators, when the MPS Police pass the investigation to SWP, 
when evidence is presented to acquire a search warrant and when investigators 
present the evidence in the court.  The formality of the evidence increases as the 
investigation proceeds. Prior to presenting the findings to the court, investigators 
meet with the legal team to understand the presentation requirements.  Through 
the meeting, the target audience in the court are determined.  Investigators also 
carry out the necessary preparation prior to attending the court such as preparing 
expert testimony, exhibits and appropriate presentation aids.   
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During the presentation in the court, investigators are able to assist the judge and 
jury in understanding the technical points made by avoiding complex arguments 
and delivering their conclusion in a logical and structured manner. The 
presentation contains factual data that investigators have deduced.  Moreover, 
investigators use the CDFIPM to enable the judge to comprehend the processes 
that they have followed during the investigation.  In the court, the investigators 
have to prove and to defend the validity of the hypothesis as it is challenged by 
the court and the defence lawyers.  Since investigators have followed a formal 
model which enabled them to carry out the investigation in a forensically sound 
manner, the opposite hypothesis is refuted.  The court decides that the suspect 
has made an unauthorised access to Bank X’s web server and sentences him to 
prison.  
 
Investigation	Closure	Process	
• This Process takes place after a formal decision is reached by the court 
concerning the incident.  During this Process, based on the outcome of the 
investigation, Bank X reviews its existing policies and procedures concerning its 
IT security.  As there is no need to backtrack to the previous stages in the 
investigation, bank management decide to accept the hypothesis.  During this 
Process, the bank identifies the lessons learnt and the suspect’s system is 
returned to his employer’s company.  The result of the case is recorded on the 
database for the future readiness.  The final phase of this activity is Disseminate 
Investigation Results, where relevant information concerning this incident and 
its outcome are communicated to all stakeholders.  The initial communication is 
carried out prior to the completion of the trial in order to remove the sensitive 
data from the disseminated information.  The final phase, the Review Phase, 
discusses how the incident could have been handled better.  One outcome is to 
install the central log server sooner than planned.  The Review Phase includes a 
review of the investigation and identifies some new analysis techniques that are 
employed.  The techniques are added to the official analysis procedures.  During 
the analysis, new suspect files are identified, and they are added to the hash 
database so that they can be quickly found in the future investigations. 
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Future	Readiness	Process	
• This activity takes place both in Bank X and also the two police forces.  Bank X 
starts applying the lessons that they have learnt from this incident; a set of 
recommendations are made on how they can improve in terms of securing their 
digital data assets.  As a result, they improve their existing forensic readiness 
procedures and incident detection systems.  The two police forces also develop 
case studies based on this particular investigation for future training of other 
officers. 
 
4.3	 Summary	of	the	Chapter		
This Chapter followed the Demonstration activity of the Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP 
and discussed the methods employed to demonstrate the potential deployment of the 
CDFIPM.  In order to assess how the CDFIPM addressed the stated research problem, 
two approaches were adopted.  The first approach discussed in the Appendix A 
involved conducting a hypothetical digital investigation in a DFL. This approach 
successfully demonstrated essential investigative techniques associated with the 
‘Investigative Processes Class’ of the CDFIPM, that could be used to answer the 
investigative questions of who, when, where and how.  The second approach discussed 
in this chapter involved applying the CDFIPM to three case scenarios and performing a 
‘walkthrough’ of the model.  The walkthrough of the CDFIPM employing the three case 
scenarios successfully mapped the entire Processes of the model to the corresponding 
activities carried out by DFIs operating in the three fields of law enforcement, 
commerce and incident response.  Having completed the Demonstration activity, the 
next stage in the Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP is the Evaluation activity, which is 
conducted by a number of DFIs, legal practitioners, experts and researchers in the field 
of digital forensics and is discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter	5:	 Evaluation	
5.1	 Introduction		
A model has ‘utility’ if it is practical, applicable and appropriate; this denotes that there 
must be an advantage to using the model.  The model has ‘usability’ if it is easy to be 
employed in order to achieve its stated goal.  An effective model should, therefore, have 
both utility and usability.  If the model does not meet the two components of usability 
and utility, the question will then arise as to why it was developed in the first place.  If 
the artefact is so difficult to use that its users are discouraged from employing it, then its 
value is greatly reduced and its advantages are lost.  Thus, the artefact needs to be 
evaluated in order to determine whether it has achieved both utility and usability.  To 
evaluate a process model, five questions will ultimately need to be answered (Wise et 
al., 2013; Groesser and Schwaninger, 2012; Cook and Skinner, 2005; Barlas, 1996): 
1. Is the model theoretically valid (Adams, 2012)?    
2. Is the model usable (Adams, 2012)?    
3. Does the model provide explanatory or guiding power for the user (Adams, 
2012)?   
4. Has the model been built right? and  
5. Has the right model been built?  
 
In relation to question 1 above, the validity of a process model derives from the extent 
to which it conforms to guiding principles, based on which the process is structured 
(Adams, 2012).  Concerning question 2, the model has usability if its intended user 
community are able to apply it in real life situations to organise their activities to 
proceed through the process and produce the required results efficiently (Adams, 2012).  
In terms of question 3, the model has guiding power if it directs the process, suggests 
some sequences of activity and warns against the others (Adams, 2012).  Regarding 
question 4, the model has been built right if it meets all the stated requirements levied 
upon it, and is internally complete, consistent, and accurate enough to fulfill its stated 
aim.  Concerning question 5, a right model has been developed if its intended 
application is observed and confirmed by the experts.  If the agreement is not acquired, 
the model will need to be amended to bring it closer with its intended application.    
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In Chapter 3, the theoretical foundation for the design and development of the new 
model was described (question 1); and in Chapter 4, the process of assessing whether 
the new model has achieved both utility and usability started through case scenario 
walk-throughs as well as a practical experimentation associated with this chapter which 
is discussed in detail in Appendix A (question 2).  The guiding power of the new model 
emanates from the UML Activity Diagrams for different Processes of the CDFIPM as 
well as the model’s Overriding Principles (question 3).  However, the model now needs 
to be subjected to an evaluation of this guiding power that also extends the activities of 
Chapter 3 and 4 to establish whether the new model has both utility and usability 
(Adams, 2012).  This evaluation will further determine whether the model has been 
developed right and whether the right model has been built (questions 4 and 5).   
 
Therefore, the evaluation of the CDFIPM is the subject of this chapter and continues the 
Peffers et al’s (2006) Design Science Research Process (DSRP), that requires the 
artefact to be used to address the research problem.  The fifth step set out in the Peffers 
et al’s (2006) DSRP, the Evaluation activity, requires the model to be validated in order 
to determine: 
 
1. how well it supports the solution to the stated problem; and 
2. whether it is necessary to iterate back to the step three (Design and 
Development) to try to improve the effectiveness of the artefact; or  
3. whether it is needed to continue to the Communication activity (step 6 is 
discussed in Chapter 6) and leave further improvement to subsequent projects. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 5.2 discusses the selected 
validation methods for the evaluation of the CDFIPM.  Section 5.3 covers the process 
for expert selection, while section 5.4 describes the makeup of the expert panel. Section 
5.5 discusses the process for communication with the experts and the acquisition of 
their feedback, while section 5.6 presents the evaluation questionnaire.  The feedback 
analysis method is discussed in section 5.7.  Section 5.8 discusses the analysis of the 
feedback and comments received by the reviewers, while section 5.9 presents the 
discussion of the evaluation.  In section 5.10, alterations are made to the proposed 
model following the analysis of the acquired feedback, while section 5.11 refers the 
reader to the Appendix B for the final version of the proposed model.  In section 5.12, 
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the proposed model is further assessed by subjecting it to the three sets of assessment 
criteria against which the previously proposed modes were judged in Chapter 2.  In 
section 5.13, the proposed model is mapped to the previously proposed models.  
Finally, the chapter is summarized in Section 5.14. 
 
5.2	 Methods	of	Validation		
Validation is the process of determining the extent to which an artefact (a model) and its 
related data are a correct representation of the real world from the standpoint of the 
intended applications of the model (Law, 2014).  A set of validation methods can be 
employed to assess the model’s accuracy in meeting its intended outcomes.  There exist 
five main types of methods in relation to validating models or simulations including 
(Eddy et al., 2012): 
1. Internal Validity – the model’s components are analysed and their accuracy are 
checked; 
2. Cross Validity – results are compared with other models analysing the same 
problem; 
3. External Validity – model is used to simulate different scenarios;  
4. Predictive Validity – model results are compared with prospectively observed 
events; and 
5. Face Validity – independent experts evaluate the model structure, its associated 
data and results.  
 
In the context of this research, methods 1, 2 and 3 above have already been applied to 
the CDFIPM in Chapters 3 and 4 (also see section 5.1).  For instance, in terms of the 
Internal Validity method, the CDFIPM’s components were analysed and justified in 
Chapter 3 (Design and Development), which addressed whether the CDFIPM’s 
components behaved as intended and whether it had been implemented correctly.  In 
relation to the Cross Validation method, the CDFIPM has been mapped and compared 
with the existing models in Table 3 (see section 5.13), which involves determining the 
degree to which they calculate the same results.  With regards to the External Validation 
method, in Chapter 4 (Demonstration), the CDFIPM was applied to the different 
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scenarios and a walk-through of the model was performed to simulate different types of 
real life investigations.  
 
Concerning method 4 above, Predictive Validity, this has been excluded from this 
research on the basis that this validation method will need to be carried out over a long 
period of time, during which it will involve employing the model to predict events and, 
after some time, comparing the predicted outcomes to the actual ones.  Therefore, 
Predictive Validity has not been applied to the CDFIPM, being outside the timing scope 
of this research. 
 
Face Validity (method 5), which is considered to be the strongest form of the 5 stated 
validation methods (Eddy et al., 2012; Law, 2014; Pace and Sheehan, 2002) is the topic 
of this chapter, where the external experts evaluate the model structure, its associated 
data, results and accuracy independently.  This method is used to answer questions 3, 4 
and 5 outlined in section 5.1: 
3. Does the model provide explanatory or guiding power for the user?    
4. Has the model been built right? and  
5. Has the right model been built?  
 
According to Pace and Sheehan (2002), the main validation method for models must 
include assessment by experts and peers.  This argument is supported by other 
researchers in various scientific environments (Burgman et al., 2011; Czembor and 
Vesk 2009; Ludwig et al., 2001).  Moreover, in circumstances in which empirical data 
are scarce or unobtainable33, expert knowledge and their input are often considered to 
be the best or only source of information (Adams, 2012; McBride and Burgman, 2012; 
Kuhnert et al., 2010; Sutherland, 2006).  In these situations, experts can be requested to 
provide input for all the stages of the modelling process (Martin et al., 2012; Cowling 
and Pressey 2003; Pearce et al. 2001).  In all circumstances, the prevailing idea is to 
take advantage of the knowledge that cannot be acquired by relying upon other data 
sources and applying this knowledge to the evaluation of a model (Adams, 2012). 
 																																																								
33 Due to the fact that Digital Forensic Science is a new field, there exist little, if any, criteria against 
which a digital forensic process model process model can be evaluated against. 
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Thus, this chapter draws upon the Face Validity method by recruiting external 
independent experts to answer the remaining three questions and ultimately determine 
whether the CDFIPM has achieved both ‘utility’ and ‘usability’ necessary for a model.  
 
5.3	 Expert	Selection	Process		
The process for selection of experts involved identification of the expertise that were 
relevant to the research aim and selection of the experts who would best meet the 
requirements for expertise within the thesis author’s research timing scope.  Booker and 
McNamara (2004) define the “Expert knowledge” as the knowledge and expertise that 
qualified persons have acquired due to their technical practices, training and experience.  
Based on this definition, it is, therefore, reasonable to regard an individual as a ‘domain 
expert’ if he/she is familiar with the subject at hand and is accountable for the analysis 
of the issue and provision of sound judgments.   
Moreover, according to McBride and Burgman (2012), the experts should be selected 
on the basis of explicit criteria in order to ensure transparency and establish that the 
results represent the full range of views in expert field.  The common metrics outlined 
in the literature for selecting experts include: experts’ qualifications, employment, 
memberships in professional bodies, publication records, years of experience, peer 
nomination, and perceived standing in his/her community (Czembor and Vesk, 2009; 
Drescher et al., 2008; Whitfield et al., 2008).  Additional considerations that need to be 
made include availability and willingness of experts to participate, and the possibility of 
conflicts of interest34 (McBride and Burgman, 2012).       
The appropriate number of experts should depend on (1) the scope of the research 
problem (see below) and (2) the available timing during which the research is expected 
to be completed (McBride and Burgman, 2012).  However, the literature on expert 
selection strongly suggests the inclusion of as diverse a range of experts as possible 
(Armstrong, 2006; Clemen and Winkler, 1999) by recruiting multiple experts in order to 
reduce the impact of individual mistakes and biases and to pave the way for assessments 
that are representative of the entire expert community (Fisher, 2009; Hokstad et al., 
1998). 																																																								
34 Experts who participated in the evaluation process did not know the thesis author.	
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In terms of the scope of this research problem, the research aim has three embedded 
aspects including: 
1. ‘being comprehensive’ in that it encompasses the entire digital investigative 
process; 
2. ‘being formal’ in that it synthesizes, harmonizes and extends the existing models 
and assists courts of law in determining the reliability of the digital investigative 
process followed; and 
3. ‘being generic’ in that it is relevant to both law enforcement and corporate 
investigations. 
 
In relation to the expert selection for the aspect 1 (being comprehensive), due to its 
many processes, the CDFIPM needed to be evaluated by different groups of experts 
with different sets of skills and expertise.  For example, Digital Forensic Practitioners 
who often conduct the data acquisition were in the best position to provide a sound 
judgment on the CDFIPM’s Acquisition Process.  Similarly, Digital Forensic Analysts 
who often carry out the Examination, Analysis and Interpretation Processes were in the 
best position to comment on the corresponding Processes in the CDFIPM.  Indeed, in 
most scientific environments as Martin et al. (2012) and Ludwig et al. (2001) point out, 
the breadth of research problems denotes that no one individual will be expert for all 
aspects of the problem.  Hence, it was necessary to identify and recruit a diverse group 
of experts with different skill sets for the Evaluation process.   
 
In terms of the expert selection for aspect 2 (being formal), it was deemed necessary to 
involve an appropriate and diverse set of experts such as legal practitioners in the 
Evaluation process.   
 
With regards to the expert selection for aspect 3 (being generic), Ford and Sterman 
(1998), as cited by Adams (2012), emphasize the need to recruit expert knowledge from 
individuals who are routinely involved in the process.  Therefore, since the CDFIPM is 
intended to be applicable to both law enforcement and corporate investigations, it was 
deemed necessary to recruit experts operating within the two stated fields to acquire 
expert knowledge for a practical evaluation of the CDFIPM.  This approach would 
place the CDFIPM under both ‘utility’ and ‘usability’ testing (discussed in the previous 
		 246	
section) by the experts in relation to how ‘useful’ and ‘relevant’ the new model would 
be to each of the experts’ particular domain of practice, and also with regards to how 
suitable the new model would be for describing the entire digital investigative process 
in each of the experts’ particular fields.   
      
Therefore, based upon the recommended common metrics as outlined in Czembor and 
Vesk (2009), Drescher et al. (2008) and Whitfield et al. (2008) (see the above), the 
following selection criteria were employed to identify and recruit experts who would be 
requested to evaluate the new model, the CDFIPM:   
1. geographical operation – DFIs and legal practitioners would need to operate 
within the United Kingdom since the model is aimed at the U.K. jurisdiction.  
2. period of experience and learning – the participants would need to have 
extensive knowledge and experience in the domain of digital forensics for a 
period greater than 10 years. 
3. the manner in which the experience had been acquired – the experts’ experience 
would need to have been attained through practice or theory in order to ensure 
that the expert panel would consist of both theorists and practitioners.  
4. qualifications – the participants needed to have appropriate qualifications in 
relation to digital forensics, information security or computer science. 
5. reputation – the experts would need to have a solid standing in their particular 
domains of practice.  
 
Having rationalized the expert selection process and identified the criteria for such a 
selection, the next section expands upon the constituents of the selected expert panel. 
 
5.4	 Expert	Panel	Makeup		
In order to address the research aim, a diverse set of eminent experts within the U.K. 
jurisdiction were identified and recruited to review the new model and provide their 
feedback.  Recruiting numerous experts to evaluate the CDFIPM was considered to be a 
necessary approach in order to acquire the needed expert coverage even though this was 
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not a straightforward process35.  The use of this diverse set of experts was deemed to be 
beneficial to increase what McBride and Burgman (2012) label as “the acceptance or 
perceived validity of the elicitation process”.  The recruitment of a varied set of experts 
would ensure that different perspectives would be brought into the Evaluation process.   
 
Experts who took part in the evaluation of the CDFIPM were categorized into three 
groups of: 
1. Digital Forensic Investigators (DFIs)36; 
2. Legal Practitioners; and 
3. Academics. 
 
Experts from the panel were identified as representative of their specific domains of 
practice based on their roles, responsibilities, experience and involvement within 
pertinent associations within the U.K. jurisdiction.  The recruitment process for the 
expert panel was considered complete once numerous participants from each of the 
three fields covered by the research scope had consented to assist.  The followings are 
the profiles of the experts constituting the members of the three groups of the expert 
panel: 
 
1. A	representative	of	law	enforcement	who:	
• manages the entire High-Tech/Cyber Crime team of North West 
Regional Organised Crime Unit (TITAN), consisting of six police forces 
in Cumbria, Cheshire, Lancashire, Greater Manchester, Merseyside and 
North Wales;   
• is a Detective Sergeant of e-Forensics with 25 years of experience as a 
police officer, 15 years of which as a digital forensic investigator; 
• is a sub-contracted Technical Assessor for UKAS (United Kingdom 
Accreditation Service) as an ISO 17025 Forensic Laboratory Auditor and 
ISO 17025 Technical Assessor; and 																																																								
35 Selection of the appropriate experts who could provide valuable input to this research was a very long 
and enduring experience involving a period of over 9 months and travelling across the country which 
would sometimes result in disappointments as some potential participants would pull out at the last 
minute due to the workload or their lack of availability.   
36 This refers to Digital Forensic Practitioners, Digital Forensic Examiners, Digital Forensic Analysts, 
Case Officers and Digital Forensic First Responders.     
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• has an MSc in Computing & Information Technology and is EnCase 
Certified Examiner. 
 
2. A	representative	of	commercial	practice	who:	
• is the director of Digital Forensics for a large company (based in 
Nottingham) providing digital forensic consultancy services;  
• has 18 years of experience as a Digital Forensic Investigator and a 
Forensic Triage Specialist; 
• has previously managed the Nottinghamshire Police High-Tech Crime 
Unit as a Detective Sergeant both in Digital Forensics Unit and also in 
Fraud Squad; and 
• is on the editorial panel for the ACPO Good Practice and Advice Guide 
for Managers of e-Crime Investigation and the ACPO Good Practice 
Guide for Digital Evidence. 
 
3. A	representative	of	legal	practice	who:	
• is a self-employed barrister with 13 years of experience;  
• practices in Criminal Law from Apex Chambers, based in Cardiff; 
• has worked on over 20 cases involving digital investigations;  
• has an LL.B; and 
• has acted as an external examiner within the University of West England. 
 
4. A	representative	of	law	enforcement	who:	
• heads the Cheshire Police Headquarter (Cheshire Constabulary) High-
Tech Crime Unit;  
• is a Detective Sergeant of eForensics with 28 years of experience as a 
police officer, 14 years of which as a Digital and Network Forensic 
Investigator; and 
• has a BSc in Computing and Information Technology and is a certified 
ENCE, a certified Security Incident Specialist, a certified Forensic 
Investigation Analyst and a qualified force trainer for eForensics. 
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5. A representative of commercial practice who: 
• is the Chief Technical Officer (CTO) in a large company (based in 
London) providing IT services including Digital Forensics; 
• has 30 years of experience in Information Technology; and 
• has an MPhil in Operating System Anti-Malware/Security and an MSc in 
Internet Engineering. 
 
6. A	representative	of	law	enforcement	who:	
• is a Detective Constable of Digital Forensic at the South Wales Gwent 
Police High-Tech Crime Unit; and 
• has 18 years of experience as a police officer, 11 years of which as a 
Digital Forensic Investigator. 
 
7. A	representative	of	law	enforcement	who:	
• is a Detective Constable of Digital Forensic at the South Wales Gwent 
Police High-Tech Crime Unit; and 
• has 11 years of experience as a Digital Forensic Investigator.  
 
8. A	representative	of	Academia	who:	
• is a university professor and a prominent researcher with many 
publications on information security, biometrics and digital forensics; 
• has a PhD and the title of “professor”; and 
• is the key note speaker at reputable information security and digital 
forensics conferences. 
 
9. A	representative	of	legal	practice	who:	
• is a Deputy High Court Judge and a barrister based in Exchange 
Chambers within Manchester, Leeds and Liverpool; 
• has 34 years of experience of practicing law; 
• is current Chairman of the Northern Chancery Bar Association and is a 
Trustee of the North West Partnership;  
• practices criminal law with the main focus on commercial fraud; and 
• has an LL.B.   
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10. A	representative	of	Academia	who:	
• is a university professor and a well-known researcher with various 
publications on digital forensic practice; and 
• has a PhD and has extensive links with the industry  
 
Having discussed the constituents of the selected expert panel, the next section 
discusses the format of communications with these experts and the way in which the 
feedback was acquired from the expert panel. 
 
5.5	 Communication	and	Feedback	Formats		
In the first instance, the participating experts in the Evaluation process were requested 
to assist in this research via email.  The experts were identified as being representatives 
of their specific domains of operation based on their roles, responsibilities and 
involvement with relevant associations.  After the experts were identified and their 
confirmation for participation in the Evaluation process was obtained, then in line with 
the best practices outlined in the literature (Rothlisberger et al., 2010; Cooke and 
Goossens 2000; Morgan and Henrion, 2010), they were provided with relevant 
materials associated with the CDFIPM that had been compiled into an appropriate, 
accessible form.  These consisted of the UML Activity Diagrams of the CDFIPM’s 
Processes, the explanatory notes based on the descriptions of the model’s components, a 
questionnaire, background information such as the aim and objectives of the research, 
and also a description of what the thesis author requested the experts to undertake.  
These materials were sent to the participating experts via email so that they could have 
sufficient time to evaluate them, raise any potential concerns, comment on any aspect of 
the model, and volunteer relevant information.  Having acquired the expert knowledge 
(data) via e-mails, the thesis author would then hold formal meetings with the experts in 
the form of interviews and focus groups (see the end of this section) in their work 
environments for further knowledge extraction process.   
 
In terms of the provided questionnaire, based on the utility and usability
 
testing 
(Adams, 2012), experts from the panel were requested to review typical tasks pertaining 
to those stages of the investigative process that were relevant to their own domains 
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through using the CDFIPM, and then to provide a subjective rating on the basis of how 
‘useful’ the model would be to their domains of practice, and also how ‘easy’ it would 
be to use the new model (see the Evaluation questionnaire in section 5.6).  This 
subjective rating was to be taken into account in order to enhance the model.  Prior to 
submitting the materials to the experts for eliciting their knowledge, these were 
carefully piloted (tested and revised) to ensure that the documentations had been 
compiled properly.  It was important to ensure that the Evaluation questions had been 
formulated appropriately to reflect the research aim and objectives, identify potential 
issues with biases or question phrasing, and receive feedback about any potential ways 
to enhance the quality of the process and of the knowledge that was to be extracted.  
The pilot process was conducted with the thesis author’s director of study and 
supervisor, who checked the compiled documents prior to them being submitted to the 
experts for review.  As stated above, once the initial feedback was acquired from the 
experts via e-mail communications, the thesis author would then travel to the experts’ 
workplaces at an arranged date to discuss their feedback with them and to elicit further 
expert knowledge that was not possible to obtain via e-mails.  These meetings would 
take place through focus group and interview formats.  Such an approach is 
recommended in the literature based on its advantages as follows (Ciardhuáin, 2004): 
 
• The interview and focus group format take full advantage of the experience and 
skills of those participating by being more open than a narrowly-focused survey. 
• Experts have a stronger understanding of the subject matter as they can ask 
questions concerning the research than simply replying to a fixed set of 
questions. 
• Participants are able to express and discuss views that are very likely not to be 
identified by a simple survey. Such issues can be analysed at once in some 
detail. 
• Experts are left free to express their views in whatever manner they feel is most 
appropriate. 
 
Having discussed the formats of communication and expert knowledge elicitation 
process, this discussion continues to the next section, where the questionnaire submitted 
to the expert panel will be presented.    
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5.6	 Evaluation	Questionnaire		
The following is the questionnaire consisting of a set of 8 questions that was submitted 
to the expert panel as part of the Evaluation process.  In addition to this set of 8 
questions, there was an additional question which was posed only to the legal 
practitioners in order to elicit the knowledge that was necessary to be acquired in 
relation to answering the second aspect of the research aim, which is: 
 
The CDFIPM must be formal in that it assists courts of law in determining the 
reliability of the digital investigative process followed. 
 
This question is as follow: 
 
If this model were explained to you by a digital forensic investigator who has 
employed it to conduct a digital investigation, as a judge/barrister, do you think 
that the model would enable you easily to understand the steps taken by 
investigators to acquire digital evidence? If so, can you explain how? 
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Figure 41. Evaluation Questionnaire 
The Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation 
Process Model (CDFIPM) 		
 
Please notice: any personal information provided will be kept confidential and will be deleted 
once the comments and feedback have been reviewed and analysed. 
 
 
Prior proceeding to the questions, please state: 
Your full name: _______________________________________________________________ 
The institution you work/ have worked for: __________________________________________ 
Your job titles related to domain of digital forensics: __________________________________  
Your period of learning and experience: ___________________________________________ 
The condition in which the experience has been gained: _______________________________ 
 	
In reviewing / evaluating the model: 
 
1. Please identify any aspects of the model that are not representative of the processes 
as carried out in your field of practice (utility). 
 
2. Please identify any aspects of the processes carried out in your field of practice that 
are not covered in this model (utility). 
 
3. Did you think that the model adequately represented the structure of investigations in 
your organisation (utility)?  
 
4. Please describe which activities in the model most closely relate to your field of 
practice and your own experience (utility). 
 
5. Please describe what aspects, if any, of the model you felt could be improved (utility). 
 
6. Please rate the model on the scale of 1 to 10 with 1 not being useful at all and 10 
being the most useful (utility). 
 
7. Please rate the model on the scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being very difficult to use and 10 
being very easy to use (usability).  
 
8. Please provide any additional comments that you might have on the model attached.   
 
(Please provide your answers/feedbacks/comments on a separate sheet of paper.)  		
		 254	
5.7	 Feedback	Analysis	Method		
After the elicitation process was completed, the expert knowledge acquired (data) was 
analysed through a rigorous verification process.  In line with McBride and Burgman’s 
(2012) and Cooke’s (1991) suggestions, during the process of data analysis, the thesis 
author checked for obvious errors or inconsistencies by comparing the expert’s 
responses to those of others in the panel.  In comparing an individual expert’s responses 
with those of the rest of the panel, the thesis author looked for similarities, irregularities, 
biases, or strongly conflicting opinions in addition to varying interpretation of the 
information.  When such irregularities or problematic responses were identified, the 
thesis author followed up on the conflicting feedback through further discussions with 
the experts.  As an example, DFIs operating within both Cheshire and Gwent Police 
HTCUs stated that the suspect must be interviewed at the crime scene, whereas one of 
the legal practitioners (barrister) based in South Wales refused such a notion on the 
basis of tight U.K. laws.  In this situation, the thesis author had to follow up the 
conflicting response to bring clarity to the feedback.  The aim of the verification aspect 
of the analysis process was to reach a final set of judgments that the expert panel had 
approved and to ensure that the documented responses were reliable and that they would 
truly and faithfully reflect each expert’s true beliefs.   
 
5.8	 Expert	Feedback	and	Analysis	
After collecting the feedback from the expert panel via e-mails, focus groups and 
interviews, hereafter referred to as the ‘Feedback Elicitation Formats’, these feedbacks 
were analysed and acted upon where necessary.  The feedback, comments and views 
expressed by the experts were both very positive and promising.  The aim of this section 
is to provide a subjective analysis of these feedbacks.  In order to do so, these feedbacks 
are presented in the form of quotes derived from the Feedback Elicitation Formats 
together with the thesis author’s specific comments in response to these detailed 
feedbacks.  Acting upon the acquired feedback will involve ‘addition to’, ‘alteration to’ 
and ‘deletion from’ the CDFIPM.  ‘Addition’ refers to a new component being added to 
the model, ‘alteration’ refers to the change in a component’s naming or order and 
‘deletion’ refers to the deletion of a component from the model.  Therefore, those 
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feedbacks that the thesis author has acted upon by making an ‘addition to’, ‘alteration 
to’ or ‘deletion from’ the model will be represented by the following three types of 
references (The idea of the following format is derived from Adams’ (2012) study):  
 
1. Reference	 to	 Addition: ‘REF: ADD #n’, where ‘n’ represents the number of 
implemented ‘addition’. 
 
2. Reference	 to	 Alteration: ‘REF: ALT #n’, where ‘n’ represents the number of 
implemented ‘change’. 
 
3. Reference	 to	 Deletion: ‘REF: DEL #n’, where ‘n’ represents the number of 
implemented ‘deletion’. 
 
Prior to discussing the detailed feedback acquired from the experts and the analysis of 
those feedbacks, some positive general comments made by the expert panel in relation 
to the CDFIPM are first presented in the next sub-section.   
 
Notice: The evidence of both general positive feedback as well as detailed feedback 
will be provided as audio recordings as well as e-mail printouts upon a request. 
 
5.8.1			General	Comments	from	the	Expert	Panel	
• “I can see a lot of work has been put into this and you have covered everything I 
can think of, my only comment would be enabling your model to be interactive 
rather that a set procedure.” (Law enforcement DFI and Case Officer)  
 
• “The model is impressive in its detail and reasonably easy to understand and 
use.  The author has clearly understood the practicalities of an effective and 
efficient digital investigation.” (Legal practitioner, barrister) 
 
• “With ACPO Guidelines, there is no defined structure to it, no defined path to it.  
What we need is that these methods have been validated scientifically.  This is 
something you have worked out over long time.  Your model has been peer 
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reviewed both by practitioners and scientists even though we might choose it 
differently.” (Law enforcement DFI) 
 
• “This model is very timely and well-researched.  It is my conclusion that you 
have gone deep enough into details of finding out what exactly is wrong with the 
existing models and what to do to improve them.” (University professor) 
 
• “This is sound standard for forensic service providers (FSPs).  This is like 
UCAS was.” (Law enforcement DFI) 
 
• “Your model provides a concise guidance on the exact processes that examiners 
need to follow during any kind of digital investigation.” (Commercial DFI)  
 
• “It is necessary that the court understands the process that has been followed.  
Your model has done a great job as its processes are documented in a very 
rational way.  A judge or barrister could pick up this model and work out what 
has been happening in a digital investigation.” (Legal practitioner, judge) 
 
• “What you have presented is actually good.  You have done a great job; I feel 
that the model you have presented would accelerate digital investigations 
because it gives a common order of processes and activities that a computer 
forensic investigation requires.” (Law enforcement DFI and Case Officer) 
 
• “Your model is like modular plugin type for different fields.” (Law enforcement 
DFI)     
 
• “There is much in your model that covers cybercrime and such attacks that are 
not covered in LE.” (Law enforcement DFI) 
 
• “Sorry for the delay in replying.  I have had a chance to look at your model and 
it is sound in its interpretation. How would you like my feedback?” 
(Commercial DFI) 
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• “Your model reflects in part our Cheshire’s existing model, and I do not intend 
changing to anything other in the near future as this model simply reflects what 
we already have.” (Law enforcement DFI and Case Officer) 
 
• “I have had an initial look at your work and it looks interesting and a very 
comprehensive model.” (Commercial DFI) 
 
5.8.2			Detailed	Feedback	and	Response	
	
Feedback	E-1: Readiness and Incident Detection are not part of Cheshire’s 
model.  We rely more heavily on intelligence.  
 
• Response: Considering the fact that the above comment was made from a 
law enforcement perspective, this was expected as the two Processes are 
often carried out in the commercial practice.  Hence, this is why they had 
been developed as part of the CDFIPM to accommodate also for corporate 
requirements.  Incident Detection in the context of law enforcement often 
comes in the form of a ‘101’ or ‘999’ call, or ‘intelligence’ (see the next 
feedback ‘Feedback E-2’) such as witnesses or the suspect’s spouse.  
	
	
Feedback	E-2: We rely heavily on intelligence as part of crime detection and 
also our planning activities.  It would be important to include 
activities related to intelligence gathering in your model.  Add an 
additional stage between ‘incident detection’ and ‘planning’ in 
the model. 
 
• Response: This is an important aspect of an investigative process often 
carried out within the law enforcement environments that had not been 
previously included in the CDFIPM.  A new Process entitled Intelligence 
Gathering will now be added to the model so that its results feed into the 
Planning Process of the CDFIPM.  Based on this new Process, DFIs will be 
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required to collect intelligence using both covert (on condition that the 
authorisation permits its doing so) and overt methods.  Moreover, they will 
also need to assess the acquired intelligence, profile suspects and formulate 
initial hypothesis during this Process. (“REF: ADD #1”)  
 
 
Feedback	E-3: Event Reconstruction is something we do not tend to practice as 
it is labour intensive. However, I would use this if the 
circumstances dictate.   
 
• Response: The above feedback is arguable. Although Event Reconstruction 
might be labour-intensive, it still must be part of any digital investigation so 
that it, together with the Analysis and Interpretation Processes, can enable 
DFIs to construct a full picture of the events that have taken place.  If DFIs 
do not perform the Event Reconstruction Process, questions in relation to 
who, why, where, when and how will not be addressed properly.  As a result, 
this can severely affect the outcome of the case in courts.  However, in 
certain circumstances, Event Reconstruction might not be as necessary; for 
example, when the incident/crime is not classified as severe, and the 
investigation results are to be presented to the company management as 
opposed to a court.  Thus, no further action will be taken in light of the 
above feedback.   
 
 
Feedback	E-4: We perform an on-scene triage (Triage stage 1) to determine 
evidential possibilities and opportunities as soon as possible.  We 
then perform a Stage 2 (secondary triage) back at the lab and 
this could be the same day.  
 
• Response: Onsite Triage is a major aspect of an investigative process 
which is carried out especially in law enforcement investigations that had 
been excluded from the CDFIPM.  Both Cheshire Police and Gwent Police 
HTCUs underlined the importance of Onsite Triage to the law enforcement 
digital forensic investigations.  Due to the rapid increase of digital based 
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evidence, DFIs will need to perform timely identification, examination and 
interpretation of digital evidence.  Also, in certain investigations such as 
child abductions, pedophiles, missing or exploited persons, time becomes 
extremely important as in some cases, it is the difference between life and 
death for the victim.  Moreover, the growing number of computer systems 
being submitted to DFLs is creating a backlog of cases that can delay 
investigations and negatively affect public safety and the criminal justice 
system. Therefore, it was deemed important to act upon the above feedback 
and include steps for Onsite Triage in the amended form of the CDFIPM.  
This is to enable DFIs to acquire information in a timely manner, and also to 
avoid backlog of cases by reducing the number of computer systems 
submitted to DFLs for analysis37 38. (“REF: ADD #2”)  
 
In terms of the Stage 2 Triage (Offsite Triage), implementing components 
for this is outside the scope of this thesis as this should be part of any 
HTCU’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), where the HTCU 
implements some methods (e.g. based on a matrix system) for determining 
the worth of a case prior to its acceptance for investigation as well as rating 
the emergency of and prioritising the accepted case.  Moreover, the topic of 
Offsite Triage has already been covered; for example, see Parsonage (2009). 
 
 
Feedback	E-5: Risk assessment should be treated as a principle throughout the 
whole process; it is important that you keep assessing the risks 
continually. 
 
• Response: An Overriding Principles, namely ‘Perform Risk Assessment’, 
will be added to the CDFIPM’s Concurrent Processes Class that must be 
performed throughout the entire investigative process. (“REF: ADD #3”)  																																																									
37 Adding Onsite Triage to the CDFIPM will assist DFIs in determining (at the crime scene) whether the 
digital system under investigation contains any potential evidence in the first place prior to seizing the 
device. 
38 For more information on “Onsite Triage”, see a journal paper by the thesis author in Montasari (2016, 
b).   	
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Feedback	E-6: Most of our planning and preparation (important) is done in 
advance prior to our first response in attending the scene.  As a 
result, the target is known and is assessed along with the 
premises.  All equipment is ready to go in advance, so we go from 
preparation of equipment, processes and people attending and 
planning prior to first response.   
 
• Response: The comment above is not misguided since the concept behind it 
is valid.  As the expert has correctly pointed out and this had also already 
been explicitly explained in Chapter 4, Planning and Preparation Processes 
must always be carried out prior to DFIs launching the First Response 
Process.  The above comment is essentially requesting the change in the 
order of Processes where Planning and Preparation must be placed before the 
First Response process.  However, the two stated Processes (Planning and 
Preparation) had already been placed before the Secure and Evaluate the 
Crime Scene Process, which was intended to be the First Response in the 
context of ‘law enforcement’ investigations.  There are two Processes in the 
CDFIPM that refer to the First Response. The first Process which is 
explicitly entitled First Response was intended to be used in the context of 
‘corporate investigations’, while the second Process that is entitled Secure 
and Evaluate the Crime Scene was intended to be employed in the context of 
‘law enforcement’.   
 
The above feedback might therefore be explained by the fact that the expert 
has seen the two stated Processes (Planning and Preparation) immediately 
after the first ‘First Response Process’ and assumed that the Planning and 
Preparation Processes have been placed in the wrong order.  This issue was 
raised by other experts (see Feedbacks E-7, E-18 and E-19) which resulted in 
the thesis author contacting both experts again for clarification.  Having held 
further discussions with the experts, it became obvious that the terminology 
had caused such a confusion.  Both experts suggested removing the first 
“First Response” Process as it has exact the same components as the Secure 
and Evaluate the Crime Scene and changing the naming of the latter to the 
‘First Response’, which now becomes a generic process for both law 
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enforcement and corporate investigations. (“REF: DEL #1”) and (“REF: 
ALT #1”)   
 
 
Feedback	E-7: Planning should be before first response and likewise some 
companies will constantly plan for an attack and frequently test 
their methods/tools in advance so when an incident does occur 
the plan is already in place as to what to do, so all staff know 
their role in reducing risk and dealing with it in response to a 
threat. 
 
• Response: See Feedback E-6 in relation to the ordering of the Planning, 
Preparation and First Response Processes. In terms of determining 
personnel, their roles, responsibilities and skills, these had already been 
explicitly incorporated into the CDFIPM’s Planning Process as Sub-Phases 
under the Plan Logistic Phase (see Figure 26).  Also, in relation to preparing 
and testing tools and techniques, this had already been clearly incorporated 
into the CDFIPM’s Concurrent Processes Class as one of the Overriding 
Principles.  It appears that the expert has missed observing the inclusion of 
the aforementioned components in the CDFIPM.  Therefore, no action will 
be taken in light of the above comment.   
 
 
Feedback	E-8: You have quoted a number of ISO Standards but take a look at 
ISO 17025 that comes into play this year that we are seeking 
accreditation for. 
 
• Response: At the time of writing (June 2016), ISO 17025 is still under 
development and is intended to be released within the next few months 
(seemingly next 18 months).  This Standard highlights some general 
requirements for DFLs to carry out tests in relation to their tools and 
methods including sampling.  As both Detective Constable Tim Williams 
and Detective Constable Mark Maybiy from the Gwent Police HTCU stated, 
all the UK Police Forces’ HTCUs will still need to have a digital forensic 
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investigative model in place that ISO 17025 fits in with.  Both DFIs stated, 
“we (HTCUs) will still need to define our investigative processes such as 
your model that would need to fit in with the ISO 17025.” 
 
 
Feedback	E-9: Safety issue regarding both individuals and equipment is 
something that you should address throughout the whole 
investigation. 
 
• Response: An Overriding Principles entitled ‘Address Safety Issues’ will 
now be added to the CDFIPM’s Concurrent Processes Class that will need to 
be performed concurrently throughout the entire investigative process. 
(“REF: ADD #4”)  	
	
	
Feedback	E-10: As regards to the terminology, some stages are too broad or 
vague, or too technical, and further guidance and detail would be 
useful. 
 
• Response: See the Feedback E-11 and Feedback E-24.	
	
	
Feedback	E-11: Have a key for phrases that may not be familiar to the user.  A 
‘key’ often appears as an endnote at the end of a document or a 
footnote at the end of a page so that terms unfamiliar to the user 
can be explained without taking up room in the main body of the 
document. 
 
• Response: This comment is similar to the view expressed by the expert in 
Feedback E-10.  Although this feedback is valid, this must be carried out by 
the individual who prepares the forensic report (often Digital Forensic 
Analyst) to be presented to a court or the company management.  This can 
easily be addressed by providing supporting explanations for difficult and 
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technical terms as a ‘Glossary of Terms’ in one of the appendices of the 
forensic report.  This has been demonstrated in the Appendix A of this thesis 
as part of the practical experimentation of the research (a hypothetical digital 
crime and its investigation).   
 
 
Feedback	E-12: Further planning on site is common place (splitting room to 
exhibit locations for instance) and what we decide to triage on 
site or seize depends on what we are faced with.   
 
• Response: 'Further planning” at the crime scene had already been explicitly 
incorporated into the CDFIPM’s Planning Process as a Phase entitled 
‘Update the Outline Plan’.  Thus, no additional action will be taken in this 
regard.  In terms of the point regarding Onsite Triage that the expert has 
raised, since the need for Onsite Triage was pointed out by another expert, 
steps for Onsite Triage will be added to the CDFIPM as stated in ‘Feedback 
E-4’. (“REF: ADD #2”)  
 
 
Feedback	E-13: Assess risks – state the most common examples as a prompt.   
	
• Response: The above comment is referring to the Perform Risk Assessment 
Phase included in the CDFIPM’s Planning Process.  Although this is a valid 
operational point, it is too specific for inclusion into a generic process 
model.  Therefore, no action will be taken in this regard as assessing risks 
should be specific to an investigation at hand and must be carried out by the 
person in charge of the investigation (often Case Officer) based on the SOPs 
of the investigating organisation.  Moreover, two generic Sub-Phases, 
namely Assess Risks Related to Original Media and Evidence and Assess 
Risks Associated with the Personnel, had already been included under this 
Phase.  
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Feedback	E-14: ‘Describe incident’ should come before ‘classify incident’.    
 
• Response: The above comment is aimed at Describe Incident and Classify 
Incident Phases included in the CDFIPM’s Incident Detection Process.  This 
feedback is relevant as incident needs to be described before it can be 
categorised.  Thus, the ordering will be amended. (“REF: ALT #2”) 
	
	
Feedback	E-15: You wouldn’t interview the suspect at the crime scene.    
	
• Response: This view was expressed by a legal practitioner (barrister) which 
initially appeared to be in contradiction with the approach that the law 
enforcement officers had advised the thesis author they would take, as well 
as the thesis author’s own research under sub-section 3.7.1.3 of Chapter 3.  
From the legal practitioners’ point of view, the laws associated with 
interviewing suspects at the crime scene are strict and must therefore be 
adhered to stringently.  Due to the conflicting opinions, further discussions 
took place between the thesis author and the legal practitioner prior to 
approaching the law enforcement DFIs again to seek their advice and have 
the opposing opinions clarified.  The followings are brief extracts of the 
conversation between the thesis author and the legal practitioner: 
 
The thesis author: “In terms of saying that suspects are not interviewed at 
the crime scene, does this also apply to severe situations when a person is 
missing and quick information is required, when life is in danger, or when 
the investigation involves a missing child or child pornography? If the 
officers present the suspect with incriminating evidence to encourage him to 
talk, is this unlawful? When I met up with the officers from both the Cheshire 
Police Headquarter and Gwent Police HTCUs, they informed me that 
sometimes suspects, themselves, would own up to what they have done 
because the evidence is compelling.  So, could you please advise me on this 
conflicting issue further?”  
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The barrister: “It does not generally happen.  If the police have enough 
information, they must charge the suspect, at which point there are extreme 
rules about when and how they can question them – there are lengthy Codes 
of Conduct about it.  If they do not yet have enough information, they can of 
course ask questions.  If you can, check with your police officer what they 
would do in the scenarios you present, such as a missing person or where 
life is in danger – I’m afraid I don’t have a definite answer in relation to 
that.”  
 
Upon further discussions with the law enforcement officers from both 
aforementioned police forces, once again they confirmed that it was 
completely acceptable to question suspects at the crime scene in severe 
situations as mentioned.  Therefore, Interview the Suspect Phase will not be 
removed from the model, and the investigating organisations who would 
follow the CDFIPM must apply this phase when conducting digital 
investigations.      
	
	
Feedback	E-16: ‘Document the crime scene’ – does this need to be under a 
different arrow?    
	
• Response: This comment is referring to the Document the Scene Phase 
included in the Secure and Evaluate the Crime Scene Process.  The fact that 
this Phase has been placed under a different arrow (which refers to a UML 
Activity Diagram graphical notation) indicates that this phase must be 
performed in parallel throughout all the other phases in this Process.  Thus, 
no action will be taken in this regard. 
 
 
Feedback	E-17: Have ‘organise’ then ‘classify’ rather than having them running 
in parallel  
	
• Response: This will be amended.  (“REF: ALT #3”)  
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Feedback	E-18: How do you ‘secure crime scene’ in First Response without 
attending the site, which appears for the first time in ‘Secure and 
Evaluate Crime Scene’ section? 
	
• Response: As stated in Feedback E-6, having both First Response and 
Secure and Evaluate the Crime Scene Processes created some confusions for 
a number of experts and drew valid criticisms.  As also stated, First 
Response Process will be removed from the CDFIPM and the Secure and 
Evaluate the Crime Scene Process will be renamed to First Response. 
(“REF: DEL #1”) and (“REF: ALT #1”) 
	
	
Feedback	E-19: How is ‘Preserve and Secure Physical Crime Scene’ different 
from ‘secure crime scene’? 
	
• Response: the above question raised by one of the experts again pertains to 
the confusion caused by the first ‘First Response Process’ in the CDFIPM.  
This feedback is referring to two of the Phases within the First Response 
Process that have appeared to the expert to be repetitive. As stated in 
Feedback E-6, this issue will be addressed automatically by removing the 
first ‘First Response’ Process from the model and renaming the ‘Secure and 
Evaluate the Crime Scene’ Process to ‘First Response’. (“REF: DEL #1”) 
and (“REF: ALT #1”) 
 
 
Feedback	E-20: There should be an activity in the final stage of the model (Future 
Readiness) that will require the examiners to enter feedback as 
part of a knowledge-building process to help any future incident? 
	
• Response: this activity had already been covered under a different 
terminology, namely Make Recommendations, as a phase within the Future 
Readiness Process.  Therefore, no further action will be taken in this regard.   
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Feedback	E-21: Include team/investigation debrief in the investigation closure 
section. 
 
• Response: this had already been covered under a different terminology 
‘Conduct a Critical Review’ in the CDFIPM’s Investigation Closure Process.  
Since it appears that DFIs are more accustomed to the term ‘debriefing’ as 
this was pointed out also by a number of different experts, the naming 
‘Conduct a Critical Review’ will now be changed to Conduct a 
Team/Investigation Debrief. (“REF: ALT #4”) 
 
 
Feedback	E-22: How is ‘Identification’ different from what has gone before?  
 
• Response: This is an important point which was appropriately raised in 
relation to two of the Phases of the Identification Process, namely Search 
and Identify, that had already been covered as two sub-phases under the 
Carry out Preliminary Survey Phase of the Secure and Evaluate the Crime 
Scene Process.  Therefore, the Search and Identify Phases of the 
Identification Process will be removed on the basis of their repetitions in the 
preceding Process. (“REF: DEL #2”)   
 
At this stage, it appears that the Identification Process will be left with only 
one remaining phase, namely Prioritize.  However, since it has already been 
determined to subject the Secure and Evaluate the Crime Scene Process to 
new additions in terms of Onsite Triage and Prioritization based on the 
‘Feedback: E-4 (“REF: ADD #2”)’, the Prioritize Phase will also become 
redundant in the Identification Process.  Therefore, the entire Identification 
Process will be removed from the CDFIPM. (“REF: DEL #3”)   
 
 
Feedback	E-23: ‘analysis’ should come before ‘developing hypothesis’.  Although 
having analysis + hypothesis would be sufficient, you could 
always have a re-analysis in light of the hypothesis afterwards.  
In reality a competent investigator would always re-evaluate; so 
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having a ‘re-analysis’ component would simply acknowledge that 
(& perhaps encourage / remind less competent investigators to 
do so!)    
 
• Response: The above feedback is aimed at Develop a Hypothesis and 
Analyse Digital Evidence Phases of the Analysis Process.  The ordering of 
the two Phases will now be changed and a new Phase entitled ‘Reanalyse 
Digital Evidence’ will be included after Develop a Hypothesis Phase in the 
Analysis Process. (“REF: ALT #5”) and (“REF: ADD #6”)     
 
 
Feedback	E-24: What is meant by ‘reduce acquired data’? Why?   
 
• Response: The above question was posed by a legal practitioner in relation 
to the Reduce Acquired Data Phase of the Examination Process.  The 
following is the response that the thesis author provided and the legal 
practitioner’s further feedback. 
 
Thesis author: “In terms of the ‘Reduce Acquired Data’ Phase, since a 
digital device can contain a large amount of data, most of which are not 
related to the case under investigation, investigators will therefore need to 
reduce data only to what they are interested in.  Does this make sense?” 
 
The legal practitioner: “Yes, that makes sense.  However, the fact that I (as a 
lay person) had to ask suggests it may be useful to provide a better 
explanation.  An option would be to have a ‘Glossary of Terms’ at the end of 
the document – I think that would be really valuable, and I have seen them 
used a lot in other technical documents presented to the court.” 
 
This issue was also raised in Feedbacks E-10 and E-11 and addressed in 
Feedback E-11.  
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Feedback	E-25: There is no need to have ‘Consolidate investigation findings’ 
when you have ‘review investigation results’ immediately after it.   
 
• Response: Consolidate Investigation Findings Phase will now be removed 
from the Event Reconstruction Process as it appears to be repetitive to its 
following Phase, namely Review Investigation Results. (“REF: DEL #4”)   
 
 
Feedback	E-26: After ‘Identify areas of improvement’, have a further action to act 
on any areas identified.      
 
• Response: A new Phase entitled ‘Act upon Any Areas Identified’ will be 
added after Identify Areas of Improvement (if any) Phase of the Event 
Reconstruction Process. (“REF: ADD #7”)   
 
 
Feedback	E-27: In the ‘Presentation’ section, why is there a requirement to 
consider the appeal process at this stage?      
 
• Response: The Consider Appeal Process had been included in the 
Presentation Process in order to enable the investigators to make 
contingency plans in advance to take account of possible case rejection by 
courts of law where they would need to launch an appeal.  Therefore, this 
Phase will remain in the Presentation Process, and no further action will be 
taken.    
 
 
Feedback	E-28: Consider re-ordering ‘Presentation’ section as follows: 
Determine the target audience – Understand the requirements of 
the presentation – Consider (and apply) the legal jurisdictional 
requirements – Consider the appeal process – Prepare exhibits – 
Use appropriate presentation aids – Present the report – Prove/ 
defend the validity of the hypothesis – Decide the case      
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• Response: The ordering of the Phases in the Presentation Process will be 
amended as suggested above. (“REF: ALT #6”)   
 
 
Feedback	E-29: In ‘Investigation Closure’ section, ‘Record the case decision’ 
should come after accepting or rejecting the hypothesis and 
before the question of whether the evidence can be returned. 
 
• Response: The Record the Case Decision will now be placed immediately 
after the Accept or Reject the Hypothesis Phase as suggested in this 
feedback. (“REF: ALT #7”)    
 
 
Feedback	E-30: If the evidence cannot be returned, have separate actions for (a) 
store, cleanse and re-use the evidence, and for (b) destroying the 
evidence – ask a question the answer to which would identify 
which of these 2 options would be followed. 
 
• Response: The above comment refers to the management of evidence in the 
Investigation Closure Process.  This is a very constructive feedback which 
was brought to the thesis author’s attention as no explicit condition (question 
in the form of UML Activity Diagram notation) had previously been 
specified with regards to the sensitivity of digital evidence. Further 
clarification was needed in terms of the legal aspect of sensitive digital 
evidence.  Therefore, further communication took place between the thesis 
author and the legal practitioner (judge) as follows: 
	
Thesis author: “Thank you very much for bringing such an important issue to 
my attention.  I am going to create further condition as suggested.  So, this 
will be like this: ‘Can the evidence be returned?’ If the answer is ‘yes’, the 
evidence will be returned.  If the answer is ‘no’, the investigator will be 
provided with another condition asking whether the evidence can be 
destroyed.  If the answer to this question is ‘yes’, the investigator will need 
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to destroy the evidence.  If the answer is ‘no’, the investigator could cleanse 
and reuse the device.  From a legal point of view, is this a sound approach? 
And is this similar to what you thought?”     
 
Judge: “Yes.  I don’t know whether you also need to include a more detailed 
guide for the investigator as to when each step would be appropriate.  For 
example, presumably ‘sensitive’ information would not be returned, but 
would be destroyed.  It may help investigators to have a finite list of which 
types of evidence would fall into each category; but I don’t know if this goes 
beyond the remit of what you are trying to achieve here.  Another, perhaps 
simpler way might be this: 
 
- ‘Is the evidence sensitive?’ (And / or other terms that would cover all 
scenarios which you would decide whether to return, destroy or cleanse 
& reuse evidence.) 
- Yes – it cannot be returned – Can it be destroyed? ……. (Cleanse and 
reuse, etc.) 
- No – it can be returned. 
 
Based upon the above detailed feedback and further clarification, three new 
conditions have been developed that will be included in the Presentation 
Process to accommodate also for ‘sensitivity’ of digital evidence (“REF: 
Add #8”).  However, developing a fixed list of which types of evidence 
would fall into each category is outside the scope of this research and must 
be determined by the investigating organisations based on their own internal 
guidelines.  
 
 
Feedback	E-31: Consider swapping order of ‘make recommendations’ and 
‘develop a case study’ in ‘Future Readiness”. 
 
• Response: The ordering will be amended. (“REF: ALT #8”)   
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5.9	 Discussion	of	Evaluation	
The aim of this chapter was to evaluate the CDFIPM further in order to determine 
whether it has achieved both components of ‘utility’ and ‘usability’.  To this end, five 
questions were raised that needed to be addressed.  It was established that the first three 
questions out of the five had already been answered throughout Chapter 4 and 5.  
However, to address the remaining questions four and five (“has the model been built 
right?” and “has the right model been built?”), the model needed to be subjected to an 
independent, external evaluation that would extend the activities of Chapter 4 and 5.  
Therefore, the topic of this section pertains to the utility and usability of the CDFIPM to 
determine answers to the remaining two questions.  
 
5.9.1			Utility	
The ‘utility’ component of the Evaluation activity was intended to ensure that the 
CDFIPM has ‘serviceability’, ‘applicability’ and ‘appropriateness’ to the law 
enforcement, commerce, incident response and legal domains as stated in the research 
aim.  The CDFIPM was therefore subjected to an external, independent evaluation by 
the leading experts in its intended user community to ensure that it had captured the 
entire investigative process as carried out by experts in the stated fields.  The comments 
regarding the CDFIPM were very positive, and the feedback was both constructive and 
insightful.  There were a total number of 31 detailed feedback including suggestions for 
new additions, amendments and deletions.  Out of the 31 feedback, 8 new additions, 8 
amendments and 4 deletions were made into and from the CDFIPM.  Having made the 
new model subject to experts’ scrutiny, it became clear that there did not exist any 
aspects of the CDFIPM that were not representative of the processes as carried out in 
the fields covered by the research scope.  Similarly, there were not any aspects of the 
processes as performed in the stated fields that were not covered in the CDFIPM.   
 
In response to the question of utility (see the questionnaire in section 5.6), “Please rate 
the model on the scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being not useful at all and 10 being the most 
useful.”, experts provided the mean score of ‘9’.  This suggests that the CDFIPM has 
achieved its intended component of utility required of a useful artefact.  The followings 
are some comments made by experts in relation to the utility of the CDFIPM: 
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• “Much of your model covers most aspects in good detail of what is required but 
the order would change or be adopted to operational needs.  But, all principles 
and processes are there in good details.” (Law enforcement DFI and manager)  
 
• “You have identified the relevant problems with the current models and have 
provided detailed analysis.  I believe that your model has made a significantly 
novel contribution in its current length and presentation. Congratulations on 
accomplishing such a daunting task!” (University professor) 
 
• “This model allows a smooth transition from one phase to another during a 
digital investigation.  If I were to use it, it would certainly give me a detailed 
advice about what to do with the evidence.” (Commercial DFI) 
 
• “You have covered all avenues in different elements of digital investigations.” 
(Law enforcement DFI) 
 
• “It is absolutely practicable and structured.  You would not go wrong.” 
(commercial DFI) 
	
• “This model is very comprehensive; I can’t see any loopholes. Some issues are 
raised about detaining a suspect, where there could be multiple persons in a 
property with none saying who the suspect is.” (Law enforcement DFI) 
 
• “I can say that your model provides transparency in acquiring produced result 
for each given process.” (Legal practitioner, Judge) 
	
• “Because of its level of details, your model will facilitate collecting high quality 
evidence in a fast manner.” (Law enforcement DFI)  
 
5.9.2			Usability	
The ‘usability’ component of the Evaluation activity was intended to determine the ease 
with which experts in the law enforcement, commerce, incident response and legal 
domains can employ the CDFIPM to carry out those activities of the model that relate to 
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their practice.  In response to the question of usability (see the questionnaire in section 
5.6), “Please rate the model on the scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being very difficult to use 
and 10 being very easy to use.”, experts provided the mean score of ‘8.7’.  This also 
indicates that the CDFIPM has achieved its intended component of usability required of 
a useful artefact.  The followings are some comments made by the experts in relation to 
the usability of the CDFIPM: 
 
• “This model is clear in its layout and the majority of its terms, which largely 
enables the user to understand the steps taken during the investigation without 
assistance.  Where some of the terms are unclear or technical, the assistance of 
the explanation of a digital forensic investigator would overcome any difficulty 
in comprehension.” (Legal practitioner, barrister) 
 
• “It is important to have robust process behind the presentation of digital 
evidence because you have an adversarial system.  Each seeks to undermine the 
evidence of the other if they can.  Your model presents the forensic process very 
clearly; it is readily understandable to someone without technical expertise 
especially for jury.” (Legal practitioner, judge) 
 
• “Your model has a very clear layout that covers all aspects succinctly.”  (Law 
enforcement DFI) 
 
• “I like the workflows as they are simple but effective.” (Law enforcement DFI) 
 
5.10	Alterations	Made	to	the	CDFIPM	
This section presents the modifications that were made to the abstract representation as 
well as the UML Activity Diagrams of the CDFIPM in response to the feedback 
provided by experts in section 5.8.2.  Where a modification has been made, this is 
shaded and provided with its corresponding reference (addition, alteration or deletion) 
from the feedback in section 5.8.2.  
  
		 275	
5.10.1			Alterations	to	the	CDFIPM’s	Abstract	Representation	
	
Figure 42. The modified version of the abstract representation of the CDFIPM 		 	
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5.10.2			Alterations	to	the	CDFIPM’s	Activity	Diagrams	
Figure 43. Amendment to the CDFIPM for ALT #2, DEL #1 and ADD #1 
Readiness	
Policy/ Procedure 
Operational 
Readiness 
Infrastructure 
Readiness 
Incident	Detection	
Detect 
incident. 
Report 
incident. 
Validate 
incident. 
Assess 
incident. 
Possible information 
security incident?   
Confirmed 
information security 
incident?   
Improve. 
Classify 
incident. 
Describe 
incident. 
Review 
incident. 
No 
Yes 
No Yes 
1- Type of incident 
2- Scope of the incident 
3- Severity of the incident 
Reduction of 
false alarm 
First	Response	
Address safety 
issues. 
Secure crime 
scene. 
Document the  
crime scene. 
Isolate and contain. 
Secure physical and 
digital evidence. 
Eradicate. 
Monitor 
network. 
Carry out preliminary 
interviews. Coordinate 
Managerial, human, 
legal and law 
enforcement resources 
Intelligence	Gathering	
Collect Intelligence 
Go	/	input	to	
Planning	Process		
Assess Intelligence Profile Suspect Formulate Initial Hypothesis 
1. Open Source Intelligence 
2. Covert Source Intelligence 
 
REF:	DEL	#1	
REF:	ADD	#1	
REF:	ALT	#2	
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Figure 44. The CDFIPM’s Planning and Preparation Processes, no amendment required 
Planning	
Output from the 
Intelligence 
Gathering Process 
Understand task 
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picture. 
Determine required 
outcomes. 
Determine  
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3- Legal 
1- Assess risks related to original media 
and evidence 
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Multiple locations 	
Consider authorisation. 
Perform risk 
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Prepare techniques. 
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management support. 
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Subpoena 
Etc. 	
Go/input to the First 
Response Process. 
		 278	
	
Figure 45. Amendment to the CDFIPM for ALT #1, ADD #2 and DEL #2 & #3 
Document the scene. 
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Internet 
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REF:	ADD	#2	
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Figure 46. The CDFIPM’s Acquisition and Collection Process, no amendment required 
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Figure 47. Amendment to the CDFIPM for ADD #6 & #7, ALT #3 & #5 and DEL #4 		
Examination	
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Acquisition and 
Collection Process. 
Survey digital crime 
scene. 
Examine  
acquired data. 
Harvest acquired 
data. 
Reduce acquired 
data. 
Identify digital 
evidence. 
Classify digital 
evidence. 
Organise digital 
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REF:	ALT	#5	
REF:	ALT	#3	
REF:	ADD	#7	
REF:	DEL	#4	
REF:	ADD	#6	
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Figure 48. Amendment to the CDFIPM for ALT #4, #6, #7 & #8 and ADD #8 	
Presentation	
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Consider (and apply) the 
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Consider the appeal 
process. 
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learnt. 
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Investigation	Closure	
REF:	ALT	#6	
REF:	Add	#8	
REF:	ALT	#7	
REF:	ALT	#4	
REF:	ALT	#8	
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5.11	Final	Version	of	the	Proposed	Model	
The final versions of the abstract representation and the UML Activity Diagrams of the 
CDFIPM are presented in the Appendix B.   
 
5.12	Assessing	the	CDFIPM	against	the	Three	Criteria		
This section describes the process thorough which the proposed model was further 
evaluated by subjecting it to the same three sets of assessment criteria that the 
previously proposed models were subjected to in Chapter 2.  This was to demonstrate 
how the CDFIPM itself would compare against the requirements outlined in those 
criteria, and also to judge the model even further.   
 
5.12.1			Beebe	and	Clark	Assessment	Criteria	
Just to recall the Beebe and Clark’s (2005) four-point requirement, these are 
summarised as follows: 
 
1. A model must achieve scientific rigor and relevance; 
2. A model must simplify complex process to facilitate understanding of the 
underlying structure; 
3. A model must retain enough granularity, or the flexibility to incorporate 
granularity needed to exploit the framework in unique situations; and 
4. A model must delineate standard assumptions, concepts, value and practices. 
 
It is contended that the CDFIPM has achieved all the criteria as outlined in the Beebe 
and Clark’s (2005) four-point requirement.  The followings justify such a claim:  
 
Concerning Requirement 1, the CDFIPM has achieved both rigor and relevance since it 
is comprehensive such that it contains not only the higher-order layers, i.e. Classes and 
Processes, but also lower-level components, i.e. Phases and Sub-Phases, as well as 
important Overriding Principles.  Rigor has been achieved through the use of a Phase 
approach and the inclusion of important Overriding Principles, while relevance has been 
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achieved through the use of objectives-based Sub-Phases.  In terms of Requirement 2, 
the hierarchical nature of the CDFIPM allows complex process simplification by 
allowing its intended user community to focus on higher order layers conceptually.  The 
CDFIPM has initially provided a simplified representation and abstract understanding 
of the overall investigative process at its highest level, i.e. Classes and Processes.  This 
was to simplify the complex investigative process to facilitate understanding of the 
underlying structure.  In relation to Requirement 3, the CDFIPM has then progressed to 
incorporate multiple layers of detail, i.e., Phases and Sub-Phases, to facilitate 
granularity.  This, in turn, has achieved practicality and specificity goals set by its 
intended user community, digital forensic investigators, experts, legal practitioners and 
researchers alike.  Finally, in terms of Requirement 4, the CDFIPM has delineated 
standard assumptions, concepts, values, and practices through the use of constraints, 
definitions, principles, objectives, and task hierarchies. 
 
This argument that the CDFIPM has achieved all the four-point requirement set by 
Beebe and Clark (2005) is further confirmed by the positive feedback acquired from its 
intended user community discussed previously in this chapter. 
 
5.12.2			Carrier	and	Spafford	Assessment	Criteria	
The Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) five-point requirement by which the proposed model 
can be further assessed are summarized as follows: 
 
1. A model must have a basis in existing physical crime scene investigatory theory; 
2. The model must be practical in that it matches the steps taken in actual 
investigations; 
3. The model must be technologically neutral to ensure that the process isn’t 
constrained by current products and procedures;  
4. The model must have specificity to facilitate technology requirement 
development; 
5. The model must be applicable to all possible user communities. 
 
As with achieving all of the Beebe and Clark’s (2005) criteria, the CDFIPM has also 
fulfilled all the criteria in the Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) five-point requirement. 
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In relation to Requirement 1, the CDFIPM has clearly demonstrated that it has basis in 
the existing physical crime scene theory due to its implementation of the activities and 
Principles associated with physical investigation.  An example of this relates to the 
components provided in the First Response Process, or the Overriding Principles such 
as Address Safety Issues or Perform Risk Assessment.  Regarding Requirement 2, due 
to its level of detail demonstrated through its hierarchical approach, the CDFIPM has 
achieved the required level of practicality and specificity.  Beebe and Clark state, “A 
framework that can handle the infusion of layers of detail will ultimately guide the 
practitioner regarding ‘how to’ and ‘where to’ find digital evidence (Beebe and Clark, 
2005).”  The CDFIPM can easily guide DFIs in any investigation due to its scientific 
approach demonstrated in model’s granularity.  The model has been applied to various 
case studies, and walkthroughs of the model have been performed.  The model has also 
been tested by its various intended user communities.  In relation to Requirement 3, the 
CDFIPM is also technologically neutral as it is not limited to a particular tool or 
technology. A concerted effort was made to apply scientific principles into the design 
and development of the CDFIPM to ensure such a neutrality.  In terms of Requirement 
4, the CDFIPM is detailed such that it can be used to aid the development and 
application of methodologies to new technologies as they emerge and become the 
subject of investigations.  The CDFIPM has identified opportunities for development 
and deployment of technology to assist the work of DFIs.  Finally, in relation to 
Requirement 5, the CDFIPM is generic in that it can be deployed across various fields 
of digital forensics.  
 
5.12.3			Daubert	Test	Assessment	Criteria	
The Daubert Test’s five-point requirement, against which the CDFIPM can be further 
assessed are summarized as follows: 
 
1. whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested;  
2. whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication;  
3. its known or potential error rate;  
4. the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and  
5. whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within the relevant scientific 
community.  
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The CDFIPM has achieved the first four requirements as outlined in the Daubert Test.  
The model has been tested by its intended user community (Requirement 1), and as a 
result, its potential error rate was identified and subsequently rectified (Requirement 3).  
The model has also been subjected to peer-review and extensive publications in 
reputable journals and conferences, discussed in section 5.2 (Requirement 2).  
Furthermore, the CDFIPM’s operation is governed by various existing standards and 
guidelines that the model has drawn upon such as ISO/IEC 27035, 27037, 27043 and 
ACPO Good Guide for Digital Evidence, etc. (Requirement 4).  In terms of 
Requirement 5, this cannot be known at this point in time (as of June 2016) whether or 
not the model has been widely accepted by the digital forensic community.  This will be 
determined over a few months or possibly years once the model is widely available to 
the digital forensic community.  However, due to its detailed and scientific approach as 
well as the positive feedback that the model has received from its intended user 
community, it is anticipated that the CDFIPM will attract widespread acceptance within 
the field of digital forensics.    
 
5.13	Comparison	of	the	CDFIPM	against	Previous	Models		
The proposed model has also been mapped to the previously proposed models in Table 
3 in order to reveal how the CDFIPM compares with these models.  This comparison 
clearly demonstrates the comprehensiveness of the new model, as compared to the 
previous models.  Those components of the CDFIPM that have matching components in 
the previous models will be marked using a “✔” sign over a grey cell background under 
the relevant previous model.  Also, contributions of the CDFIPM in terms of new 
components will be highlighted in ‘yellow’ colour. 
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Table 3. Mapping the previous models to the proposed model 
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5.14	Summary	of	the	Chapter		
The CDFIPM has now been through a process of critical review and feedback by the 
leading experts in its intended user community, and subsequent process of alteration 
including new additions, amendments and deletions.  This was to address the two 
components of ‘utility’ and ‘usability’ further by finding the answers to the two 
remaining questions (“has the model been built right?” and “has the right model been 
built?”).  All the acquired feedback was very positive and there was no negative 
comment.  In places where the agreement was not acquired, the thesis author iterated 
back to the Design and Development Phase of the research to make alterations based on 
the feedback to bring the model to the closest place possible (within the scope of the 
research) to its intended application.  Having completed the formal evaluation of the 
CDFIPM, it is now contended that “the new model has been built right” and that “the 
right model has been built” on the basis that its intended application has been observed, 
accepted and confirmed by the prominent experts in its intended user community.  
Therefore, the CDFIPM is complete, consistent, and accurate enough to fulfill the 
solution to the stated research problem, as defined in section 1.2.   
 
The proposed model was also assessed against the three sets of assessment criteria that 
the previously proposed models had been judged against in Chapter 2.  The outcome of 
this assessment also revealed that the CDFIPM meets all the requirements as outlined in 
those criteria.  The CDFIPM was finally mapped to the previous models demonstrating 
its comprehensiveness as compared to the previous models.  Therefore, since the 
CDFIPM meets all the requirements levied upon it, this warrants the continuation of the 
steps as outlined in the Peffers et al’s (2006) Design Science Research Process (DSRP), 
where the next step is to address the Communication activity of this research, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter, Conclusion.  
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Chapter	6:	 Conclusions	
6.1	 Introduction		
This chapter begins by addressing the final activity of the Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP, 
namely Communication, before explaining how this research has accomplished the 
development of the CDFIPM (the research artefact) and extending the discussion to the 
question of how the CDFIPM could be employed in its intended user community.  The 
research limitations are considered, as well as possible future research opportunities in 
the field of digital forensics. As previously, the chapter concludes with a short 
summary.   
 
6.2	 Communication	
According to the Communication activity of the Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP, the 
researcher needs to communicate the research problem and its importance, the research 
artefact, its utility, usability and novelty, the rigor of its design, and its effectiveness to 
the intended user community.  The first communication activity in relation to this 
research was conducted in 2015, when the CDFIPM in its very initial stage was 
presented both orally and as a research paper at the 10th International Conference on 
Global Security, Safety & Sustainability, held in London.  The summit was attended by 
both national and international renowned participants from law enforcement, industry 
and academia, who provided brief but valuable comments on the initial stage of the 
CDFIPM.  Following the formal evaluation of the CDFIPM by its intended user 
community39, a Deputy High Court Judge based in Exchange Chambers in Manchester, 
Leeds and Liverpool who is the current Chairman of the Northern Chancery Bar 
Association (as of May 2016) and is a Trustee of the North West Partnership, has 
expressed interest in employing the CDFIPM when dealing with cases involving 
computer crimes.   																																																								
39 These include: digital forensic investigators operating in three fields of law enforcement, commercial 
practice and incident response, judges, legal practitioners, those in the research community in the fields of 
digital forensics and information security and other relevant audiences.   
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Extracts from this research and the CDFIPM have also been published or accepted for 
publications in the following peer-reviewed journals and conference proceedings: 
 
• Montasari, R (2016). ‘An Ad Hoc Detailed Review of Digital Forensic 
Investigation Process Models’, International Journal of Electronic Security and 
Digital Forensics (IJESDF), 8 (3), pp. 205-223. 
 
• Montasari, R (2016). ‘A Formal Two Stage Triage Process Model (FTSTPM) 
for Digital Forensics Practice’, International Journal of Computer Science and 
Security (IJCSS), 10 (2), pp. 69-87. 
 
• Montasari, R. (2016). ‘A Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Process 
Model’, International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics 
(IJESDF), 8 (4), pp. 285-301. 
 
• Montasari, R. (2016). ‘Review and Assessment of the Existing Digital Forensic 
Investigation Process Models’, International Journal of Computer Applications, 
147 (7), pp. 41-49. 
 
• Montasari, R., Peltola, P. and Carpenter, V. (2016). ‘Gauging the Effectiveness 
of Computer Misuse Act in Dealing with Cybercrimes’, International 
Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services, pp. 1-5. 
 
• Montasari, R., Peltola, P. and Evans, D. (2015). ‘Integrated Computer Forensics 
Investigation Process Model (ICFIPM) for Computer Crime Investigations’, 
Proceedings of 10th International Conference on Global Security, Safety and 
Sustainability: Tomorrow's Challenges of Cyber Security, pp. 83-95. 
 
• Montasari, R. and Peltola, P. (2015). ‘Computer Forensic Analysis of Private 
Browsing Modes’, Proceedings of 10th International Conference on Global 
Security, Safety and Sustainability: Tomorrow's Challenges of Cyber Security, 
pp. 96-109. 
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• Montasari, R. (in press). ‘Digital Evidence: Disclosure and Admissibility in the 
United Kingdom Jurisdiction’, Proceedings of 11th International Conference on 
Global Security, Safety and Sustainability: Tomorrow's Challenges of Cyber 
Security. 
 
• Montasari, R. (in press). ‘A Standardized Data Acquisition Process Model 
(SDAPM) for Digital Forensic Investigations’, International Journal of 
Information and Computer Security (IJICS). 
 
6.3	 Research	Summary	
In Chapter 1, three major issues were identified with the existing digital forensic 
investigation process models (DFIPMs), namely the lack of a model that has all three 
characteristics of being “comprehensive”, “formal” and “generic”.  The research 
therefore set out to address the fundamental problem that: 
There does not exist a comprehensive model encompassing the entire digital 
investigative process that is formal, such that it can assist a court of law in 
determining the reliability of the investigative process followed, and that is 
generic, in that it can be applied in the different fields of law enforcement, 
commerce and incident response.  
 
Following the identification of the research problem, two research hypotheses were 
developed as follows: 
 
A formal process model can be developed that is comprehensive in that it 
encompasses the whole digital forensic process and that is generic in that it can 
be employed by the digital forensic investigators in the fields of law 
enforcement, commerce and incident response. 
 
A formal process model will enable digital forensic investigators to carry out 
more effective, forensically-sound digital investigations than is possible with the 
use of ad-hoc tools, and will assist the courts in determining the reliability of the 
processes employed in such investigations. 
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In order to address the research problem and prove or refute the research hypotheses, 
the following research aim was then formulated: 
 
To develop a comprehensive model encompassing the entire digital investigative 
process that is formal in that it synthesizes, harmonises and extends the existing 
models, and that is generic in that it can be applied in the different fields of law 
enforcement, commerce and incident response. 
 
In order to achieve the aim, the following objectives were set out to be accomplished: 
 
1. Critically analyse and assess the previous DFIPMs against different assessment 
criteria in order to identify the models that can contribute to the design and 
development of the new model. 
 
2. Following the identification of the prevailing models (those that have withstood 
the assessment), determine their key contributions based on the assessment 
criteria. 
 
3. Identify the components essential for the new model from a combination of the 
key contributions of both the prevailing and the reviewed models. 
 
4. Build upon the contributions of the previous models by constructing a new set of 
domain-specific components. 
 
5. Based upon the above preceding steps, design and develop a formal 
representation of the new model, incorporating both the identified components 
and the new set of constructed components.  
 
6. Evaluate the model using three methods, including applying the model to 
different case studies, assessing it against the different assessment criteria used 
to assess the previous models and recruiting different sets of independent 
experts.   
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To achieve those objectives, three research questions were sought to be answered: 
1. What are the essential components necessary in a comprehensive model that is 
formal, generic and forensically sound for the entire digital forensic process?  
 
2. Once the components of such a comprehensive model that is formal, generic and 
forensically sound are determined, how can they be integrated into a working 
model?   
 
3. What is the most appropriate method to describe, present and use the model for 
the entire digital forensic process? 
 
Finally, in Chapter 1, to answer the three research questions, the Peffers et al’s (2006) 
Design Science Research Process (DSRP) model was identified and justified as the 
appropriate methodology to carry out the various stages of this research.  
 
In Chapter 2, based upon the Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP, the acquisition of two 
resources was sought in order to define the “objectives of the solution”.  These 
included: “… knowledge of the state of the problem” and “current solutions and their 
efficacy, if any”.  The knowledge of the state of the problem for this research was partly 
covered in the preceding chapter (Chapter 1), where the research problem was defined 
and the value of its solution justified.  However, to address the two resources fully, 
further knowledge of the state of the problem was required and current solutions, if any, 
had to be identified.  In order to acquire the two stated resources, a general review of the 
topic of digital forensic investigation was provided, followed by a detailed review of the 
field of digital evidence and how its admissibility is governed within the U.K. and U.S. 
jurisdictions.  Current standards and guidelines associated with the digital investigative 
process were then reviewed, which set the necessary background for a review and 
assessment of the previous models.  Prior to such review and assessment, three different 
sets of assessment criteria were identified against which the previous models were 
reviewed and assessed.  Through this assessment, the prevailing models that could 
contribute to the design and development of the CDFIPM were identified, and the 
necessary components that would constitute the basic structure of the new model were 
determined. 
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Chapter 3 covered the Design and Development activity of the Peffers et al’s (2006) 
DSRP, implementing design and development of the CDFIPM based upon the 
information acquired in Chapter 2 in relation to the three research questions.  After 
considering the fundamental requirements of the CDFIPM, there followed a detailed 
discussion of its design elements, where the CDFIPM’s formal representation was 
examined and the use of UML Activity Diagrams was justified.  Further examination 
was made in relation to the hierarchical structure of the CDFIPM before a detailed 
analysis of the design and development of the model was undertaken.  The CDFIPM 
was also presented in its various layers of granularity through the use of the UML 
Activity Diagrams.    
 
Chapter 4 covered the Demonstration activity of the Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP, 
applying the CDFIPM to various case scenarios representing different digital forensic 
environments, thereby demonstrating the efficacy of the proposed model to solve the 
stated research problem.          
 
Finally, Chapter 5 covered the Evaluation activity of the Peffers et al’s (2006) DSRP, 
where the CDFIPM was subjected to external, independent evaluation by its intended 
user community to determine how well the new model would support a solution to the 
stated research problem.  Following feedback from the experts, it was necessary to 
return to the Design and Development stage to make various amendments before 
presenting the CDFIPM in its amended form. 
 
6.4	 Research	Questions	Addressed	
To achieve the research objectives, the following three research questions were sought 
to be answered:  
 
1. What are the essential components necessary in a comprehensive model that is 
formal, generic and forensically sound for the entire digital forensic process?  
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2. Once the components of such a comprehensive model that is formal, generic and 
forensically sound are determined, how can they be integrated into a working 
model?   
 
3. What is the most appropriate method to describe, present and use the model for 
the entire digital forensic process? 
 
Question one has been answered by conducting a critical review and detailed 
assessment of the existing models in Chapter 2 using three different assessment criteria, 
namely those of Beebe and Clark (2005), Carrier and Spafford (2003) and the Daubert 
Test (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993).  Following a review of the 
assessment results, the prevailing models (those that most closely met the assessment 
criteria) were identified for consideration of their potential contribution towards the new 
model.  Having identified the prevailing models, their key contributions were 
determined based on the assessment criteria, and the necessary components for the 
CDFIPM were identified from these key contributions.  The author was then able to 
develop a new set of domain-specific components, based upon the knowledge acquired 
through interactions with experts that could not be found in the literature.   
 
Question two was addressed during the Design and Development stage of the research 
in Chapter 3, where the identified components and the developed domain-specific 
components were integrated into the CDFIPM through the use of the UML Activity 
Diagrams.  Question three was addressed first in Chapter 4 and then in Chapter 5.  In 
Chapter 4, case scenarios having been identified as the most appropriate method to use 
and describe the new model, the CDFIPM was applied to different scenarios and a 
walkthrough of the model was performed.  Question three was then independently 
addressed by external experts, the model’s intended user community, who evaluated the 
CDFIPM based upon the three elements of “rigor”, “usability” and “utility” to 
determine its suitability for the environments40 in which the CDFIPM is intended to be 
employed.  To further demonstrate the suitability of the CDFIPM, a practical 
experimentation was conducted, presented in Appendix A.      
 																																																								
40 This includes: law enforcement, commerce and incident response, as well as court environments. 
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6.5	 Research	Objectives	Achieved	
In order to achieve the research aim, the following objectives needed to be 
accomplished: 
 
1. Critically analyse and assess the previous DFIPMs against different assessment 
criteria in order to identify the models that can contribute to the design and 
development of the new model. 
 
2. Following the identification of the prevailing models (those that have withstood 
the assessment), determine their key contributions based on the assessment 
criteria. 
 
3. Identify the components essential for the new model from a combination of the 
key contributions of both the prevailing and the reviewed models. 
 
4. Build upon the contributions of the previous models by constructing a new set of 
domain-specific components. 
 
5. Based upon the above preceding steps, design and develop a formal 
representation of the new model, incorporating both the identified components 
and the new set of constructed components.  
 
6. Evaluate the model using three methods, including applying the model to 
different case studies, assessing it against the different assessment criteria used 
to assess the previous models and recruiting different sets of independent 
experts.   
 
The research objectives have been achieved by addressing the three research questions 
set out in section 6.4.  The first four objectives were achieved in Chapter 2, where three 
assessment criteria were identified against which the previous models were assessed. 
This assessment identified those prevailing models that could contribute to the design 
and development of the CDFIPM.  Following the identification of the prevailing 
models, their key contributions were determined, and the necessary components for the 
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CDFIPM were identified from these key contributions.  A new set of domain-specific 
components were developed through the knowledge acquired from interaction with 
experts.  Objective 5 was achieved in Chapter 3, the CDFIPM being designed and 
developed by synthesizing the components identified from the key contributions of the 
prevailing models with the new set of domain-specific components.  Their integration 
was achieved into the CDFIPM through the use of UML Activity Diagrams.  Finally, 
objective six was achieved in two stages, by applying the CDFIPM to different case 
scenarios and by performing a walkthrough of the model in Chapter 4 and by subjecting 
the model to an independent evaluation by its intended user community in Chapter 5. 
 
6.6	 Research	Aim	Achieved	
In order to address the research problem and to prove or refute the research hypothesis, 
the following research aim was formulated: 
 
To develop a comprehensive model encompassing the entire digital investigative 
process that is formal in that it synthesizes, harmonises and extends the existing 
models, and that is generic in that it can be applied in the different fields of law 
enforcement, commerce and incident response. 
 
The research aim has been accomplished as the objectives set out to achieve the 
research aim have been fulfilled (see section 6.5) by addressing the three research 
questions (see section 6.4).  In summary, to develop the model in such a way that it 
could be both formal and generic to the three fields of law enforcement, commerce and 
incident response, the common components from the “prevailing” models across the 
three fields were identified, then synthesized, harmonised and extended (in Chapter 2) 
and subsequently integrated into a comprehensive model covering the entire 
investigative process (in Chapter 3).  The final CDFIPM was represented through the 
use of formal notations, the UML Activity Diagrams.   
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6.7	 Research	Problem	Addressed	
In order to address the three identified issues with the existing models in relation to the 
lack of a model that has all the three characteristics of being “comprehensive”, formal” 
and “generic”, the following research problem was formulated that needed to be 
addressed: 
 
There does not exist a comprehensive model encompassing the entire digital 
investigative process that is formal, such that it can assist a court of law in 
determining the reliability of the investigative process followed, and that is 
generic, in that it can be applied in the different fields of law enforcement, 
commerce and incident response.  
 
The research problem has also been addressed through the accomplishment of the 
research aim discussed in section 6.6. Therefore, having addressed the research 
problem, the two formulated research hypotheses also hold true: 
 
A formal process model can be developed that is comprehensive in that it 
encompasses the whole digital forensic process and that is generic in that it can 
be employed by the digital forensic investigators in the fields of law 
enforcement, commerce and incident response. 
 
A formal process model will enable digital forensic investigators to carry out 
more effective, forensically-sound digital investigations than is possible with the 
use of ad-hoc tools, and will assist the courts in determining the reliability of the 
processes employed in such investigations. 
 
This is further supported by the external feedback acquired from the CDFIPM’s 
intended user community (discussed in detail in Chapter 5).  
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6.8	 Research	Contribution	
It is contended that this research has made a significant and novel contribution to the 
field of digital forensic science by implementing a process model, the CDFIPM, that 
would assist digital forensic investigators in following a uniform approach.  The 
research has synthesized, harmonised and significantly built upon the existing models to 
produce the first process model that has all three characteristics of being 
comprehensive, formal and generic.  No such a model previously existed in the 
literature.41  The CDFIPM is comprehensive, covering the entire investigative process, 
formal as it assists courts in determining the reliability of the investigative process 
followed and generic in that it can be applied by digital forensic investigators operating 
in the three fields of law enforcement, commerce and incident response.  The author 
maintains that the proposed model is inclusive of all the advantages of the previous 
models through their synthesis and harmonisation, and contains purified terminology 
using the terms commonly agreed upon by the digital forensic community.   
 
It is therefore argued that the CDFIPM would be a significant step towards the 
establishment of standards for the digital forensic investigative process.  Every 
component in the model is well defined in terms of scope, functions and order.  The 
CDFIPM has exceeded the steps needed to acquire, preserve, examine and analyse 
digital evidence, also incorporating the non-technical aspects of a digital investigation, 
including authorization, notification, proof, defence and transportation of evidence.  The 
model fully and thoroughly describes the flow of information in a digital investigation, 
from the moment digital investigators are notified of a crime until the investigation 
reaches its formal conclusion.   
  
This research has also demonstrated how the entire digital investigative process, both in 
its high-level and lower-level details, can be represented through a proven formal 
notation, the Unified Modelling Language (UML). The representation of the CDFIPM 
via the UML Activity Diagrams will assist courts in properly understanding the digital 
investigative processes followed, a point acknowledged by the legal practitioners and 
judge who participated in an external evaluation of the model.   																																																								
41 Table 2 sets out the specific contributions of this research in relation to the CDFIPM’s components, 
highlighted in “yellow”. 
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Due to its level of details and step-by-step approach, the CDFIPM provides 
investigators with concise direction on the processes to be followed, enabling them to 
speed up the investigative process while minimising errors and negligence.  Therefore, 
in the event of a challenge to the digital investigative process, there would be no doubt 
concerning the soundness of the processes followed.  The proposed model also contains 
generic methods that digital forensic investigators can use to relate technology to non-
technical observers.  Importantly, the application of the CDFIPM could bring about the 
improved admissibility of digital evidence in courts, being a formal model with strong 
overriding principles resulting from rigorous scientific verification.  Finally, this thesis 
contains the most comprehensive, critical review and assessment of the previous digital 
investigation process models presented to date.   
 
6.9	 Limitations	and	Future	Work	
Although the CDFIPM is mainly aimed at the U.K. jurisdiction, it could easily be 
adapted to other jurisdictions.  Without such modification, the model already has 
relevance to those jurisdictions which employ a similar legal basis for evaluating the 
digital investigative process.  The CDFIPM focuses predominantly on “Computer 
Forensics” as opposed to other branches of digital forensics.42 Although some much 
simpler models have claimed to be appropriate for various branches of digital forensics, 
such a claim is not made in relation to the CDFIPM for accuracy purposes.  However, it 
is argued that due to the CDFIPM’s detailed and generic approach, it could easily be 
adapted to cover any branch of digital forensics. Although an evaluation of the 
CDFIPM has been undertaken by the High-Tech Crime Units (HTCUs) of two different 
police forces in the U.K., experts in corporate and incident response environments, legal 
practitioners and researchers in academia, it cannot be representative of all intended 
users.  Future work should include a more comprehensive trial by digital forensic 
investigators, experts, legal practitioners and researchers as part of a wider study.   
 
Similarly, although the case scenarios to which the CDFIPM was applied represent each 
of the three fields of digital forensics to which the model is relevant, the CDFIPM 
would benefit from further case studies to identify task hierarchies.  This would 																																																								
42 Such as Malware Forensics, Cloud Forensics, Network Forensics and Mobile Forensics. 
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improve task development efforts and facilitate scenario development, assisting its 
users, researchers and tool developers in understanding how to take advantage of and 
apply the model.  Finally, as with the future work, the CDFIPM must be validated 
through the Method Validation under ISO 17025 accreditation 43 , which will be 
published in the U.K. within the next 18 months (as of June 2016), to determine its 
compliance.   
 
6.10	Summary	of	the	Chapter	
This chapter has outlined the way in which this research has been communicated and 
has provided a summary of the research, describing how the research problem, 
hypothesis, aim, objectives and questions have been addressed, before analyzing the 
contributions of the research, its research limitations and the potential future research 
opportunities.   
  
																																																								
43 The Forensic Science Regulators (2016) will require that all Forensic Service Providers providing a 
Digital Forensic Service have ISO 17025 Accreditation, which will soon become the UK’s Best Practice 
Guidance. 
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Appendix	A.	Forensic	Laboratory	Experimentation	
This section discusses the practical experimentation of the Demonstration activity that 
was carried out in a digital forensic laboratory (DFL)44.  Under the experimentation 
approach, the thesis author would act as a DFI commissioned to conduct a hypothetical 
digital investigation and present its findings in the form of a ‘formal report’ to be 
submitted in a court of law.  The aim of this approach is to demonstrate essential 
investigative techniques associated with the Investigative Processes Class of the 
CDFIPM, that could be used to answer the investigative questions of who, when, where 
and how.  Since this report is embedded within the thesis, its structure (e.g. headings, 
numbering, and sections, etc.) does not fall under the thesis structure. 
 
It is assumed that DFAs following the techniques outlined in the following report 
maintain a detailed note-taking during any forensic investigation.  This is due to the fact 
that a successful digital investigation requires detailed notes during the course of an 
investigation.  These notes can be in the form of taking photographs, videos and screen 
captures, bookmarking the digital evidence through a forensic software tool such as 
Encase, FTK and XWays Forensics etc., utilising built-in logging/reporting options 
within the forensic software tool, highlighting and exporting data (representing potential 
digital evidence) into for example, .CSV, .TXT, .XLSX and .PDF, .JPG, .PNG and .GIF 
files, or even a digital audio recorder as well as hand-written notes.  There does not 
exist a standard requiring DFAs to follow a particular method when conducting the 
note-taking.  This will depend on DFAs as each DFA might approach the note-taking 
process differently.  However, the more notes a DFA takes, the easier it will become to 
prepare and finalize the report. 
  
																																																								
44 The practical experimentation of the Demonstration activity was carried out in one of the digital 
forensic laboratories of the University of South Wales (formerly known as the University of Glamorgan) 
due to their extensive resources as well as well-equipped laboratories. 
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Report	on	Forensic	Analysis	of	the	Computer	Allegedly	Used	to	
Penetrate	BOLtd	Network	Security	
 
 
 
DIGITAL	FORENSIC	ANALYST:	 Digital Forensic Investigator, Reza Montasari 	 Cheshire Headquarter Police High-Tec Crime Unit 
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INSTRUCTING	PARTY:	 Head of the Cheshire Headquarter Police High-Tech Crime Unit, 
Detective Sergeant Andrew Dodd 
 	 Cheshire Headquarter Police High-Tec Crime Unit 
 	 Clemonds Hey, Winsford, Cheshire, CW7 2UA 
 	 Phone: 0151 424 7431 
 
	
SUBJECT:	  Digital Forensic Expert Witness Report 
	
UK	GUDILEINES	ADHERED	TO:	
 
The Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Process 
Model, the CDFIPM 
	
CASE	REFERENCE	NUMBER:	
 
100326837-BOLtd-Vindaloo-Hacking 
	
REFERENCE	ITEM:	
 
HD Image (vindaloo_.E01 & vindaloo_.E02) - 19,077 MB 
	
OFFENCE:	  Illegal penetration into network system, Hacking and theft of 
proprietary information 
ACCUSED:	 Thomas Nigel 
DATE	OF	REQUEST:	 2nd November 2015 
DATE	OF	CONCLUSION:	 3rd June 2016 
	
	
Statement	of	Truth:	
I believe that the facts stated in this document are true.  I testify that digital evidence 
(the hard drive image) received has not been altered in any way and the hard drive 
image has not been in any other individuals’ possession during the period of 70 days 
(from 2nd March 2016 to 11th May 2016), during which the forensic analysis was carried 
out. 
 
Notice: All technical terms in the report are highlighted in bold when first used.  
Explanations are provided in the Glossary of Terms (Appendix A.1).   
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A.1	 Background	to	the	Case	
Board Optimisation (BO) Company, which specialises in the optimisation of PCB 
board [1] designs, believes a hacker has successfully penetrated their network security 
system, accessing a number of files including a design for a new PCB for a major 
entertainment system manufacturer.  The Nottingham Headquarter Police Plaza traced 
the suspect and seized his/her computer, which was reportedly used to penetrate 
BOLtd’s network.  It is thought that this computer contains evidence related to this 
intrusion.  
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A.2	 Executive	Summary	
Using different forensic tools and methodologies, seven factual and nine suspicious 
evidence items were discovered (see A.4.1 and A.4.2).  Upon completing the Analysis 
Process, it appears that the suspect’s system was used to penetrate into BOLtd’s 
network.  Documents belonging to BOLtd Company were discovered on the suspect’s 
system.  Based upon the log files discovered, it appears that WinSCP software was used 
for unauthorised file transfers.  It also appears that the suspect was a student completing 
a university course, possibly in the area of digital forensic or network security, with a 
good understanding of Information Technology.  Analysis revealed that the suspect was 
actively attempting to learn about tools and techniques regarding the exploitation of 
network security vulnerabilities.  For example, tools were downloaded such as WinSCP 
and Back Oriface [3] etc. and five PDF files explaining penetration tools and 
techniques were discovered.  Examining the Internet history of the browsers installed 
revealed that the suspect had visited and bookmarked certain questionable websites for 
information about hacking tools and techniques. 
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A.3	 Objectives	
On 2nd March 2016 at 13:00 PM, Detective Sergeant Huw Read contacted my office 
with regards to the examination and analysis of a computer’s hard drive suspected of 
containing potential evidence associated with the penetration into BOLtd’s network.  He 
informed me that the suspect’s computer had already been seized by the police officers 
in the division, and that another detective in our High-Tech Crime Unit, Mr. Gareth 
Davis, had already carried out the forensic data acquisition on the hard drive.  Detective 
Sergeant Huw Read proceeded to provide me with the hard drive image [2] and 
commissioned a full forensic analysis as well as a report for possible criminal charges 
and civil litigation.  The goal was to examine and analyse the hard drive image to 
identify and recover any evidence items related to BOLtd’s network security breach.  I 
shall therefore present my relevant findings in section A.4 of this report, while in 
section A.5, I shall discuss the steps that I took to conduct this digital forensic analysis.  
Finally, I will provide my conclusion in section A.7.    
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A.4	 Relevant	Findings	
This section details the factual and suspicious items of evidence recovered from the 
hard drive image that have both probative and evidential value. 
 
A.4.1			Factual	Items	
A.4.1.1				Evidence	Item	1		
Text file – evidence item: an email which appears to have circulated amongst two of the 
BOLtd’s employees was found on the suspect’s system.  This was a deleted file 
recovered through ‘Data Carving’ [8].  Analysing two recovered database log files 
entitled ‘index.dat’ [9] and “NTUSER.DAT”, it is suspected that WinSCP tool using 
Internet Explorer version 5 had been used to hack into a BOLtd computer to acquire the 
document (Refer to sections A.4.1.3, A. 4.1.4 and A.4.1.5 for information on these 
files). The file path to this evidence is: /img_vindaloo_.E01/$OrphanFiles/Bob.txt 
 
Table 4. Factual evidence item 1: text file 
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A.4.1.2				Evidence	Item	2		
Image file – evidence item: a new PCB board confidential design: the suspect had 
deleted this; however, it was discovered through data carving.  Similar to ‘Evidence 
Item 1’, analysing ‘index.dat’ and ‘NTUSER.DAT’, it appears that WinSCP was utilised 
with Internet Explorer Version 5 to hack the document (see sections A.4.1.3, A. 4.1.4 
and A.4.1.5 for details).  Also, a short-cut, ‘BO12-1HDJ378.lnk’ had been made.  The 
file path to this file is: /img_vindaloo_.E01/$OrphanFiles/BO12-1HDJ378.tiff 
 
Table 5. Factual evidence item 2: image file 
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A.4.1.3				Evidence	Item	3		
Database file – evidence item: small-sized database file: Investigating the below 
‘index.dat’ file, it appears that the suspect utilised WinSCP to penetrate the BOLtd’s 
network and download evidence items 1 and 2 (see sections A. 4.1.5 and A.4.1.6).  The 
path to the database file is:	
Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/History/History.IE5/MSHist012008112420081125/index.dat  
 
Table 6. Factual evidence item 3: database file 	
	
A.4.1.4				Evidence	Item	4	and	5		
A Desktop Shortcut and a Database File – evidence items: Examining this file, it 
appears that the suspect had a shortcut to a directory ‘C:\pwn” entitled “BO_Systems’.  
At first, it looks as though this is a shortcut to a remote machine (i.e. 
‘ADMIRALKIRK’) but on closer inspection via the suspect’s system registry, it was 
revealed that ADMIRALKIRK is the hostname of the suspect’s computer.   
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The presence of this shortcut indicates that the suspect may have had content relating to 
BO Systems stored in C:\pwn.  
 
The file path to Bo_System.lnk is: 
/img_vindaloo_.E01/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Recent/BO_Systems.lnk  
 
The file path to NTUSER.DAT is:  
/img_vindaloo_.E01/Documents and Settings/Administrator/NTUSER.DAT  
 
Table 7. Factual evidence items 4 and 5: a desktop shortcut and a database file 
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Figure 49. The suspect’s “C:\WINNT\system32\config\system” registry hive loaded for investigation 
 
A.4.1.5				Evidence	Item	6		
Executable file –evidence item– an SFTP client for Microsoft Windows: The main 
function of WinSCP is to secure file transfer between local and remote computers.  
Although used for legitimate reasons, such as enabling students to connect to their 
institution’s servers, it can also be used for illegal penetration to a remote network.  
Examining a database Log file [10] entitled ‘index.dat’ (see evidence item A.4.1.3) 
suggested that the suspect might have used this program to penetrate into BOLtd’s 
network (see A.4.1.6).   
The path to the location of this program is: Program Files/WinSCP/WinSCP.exe  
 
Table 8. Factual evidence item 6: executable file- an SFTP client for Microsoft Windows 
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A.4.1.6				Evidence	Item	7		
Registry Data – evidence item: WinSCP CDCache: Loading the user’s registry hive 
(NTUSER.DAT in C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator) on the investigator’s machine 
allowed for an in-depth view of system and application settings and other registry data.  
One such piece of data which could be recovered was the ‘CDCache’ of WinSCP – a 
location in the registry which is used by WinSCP to cache the directories used in a 
session.  This data implies that a session has been opened using the username ‘isrg’ on 
the host ‘193.63.130.140’ (which resolves to j4-phd04.fat.glam.ac.uk).  At some point 
during the session, a directory at “/home/isrg/Desktop/BO_Systems” was opened. 
 
Table 9. Factual evidence items 7: registry data- WinSCP CDCache 
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A.4.2			Suspicious	Items	of	Evidence	
A.4.2.1				Evidence	Item	1		
Evidence Item: MSN instant messages saved as XML file: Investigating the Log files of 
the MSN Live Messenger, it became clear that the suspect held conversations with 
someone appearing to be the suspect’s friend.  They discussed possible ways of 
penetrating another’s computer.  At the time of the conversations, both appeared to be 
students completing an assignment.  The conversations were stored in a script on the 
suspect’s system entitled “huwbear613786887.xml”.   
 
The full path to the location of this XML file is:  
Documents and Settings/Administrator/My Documents/My Received Files/Pickard0412838646899/History/ 
HUWBEAR613786887.XML 
 
 
Further investigation of this script and following the traces discovered revealed that the 
friend with the email address of ‘huwbear@passport.com’ had sent 5 PDF files 
containing information about how to penetrate and exploit network resources to the 
suspect, whose email address appeared to be ‘picard012@passport.com’.  The friend 
advised the suspect to look into ‘Back Oriface’, a tool which could be used to penetrate 
a network.  Below sub-sections discuss these PDF files and Back Oriface.   
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Table 10. Suspicious evidence item 1: MSN instant messages saved as XML file 
	
A.4.2.2				Evidence	Item	2		
Doc File – Evidence Item: hackingstuff: The above discovered evidence again suggests 
that the suspect had looked into hacking information and had a good understanding of 
network penetration.  This document appears to be an assignment completed by the 
suspect and suggests the suspect was a student.   
 
The file path is: 
/img_vindaloo_.E01/Documents and Settings/Administrator/My Documents/uni cw/hackingstuff.doc  
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Table 11. Suspicious evidence item 2: doc file 
 
A.4.2.3				Evidence	Item	3,	4,	5,	6	and	7		
Evidence Items: Five PDF files: All PDF files were stored in ‘My Received Files’ 
folder, a default folder for MSN messenger to store received files. The file paths to 
these PDF files are: 
 
msfuture.pdf 
/img_vindaloo_.E01/Documents and Settings/Administrator/My Documents/My Received Files/msfuture.pdf  
 
defcon.pdf 
/img_vindaloo_.E01/Documents and Settings/Administrator/My Documents/My Received Files/defcon.pdf  
 
 
blackhat2006-xssploitation.pdf 
/img_vindaloo_.E01/Documents and Settings/Administrator/My Documents/My Received Files/blackhat2006-
xssploitation.pdf  
 
metasploit_prime.pdf 
/img_vindaloo_.E01/Documents and Settings/Administrator/My Documents/My Received 
Files/metasploit_prime.pdf  
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tactical_defcon2007.pdf 
/img_vindaloo_.E01/Documents and Settings/Administrator/My Documents/My Received 
Files/tactical_defcon2007.pdf  
 
 
Table 12. Suspicious evidence items 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7: five PDF files 
	
A.4.2.4				Evidence	Item	8		
Executable File – Evidence Item: Back Oriface: Using Mozilla Firefox, the suspect 
downloaded BO2K from the website ‘sourceforge’ onto the ‘Downloads’ folder.  The 
path is: /img_vindaloo_.E01/Documents	and	Settings/Administrator/My	
Documents/Downloads/bo2k_1_1_6A/BO2K_1-1_6/	
 
However, there was not enough evidence to suggest the suspect had installed this 
software on his machine; except the fact that there was a shortcut icon called ‘b2ok.lnk’ 
on his desktop to this executable program.  This tool can be deployed by cyber-
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criminals to penetrate a network. Entries of this executable file could be found in 
downloads.sqlite.  The path is: /img_vindaloo_.E01/Documents	and	Settings/Administrator/Application	Data/Mozilla/Firefox/Profiles/	
tsx7ewbx.default/downloads.sqlite	
 
Table 13. Suspicious evidence item 8: Back Oriface 
 
B2OK had been deleted.  An entry for the deletion of this software could be seen in the 
‘Recycler’.  (see section A.5.3.4) 
 
Figure 50. Entries of Bo2k found on “downloads.sqlite”  
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A.4.2.5				Evidence	Item	9		
Executable File – Evidence Item: SchedulingAgent: SchedulingAgent had been 
downloaded and installed in the ‘Installed Programs’ folder.  Analysing this application, 
it appeared that it was a Backdoor Trojan.  The full path is: 
img_vindaloo_.E01/WINNT/system32/config/software  
 
Table 14. Suspicious evidence item 9: executable file- SchedulingAgent 
	
	
	
	
	
	
			
		 343	
A.5	 Steps	Taken	
A.5.1			Preserving	Chain	of	Custody	
On 2nd March 2016 at 13:00 PM, Detective Sergeant Huw Read provided the evidence 
item, ‘hard drive image’, which was in two segments including ‘vindaloo_.E01’ and 
‘vindaloo_.E02’.  Both segments were in a folder entitled ‘iy4s703’.  The image had 
already been verified through matching MD5 [4] and SHA1 [5] checksums. 	
Figure 51. Log file of the original image 
 
The hard drive image was held by the digital forensic analyst in his securely locked 
office for 70 days while all the forensic analysis was conducted, from 2nd March 2016 
until 11th May 2016.  At no time was the evidence was transferred to other individuals, 
nor were others able to interact with it.  The evidence item was returned to Dr. Huw 
Read on 11th May 2016 at 09:00 AM. 	  
A.5.2			Preparation	for	Digital	Forensic	Analysis	
A.5.2.1				Forensic	Analysis	Workstation	Specific	Details		
The followings are the details of the workstation through which the analysis was 
conducted: 
 
• Workstation: Dell Desktop 
• Operating System: Windows 7 
• System Type: 32- bit Operating System 
• Processor [6]: Genuine Intel(R) CPU 
• RAM [7]: 2GB 
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The forensic analyst was the only user of this workstation with administrative rights: no 
others could access this machine and its resources.  To secure the workstation and its 
resources, a secure password had also been set up to prevent unauthorised access.  The 
workstation at all times was located in his office with a secure lock on the door.   	
A.5.2.2				Forensic	Software	Utilised		
A wide range of legally approved and accepted forensic tools were utilised throughout 
the Exanimation and Analysis Processes.  These included: 
 
• AccessData FTK Imager 3.12 and FTK 4 
• Autopsy 3.0.4 
• Scalpel and Photerec Version 6.13 
• LiveView 
• VMware Player 
• API monitors and rifiuti 
• Virustotal (online malware checking tool) 
 
A.5.2.3				Master	Copy	and	Working	Copy		
Before starting the analysis, to maintain evidential integrity, two forensic sound copies 
of folder ‘iy4s703’ were made.  The first, ‘Master Copy’, was a back-up made in case of 
corruption or damage.  The second copied, ‘09031324-BOLtd-Vindaloo-Hacking’, was 
the copy on which the Examination and Analysis Processes were conducted.  The 
original copy folder ‘iy4s703’ was stored in a previously sterilized external hard drive 
in the investigator’s secure office. 	
A.5.2.4				Image	Verification		
To maintain evidential integrity and ensure that the original hard drive image had not 
been modified, the image was again verified using FTK Imager 3.1.2. 
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Figure 52. Original given HD image verified again through MD5 and SHA1 checksums  	
A.5.2.5				Converting	Image	to	the	Raw	Format		
The original image with ‘EnCase-E01’ file format was converted to a ‘Raw’ format to 
be able to interact with the image dynamically using ‘LiveView’ as well as being able to 
run ‘data carving’ on the image.  Using FTK Imager 3.1.2, the copy of the original 
vindaloo image was first brought to the FTK Imager by adding it as an evidence item; 
and then to convert the image, the image was exported as a ‘Raw’ file.  Using FTK 
imager 3.1.2, the ‘Raw’ image was verified through corresponding MD5 and SHA1 
checksums. 
 
Figure 53. Raw image format verified through corresponding MD5 and SHA1 checksums 	  
A.5.2.6				Case	Creation	
To analyse the hard drive image a case entitled ‘09031324-BOLtd-Vindallo-Hacking’ 
was built within both software FTK 4 and Autopsy 3.0.4.  For accuracy purposes and to 
ensure that the same results could be achieved by different forensic tools, two different 
analysis tools were used.  
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A.5.3			Digital	Forensic	Examination	and	Analysis	
This section details the investigation methodologies and additional software deployed to 
carry out the examination and analysis of the hard drive image (working copy). 
 
A.5.3.1				Virtualisation	and	API	Monitor	
VMware player running Windows XP guest was utilised to examine programs 
suspected of being malware in a ‘controlled environment’.  Using the ‘snapshot’ feature 
within the virtual machine allowed the restoration of the investigator’s contaminated 
virtual machine.  Moreover, API Monitors including ‘Curprocess’, ‘Windump’ and 
‘Kakeewar’ were installed on the virtual machine to monitor the process of the 
suspicious programs.   Below are the programs analysed and the findings: 
 
Back	Oriface	
Before bringing Back Oriface to the virtual machine, a scan was run on the program 
using Avast local anti-virus.  Avast marked the program as a Trojan and blocked it from 
running on the investigative machine.  However, after bringing it to the VMware, the 
B2OK would not run, so it was not possible to monitor its process. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 54. Avast anti-virus classifying B2OK as a Trojan program and blocking its opening  	
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Dxdiag.exe	
The ‘dxdiag.exe’ was examined inside VMware Player and found to be spyware, by 
interrogating the running process of the application via the installed API tools and 
finding the calls being made to the Guest Windows XP.  The file path is: 
WINNT/system32/dllcache/dxdiag.exe  
 
Figure 55. The ‘dxdiag.exe’ examined inside VMware Player and found to be spyware 	
A.5.3.2				Online	Malware	Checking	Tool	
‘VirusTotal’ was deployed to determine whether certain executable files were malware.  
To scan a suspicious executable file, the program was exported to the investigator’s 
desktop and then, using ‘VirusTotal’, was browsed and scanned.  For example, B2OK 
was scanned and marked as Trojan, with a quite high detection ratio of 21 out of 46. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 56. B2OK file browsed and scanned using VirusTotal 
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Figure 57. The result of the scan showing B2OK as a Trojan program with high detection ratio 
 
A.5.3.3				Live	View	
Live View was used to enable interaction with the image.  To boot the image from Live 
View and mount it as a virtual hard drive, I firstly converted the provided image in 
‘E01’ format to ‘Raw’ format (see A.5.2.5), then installed Live View with additional 
components including VMware Server and Java.  This enabled me to examine the hard 
drive image as if I was the suspect browsing through the directories.  Interacting with 
the ‘Raw’ image in Live View confirmed those items of evidence found from FTK 4 
and Autopsy 3.0.4. 
 
A.5.3.4				Recycler	
Within the Recycler, MAC times were looked at.  Times were in GMT and since the 
suspect was resident in South Wales, no conversion was necessary.  The ‘Recycler’ 
contained 8 deleted files.  All MAC activities regarding the deleted files happened 
between 15th and 26th November 2008.   
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Figure 58. The deleted files in the recycler 
 
Once placed in the ‘Recycler’, a file is renamed and retained until further instruction.  
As the above figure shows, the file names changed after the suspect moved them.  Older 
versions of Windows OS assigned the format “DC#.XXX” to such files.  ‘DC’ is the 
standard Windows given to deleted files, the numbers are the integer numbers allocated 
in the order files were received and ‘XXX’ is the original file extension.  Although, as 
discussed in A.4.2.3, there was not enough evidence to prove that suspect had installed 
B2OK, this analysis confirms its deletion.  The B2OK program, originally a zipped 
folder, was renamed ‘DC3.zip’ and placed in the ‘Recycler’ before the confiscation of 
the computer. 
 
Figure 59. DC3.zip pointing to the previously downloaded B2OK program 
 
However, given that the suspect had good IT skills, other files might have been 
permanently deleted by holding down the ‘Shift Key’ while deleting files to by-pass the 
‘Recycler’ or by deleting them from the ‘Recycler’ directly.  This required an analysis 
of whether any stored information concerning the assumed deleted files could be found 
in their original states.  Being an old version of Windows OS, the ‘Recycler’ had a 
		 350	
master database holding all of the information entitled ‘Info2’ discussed in the next 
section. 
 
A.5.3.5				rifiuti	–	INFO	2	
Although a deleted file immediately appears in the ‘Recycler’, in the background the 
full path and file name are retained in a hidden file entitled ‘Info2’.  Two Info2 files 
were located, both pointing to the ‘S-1-5-21-1715567821-1682526488-1957994488-
500’ folder placed in the ‘Recycler’.  The paths to these two files are: 
 
/img_vindaloo_.E01/RECYCLER/S-1-5-21-1715567821-1682526488-1957994488-500/INFO2  
/img_vindaloo_.E01/RECYCLER/S-1-5-21-1715567821-1682526488-1957994488-500/INFO2		
 
Figure 60. The paths to the INFO files: the INFO2 pointing to the “Recycler” deleted folder 
 
A special tool ‘rifiuti2’ was then used to examine this INFO2.  The INFO2, exported 
from FTK4, was copied to the ‘rifiuti2’ folder and the command ‘rifiuti INFO2’ was 
executed.  No additional information was found. 
 
Figure 61. Analysis of “INFO2” in “rifiuti” revealing no further information 
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A.5.3.6				Search	Function	–	Keyword	Searches	
The ‘Search’ function in FTK was frequently utilised to speed up the location of files 
which could be evidence items.  As it was not clear where on the hard drive image 
certain files could be found, ‘Index Search’ was used more than ‘Live Search’ as it 
suggests similar hit results for search terms.  Evidence items 4 ‘Bo_System.lnk’ and 9 
“hackingstuff” (sub-sections A.4.1.4 and A.4.2.2) were found through ‘Index Search’.  
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A.6	 Timeline	of	Important	Events	
Having conducted the Examination and Analysis Processes, I proceeded to create a 
concise timeline of important events associated with the case being investigated.  This 
was to help to communicate this information more clearly.  This section represents the 
timelines of various important events pertaining to the case.  Due to the size of an A4 
sheet, the timeline of a particular event might run through multiple figures.  
 
A.6.1				Timeline	of	Items	of	Evidence	
Figure 62. Timeline of items of evidence  
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A.6.2				Timeline	of	Web	History	and	Downloads	
Figure 63. Timeline of web history and downloads  
 
A.6.3				Timeline	of	Installed	Programs	
	
Figure 64. Timeline of installed programs 
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A.7	 Conclusions	
It appears that the suspect did penetrate the company’s network, as the discovered 
Evidence Items 1 (email saved as a text file) and 2 (design of Circuit Boards) were 
confidential documents belonging to BOLtd, and he would have had to penetrate the 
network to acquire them.  I do not regard as valid the potential counter-argument that a 
certain type of Trojan could have penetrated the network security and placed them on 
the suspect’s system indirectly.  There are two reasons to support the conclusion that the 
items of evidence were directly and consciously placed on the suspect’s machine.  
Firstly, after identifying different types of Trojans on the suspect’s system, using 
different tools such as Virtualisation, API monitors, Anti-Virus and an online tool, they 
were analysed.  There was no evidence of any Trojan able to carry out such a 
penetration.  Secondly, suspicious evidence items were found suggesting that the user 
was actively and consciously attempting to learn how to hack into a network.  For 
example, he browsed and bookmarked questionable websites detailing network 
penetration techniques.  The web browsing history further confirms nefarious intent.  
For example, there are several conversations with a friend through Windows Live 
Messenger, with discussions about possible methods of network hacking.  The suspect’s 
friend then sent five PDF files containing similar information.  Similarly, based on a 
recovered word document appearing to be an assignment concerning hacking methods, 
the suspect seemed to have extensively researched the subject, acquiring knowing of 
network penetration techniques.  Based on the findings, it appears that the suspect had 
used WinSCP to transfer unauthorised files from BOLtd Company.  The forensic 
analysis of the hard drive image was repeated to ensure that the same results could be 
achieved for accuracy purposes.  Someone studying a course in network security or 
computer forensics could have used his knowledge to destroy or hide other evidence 
items not recovered in this investigation.  It may be that such an individual overlooked 
the deletion of the incriminating items of evidence that were found, or was too pressed 
for time to be able to delete them all. 
 
Declaration: In arriving at the above conclusions, I made all the enquiries which I 
strongly felt were appropriate.  I can testify that no matters of significance which I deem 
relevant have been withheld from the panel. 
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Appendix	A1.	Glossary	of	Terms	
[1] PC Board: a thin board comprising of fibreglass and including electrical wires 
which connect the central processor to other components. 
 
[2] Hard Drive Image: a complete copy of the hard drive contents. 
 
[3] Back Orifice: a tool allowing system administrators to control a computer from a 
remote location. 
 
[4] MD5: an algorithm used to verify data integrity through the creation of a 128-bit 
message digest from data input that is claimed to be as unique to that specific data as a 
fingerprint is to an individual. 
 
[5] SHA1: a SHA-1 sum is a calculation done on a file that produces a unique result.  It 
is used to ensure the file hasn't been tampered with. 
 
[6] Processor: the computer’s brain, which tells the computer what to do and when. 
 
[7] RAM: providing space for a computer to read and write data to be accessed by the 
CPU, RAM is volatile, so data stored stays there only whilst the computer is running.   
 
[8] Data Carving: a method to recover deleted files. 
 
[9] Index.dat: hidden files within a computer containing traces of websites visited. 
 
[10] Log File: It keeps record of all of the a particular server‘s activities.  
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Appendix	A2.	Case	Documents	
Table 15. Evidence record document 
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Table 16. Hard drive image document 
	
 
Table 17. Job request document 
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Appendix	B.	 Final	Version	of	the	Proposed	Model	
B.1	 The	CDFIPM’s	Abstract	Representation	
	
Figure 65. Final version of the CDFIPM’s abstract representation  
	
M
ai
nt
ai
n	
a	
D
et
ai
le
d	
D
oc
um
en
ta
ti
on
	
O
bt
ai
n	
an
d	
Ad
he
re
	to
	A
ut
ho
ri
sa
tio
n	
	
Pr
es
er
ve
	D
ig
it
al
	a
nd
	P
hy
si
ca
l		
Ev
id
en
ce
	
Pr
es
er
ve
	C
ha
in
	o
f	C
us
to
dy
	
M
an
ag
e	
In
fo
rm
at
io
n	
Fl
ow
	
Concurrent	
Processes	Class	
M
ai
nt
ai
n	
a	
D
et
ai
le
d	
Ca
se
	M
an
ag
em
en
t	
In
te
ra
ct
	w
ith
	P
hy
si
ca
l	I
nv
es
ti
ga
tio
n	
Pr
ep
ar
e	
an
d	
Te
st
	T
oo
ls
	a
nd
	T
ec
hn
iq
ue
s	
Ad
dr
es
s	S
af
et
y	
Is
su
es
	
Pe
rf
or
m
	R
is
k	
As
se
ss
m
en
t	
Readiness	Process	Class		
Acquisitive	
Processes	Class	
First	Response	
Acquisition	and	Collection	
Investigative	
Processes	Class	
Examination	
Analysis	
	Interpretation		
Reporting	
Presentation	
Investigation	Closure	
Future	Readiness	Process	Class	
Initialization		
Processes	Class	
Incident	Detection	
Planning	
Preparation	
Intelligence	Gathering	
	Event	Reconstruction		
		 359	
B.2	 The	CDFIPM’s	UML	Activity	Diagrams	
	
Figure 66. Final version of the Readiness, Incident Detection and Intelligence Gathering Processes 											
Readiness	
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1- Type of incident 
2- Scope of the incident 
3- Severity of the incident 
Reduction of 
false alarm 
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Figure 67. Final version of the Planning and Preparation Processes 
Planning	
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Figure 68. Final version of the First Response Process 
Document the scene. 
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accessing the device. 
Search. 
Identify. 
 
- Determine locations for search. 
- Search the crime scene. 
- Identify technical issues. 
- Address specifics relating to 
hardware and software. 
- Determine the combination of    
offsite and onsite data acquisition. 
- Determine devices for removal. 
 
Go/input to the 
Acquisition and 
Collection Process. 
 
		 362	
	
Figure 69. Final version of the Acquisition and Collection Process 
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Figure 70. Final version of the Examination, Analysis, Interpretation, Event Reconstruction and 
Reporting Processes 	
Examination	
Output from the 
Acquisition and 
Collection Process. 
Survey digital crime 
scene. 
Examine  
acquired data. 
Harvest acquired 
data. 
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data. 
Identify digital 
evidence. 
Classify digital 
evidence. 
Organise digital 
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hypothesis?   
Event	Reconstruction	
Review investigation 
results. 
Test the review results 
against the original 
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Backtrack to the Survey Digital Crime 
Scene Phase in the Examination Process. 
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Reporting	
Produce the investigation report. 
Go/input to the 
Presentation Process. 
The outcome of the 
Analysis and Event 
Reconstruction Processes 
 	
Analysis	
Analyse digital 
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Re-analyse digital 
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Attribute. 
Develop a hypothesis. 
Interpretation	
Interpret analysis results. Organise the interpreted evidence. 
1- Compare. 
2- Prioritize digital 
evidence artefact. 	Describe facts found during the Analysis Process. 	
Classify the interpreted 
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Act upon any areas 
identified.. 
Evaluate analysis 
results. 
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Figure 71. Final version of the Presentation, Investigation Closure and Future Readiness Processes 	
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